胎儿的准人格地位及其人格利益保护

胎儿是一种人类生命,但又不是人;其不具有现行法规定的民事权利能力,但又必须享受一些权益的法律保护。对于胎儿的人格地位,民法理论素有争议。胎儿属于准法律人格者。准法律人格即非完全法律人格者亦非完全无法律人格者。它是法律立足于胎儿的生命特质、胎儿保护的价值理念以及民法人格制度的立法逻辑所作出的人格定位。准法律人格者享有不同于自然人的特殊的人格利益及其权益保护规则。     

The legal status of the fetus: an international review

The article examines the way that courts and legislatures in the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada and Australia have answered questions regarding the legal status of a fetus. These questions have arisen in a variety of legal situations: the article deals with succession, criminal, child protection and negligence law. The conclusion offered is that a fetus has a value and an existence that the law should recognise. This does not mean, however, that in all circumstances the law should protect the interests of the fetus. Law-makers will respond differently to claims made on behalf of a fetus, depending on the context. The fetus does not have a uniform value or character in the eyes of the law. The law makes choices as to the situations in which it will take account of actual or threatened antenatal harm.     

论胎儿在我国未来民法典中的民事主体地位

随着生命科学时代的到来,胎儿及其法律保护将成为21世纪的“时代课题”。胎儿是生命的初始阶段,胎儿生长发育直接关系着人类的生命质量和一国的国民素质。因此,自罗马法以来,各国都相应立法保护胎儿的利益,但在我国法律几乎是一片空白,本文试从民法视角思考胎儿的利益保护问题,认为未来的民事立法应当赋予胎儿民事主体地位。     

The pregnant woman and the good Samaritan: can a woman have a duty to undergo a caesarean section?

Although a pregnant woman can now refuse any medical treatment needed by the fetus, the Court of Appeal has acknowledged that ethical dilemmas remain, adverting to the inappropriateness of legal compulsion of presumed moral duties in this context. This leaves the impression of an uncomfortable split between the ethics and the law. The notion of a pregnant woman refusing medical treatment needed by the fetus is troubling and it helps little simply to assert that she has a legal right to do so. At the same time, the idea that a pregnant woman fails in her moral duty unless she accepts any recommended treatment or surgery--however great the burden--is also not without difficulty. This article seeks to find a way between these two somewhat polarized positions by arguing that, instead of being a question primarily about whether legally to enforce moral obligations, the 'maternal-fetal conflict' begins with previously unrecognized difficulties in determining when a woman's prima facie moral rights invoked in the treatment context should 'give way' to the interests of the fetus. This difficulty is mirrored within the law. Thus, how can we tell when a pregnant woman has the moral or legal duty to submit to a caesarean section? Seen in this way, the conflict is a problem which lies at the interface between moral and legal rights and duties, showing that there are important conceptual links between the ethics and the law. Against this background, this article explores the limits of a pregnant woman's right to bodily integrity by focusing upon the idea of her moral duty to aid the fetus through her body. Here we find difficulties in determining the existence and extent of this somewhat extraordinary duty. Such a duty is contrasted with both negative and positive duties toward others in the course of 'general conduct.' Attention to the social context of pregnancy and the refusal of treatment within this is also instructive. Overall, the purpose is to foster understanding and acceptance of the current legal position.     

Life and death before birth: 4D ultrasound and the shifting frontiers of the abortion debate

The development of 4D ultrasound technology has democratised fetal imagery by offering direct visual access to realistic images of the fetus in utero. These images, which purport to show a responsive being capable of complex behaviour, have renewed debate about the personhood of the fetus and the adequacy of current abortion regulation. This article considers recent abortion law reform initiatives in the United Kingdom and the United States and observes two shifts in the frontiers of these debates. The first concerns a shift from viability to sentience as a criterion of legal significance. The second concerns a shift toward constructing abortion in terms of feticide as distinct from the termination of pregnancy. Both strategies seek to deploy morphological similarities between the sentient fetus and newborn baby as a basis for extending law's dominion over the fetus.     

The juridical status of the fetus: a proposal for legal protection of the unborn

This article investigates the juridical status of the fetus. It assesses what this status should be in the light of recent developments in case law, legislation, medicine, and technology (particularly in vitro fertilization). The article is presented in 5 sections: Section 1 deals with the supreme court's landmark decision in Roe vs. Wade, which relied on biological stages of fetal development rather than philosophical determination of when life begins. Section 2 examines the historical reliance on birth as the point at which legal protection vests in the developing human. Section 3 compares fetuses with newborn children, identifying relevant similarities and differences. Section 4 studies whether the fetus at all stages of development should have the same protection (the author concludes they should not). Section 5 examines the practical implications of choosing viability as a developmental stage of special significance for legal protection.     

部分权利能力制度的构建

局限于19世纪的哲学认识,权利能力仅被赋予自然人和法人,其他人和组织形态的权利能力被忽略。因而,当迫切需要法律对这些人和组织予以调整时,传统权利能力的规定成为不可逾越的体系障碍,必须通过法律续造的方法构建部分权利能力制度。事实上,民法关于权利能力制度的构造以及立法上的一些规定已经为部分权利能力的构建提供了坚实的理论基础和立法例支撑。部分权利能力是在部分而非全部的民事法律关系中作为民事权利享有者和义务承担者的能力,它通过考察自然人和法人以外的人和组织的人格状态和特定法律关系的价值和目的来认定。部分权利能力是一个开放的概念,它不但包括胎儿、死者与合伙的部分权利能力,还包括其他一些人和组织的部分权利能力。     

"Pro-life" absolutes, feminist challenges: the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law 1986-1992

This article asks how Irish abortion law developed to the point of stopping a young pregnant rape victim from travelling abroad to have an abortion in 1992 (Attorney General v.X). The author argues that this case, which ultimately saw the Irish Supreme Court overturn that decision and recognize the young woman's right to abortion, was the last chapter of the fundamentalist narrative of Irish abortion law. The feminist critique of that law needs to consider its particular fundamentalist aspects in order to clarify the obstacles posed to the struggle for Irish women's reproductive freedom. The author argues that a fundamentalist narrative ordered the post-colonial and patriarchal conditions of Irish society so as to call for the legal recognition of an absolute right to life of the "unborn." The Supreme Court's interpretation of the constitutional right to life of the fetus in three cases during the 1980s is evidence that Irish abortion law was constructed through a fundamentalist narrative until that narrative was rejected in the Supreme Court decision in Attorney General v. X.     

The case of abortion

Abortion as an issue is tried in a courtroom situation. The followi ng questions are dealt with: 1) At what point in the gestation process is the fetus recognized to be a human being and accorded the protection of a human being? and 2) Does a woman have a right to abort her pregnancy? Witnesses present evidence and viewpoints from the following disciplines: law, religion, biology, history, legal history, and medicine. The advocate for abortion focuses on a woman's right to privacy and to control over her own body. The opponent of abortion emph asizes the sacredness of life.     

法理即法律原理之解说

自清末民初以来,将法理解说为法律原理就成为法学界的通例,但其界定方式则有四种:一是径直以法律原理定位法理;二是将法律原理、法律原则并列来定位法理;三是将法理视为由法律原理推导出的法律一般原则;四是认为法理是指法律原则,但包括法律原理在内。法理和法律原理的存在是一种客观的必然:世上的万事万物都应有其存在和运行的原理,法律自然也不例外;法律作为人类的伟大创造,自身即蕴含着追求正义等法律价值的法理;法律的价值观念虽因时代、地区的不同而会有所差异,但其中的基础法理却不受时空影响;对法律的分析和研究舍法理之外别无他途。立足于已有的研究成果,可将法理界定为"在综合各种法律现象的基础上,由学者所抽象并为社会所认同的有关法律基础、法律根据、法律判准、法律渊源的基础性、普遍性原理"。同时,法理与自然规律、社会价值、内存于法典和单行法律中的法律原则以及事理、情理等存在明显的差异,不可混淆。     

税收法律行为初论

与税收法律关系同样都为税法学的基本范畴 ,但税收法律行为的研究在传统税法学理论中却付之阙如 ,本文即对此作出了探索性的研究。本文首先界定了税收法律行为的概念 ,并确定了其较为重要的种类划分 ;然后 ,通过对税收法律行为与行政法律行为以及私法法律行为之间关系的分析 ,明确了税收法律行为的公、私法交融的性质特征 ,并着重以契约行为为例加以进一步的说明 ;最终 ,将税收法律行为与税法上的事实行为一起 ,初步构建了税法上行为的体系。     

围绕“人格”问题的法理论辩

"人格"问题在法学与法律上都是个众说纷纭的概念,由此也引起学界对其意义、范围以及与其它概念相区别的争论。诸如"人格的概念在法律上是否必需?","人格概念是否仅存在于私法制度之中?","人格"的概念是否与"法律主体"、"权利能力"的内涵相同?……等等,都常常引起人们的关注。作为法学、法律上的一个基础概念,人格有其存在的特殊意义,它既在私法上成为法律主体建构的基石,也在公法上为人的平等提供了依据。同时,人格既不等同于法律主体,也不类似于权利能力,而是法学、法律上具有独特内涵的专门范畴。     

习惯,还是习惯法：习惯在法律体系中形态研究

习惯、习惯法与民间法是当今法学界常用的三个不同概念,用来分别指称不同的规范范畴。习惯是法律的重要渊源,不管在来源与形式上,是不可否认的事实。习惯法作为一个具有特殊意义的概念,在人类法律史上的存在却具有特殊的时代性与价值意义。中国古代对少数民族固有法与习惯,中原汉人民间各类具有规范性作用的＂俗＂并不用习惯法来指称,而是用＂刑＂、＂法＂、＂例＂和＂俗＂等。习惯在法律体系中成为法律的路径有二种：概括性承认习惯在特定条件下成为法律适用时的依据和把习惯作为立法来源,写入正式的法律,上升为成文法。习惯法在法律体系结构中有两种模式：法律与习惯法并存和特定法律适用中习惯成为特定案件与事件的依据而成为习惯法。     

法律方法与几个相关概念的比较

在我国法学研究中,法律方法、法学研究方法、法学方法论、法律方法论等概念经常被混淆。文章通过比较法律方法与法学研究方法、法律方法与美国的法律方法课程、法律方法与法学方法论(法律方法论)等概念及其所对应的研究领域,阐明我国的法律方法研究,与世界各国法学界与法律界所关注的法律方法,都是围绕法律人实施法律的工作技艺与思想方法而展开的,重点是研究和探讨法律实施中的各种有效且有益的具体制度与思想方式,这一特点决定了它不同于更为宏观的法学研究方法与法学方法论(法律方法论);同时,由于我国开展法律方法研究迫切需要解决的是与我国法律实施相关的问题,因此,我国的特殊性,决定了我国有关法律方法的研究,主要是针对我国法治建设所面临的具体问题,故而,又不同于美国的法律方法课程。正是在与相关概念的区别中,展现出法律方法研究独特的价值。     

中华法系中“礼”“律”关系之辨正——质疑中国法律史研究中的某些“定论”

"中华法系"是在近代比较法研究中出现的概念,这个法系的核心价值观与根本制度是礼。但长期以来,学界在研究中将律作为中华法系的主干,而将礼束之高阁。有关礼的论述笼统而缺乏细致与具体,对礼在中华法系中的地位和作用认识严重不足。正是这种几乎将礼摒弃在法研究领域之外的做法,使我们对中华法系产生了一系列误解。比如将"重刑轻民"、"以刑为主"归纳为中华法系的特点等等。在中华法系的制度构成中,律只是各种法律中的"一端",其地位与作用都远远不能与礼相提并论。但律在中华法系中确实又有其特殊性,这就是在礼的指导下,"律义"经历了一个由法而儒的演变过程。但这个过程恰恰证明了,在中华法系中占据主导与主流地位的是礼,而不是律。     

我国刑法中管理秩序法益还原为实体性法益之提倡

当前我国刑法理论往往将行政犯的法益界定为管理秩序(制度)法益,但是对于这一法益的界定,要么语焉不详、要么将其界定为抽象的行政管理秩序(制度),如此模糊的界定,使管理秩序法益日益沦为"口袋法益"。产生这一问题的根本原因在于误认为所有行政法益均可以在达到一定量的情况下上升为刑事法益,加之没有区分刑法法益与规范保护目的,导致单纯的行政管理秩序混入刑法法益之中。应将前置法秩序和单纯行政管理秩序这两个行政法益从当前刑法法益中驱逐出去,根据法秩序统一原理借助前置法将适格的刑法管理秩序法益还原为实体性法益。     

个体主义方法论和我国法人制度

私法自治是民法的理念,决定了民法理论体系的构建和制度生成。民法的理念决定了民法理论体系的立场是个人主义。私法中所坚持的是个人主义立场,因此决定了个体主义方法论是民法的基本研究方法。自然人与法人是最重要的民事主体类型,是民事主体制度的重要内容。法人是一个组织,但其行为需要由法人机关实施,因此如何合理设计法人法律制度,促使法人内部团体意志有效形成并通过法人机关实现,与第三人实施法律行为参与法律交往,实现法人的利益,同时能够有效约束法人机关,防止其利用代表权谋取私利损害法人的利益,对促进民法体系的完善与成熟,意义重大。本文从个体主义方法论的视角对我国《民法通则》中有关法人人格、法人分类、法人机关等法律制度进行评析并提出完善建议。     

论作为"制度"的法学院

法律职业为限制性的职业,目前两大法系主要国家都在制度上将法学院教育作为进入法律职业的第一道门槛;法律的技艺性、智识性和一定的神秘性及其规范特征决定了法律职业必须具备共同的职业素养,凭借法学教授、法学图书资科和法学院的社区生活三要件,制度性法学院而非仅仅作为场所的法学院培育这些素养并促使法律职业共同体形成。我国现实呼唤在制度上确立法学院教育的门槛地位,建设胜任于培育法律人的制度性法学院。     

经济法律责任独立性探讨

对法律责任划分标准的正确理解,是认识经济法律责任独立存在的前提条件。经济法律责任是以法律责任的部 门法性质为标准对法律责任进行分类的结果,且经济法律责任具有其独特性。独立的经济法律责任体制有利于 责权利效相统一原则的实现;更能体现经济法的"社会本位"性;充分发挥经济法作为独立部门法的作用;促进经 济法主体守法和执法。构建时,必须遵循经济法自身体系要求,体现经济法律责任自身特色,形式上可以与其他 部门法形式相交叉,可通过经济法中的民事责任、经济法中的行政责任、经济法中的刑事责任、经济法中的经济责 任的方式来实现。     

Legal Socialization of Children and Adolescents

Research on children and the law has recently renewed its focus on the development of children's ties to law and legal actors. We identify the developmental process through which these relations develop as legal socialization, a process that unfolds during childhood and adolescence as part of a vector of developmental capital that promotes compliance with the law and cooperation with legal actors. In this paper, we show that ties to the law and perceptions of law and legal actors among children and adolescents change over time and age. We show that neighborhood contexts and experiences with legal actors shape the outcomes of legal socialization. Children report lower ratings of legitimacy of the law and greater legal cynicism when they view interactions with legal actors as unfair and harsh. We show that perceived legitimacy of law and legal authorities shapes compliance with the law, and that these effects covary with social contexts including neighborhood. We identify neighborhood differences in this relationship that reflect differential experiences of children with criminal justice authorities and other social control agents. The results suggest that legal actors may play a role in socialization processes that lead to compliance with or rejection of legal and social norms. An erratum to this article is available at .