How the World Trade Organization shapes regulatory governance

The World Trade Organization (WTO) arguably shapes regulatory governance in more countries to a greater extent than any other international organization. This article provides a new framework for assessing the broader transnational regulatory implications of the WTO as part of a transnational legal order (TLO) in terms of four dimensions of regulatory change that permeate the state: (i) changes in the boundary between the market and the state (involving concomitantly market liberalization and growth of the administrative state); (ii) changes in the relative authority of institutions within the state (promoting bureaucratized and judicialized governance); (iii) changes in professional expertise engaging with state regulation (such as the role of lawyers); and (iv) changes in normative frames and accountability mechanisms for national regulation (which are trade liberal and transnational in scope). In practice, these four dimensions of change interact and build on each other. The article presents what we know to date and a framework for conducting further study of such transnational legal ordering.     

Redistribution in a political union: The case of the EU

A key function of centralized budgets in federal and political unions is to act as an equalizing mechanism to support economic and social cohesion. This is also the case with the European Union's (EU) budget, which operates as a redistributive mechanism that counteracts the cross-national and cross-regional inequalities created by the single market. Despite the limits on cross-national redistribution imposed by a centrifugal system of representation, the net fiscal position of member states – what they pay to the EU budget minus what they receive from it – is very diverse and has changed quite remarkably over the last decades. In this paper, we investigate how and why the net fiscal position of each member state toward the rest of the EU changes over time. We develop a novel panel dataset (1979–2014) to study how key national and EU-level political and economic variables affect the EU redistributive dynamics. We find that redistribution via the EU budget primarily targets developments in inequality within EU member states, and that an increase in domestic unemployment may also improve the country's fiscal balance. Moreover, we find that voting power in the Council is unrelated to a more positive fiscal balance. However, we find that governments with a centre-right profile are in general more successful in improving their redistributive position vis-à-vis the other member states. This may create a problem of budgetary ‘rent extraction’.     

Institutional reform and public attitudes toward EU decision making

In the face of the discourse about the democratic deficit and declining public support for the European Union (EU), institutionalist scholars have examined the roles of institutions in EU decision making and in particular the implications of the empowered European Parliament. Almost in isolation from this literature, prior research on public attitudes toward the EU has largely adopted utilitarian, identity and informational accounts that focus on individual-level attributes. By combining the insights from the institutional and behavioural literature, this article reports on a novel cross-national conjoint experiment designed to investigate multidimensionality of public attitudes by taking into account the specific roles of institutions and distinct stages in EU decision making. Analysing data from a large-scale experimental survey in 13 EU member states, the findings demonstrate how and to what extent the institutional design of EU decision making shapes public support. In particular, the study finds a general pattern of public consensus about preferred institutional reform regarding powers of proposal, adoption and voting among European citizens in different countries, but notable dissent about sanctioning powers. The results show that utilitarian and partisan considerations matter primarily for the sanctioning dimension in which many respondents in Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Sweden prefer national courts to the Court of Justice of the EU.     

Regulating public procurement in Brazil,India, and China: Toward the regulatory-developmental state

Since the 1990s, emerging economies such as Brazil, India, and China have adopted transparency-enhancing public procurement regulations in line with international norms. Yet they have hesitated to join the World Trade Organization's legally binding Government Procurement Agreement (GPA). Based on the Special Issue framework, this article scrutinizes the underlying domestic and international determinants, and how they influence emerging countries’ positions in two overlapping international procurement regimes. In particular, reform-oriented state actors, societal pressure, and lesson-drawing from international templates have induced a strengthening of domestic procurement institutions and turned emerging countries into “promoters” of the international transparency regime. Conversely, the rising powers have remained, to varying degrees, reluctant “spoilers” of the GPA-based market access regime in order to keep policy space and use procurement for domestic development objectives. The article suggests that this regulatory-developmental layering of rule-based governance and interventionist ambitions characterizes the variegated regulatory state in emerging countries.     

Functional stakes and EU regulatory governance: temporal patterns of regulatory integration in energy and telecommunications

Abstract

One of the most fiercely debated questions about EU regulatory governance is the respective role played by functional and political factors in regulatory integration. This article contributes to this debate by focussing on the functional factor. Based on a refined conceptualisation of functional stakes, it finds that they vary across sectors, evolve over time, and that these variations are reflected in the degree of regulatory integration observed. When member states perceive regulatory integration as a solution to one of their most pressing problems of the moment, they value – and sometimes even actively push for – the delegation of regulatory powers to the EU. This argument is subject to a credibility probe based on two within-sector analyses of temporal patterns of regulatory integration in energy and telecommunications. The empirical analysis lends support to the conditioning role of the functional factor in the design of EU regulatory governance.     

Corruption and marketization: Formal and informal rules in Chinese public procurement

The relationship between market liberalization and corruption has attracted scholarly attention in recent years. Conventional wisdom holds that increased economic marketization reduces corruption. China, however, provides evidence to the contrary; corruption has grown as its market‐oriented reforms progress. This paradoxical co‐development of the market and corruption begs the intriguing questions of how corruption has survived marketization and what explains the failure of government regulation. Extending the conceptual framework of institutional theory about formal and informal rules, and using public procurement in China as an example, this article shows that formal tendering rules and regulations may be modified, circumvented, or replaced by informal ones which facilitate corruption. The article identifies four corruption schemes through which procurement actors may distort competition processes and mechanisms under the guise of formal rules. Consequently, public procurement in China displays the structural outlook of market competition, but not its essential substance.     

Politicians,regulators, and regulatory governance: The neglected sides of the story

We offer a series of reflective insights about the state and direction of studies related to the politics of regulation. Notably we argue that the field is characterized by persisting divisions between Americanists and Europeanists. Largely focused on the actions taken by political principals, the former regularly report a substantial politicization of regulatory behavior. Reflecting on recent developments in US politics however, we show that political influence could be overestimated in the United States. Symmetrically, this same influence could be underestimated by Europeanists, who for now have largely focused on regulators and agencies. This is notably suggested by a discussion of recent development in European politics, as revealed by contributions systematically measuring agency politicization in Western European democracies. On this basis, we identify some promising research questions and agendas for future studies on the politics of regulation.     

Multi-level governance in the EU and EU democracy: Democratic legitimacy,democratic accountability and transparency of the European offices of the English local authorities in Brussels

This paper seeks to examine the role and functions of the representative offices of English local authorities in Brussels by considering the democratic legitimacy (i.e. linkage to elected councillors or mayors), accountability and transparency of the office’s activities. The study demonstrates that the offices differ in their governance arrangements and funding, which has a direct impact on the approach to democratic legitimacy and accountability, noting that those offices which rely most heavily on direct funding from a single authority or a combined authority have the closest links to the authorities concerned. The transparency of the offices varies considerably, with clear distinctions between offices that are creatures of contract or where offices are an emanation of the authority concerned. The pattern here is less dependent on the pattern of funding of the office and depends more on the availability of resources and the approach adopted by the office itself.     

Divided but united: explaining nested public support for European integration

Academic and general interest in public support for European Integration is on the rise. Theoretically, the utilitarian, identity, reference, cue-taking and signalling models have been developed to explain this perplexing phenomenon. While these models have been tested, there is no comprehensive up-to-date account of how well they perform separately, relative to each other and across levels. Empirically, this study utilises a data set with 110,873 respondents from the European Social Survey. Methodologically, a multilevel model is used to address causal heterogeneity between levels. The study shows that ‘attitudes towards multiculturalism’ at the individual level and ‘corruption’ at the country level are the strongest predictors. When interacting levels within models, it is demonstrated that individual trust in the national political establishment is being moderated by the level of corruption in a country in influencing support for European integration. On this basis, two models are proposed, named the ‘saviour model’ and the ‘anti-establishment model’.     

Agenda responsiveness in the European Council: public priorities,policy problems and political attention

The existence of political responsiveness in multi-level systems like the EU remains an open question despite significant recent research on the topic. This article studies whether the European Council responds to the shifting policy priorities of European citizens. More specifically, it explores the synchronic and diachronic associations between what people consider to be the most important problems and the political attention devoted to these issues from 2003 to 2014. The economic crisis after 2008 appears to have made the ranking of public concerns and the European Council agenda more alike. However, a detailed examination of the shifts in prioritisation of single issues over time reveals little evidence for dynamic issue responsiveness. Recently the European Council has paid more attention to the issues that the public considered the most pressing problems but the convergence could possibly be driven by the intensity of the underlying policy problems.     

Technocracy,democracy, and public policy: An evaluation of public participation in retrospective regulatory review

Retrospective review of existing regulations is an increasingly common aspect of the regulatory policy cycle. As with prospective regulatory policymaking, public participation is a central feature of many retrospective review initiatives. Despite its theoretical and practical significance, participation in retrospective review has received little scholarly attention. This paper presents the first systematic assessment of participation in United States retrospective regulatory review. Utilizing content analysis of an original dataset of government documents and public input produced pursuant to Executive Orders 13563, 13579, and 13610, the paper analyzes participatory institutional design, the level and composition of participants, and participation processes. The results suggest that retrospective review participation processes largely reflected the modes of stakeholder outreach and engagement employed in prospective regulatory policymaking, but resulted in comparatively low levels of participation. Consistent with the purposes enumerated in the executive orders, participation processes facilitated information exchange and were relatively representative of and responsive to stakeholders.     

The ideal profile of the PA expert at the EU level

If public affairs management is what public affairs managers do, then there is no stable definition of the ideal profile of such a manager. There is, however, a need for this in practice. If an interest group decides to strengthen its public affairs function and to open a vacancy, what then should be the text of the profile? The question also has much academic relevance, as it invites a selection of the most important characteristics required for effectively handling and influencing a specific playing field. Below is presented the ideal profile of the public affairs expert at the level of the European Union. As the ideal is always above the reality, we suggest in addition specific training of skills and development of talents in order to bridge the gap. Copyright © 2002 Henry Stewart Publications.     

Parties are always right: the effects of party cues and policy information on attitudes towards EU issues

Abstract

This article analyses the influence that political parties exert upon citizens’ opinions about European Union issues. By measuring at the same time the content and source effects on political attitudes, the article considers the possibility that voters pay less attention to the arguments used in a political message than to its source. Results from an online survey experiment in Spain show that partisan voters use a heuristic model of processing when taking positions on an unfamiliar EU issue, even though the prevalence of the source effect is moderated by the respondent’s political sophistication and party attachment. The results also indicate that some respondents tend to pay less attention to a message’s content when the message comes from their preferred party. Such findings raise concerns about the possibility for EU issue voting to guarantee the accountability of political elites and party–voter linkages.     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Corporate interests and public affairs: organised business–government relations in EU member states

The internationalisation of economic and political affairs changes the way in which business interests are brought to bear on public policy. This is a global phenomenon but can, in particular, be observed in Europe. The construction of the European Union, the development of the Single Market and the build‐up of the policy institutions to go with it, together change business–government relations profoundly. This paper answers the question of how organised business interests relate to government agencies and political institutions. By using the example of trade associations in the Netherlands and Germany, the paper shows that, despite the internationalisation of public affairs in Europe, the national political level remains strategically important for the representation of business interests. The paper thus argues that changes in European business–government relations are institutionally embedded at both the European and the national level. The implication for future research is that much of the dynamics of economic and political internationalisation materialises within the domestic arrangements of interest politics. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Disaggregating public-private governance interactions: European Union interventions in transnational private sustainability governance

Transnational private sustainability governance, such as eco-certification, does not operate in a regulatory or jurisdictional vacuum. A public authority may intervene in private governance for various reasons, including to improve private governance's efficient functioning or to assert public regulatory primacy. This article argues that to properly understand the nature of public-private governance interactions—whether more competitive or complementary—we need to disaggregate a public authority's intervention. The article distinguishes between four features of private governance in which a public authority can intervene: standard setting, procedural aspects, supply chain signaling, and compliance incentives. Using the cases of the European Union's policies on organic agriculture and biofuels production, the article shows that public-private governance interaction dynamics vary across these private governance features as well as over time. Furthermore, the analysis highlights the importance of active lobbying by private governance actors in influencing these dynamics and the resulting policy outputs.     

Good governance and differentiated integration: Graded membership in the European Union

The study of European integration has traditionally focused on organisational growth: the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU). By contrast, this article analyses organisational differentiation, a process in which states refuse, or are being refused, full integration but find value in establishing in‐between grades of membership. It describes how the EU's system of graded membership has developed, and it explains the positioning of states in this system. The core countries of the EU set a standard of ‘good governance’. The closer European countries are to this standard, the closer their membership grade is to the core. Some countries fall short of this standard and are refused further integration by the core: their membership grade increases with better governance. Other countries refuse further integration because they outperform the standards of the core countries: their membership grade decreases as governance improves. These conjectures are corroborated in a panel analysis of European countries.     

Bypassing public procurement regulation: A study of rationality in local decisionmaking

Using private contractors through procurement is common in most public sector areas. Despite the benefits of procurement, officials are sometimes tempted to circumvent procurement regulations. The aim of this article is to examine the strategies used by local governmental decisionmakers to bypass procurement regulations and to analyze the rationality underlying these officials' actions. Interviews, court documents, municipal documents, and newspaper articles describing the actions of Swedish municipal officials concerning special transport service (STS) procurements were collected and analyzed. In a case in which rural municipalities lost regular taxi services after STS procurement, we demonstrate how decisions were driven by pressure from the public and local interest groups, making municipal officials deviate from procurement regulations in striving to secure the existence of regular taxi services. One outcome was that local businesses were given preferential treatment, violating regulations and reducing economic efficiency.     

Power transitions and the rise of the regulatory state: Global market governance in flux

This special issue examines the consequences of the ongoing power transition in the world economy for global regulatory regimes, especially the variation in rising powers' transition from rule-takers to rule-makers in global markets. This introductory article presents the analytical framework for better understanding those consequences, the Power Transition Theory of Global Economic Governance (PTT-GEG), which extends the scope of traditional power transition theory to conflict and cooperation in the international political economy and global regulatory governance. PTT-GEG emphasizes variation in the institutional strength of the regulatory state as the key conduit through which the growing market size of the emergent economies gives their governments leverage in global regulatory regimes. Whether or not a particular rising power, for a particular regulatory issue, invests its resources in building a strong regulatory state, however, is a political choice, requiring an analysis of the interplay of domestic and international politics that fuels or inhibits the creation of regulatory capacity and capability. PTT-GEG further emphasizes variation in the extent to which rising powers' substantive, policy-specific preferences diverge from the established powers' preferences as enshrined in the regulatory status quo. Divergence should not be assumed as given. Distinct combinations of these two variables yield, for each regulatory regime, distinct theoretical expectations about how the power transition in the world economy will affect global economic governance, helping us identify the conditions under which rule-takers will become regime-transforming rule-makers, regime-undermining rule-breakers, resentful rule-fakers, or regime-strengthening rule-promoters, as well as the conditions under which they remain weakly regime-supporting rule-takers.