Do Critical Citizens Foster Better Governance? A Comparative Study

Both critical citizens and governance are attracting increasing interest in political science. Strangely enough, however, the two strands of research are rarely combined. This article sheds light on the relation between governance and political criticism by focusing on Europe. The article discusses and examines whether the level of political criticism expressed by a state's citizenry correlates with or even affects the quality of governance. In contrast to the conventional ‘translation’ of criticism as discontentment, this article scrutinises ‘normative critical attentiveness’, which is explained in detail (data: International Social Survey Program 2004, module: Citizenship). Legitimate and effective governance, as measured by the World Bank indices, correlates positively with critical attentiveness: states with citizenries that regard attentiveness as a civic duty provide more legitimate and effective governance than states with less attentive citizenries. These correlations remain significant when controlled for economic development. The cause of direction is not uniform, but must be differentiated for different characteristics.     

When Can Politicians Scare Citizens Into Supporting Bad Policies?

Many people claim that politicians use fear to manipulate citizens. Using a model, we examine how select attributes of fear affect a politician's ability to scare citizens into supporting policies that they would otherwise reject. In the model, the politician can alert citizens to the presence of a threat. But his claim need not be true. How citizens respond to this claim differs from most game-theoretic models. Our representation of this response follows from research in psychology, has distinct conscious and subconscious components, and does not presume efficient processing (i.e., Bayesian updating). Our conclusions counter popular claims about when politicians will use fear to manipulate citizens. They also highlight issues (abstract, distant) and leaders (secretive) for which recent empirical findings about how fear affects politics will—and will not—generalize to other cases.     

Will More Black Cops Matter? Officer Race and Police‐Involved Homicides of Black Citizens

In response to police‐involved homicides of black citizens in Ferguson, Missouri, and elsewhere, some have suggested that more black police officers could reduce the number of these events. The authors offer an empirical test of this assertion. The literature offers conflicting expectations: some studies suggest that increased representation reduces discrimination, while others suggest that it increases discrimination. The authors reconcile these perspectives using the concept of critical mass, which leads to the expectation that an increase in black officers will reduce the number of black citizens killed in encounters with police, but only once the proportion of black officers is sufficiently large. We test this expectation in analyses of recently compiled data on police‐involved homicides in 2014 and 2015 in large U.S. cities.     

Are Some Citizens More Equal than Others? Evidence from a Field Experiment

The equal treatment of all citizens is one of the fundamental principles of good administrative practice. Nevertheless, there are growing numbers of media and scientific reports on unequal treatment by public administrations. This article examines the unequal treatment of citizens by gender and ethnic origin by means of a survey‐based field experiment in German local government. With the help of two vignettes and randomized assignment of names, responses to fake citizen requests by local governments are analyzed for speed, quality, and service orientation. The results show very limited discrimination effects. While there is no evidence for general ethnic discrimination, a more differentiated analysis indicates patterns of ethnic discrimination conditioned by gender.     

The Transparency President? The Obama Administration and Open Government

President Obama has trumpeted transparency as a major part of his agenda, promising "unprecedented" openness throughout the federal government. Although Obama benefits politically from the contrast with his predecessor's reputation for secrecy, in the long run an excessive emphasis on fishbowl governance can raise unrealistic expectations and ultimately backfire. After all, at some point transparency has its costs, such as when disclosure dampens internal deliberation or undermines privacy. The real issue, then, is how much transparency and what type. Despite its rhetoric, the Obama Administration has placed limits on transparency and will likely continue to do so. Yet members of the public and open government activists are unlikely to appreciate the need for such limits, leading to disappointment and charges of hypocrisy. It remains unclear whether Barack Obama will earn the mantle of the "transparency president"—or whether the hopes he has raised will, when unfulfilled, only reinforce public cynicism.     

Citizens,Partners or Patrons? Corporate Power and Patronage Capitalism

Abstract

The addition of new social roles in public service and civil society to large business corporations' enormous economic power and substantial political influence suggests novel but little-understood changes in the institutional relations between business, state and civil society. Sociological emphasis on the centrality of power relations in business conduct and radical diagnoses of a corporate ‘take-over’ of public and civil society institutions is contradicted by other literature which portrays corporations as socially responsible benefactors rather than all-powerful behemoths. The present analysis assesses rival emphases on power relations and normative shifts toward corporate social responsibility in the sphere of business–civil society partnerships. It argues that, in the United States and Britain, a new set of institutional relationships is emerging to fill a vacuum in tackling social and environmental problems. In this new institutional field, large corporations are taking on the role of patrons to a variety of clients amongst public and civil society organisations. This social relationship parallels similar episodes of patronage when systems of community and public welfare disintegrated during the rise of capitalism.     

Transparency and mistrust: Who or what should be made transparent?

It is increasingly recognized in public administration that the relationship between trust and transparency is not straightforward. Recently, right‐wing populists have risen to power, rejecting transparency requirements based on documents while claiming that they “hide nothing.” Clearly, existing scholarly conceptualizations are insufficient for understanding how transparency operates as a value in real‐world political contestation. An analysis of state‐ and national‐level politics in Nigeria reveals that, while always retaining a core informational component, there are multiple competing conceptions of transparency. Popular demands for transparency express a belief that not only should data be made transparent, but also the social networks in which politicians are embedded. “Transparency in people” can clash with more traditional, technocratic transparency practices centered on data. By rethinking who or what should be made transparent—data, things, or people—this article offers fresh theoretical insights on the complex politics of transparency and trust.     

What Do Corporations Owe Citizens?

Institutional investors occupy an important location in the corporate governance system in countries with high shareholding, such as the US. As these are also countries where pensions are heavily invested in equities, the pension and corporate governance systems intersect, though they are usually analyzed separately. Institutional investors could play a more active role in corporate governance, but many if not most have not done so. Public pension funds are more proactive on corporate governance transparency issues than are the privately held funds, in part because the latter have some conflict of interest between those who own the parent firm and those who invest in the funds. Overall, institutional investors in the US have fewer powers over the managers than do the UK counterparts. Debates over SEC Rule 14a-8 which would give more power to IIs reflects the views and influence of competing lobbies on each side of the battleground among shareholders, managers, and employees over the cash flow of the firm, a battleground in which pension funds are increasingly important players.

Do Citizens Tolerate Antidemocratic Statements?

Antidemocratic statements by politicians have become part of politics in several backsliding democracies. Yet, we know little about how ordinary citizens think antidemocratic statements should be dealt with. We employ conjoint experiments fielded in the United States, Germany, and Hungary to investigate the extent to which citizens think undemocratic and other controversial statements should be restricted. Specifically, we randomly assign antidemocratic statements – threatening electoral integrity directly or indirectly – along with other controversial statements to hypothetical politicians running for elections. We show that citizens wish to ban antidemocratic statements relative to generic placebo statements. Moreover, this willingness corresponds to their willingness to ban other forms of controversial statements that either represent offenses to different identity markers or induce material risks. We also find that the willingness to ban antidemocratic statements is evident across the three countries and regardless of gender, education, age, and partisanship, with only modest differences in the results between countries and subgroups. Our findings thus indicate that citizens generally care about democracy, which is good news for democracy and electoral integrity, but also that they do not care more about democracy than other fundamental values related to material costs or identity markers.     

Political Awareness and Electoral Campaigns: Maximum Effects for Minimum Citizens?

Revisionists demonstrate campaigns mobilize, educate, activate predispositions, and change minds. Attention has turned from the “minimum effects” thesis to questions about the conditions under which campaigns matter and questions about which types of people are susceptible to campaign effects. Focusing on whether campaign effects are mediated by chronic political awareness, I find that current scholarship on this question is mixed. Some find that campaigns affect the politically unaware most, some find bigger effects among more aware citizens, and some find similar effects across the awareness distribution. Noting the possibility that awareness mediates different types of campaign effects differently (e.g. priming, persuasion, or learning), Zaller’s Receive–Accept-Sample framework is consulted to develop expectations. I test the RAS generated predictions using the 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey pre/post panel. The results support the theory that awareness mediates different campaign effects differently.     

Does Agency Autonomy Foster Public Participation?

Allocation of public resources is an area in which considerations of both economic efficiency and democratic legitimacy are likely to be present. Public administrators are often blamed for being too devoted to the norms of bureaucratic ethos, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and top‐down control, and less so to the norms of democratic ethos, such as inclusiveness and bottom‐up decision making. This article examines whether managers in agencies with greater budget autonomy are more likely to include the public when allocating resources. Because participation offers an opportunity for agencies to enhance the legitimacy of their decisions, it is expected that the value of citizen input will increase with the degree of agency autonomy. Using data on the practices of citizen participation in budgeting in two state departments—transportation and environment—this study finds that agencies with a higher degree of autonomy tend to be more open to public comment than agencies with more centralized budget processes.     

Making Citizens Smart: When do Institutions Improve Unsophisticated Citizens’ Decisions?

Many scholars lament citizens’ lack of political sophistication, while others emphasize that information shortcuts can substitute for sophistication and help citizens with their political choices. In this paper, I use experiments to assess whether and under what conditions institutions can substitute for sophistication and enable even unsophisticated citizens to make informed decisions. The results of my experiments demonstrate that institutions, such as a penalty for lying or a threat of verification, can help both sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens to make more informed decisions. Further, my results suggest that institutions may, under certain conditions, level the playing field between sophisticated and unsophisticated citizens.

More Similarities or More Differences? Comparing Public and Nonprofit Managers’ Job Motivations

Existing research on career motivations tends to focus either on the difference between private and public organizations or on the difference between nonprofit and for‐profit firms. Although commonalities exist, the literature suggests that there also are many differences in what motivates public and nonprofit employees. Employing data from the National Administrative Studies Project III, this research examines how seven motivational aspects correlate with the choice between public and nonprofit employment. The authors find that managers who value advancement opportunities, a pension and retirement plan, and the ability to serve the public in their jobs are more likely to accept a job in the public sector, whereas managers who value family‐friendly policies and increased responsibility are more likely to accept a position in the nonprofit sector. Participation in volunteering is positively associated with nonprofit employment. The authors suggest a possible link between volunteering and the unique nonprofit motivation that is differentiated from public service motivation.     

‘Come together?’ Citizens and civil servants dialogue and trust

Trust is a key element in the co‐creation of solution for public problems. Working together is a gradual learning exercise that helps to shape emotions and attitudes and to create the foundations of trust. However, little is known about how institutions can promote trust. With the intention of going deeper into the subject, this paper focuses on a local experience in Spain: Madrid Escucha, a City Council initiative aimed at stimulating dialogue between officials and citizens around projects to improve city life. Three are our questions: who participate in these spaces, how the interactions are, and what advances are achieved. Based on qualitative research, empirical findings confirm a biased participation in this kind of scenarios as well as the presence of prejudices on both sides, an interaction characterised by initial idealism followed by discouragement and a possible readjustment, and a final satisfaction with the process even when results are not successful.     

Do Citizens Really Shop between Decentralised Jurisdictions? Tiebout and Internal Migration Revisited

Tiebout predicted that differences in service provision and tax rates across regions would lead citizens to migrate to their preferred jurisdiction. This central tenet of the fiscal federalism literature has rarely been explored outside the North American context. This paper delves into this gap in the literature by examining the factors that undermine Tiebout's prediction. It undertakes an international comparative analysis drawing upon recent innovations in the measurement of internal migration that facilitate country comparisons. While some of Tiebout's ideas find limited support, the overall weight of evidence suggests a weak link between internal migration and decentralisation