Climate Change Litigation,Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v. EPA

Climate change litigation is an obsessive preoccupation for many legal scholars. Three different “narratives” can be identified for why scholars find such litigation important to study: litigation is a response to institutional failure, legal reasoning holds authority, and litigation is a forum for the co‐production of facts and social orders. The nature and consequences of these narratives are considered in the context of the first U.S. Supreme Court “climate change” case—Massachusetts v. EPA (2007). This analysis has implications for both how scholars understand their expertise in this area, and how they should foster it.     

What Is Transnational Law?

Is it important to conceptualize transnational law and “map” it as a new legal field? This article suggests that to do so might help both juristic practice and sociolegal scholarship in organizing, linking, and comparing disparate but increasingly significant types of regulation. To explore the idea of transnational law is to raise basic questions about the nature of both “law” and “society” (taken as the realm law regulates). This involves radically rethinking relationships between the public and the private, between law and state, and between different sources of law and legal authority. Taking as its focus Von Daniels's The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective and Calliess and Zumbansen's Rough Consensus and Running Code (both 2010), the article considers what approaches may be most productive, and what key issues need to be addressed, to make sense of broad trends in law's extension beyond the boundaries of nation‐states.     

Open and distance learning in a New Europe*

Legal education is gradually moving away from the teaching of national law towards a more European, transnational, or even “global” way of teaching. This paper seeks to explain why an international legal education is to be preferred to a national curriculum and what this means for how law is taught and how law schools are ideally organised. The arguments for an international legal education lie in the increasing plurality of legal sources, the desire to attract students from a larger pool, and the need not only to give students a specialised professional training but also to prepare them for global citizenship. It is claimed students should be exposed to alternative ways of achieving justice, thus creating a dialogue with otherness. This can be done by a focus on the arguments behind the choices made by the relevant authorities and not on the doctrinal intricacies of national legal systems. This type of international curriculum, in which competing conceptions of justice are at the centre of attention, requires a specific teaching method. Two methods seem best suited to allow students to construct their own understanding of legal problems: problem-based learning (PBL) and the Socratic method. In addition, teaching law in an international setting forces us to think through the sequence in which the various jurisdictions come to the fore, the assessment of students and the use of teaching materials and language of instruction. Also discussed are the challenges for the law school as a whole, such as the relationship between teaching and research, the recruitment of faculty and the decreasing relevance of the traditional departmental structure.     

Deduction and Justification in the Law. The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts

Abstract. Legal terms, such as “ownership,”“contract,”“validity,”“negligence,” are used as middle terms in legal deduction. The paper distinguishes two problems regarding this use. One is the logical function of terms for deduction within a normative system. Specific problems dealt with in this connection are meaning, definition, and economy of expression. The other problem connected with middle terms is the “moulding” and possible manipulation of the meaning of legal terms, for arriving at desired conclusions in a given scheme of inference. It is indicated how the moulding of contested legal concepts, if not restricted, will obscure the ratio of legal rules. This problem is relevant, inter alia, to arguments ex analogia in the law.     

Beyond the Goods/Resources Dichotomy: Animal Labor and Trade Law

Abstract

Since its inception, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has, in a rather self-evident manner, treated animals as objects of trade: Animals must be either goods or natural resources subject to the terms and conditions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). However, broader public and legal efforts to recategorize animals from goods to “sentient beings,” which are emerging across the world, are casting serious doubt on these assumptions. Using animals’ subjectivity as a starting point, a new and bourgeoning strand of anthropological, ethical, and political studies argues that animals should properly be recognized as working subjects. Be it guide dogs, truffle hogs, logging elephants, or dairy cows—working animals, they argue, are owed wholly new legal and ethical duties. This article builds on these arguments to examine the consequences of “animal labor” for trade law: Are animals wrongly classified as commodities or resources? Is there a need and room to recognize animals as service providers under the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS)? What are the legal consequences of this proposed change? This article sets out to answer these questions and argues that recognizing animals as workers in trade law is conceptually coherent and can play a crucial role in empowering states to protect animals effectively at the international level.     

Legislative Intentions and Counterfactu-als: Or,What One Can Still Learn from Dworkin's Critique of Legal Positivism

Riggs v. Palmer has become famous since Dworkin used it to show that legal positivism is defective. The debate over the merits of Dworkin's claims is still very lively. Yet not enough attention has been paid to the fact that the content of the statute at issue in Riggs was given by the counterfactual intention of the legislature. According to arguments from legislative intent, a judicial decision is justified if it is based on the lawmaker's intention. But can legislative intentions be determined counterfactually? More generally, what are the discursive commitments undertaken by a lawyer or a judge, in an exchange of legal reasons, when using this interpretive methodology? This paper addresses these issues considering, in particular, David Lewis's “resemblance” condition and “relevant similarity” between possible worlds in the evaluation of counterfactual statements. The analysis sheds some new light on the debate on theoretical disagreements and shows that Dworkin's conception of law as an argumentative practice is not necessarily at odds with legal positivism. It rather allows us to look at it under a better light.     

The Force of International Law: Lawyers' Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s

Where does international law (IL) draw its authority from a still weakly institutionalized international scene deprived of the warrants of a state? To address this classical debate, the article draws from a case study on the social and professional structure of the “international legal community” as it emerged during the 1920s as part of the rise of multilateralism and international organizations. It focuses on the “situation of the international lawyers” of the time, starting with the multiple and often antagonistic roles they play (as legal advisers, scholars, judges, diplomats, politicians, etc.) and the variety of interests and causes they defend (states, international organizations, professional interests, etc.) in international politics. It argues this heteronomy of international lawyers helps understand the autonomization of international law. Far from being opposed to one another it has often been assumed—realism and idealism, national loyalty and international loyalty, political logic and learned logic—actually gain when analyzed as various modes of affirming a single cause—that of an international rule of law. This attention given to the “situation of international lawyers” and to the way they manage their various allegiances also accounts for the particular vision of the “International” and of “Law and Politics” relationships that are encapsulated in this emerging international corpus juris.     

More Reasons Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy

It is generally assumed, without argument, that legal theory, legal philosophy, philosophy of law, and jurisprudence all mean the same thing. This paper rejects that assumption, and in particular the assumption that jurisprudence is the same thing as legal philosophy. This assumption has recently been challenged by Roger Cotterrell in his article “Why Jurisprudence Is Not Legal Philosophy,” and I seek to build on his arguments by adding insights found in the work of Stanley Fish.     

The Regular Practice of Morality in Law

Abstract. This article examines the possibility of moral considerations and arguments serving as validity conditions of law in legal positivist theory. I argue that, despite recent attempts, this possibility has yet to be established. My argument turns on a defense of Joseph Raz's Sources Thesis, yet I do not adopt his famous “argument from authority.” Rather, I offer a renewed defense of the distinction between creation and application of law and argue that moral considerations and arguments, whether recognized in law or not, remain arguments about the modification of law.     

Is Ratnākaraśānti a gZhan stong pa?

The doctrinal position of Ratnākara?ānti (ca. 11th century) is a source of great controversy among modern scholars. As diversified as the modern understanding of Ratnākara?ānti’s doctrinal position is the traditional ways in which the gZhan stong view is defined in Tibet. This paper aims to (1) argue, with special attention paid on his presentation of the three natures, that Ratnākara?ānti defines his own doctrine as Rang bzhin gsum gyi dbu ma / *Trisvabhāva- mādhyamika in his “Core Trilogy”: the Prajñāpāramitopade?a, the Madhyamakāla?kāropade?a, and the Madhyamakāla?kārav?ttimadhyamapratipatsiddhi, (2) demonstrate, by comparing Ratnākara?ānti’s view with that of the orthodox Jo nang authors represented by Dol po pa Shes rab rgyal mtshan (1292–1361) and Tāranātha (1575–1634), that Ratnākara?ānti is arguably a gZhan stong pa in its strictest sense, and (3) problematize Brunnhölzl (Prajñāpāramitā, Indian “gzhan stong pas”, and the beginning of Tibetan gzhan stong, Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde Heft 74, 2011) and Sponberg’s (Bukkyō bunka kenkyūjo kiyō 21:97–119, 1982) classification of different accounts of the three natures in Indian, Tibetan and Chinese sources.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

The Splendors and Miseries of Constitutional Reasoning in Times of Global Crisis: A Critical Look from the Realist Perspectives of Semiotics

The European Stability Mechanism (ESM) is the rescue fund that may grant loans to struggling euro zone governments by issuing bonds, collectively by the euro zone members. The implementation of the ESM spawned a lot of legal challenges brought to higher judicial authority in Ireland, Austria, Estonia, Germany and Poland. In the fall of 2012 the ESM was subject to legal analysis in the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in the European Court of Justice. Delivering much anticipated rulings in legal challenges to the legal provisions establishing the ESM, courts avoided upsetting the complex arrangements in question by producing legal decision of direct political import and letting EU bailout measures go forward. In looking over different critical responses, we have seen an argument raised by media and legal scholars, according to which courts’ capitulation before the power of financial markets in the EMS rulings represents “a sign of judicial crisis” that marks the weakness of modern European jurisprudence. In light of their importance, we undertake a preliminary semiotic analysis of the ESM rulings of the Estonian National Court, the German Constitutional Court, and in the European Court of Justice. Our analysis aims at discerning the crucial aspects of those rulings is performed on the basis of different semiotic methodologies combined with the refined ideas of the Scandinavian analytical school of the doctrinal study of law. In traditional legal studies there seems to be a taken for granted assumption that there is one analytical way to dissect judicial reasoning of the supreme courts. This paper argues that the manner of analyzing the constitutional reasoning needs to be congruent with the particular research methodology.     

On Collective Actions. Some Remarks on the Theory of Legal Actions

In this paper the author deals with collegial judicial decisions as a form of human action. The scope is, however, limited to three questions: (1) What is the structure and the status of the general theory of action; (2) Is this theory applicable to such performative acts as judicial decisions; and finally, (3) Is it possible to speak about action in connection with collective agents such as collegial courts? The author defends the thesis that general theory of action as such is applicable to collective action, too, because the difficulty is not in the structure of that theory, or in its “individual character,” but specifically in the notion of “collective will.” This kind of “will” is epistemologically always a result of a political procedure, and speaking about the “collective will” presupposes the analysis of these procedures, because in practice they and only they formulate “collective motives,”“collective beliefs” and the like.     

FAMILY DEFINITIONS AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN CUSTODY DECISION MAKING: THE IMPORTANCE OF A CHANGING LITIGANT CONTEXT

Recent scholarship has advocated two distinct approaches to promoting the preservation of children's attachment relationships during custody disputes between their biological and nonbiological parents. Some scholars argue that legal recognition of expansive definitions of the family is the key to protecting children's attachments, while others argue that such protection is contingent upon legal recognition of children's rights. This research examines the efficacy of these competing arguments through an analysis of 75 cases decided in 21 states and the District of Columbia between 2004 and 2005. Findings suggest that judicial attention to definitions of the family is generally confined to cases involving specific types of litigants; namely, former homosexual partners, couples who utilized fertility technologies, former stepparents, and presumptive fathers. In these instances, attention to broad conceptions of the family is associated with the maintenance of children's attachment relationships. Beyond this particular context, however, judges focus almost exclusively on balancing children's interests and rights against those of their biological parents. These findings suggest that both children's rights and family definitions influence judicial decisions, but their impact is context specific. For those scholars advocating legal change, this is an important insight because it shifts the debate from an “either/or” focus to one that recognizes the importance of the litigant context in custody decision making.     

Conversational Implicatures and Legal Texts

Legal texts are often given interpretations that deviate from their literal meanings. While legal concerns often motivate these interpretations, others can be traced to linguistic phenomena. This paper argues that systematicities of language usage, captured by certain theories of conversational implicature, can sometimes explain why the meanings given to legal texts by judges differ from the literal meanings of the texts. Paul Grice's account of conversational implicature is controversial, and scholars have offered a variety of ways to conceptualize implicatures and Grice's maxims of conversation. Approaches that emphasize the systematic nature of implicatures can provide explanatory accounts of the gap between literal meaning and the meaning communicated in the text. For example, a theory of scalar implicature, a type of generalized conversational implicature, can account for the application of the interpretive principle known as ejusdem generis, which narrows the scope of “catch‐all” clauses located at the end of lists of items. Despite the availability of such theories, some scholars have argued that conversational implicatures are not applicable to legislation. The arguments, based primarily on the uniqueness of the legislative context and its noncooperative nature, though, do not establish the inapplicability of conversational implicatures to legislation.     

The Continuing Problem of the Universal to Questions of Justice: A Feminist Reading of Lars von Trier’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Dogville</Emphasis>

What are the terms of evaluation that seem relevant in deciding whether a film is feminist or anti-feminist? Which critical practices should be engaged in such an evaluation? In recent and contemporary critical feminist practices, feminist arguments are no longer based on a stable subject category of “woman” and there is no longer any particular methodology upon which feminist theorists rely. The category of “woman” has been revealed to be not an ahistorical, stable category but an effect of material and representational practices. Further, feminist methodologies have been concerned to contextualize the framing of the questions they ask, as well as their place in the methodologies they employ. In addition to the refusal of an essentialized female subject, feminists have called into question the idea that it is possible to produce a “feminist method” based on the standpoint of a female subjectivity, even where this subjectivity is admitted as a construct, arguing that this extrapolation to the general from a particular point of view produces political, and frequently racist, effects. In this essay, I consider Lars von Trier’s controversial film Dogville (2003) as a case study to explore the relation of practices of representation to questions of feminist justice. I argue that the film does a lot of good critical work in showing the ways in which certain practices of representation can be mobilized to produce a collectivity (or “sovereignty”) that is seen to emanate from “the people” and to thereby instantiate authority, while simultaneously disguising the material and political effects of its subjugation of “others.” However, in doing this work the film produces its own problematic construction of universality and particularity. Further, the film instrumentalises representations of sexual violence and subjection in order to prove its point, and as productive as these tactics are to illuminating questions of social justice, I argue that this representational practice produces effects that need to be read as anti-feminist.     

Why Methods Matter in European Legal Scholarship

Both in the United States and in Europe, there is a debate on methodology in legal research. Doctrinalists and multidisciplinarians appear to be in different camps fighting over the ‘true nature’ of legal scholarship. We wonder where this renewed attention for methodology is coming from and what is behind it. Should European legal scholars follow certain colleagues in the United States who believe that doctrinal research is dead and should we all engage in law and … research now? If not, does this imply that there is nothing wrong with mainstream European doctrinal legal scholarship? We believe the latter is not the case. Our hypothesis is that an ongoing instrumentalisation of law and legal research decreases the attention for methodology, for theory building, and for keeping enough professional distance to one's object of research. This threatens to result in a creeping process of herd behaviour, in copy pasting the methodology of judicial lawmaking to legal scholarship and in a lack of transparency and methodological justification in scholarly legal publications. What is desperately needed is more reflection on methodology and theory building in European legal scholarship.     

争论中的当代“西方马克思主义法学”

西方学者关于马克思主义法学问题的争论 ,包括两个大的方面 :一是对马克思主义法学的评价问题 ,涉及马克思主义法学的系统性、统一性和价值问题。二是对马克思主义法学中的基本问题的态度 ,包括法与经济关系的理论 ,法的阶级性理论和法的历史发展问题。当然 ,对前一类问题不仅仅是认识问题 ,也有个态度问题 ;对后一类问题也不只是态度问题 ,同样有个理解的问题。一切严肃的资产阶级法学家和“西方马克思主义者”都在这些问题上尽可能充分地表现他们的立场和观点。     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.