Falling From Grace: Nonestablished Brokerage Parties and the Weight of Predominance in Canadian Provinces and Australian States

Given the conventional meaning of party predominance—winninga majority of legislative seals in four or more consecutiveelections—all sixteen subnational political systems (SPS)in Australia and Canada have featured at least one predominantparty since the end of World War II. In Australia, no predominantparty has failed ever again to hold office, and failed to secureeven official opposition status for two consecutive elections,upon losing predominance. In Canada's central and Atlantic (CAC)provinces, only two of eleven predominant parties have failed.In Canada's four western provinces, however, three of six predominantparties have failed since governing after World War II. Severalfactors combine to produce differences among predominant partiesin Australia and Canada. When these parties engage in brokeragepolitics, and therefore lack entrenched social foundations,and where patterns of socialized party identification have beeninterrupted, the "weight of predominance" can become fatal.Upon losing power, these parties may cease to be relevant. Theworldwide proliferation of federal systems suggests that thelife-cycles of SPS as just described may become more relevantwith time.     

Testing Riker's Party-Based Theory of Federalism: The Argentine Case

This study seeks to advance our understanding of the institutionalunderpinnings of federalism by evaluating William H. Riker'sstudy of party causality. Using data from federal funds transfersin Argentina, a federation exhibiting high levels of fiscaldecentralization despite its centralized party system, it isshown that when governorships are held by opposition parties,the overall amount of federal funds transferred to provincesincreases considerably. In addition, changes in the partisancomposition of the national government are also associated withsteep increases in the share of provincial federal funds, whereas,more controversially and challenging prominent recent studiesof decentralization in Latin America, divided government atthe national level leads to centralization of intergovernmentalfunds. These findings support Riker's contention that politicalparties exercise a decisive influence over the distributionof fiscal powers between states and the national government.     

Alternate Routes to Autonomy in Federal and Quasi-Federal Systems

In late twentieth-century federal systems, provinces and stateshave sought greater autonomy because of economic neglect, distinctivenessof society and political culture, administrative inefficiency,and local efficacy. This article examines both structural andpolitical avenues to autonomy in six stable democratic federalsystems. In general, structural attempts to increase provincialor state autonomy in federal systems are found wanting. Becauseamendments to federal constitutions require extraordinary majoritysupport, they tend to centralize power. Referenda may be usedto retard centralization only under exceptional circumstances.Secession has been a successful strategy in only a small numberof cases. Political strategies, such as judicial interpretationof the constitution and conferencing, have been somewhat moreeffective; but political system characteristics impose restrictionson their use. Two types of decentralization that apply universally—devolutionand deconcentration—appear to enhance powers of subnationalunits. However, they require significant facilitating conditionson the national plane. The article calls into question the practicalvalue of structural arrangements, suggesting that alternatepolitical strategies sometimes produce more decentralized effects.     

Seat-vote curves, loyalty effects and the provincial distribution of Canadian government spending

Federal government spending in the Canadian provinces for 1962–2002 is examined with emphasis on the role of seat-vote elasticities in majoritarian electoral systems. Fixed effects regressions establish that per capita federal spending in a province increases with political competition, as measured by provincial seat-vote elasticities, and with loyalty to the federal government as measured by the degree of provincial support for the federal government. However, too much loyalty can be counter-productive because very loyal provinces are uncompetitive with low seat-vote elasticities.     

The Implications of Elections for Federalism in Iraq: Toward a Five-Region Model

For most observers, Iraq's recent elections were an importantfirst step on the road to democratic normalcy. However, threerelated outcomes—the political marginalization of SunniArabs, the electoral gains made by Shi'a religious parties,and the triumphant performance of the Kurds—render thetask of crafting Iraq's permanent constitution significantlymore problematic. In this paper, we examine the implicationsof these election results for the design of Iraq's federal system.Our focus is on the character of the subunits in any futuresystem, specifically on whether Iraq should adopt a form ofterritorial federalism based on the country's existing eighteenprovinces (as most scholars argue) or whether a form of ethnic,or "plurinational," federalism based on five regions would bebetter able to address the very significant problems createdby the election results. After assessing the relative meritsof the various proposals for a federal Iraq, we conclude thata system based on five broad regions, though not ideal, is theleast bad of the options available.     

Why Federalism Does Not Always Take Shape: the Cases of Italy and Nepal

Federalism has been discussed as a potential system of governance in many countries, but in some it has failed to take shape. This has been the case in Nepal and, to a certain extent, in Italy. In fact, in Italy the federal option was rejected at the time of Risorgimento, and constitutional reforms in the 2000s never transformed the country into a federation as desired by political actors such as the Northern League despite some decentralization. In Nepal, the 2007 interim constitution specified that the country would be federal, but the first Constituent Assembly elected to write a new constitution was unable to produce a federal map acceptable to the major political parties and the second is wrestling with the same issue. In both cases, federal structuring was attacked by political actors who argued that it could promote disunity, undermine solidarity, and possibly lead to disintegration. This article argues that the idea of federalism held by prominent political actors as promoting division and conflict played strongly against its implementation.     

From Coercion to Partnership in Federal Partial Preemption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH Act

This article examines the experiences of three important partial-preemptionprograms—the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Actof 1977 (SMCRA), the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970(OSH Act), and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of1976 (RCRA)—over the last two decades to improve our understandingof how federal-state interactions have shaped the regulatorypartnership. The evidence we gather suggests that the controlof regulatory programs has shifted over time back and forthbetween the federal government and the states. In the initialyears of these programs, what the Congress intended to be aregulatory partnership was, in effect, almost total federalpreemption of state authority. Under the Ronald Reagan administration,the opposite occurred; federal regulation in many cases becamede facto state regulation as federal officials essentially abdicatedtheir oversight responsibility. By the end of the 1980s, thefederal government began again to assert greater control overintergovernmental regulatory programs. The regulatory relationshipthat emerged is one in which the federal government and thestates share responsibility and authority for the implementationof these programs.     

Federal Factions and Federated Host Parties in Israel: Some Ideological and Structural Dimensions

A new type of party has emerged in Israel—the federatedhost party. It consists of political groups and former partieswhich have the status of factions. Formal agreements set therules of the game; hence, heavy constraints are placed on thehost party in appointments and policy. The article discussesthe emergence of federated host parties and federal factions,factors of stability and unrest in the relations of host partyand factions, and the withering away of factions. Factors whichaccount for the emergence of federal factions are: persistence,differences in size of competing parties, chain reaction syndrome,countering electoral decline, crossing the lines, and secessionbrinkmanship. Comparative implications suggest six elementswhich require further study.     

Central Governing Incapacity and the Weakness of Political Parties: Russian Democracy in Disarray

Political parties can be an important mechanism by which tobetter integrate states in the developing world. Despite this,in Russia parties continue to penetrate provincial politicsonly weakly and thus do not help to integrate the state andenhance its abilities to govern in the periphery by extension.Drawing on evidence of weak central-state capacity to governin the Russian provinces and correspondingly weak politicalparty penetration, emergent political and economic actors havelittle interest in building political parties and increasingstate integration and capacity as a result. The article concludeswith a discussion of the implications of the argument and analysisfor the future of Russian political and economic development.     

Pork-Barrel Politics in Postwar Italy, 1953–94

This article analyzes the political determinants of the distribution of infrastructure expenditures by the Italian government to the country's 92 provinces between 1953 and 1994. Extending implications of theories of legislative behavior to the context of open-list proportional representation, we examine whether individually powerful legislators and ruling parties direct spending to core or marginal electoral districts and whether opposition parties share resources via a norm of universalism. We show that when districts elect politically more powerful deputies from the governing parties, they receive more investments. We interpret this as indicating that legislators with political resources reward their core voters by investing in public works in their districts. The governing parties, by contrast, are not able to discipline their own members of parliament sufficiently to target the parties' areas of core electoral strength. Finally, we find no evidence that a norm of universalism operates to steer resources to areas when the main opposition party gains more votes.     

The Nigerian Federation at the Crossroads: The Way Forward

This article reviews the first fifty years of federal experiencein Nigeria. It distinguishes three phases: an apprenticeshipto "true" federalism phase (1954–1965), a federal dominancephase under military rule (1966–1979 and 1984–1999),and a "muddling-through" phase under civilian rule (1979–1983and 1999 to date). The first phase was characterized by politicaldevolution and intergovernmental competition, during which regionalgovernments recorded tangible results. During the second phase,successive military regimes imposed centralism and federal dominancethat kept Nigeria united but arrested progress toward consolidatingfederal democracy. Civilian administrations under the thirdphase have sought to run the federation in a muddling-throughfashion, including serious political and social tensions, modesteconomic performance, and deepening poverty. Currently, therefore,the Nigerian federation is at a crossroads and has two options:devolution or death.     

Electoral Accountability in a Federal System: National and Provincial Economic Voting in Canada

Are federal incumbents punished for national and/or provincialeconomic performance, and are provincial incumbents held accountablefor the state of the provincial and/or national economy? Usinga pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis of electoral resultsand macroeconomic data for 1953–2001, this article exploresthe extent to which provincial and federal incumbents in Canadianelections are affected more by national or provincial economicconditions. The results of the analysis suggest that federalincumbents would not gain many votes by claiming credit forthe economic prosperity of any particular province when, onaverage, national economic conditions are deteriorating. Theresults further suggest that provincial incumbents are not heldaccountable for economic conditions in their provinces, butare rather punished for national economic deterioration whenthe incumbent federal party is of the same partisan family.     

The Impact of Federalism on the Organization of Canadian Foreign Policy

The international activities of Canadian provinces—mainlyAlbert, British Columbia, Ontario, and Québec—challengeconventional concepts of sovereignty and the federal view ofa national monopoly in foreign policy. These provincial activitieshave become more important since the early 1970s and have yieldedoutcomes in the field of foreign policy that would not haveoccurred otherwise. Provinces engage in international activitiesfor a number of reasons. They have the capacity, jurisdictionalobligation, and political desire to do so. Economic necessity,especially the international economic environment, is importantmotivation. Both conflict and cooperation with Ottawa also encourageprovincial involvements in international activities. Occasionally,foreign governments invite such activity as well. Present trendscoupled with the constitutional division of responsibilitiesin Canada suggest that territorial transgovernmentalism willhave greater consequences for Canadian foreign policy, therebygiving to Canada's international presence a character similarto the complexities and contradictions of the country's domesticmosaic.     

The Macdonald Commission Report and Canadian Federalism

The Macdonald Commission report is the latest in a series ofreports on Canadian federalism. Its proposal for free tradewith the United States has attracted the most public attentionand has already raised the issue of the appropriate role ofthe provinces in the negotiations. This proposal, together withproposed domestic economic and social policies directed at greaterreliance on market forces, would have a significant impact onthe relative roles of the federal and provincial governments.The institutional reforms advocated are intended to make thecentral institutions more representative and responsive, toensure federal leadership within the economic union, to clarifythe distribution of responsibilities between governments, andto facilitate intergovernmental relations. The proposals arebased on an underlying conception that while interdependencebetween governments in a federation is unavoidable, federalismis essentially competitive rather than cooperative in character.     

Canadian Energy Policy in 1985: Toward a Renewed Federalism?

Since the 1984 election of Brian Mulroney in Canada, the federalgovernment has reached three important intergovernmental agreementsin the energy sector. These accords—concerning managementof Newfoundland's offshore resources, oil pricing and taxationin the western provinces, and natural gas pricing in westernCanada—are Mulroney's showcase examples of his "renewedfederalism. " While there has been an increase in the degreeof federal-provincial consultation, enhanced cooperation inthe energy sector has been greatly facilitated by changes inthe international energy situation. An examination of othersectors suggests that the position of the Mulroney governmenton the nature of the Canadian federation may not be much differentfrom that held by the government of Pierre Trudeau.     

HAVA and the States

Two major events—the 2000 vote counting crisis in Floridaand passage of the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) in October 2002—spawneda wave of federal, state, and local policy innovation and policyimplementation. The major effect of the Florida crisis was anationwide effort to analyze information on elections and todebate policy solutions. Subsequently, HAVA, the first majorelection law in U.S. history that includes federal funds forelection equipment and operations, had a more substantial effecton policy innovation and implementation. Both before and afterHAVA, election law changes have been affected by partisan considerations,policy analyses, and entrepreneurial leadership. Thus far, HAVAhas positively affected election administration, though administrativepractices and their effectiveness vary across and within thestates.     

U.S. Prosecution of State and Local Officials for Political Corruption: Is the Bureaucracy Out of Control in a High-Stakes Operation Involving the Constitutional System?

Perhaps the most serious and disabling federal intrusion ofrecent years into the independent political status of stateand local governments has been actions by the U.S. governmentto prosecute elected state and local officials and their closeassociates for local political corruption. In 1986 U.S. Attorneysin New York, Boston, District of Columbia, Pennsylvania, andelsewhere pursued such investigations and prosecutions withunusual vigor. These activities have a recent genesis—since1974—and they are basically unauthorized, in importantrespects out of control, and overall questionable in terms ofthe federal nature of our constitutional system. These findingsare supported by data from the Public Integrity Section of theCriminal Division and the Office for U.S. Attorneys, both inthe Department of Justice, and by opinions of U.S. courts, legislativehistories of bills and statutes, and sources on criminal lawand political corruption.     

Constitutional Reform and Continental Free Trade: A Review of Issues in Canadian Federalism in 1987

Two issues dominated the Canadian federal provincial agendain 1987: constitutional reform and trade negotiations with theUnited States. On the constitutional side, a unanimous agreement—knownas the Meech Lake Accord—was reached among First Ministers(Prime Minister and provincial premiers). On the economic side,Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan signeda comprehensive, bilateral, free trade agreement. However, neitheragreement will take effect until endorsed or implemented bythe relevant legislatures, and one cannot take for granted thatlegislative approval will be forthcoming in either case. Whateverthe outcome, the attempt to grapple with these matters willhave a lasting impact on Canadian federalism. Both agreementsare controversial in certain regions, and while implementationwould initiate a string of systemic changes, rejection wouldengender new regional animosities. Thus, each of the two issues,taken separately, will affect institutional arrangements andterritorial (regional) relationships within Canada. The interplaybetween the two initiatives will also be significant.     

Rational and Pluralistic Approaches to HAVA Implementation: The Cases of Georgia and California

The Help America Vote Act (HAVA) has created a new dynamic forthe oversight and implementation of federal elections, requiringstates to assume greater control of election processes vis-à-vistheir local governments than was previously the case in moststates. We consider how HAVA has changed the relationship betweenstates and localities, especially through the HAVA planningprocess. We examine two approaches that states have used inHAVA planning—a rational approach and a pluralistic approach—andhow each can shape the power relationship between states andlocalities. We then present case studies from Georgia and Californiato illustrate how these two approaches have functioned in practice.