The distribution of income,incomplete information and the rank and Pareto criteria

One income distribution dominates another according to the rank criterion if the income in each position, ordered from lowest to highest, is at least as great in the former distribution as the corresponding income in the latter, with the strict inequality holding at least once. Pareto dominance implies rank dominance, but not conversely. But rank dominance does imply Pareto dominance where agents are expected utility maximizers relative to subjective probability distributions that characterize incomplete information regarding agents' positions in income distributions. This suggests the rank criterion as a way of evaluating income distributions without resorting to interpersonal comparisons of utility.I have benefitted from presenting an earlier version of this paper in the seminar series of the Economics Department of Emory University and in the lecture series sponsored by the Economics Institute at the University of Colorado, Boulder. I am grateful to Peter Aranson and three referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.     

Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games: A reply to Sloof

Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium (see this issue). In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities.     

A political economy model of market intervention

We argue that political competition based on income redistribution à la Lindbeck and Weibull (Public Choice 52:273–297, 1987) may cause distortive regulation in a competitive sector. For this purpose, we propose a model in which imposing a production quota allows the extraction of rents that are then used for vote-buying purposes. Our model permits us to analyze the response of regulatory policy to political factors, such as the size of a group of informed voters and the accuracy of their information about the incumbent. We also show that the extent of voter influence on policy outcomes is shaped by the state of market demand. In particular, if demand becomes weaker, market intervention increases in a magnitude that depends positively on the electoral weight of informed voters.     

Group size and the free-rider hypothesis: A re-examination of old evidence from churches: Reply to Zaleski and Zech

Public Choice - This paper replies to the comment by Zaleski and Zech on my Lipford (1995) paper, in which I examined the relationship between free riding and group size. In this reply, I...     

Multi-candidate equilibria

We demonstrate the existence of an electoral equilibrium in a model with three or more candidates. We use the same kinds of assumptions that have previously been used to establish existence in two-candidate models and have not had to make special assumptions regarding dimensionality (e.g., that there is only one dimension) or distribution of voter preferences (e.g., symmetry).     

Retrospective Voting and Political Representation

This article develops a theoretical model of political representation under the single-member district system. I establish the existence of equilibria in which legislative voting of each legislator depends only on her preference and her electorate's preference and voters sanction badly behaved incumbents and retain well-behaved ones based solely on their own representatives' roll-call records. In equilibrium, voters achieve a partial representation with respect to representatives' behavior in each district. However, with respect to representation of the social majority, my findings are indeterminate. On the one hand, there exists an equilibrium in which the majority-preferred alternative is the outcome guaranteed, except in very special circumstances. On the other hand, this equilibrium is not generally the unique equilibrium, and, for some parameter values, there is an equilibrium in which the majority-preferred alternative is less likely than the alternative preferred only by the minority to be the outcome.     

Three cheers for liberal modesty

ABSTRACT

Many liberals have been immodest in postulating that their own progressive, secular liberalism is the only one that can be justified in public reason. In Liberalism’s Religion, I articulate a more modest theory of liberalism and religion. While I personally endorse progressive secular liberalism, I argue that it is only one of the reasonable conceptions of liberal justice. This liberal modesty has profound, hitherto unnoticed implications for (i) the role of religious arguments in the public sphere, (ii) the legitimacy of religious establishment, and (iii) the justifiability of religious exemptions. In this article, I defend these three claims by providing replies to my critics.     

Comment on John T. Metzger's “planned abandonment: The neighborhood life‐cycle theory and national urban policy”

Abstract

I take strong exception to the idea that theories of neighborhood change, in and of themselves, caused the decline of inner cities. Rather, the demographic, social, and economic forces that existed in the postwar years caused some inner‐city neighborhoods to decline. The replacement of working‐class and middle‐income households by households with much lower incomes, on average, was the single biggest cause of neighborhood decline. Metzger ignores this fact as an alternative explanation for why some neighborhoods declined. It is highly implausible that my theories and those of other urban experts had such a strong impact on the public policy, building, and finance communities. Because people were responding to real conditions, it is likely that the same events would have occurred even if my model of neighborhood change had never been developed.     

Democracy and countries with Muslim majorities: a reply and update

My empirical results in Potrafke (2012) confirm past conclusions that Muslim-majority countries are less likely to be democratic. Hanusch takes issue with my results—and by inference with all past empirical results on the relation between Islam and democracy. In his comment on my study, Hanusch indicates that he believes I was using the POLITY IV index. He has not realized, as I made most clear, that the purpose of my study was to show results based on new data from Cheibub et al. (2010). Hanusch claims to have reversed the conclusion that having a Muslim majority is associated with having autocratic government. He establishes his conclusion by excluding the heartland of Islam from the estimation sample. For his estimates, Hanusch moreover uses data that do not appear to exist, at least in the claimed sources. I update my estimates to address issues that Hanusch raises. My new results confirm the conclusion that countries with Muslim majorities are less likely to be democracies. In deriving this result, I do not follow the strategy proposed by Hanusch of excluding from the data sample the countries in the heartland of Islam.     

Pluralism in the Mind and the Structure of Cognitive Minorities

In his book The Many Altars of Modernity Peter L. Berger (2014) called for the replacement of secularization theory, which in his view no longer has much relevance today, with a theory of (religious) pluralism. Such a theory must encompass two levels, the level of the mind and the level of society. In this paper I will focus on the level of mind and explain some of the conceptual linkages with the level of society which Berger only touches upon in his book. The paper’s main purpose, however, is to sketch out a framework in which Berger’s ideas on “pluralism in the mind” could be investigated empirically. I will argue to focus on “cognitive minorities”, that is, on groups of people whose understanding of the world differs significantly from that of their social environment. As concrete cases I suggest a comparative study of a religious group (Evangelical Protestants) in a strongly secularized city (Leipzig, Germany) and a group of skeptics and seekers (Unitarians) in a city characterized by evangelical religiosity (Dallas, Texas). With the help of these settings – that is my thesis – it will be possible to investigate what Berger formulated as the central issue in his pluralism theory: How is it possible for people to integrate religious and secular worldviews in their minds, more or less simultaneously?     

The Sympathetic Formation of Reason and the Limits of Science

I develop an interpretation of reason using the thought of David Hume and Adam Smith. I contend that reason in Hume and Smith can plausibly be interpreted as a kind of sensation. Reason is a sensation in that it is a sentimental conception of the relationship between two objects that impels certain interpretations. Reason is developed sympathetically in experiential contexts that not only guide but constitute reason’s operation. I comment on Hume’s talk of reason in his Treatise of Human Nature to build my interpretation. I use Smith’s work in The Theory of Moral Sentiments to develop an understanding of the sympathetic formation of reason. I briefly integrate my interpretation with talk of confirmatory bias in psychology and behavioral economics. I conclude by considering implications for scientific conversation.     

Equal citizenship,neutrality, and democracy: a reply to critics of Equal Recognition

The commentators in this Special Issue raise questions about a number of aspects of the book. One group of critics questions the book’s overall normative strategy, asking whether too much weight is placed on the idea of neutrality. A second group raises doubts about the account of neutrality itself. A third zeroes in on the book’s discussion of language rights. And a fourth group is critical of the book’s assumptions about democracy, and about its relevance to public policy disputes. In this reply, I seek to address each of these clusters of concerns. In some places, I suggest, my commentators have misunderstood my position. In other places, I argue, they have not sufficiently thought through the implications of their alternatives to that position.     

Immigration,redistribution, and universal suffrage

The effect of immigration on redistribution has been widely debated. This paper contributes to this debate by testing two explanations, which are that (i) immigration tends to reduce redistribution due to people’s higher levels of xenophobia, and that (ii) immigration affects redistribution because immigrants do not have the right to vote. Since the demand for redistribution depends on the (expected) gap between median voter income and mean income, immigrants affect the demand for redistribution because, as non-citizens, they do not change the median voter’s income, but, as economic stakeholders, they do affect the mean income. Four empirical consequences of (i) and (ii) are tested at the individual level. Evidence from the European Values Survey in 45 countries confirms (ii), showing that immigrants’ expected competitiveness on the labor market affects preferences for redistribution and that it is amplified when the perceived number of immigrants is high. In contrast, (i) is globally rejected since the impact of the citizens’ declared level of solidarity with immigrants tends to be weak and depends on the type of measurement or specification used.     

Editorial

This fourth issue provides both a follow on from the debatesstarted in our first three editions and a specific theme, thepolicing of public disorder. Alongside terrorism, neighbourhoodpolicing and the use of force, we judged as we were planningthe first editions of this new journal that we should tacklefour of the big issues in policing. Unsurprisingly, given thatthey are such big issues, there are some common themes thatrun across all of them. The most substantial of these is accountabilityand oversight, which are covered in several of the articlesin this edition. In each of the previous editorials I have drawn on my own professionalcareer to provide comment and this editorial will be no exception.In the last quarter of century I have, in roles ranging froma     

Offending the One Percent: Seven Arguments Against Distributive Desert

The belief that people morally deserve the income they acquire in the market is both powerful and deep-rooted. Nevertheless, most political philosophers are skeptical of the idea that market income is morally deserved. There is thus a large and uncomfortable chasm between the philosophical mainstream and the actual public. The purpose of this article was to inject new intellectual effort in closing this gap. The goal is the ambitious one of a comprehensive demolition of the notion of distributive desert. To this end, I put forward seven critical arguments. Four of them are common in the literature. Since these have been adequately discussed elsewhere, I mention them here briefly and only for completeness. The core of the article focuses on three original arguments. Overall, my aim is to show that, taking these arguments together, the case against distributive desert is conclusive.     

On tolerating policy and organizational termination: Some design considerations

This essay explores some factors that have led us to expect perpetuity rather than termination as normal in dealing with policies and organizations. After suggesting that this is a dangerous assumption where change and uncertainty are sufficient to require substantial adaptive capacity, it is proposed that a model tolerant of acting to make termination either more or less likely is preferred. Given that we already know how to invest to make termination less likely, the next two sections explore some strategies that may allow termination to be more easily tolerated, and the learning incident to its existence increased. The first explores the use of matrix models of organization to institutionalize the capacity for initiating and terminating temporary projects within organizations. The second section suggests several external mechanisms (savings banks, insurance policies, receivership referees, trust officers, salvage specialists, and marriage/divorce/ escrow brokerages) that could operate to make termination of policies and organizations less difficult.I wish to express my appreciation especially to Arnold Meltsner, a colleague in no way responsible for either the obvious or subtle flaws of this essay. Several years ago we undertook an empirical investigation of several score terminated organizations, and I know my thinking has greatly benefited from his effort in setting both me and the subject straight. His comments on this essay have been very helpful. Eugene Bardach and Aaron Wildavsky also provided helpful comments in the drafting of this paper.     

Lingua franca and linguistic territoriality. Why they both matter to justice and why justice matters for both

The bottom line of my book Linguistic Justice for Europe and for the World (Oxford University Press, 2011, paperback 2015) can roughly be captured in the combination of two recommendations: that the democratization of competence English as a lingua franca should be fostered in Europe and elsewhere and that language communities should be allowed to protect their language against the invasion of English and other powerful languages by imposing their own language in public communication and public education within some territorial boundaries. Most of my critics attack one or the other of these recommendations and some question some of the presuppositions of my whole approach. In this response, I try to refute some of these critiques by clarifying my claims or spelling out my arguments, and I make whatever concessions I believe are required.     

Moral Pluralism, Political Justification and Deliberative Democracy

We can make progress in political justification if we avoid debates about the extent of moral pluralism. Just by having a political view we are committed to its realization but also to its defence upon justifying grounds. It would be inconsistent to seek to realize my view in ways that undermined my ability to justify it. Yet justifying a view implies that I am open to challenges to it, and that perpetually draws me potentially into dialogue with all others, regardless of my will, and into structures which allow an inclusive dialogue to take place, with decisions being made, on the basis of open public discussion, with which I may disagree. Thus a form of deliberative democracy, probably with representative institutions, is justified, without any normative assumptions being made.     

Private sector shrinkage and the growth of industrialized economies: Reply

Further tests and thoughts on the OECD data lead me to conclude that, if anything, my 1986 paper underestimated the magnitude of the inverse relation between economic growth and government size. If one takes the nominal-based measure of government scale, as advised by Saunders, the significance levels, coefficient magnitudes and goodness of fits improve over what I found with my initial investigation. I would suggest that Saunders reconsider his reluctance to believe that the size of the public sector is unrelated to economic growth in OECD countries over this time period.One additional thought appears relevant to the current policy debate concerning budget deficits and economic performance within the major industrialized economies. The empirical work displayed here and in my 1986 paper suggests serious problems associated with the various proposals urging governments to raise taxes and/or ease fiscal policy. Elsewhere, I have suggested that available empirical evidence implies that plans to increase taxes as a way out of budget deficits are plans that carry the potential for raising government spending and possibly future deficits as well. Coupled with the evidence presented here, we should also recognize the potential of tax increases to raise the level of government participation in a country and, accordingly, exert inverse influences on its future economic performance as well. As suggested in my 1986 paper, the empirical evidence may suggest the following irony: While political participants may crave larger and larger non-market resource allocations, their future ability to satisfy that craving may very well be severely constrained by the satisfaction of that same appetite.