Comparative Climate Change Policy and Federalism: An Overview

This commentary provides an overview of the four papers in this issue of Review of Policy Research on the politics of climate change. The papers all address in one way or another aspects of how federal‐type systems are dealing with the collective action and multilevel governance issues of climate change policy. The comparative study of federal systems provides insight into how domestic authority is so often overlapping and divided when dealing with greenhouse gas emissions and climate change. Federal arrangements offer a rich array of norms, institutions, and practices for tackling these problems. Federal systems grapple continuously with the kinds of issues that are the most intractable in the climate change case, such as overcoming interregional differences of interests and values. A common federal feature is competition among subnational governments and between them and national or federated governments over climate change policy, which has been especially significant in the United States and in Canada in the relative absence of national action––although soberingly, the whole is as yet nowhere near as great as the sum of the parts. More significant, but rarer is the achievement of tighter coordination in federal systems achieved through intergovernmental co‐decision, as seen in the European Community and Australia. This has been accomplished in large part due to a consensus among all intergovernmental parties on the nature of the problem and congruence with the existing international regime, characteristics missing in the North American context.     

From Constitutional to Treaty Federalism: A Comparative Perspective

Federalism in the European Union differs significantly fromthe American model. First, instead of relying on fixed constitutionalrights, the EU remains committed to a treaty-based process offlexible accommodation. Second, the federal system of constitutionalpower division has been replaced by the subsidiarity principle.The scope and dimension of Community action are tied to negotiatedcriteria of necessity and efficiency. Third, European federalismhas not adopted the American senate model. Member-state participationin the decision-making process is based on the German modelof weighted council representation. Regions and civic organizationshave gained an additional consultative voice. As a novel typeof federal polity, the EU may gain model character for a globalizingworld of nation-states whose interests appear loosely interconnectedby federal arrangements rather than firmly nested in a federalstate.     

Brussels between Bern and Berlin: Comparative Federalism Meets the European Union

In the current debate on the future European order, the European Union (EU) is often described as an "emerging federation." This article claims that federalism is not exclusively useful in deliberating about the future of the EU. Non-statecentric conceptions of federalism provide a better understanding of the current structure and functioning of the European system of multilevel governance than most theories of European integration and international relations do. We combine political and economic perspectives of federalism to analyze the "balancing act" between effective political representation and efficient policy-making in the EU. Drawing on the examples of Germany and Switzerland in particular, we argue that the increasing delegation of powers to the central EU level needs to be paralleled by strengthened patterns of fiscal federalism and an empowered representation of functional interests at the European level. Without such "rebalancing," the current legitimacy problems of the EU are likely to intensify.     

Federalism and Health Care Cost Containment in Comparative Perspective

Despite widespread agreement over the connection between federalismand social expenditures during times of welfare state expansion,disagreement exists concerning federalism's role in the retrenchmentera. Existing approaches fail to recognize institutional variationamong federal states. Analysis of Britain, Germany, and Canadasuggests that federalism may promote or hinder health care retrenchmentdepending upon how it structures the relationship between regionaland national governments. Power-sharing federalism hinders healthcare reform by increasing the institutional obstacles to unpopularcutbacks. Power-separating federalism facilitates reform bycreating opportunities for blame avoidance without substantiallyincreasing the number of veto players. These findings challengetraditional linear or dichotomous models of federalism, suggestingthe need for an approach that captures how particular typesof federalism affect retrenchment politics.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Federalism and the Strong-State/Weak-State Conundrum: Canadian Economic Policymaking in Comparative Perspective

The areal dispersion of power and constitutional division ofresponsibilities in federal arrangements are generally feltto limit the ability of federal systems to improve economicperformance. Examining Canada within a comparative framework,we assess "the federations as weak states" hypothesis as wellas the utility of the "strong-state/weak-state" model itself.Although some aspects of the Canadian federal system—namelythe combination of federal with parliamentary traditions andthe resulting adverse policy styles—inhibit the adoptionof effective economic adjustment policies, these features arenot necessarily found in other federal arrangements. Comparisonswith Switzerland, Austria, and West Germany suggest that, undercertain circumstances, federal power sharing may be conduciveto bringing about broad agreement on both goals and policiesamong national, regional, and local governments and major economicactors.     

Pragmatic Federalism: Australian Federalism from Hawke to Howard

The article explores the nature of Australian federalism by examining four major themes in the period from Hawke to Howard. The investigation of these themes – Australian conceptions of federalism; the role of party in shaping federalism; the way problems and politics have influenced policy‐making and thereby federalism; and the nature of federal judicial review – suggests that Australian federalism can most accurately be characterised as pragmatic. It appears as a federalism shaped by pressing problems, specific policy agendas and the prevailing political dynamic, rather than by overarching conceptions of federalism derived from political theory or articulated in party ideology. This pragmatic federalism explains important aspects of Australian federalism, especially the trend towards centralisation of authority.     

The Malaise of Federalism: Comparative Reflections on Commonwealth–State Relations

The High Court's decision in the ‘Work Choices’ case expanding further the scope of the Commonwealth's enumerated powers is the latest reminder of the highly centralised nature of Australian federalism. The division of powers traditionally forming the essence of a federal system has become increasingly difficult to discern and the roles and responsibilities of the two levels of government have become entangled. While for a good part of Australia's history divided jurisdiction was deplored as an obstacle to progress in government, today the decay of the system is most likely to be lamented. Discussion of options for reform presupposes an understanding of the forces that have led to the present condition. This article examines the Australian experience in a broader comparative and historical perspective and suggests that those forces are endemic and substantial.     

Devolutionary Federalism and Elazar's Typology: The Arkansas Response to Reagan's New Federalism

This article examines the relationship between the federal andstate governments with regard to the Reagan administration'sNew Federalism. The underlying concern centers on the financialrelationship among governments portrayed by Elazar's typologyof federal aid. The focus of this investigation is directedtoward the adjustments being made by the states to accommodatethe financial and administrative changes occurring on the nationallevel, as illustrated by the case of Arkansas. The analysiscenters on two questions: 1) Has the New Federalism initiativeachieved Reagan's goals of decentralizing governmental authorityback to the states? 2) Has a major redirection in the federalsystem been achieved by reducing the federal financial obligationin the intergovernmental system? The changes being made in thefederal system, as reflected by the adjustments occurring amongthe states, may signal an important realignment of federalism.     

Introduction: Federalism and Surface Transportation

The articles for this symposium address federal, state, andlocal relationships in surface-transportation programs. Theseprograms support access to and mobility within specific locations,but the benefits do not uniquely belong to any one politicaljurisdiction. Transportation investments link jurisdictionsand produce dynamic interactions among them that both followand create strong competitive economic, land-development, intergovernmental,and political forces.     

Australian Federalism: Developments and Prospects

This article discusses the principal recent developments in,and future prospects for, constitutional change, judicial review,fiscal arrangements, local government, public policy, and intergovernmentalrelations since the 1977 Publius issue on Australian federalism,taking into account the arguments presented in the other contributionsto this volume. It highlights the continuing vertical imbalanceof Australian fiscal federalism, and the Hawke Labor government'srecent initiative for a closer working partnership with thestates for reforming intergovernmental arrangements. It arguesthat while there is scope for the latter, there is greater needfor the former. Nevertheless, the 1980s was significant as adecade of predominantly Labor governments working with the federalConstitution, while the 1990s promises to be a decade of celebratingthe centenary of the Australian Constitution and working towardimproving the functioning of its federal system.