Look for the Blind Spot where Structural Realism Meets Pluralistic Stagnation

The predominant traditions in international relations and comparative political economy both failed to anticipate the end of the cold war. The explanation is not that these traditions are flawed; rather it is that they developed in response to different kinds of questions. Structural realism explains the distribution of power in the international system, not the attitudes or expectations of domestic elites. Meanwhile institutionalist traditions at the domestic level focus on explaining stability, persistence or path-dependence and not sudden or sweeping change. Given their focus, these different traditions built on assumptions that were ill-suited to explain the end of communism. They are better suited, however, to explaining what happened to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe once communism fell.     

Grandes expectativas: la democracia mexicana y sus descontentos

There is no doubt that democracy in México has fallen short of expectations: it has not increased social and economic equality. Few people deem their participation in politics is now more effective than before, the elected government often fails to meet citizens' demands, and some regions of the country are seemingly under the control of violent drug cartels. These faults certainly fuel the voters' discontent with the democratic regime. The aim of this paper though is to focus on other less apparent sources of the existing intense political dissatisfaction. Mexicans are unsatisfied with their democratic government not only because it has not provided them with the social goods they are realistically or not expecting from democracy. They are also unhappy due to the perceived gap between an idealized notion of democracy and the way the existing democratic institutions actually work, as an odd ahistorical image of democracy has been constructed. The major claim of this work is that the critical standard of democracy assumed by Mexicans is inaccurate. It will be argued that this ideological misconception has had pernicious effects, as it has nurtured unreasonable expectations and has inhibited Mexicans from considering feasible reforms. It will be also examined in particular the role played by the pursuit of equity.     

The ideology of development and legitimation: beyond ‘Kazakhstan 2030’

The paper analyses the multifaceted discourse of development and nation-building in post-Soviet Kazakhstan. It addresses the regional clan–central elite relations and Nursultan Nazarbayev regime's legitimating agenda through the Kazakhstan 2030 Strategy for development. The economic developmental component in Nazarbayev's ideological discourses is primarily an exercise of control over regional economic and political elites and that helped building further legitimacy for the regime in various socio-ethnic constituencies on both the regional and central levels. Kazakhstan 2030 was deployed by the regime to substitute the Soviet version of ideology, legitimize the regime among various ethno-lingual audiences, and discipline the behaviour of regional elites. The paper shows how the study of elites’ interests can best explain the nature of national ideology and development projects.     

Élites gubernamentales en tres entidades federales de México (2000-2012) Un análisis estructural

This article aims at analyzing the profile and the social structure resulting from the career itineraries of governmental elites in the states of Guanajuato, the State of Mexico, and Mexico City during the 2000-2012 period. The author applies a mixed method combining the conventional sociological analysis with a network approach. The study observes in the first place the relevance of the local space for the creation and development of elites. Secondly, it identifies the regularities and divergences in the elite recruitment and development processes in the three states under study. Finally, the analysis reveals that instability in employment may be simultaneously construed as uncertainty and an asset since it allows the local elites to gather a considerable political and social capital.     

Entre la racionalidad tecnocrática y la gobernabilidad La importancia del consenso político en México

Since the 1980s the technocratic elite has controlled the Mexican economy, regardless of whether the country is governed by the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or an opposition party. On top of showing an uncommitted stance in ideological or party terms, the elite has maintained a strict control of national public finances thus generating considerable political and electoral consequences in the country. Regardless of whether there exist or not different economic options, the main problem lies in that this elite has been unable to gain the society's support. The rationality that characterizes this elite does not admit communication with society nor does it take into consideration its opinion concerning the decisions they take. This has led to an extreme politicization of economic decisions of political parties. This article intends to expose the features of the Mexican technocracy, its development and survival during the transition, as well as the mediation flaws that have impeded communication between the society and governmental authorities concerning the development and implementation of economic measures.     

From Cronyism to Oligarchy? Privatisation and Business Elites in Myanmar

Privatisation is often contentious yet in Myanmar it has not so much been its merits or drawbacks that have attracted attention as questions around implementation. In Myanmar, the implementation of privatisation has broad significance for the political economy. A first phase of privatisation was focused on small and medium-sized enterprises and did not have a significant economic impact. A second phase, commenced in 2008, consolidated the interests of a business elite with personal connections to the military regime. The impact of this second phase of privatisation was such that some elements of this elite strengthened to the extent that they no longer relied entirely on patronage, creating opportunities for diversification in their strategies of wealth creation and defence. For this reason, it is argued, the wealthiest strata of Myanmar’s business elite is now best conceived as not simply consisting of cronies but rather as a nascent form of oligarchy. In theoretical terms, this suggests that greater attention to the qualitative difference between cronyism and oligarchy is warranted, as is close study of processes – like privatisation and political reform – that enable or require a wider range of strategies of wealth defence.     

Planteamiento teórico y evidencia del desplazamiento gradual del Estado autoritario al Estado pragmático en México: la transformación de las élites

Analyses of political change in Mexico since the government shift achieved in July 2000 have been undertaken with a focus on the democratic political transition that led to the so-called alternation, that is, from the stance of a classical approach about State transformations that led from an authoritarian stage to democratization. Analytical approaches in Mexico concerning political change are focused on the undeniable democratic practice at the ballot boxes; however, the outcomes' transparency, the adoption of a new regime, and the procedural condition of the young Mexican democracy make it appropriate to consider this shift from the realist view of the exercise of power and major mechanisms for the establishment of élites' political-governmental decisions. Thus, pragmatism is put forward as an alternative political approach. This article intends to establish that political change in Mexico has gradually changed from its past condition as an authoritarian State to become a pragmatic State, favored by the advent of governmental technocracy, globalization, the market, the us hegemonic ideology, and the obvious involvement of corporate elites contained in State power institutions.     

Some Considerations Regarding the Persistence of the Economic Elite in Mexico in the First Half of the Twentieth Century

This article presents an analysis of some of the most important works on the persistence of the economic elite in Mexico during the first half of the twentieth century. The study seeks to answer the following question: How did the formation and character of the Mexican economic elites change during this period? It examines the effect of events such as the Mexican Revolution (1910–1920) and the agrarian reform programmes, as well as political instability and institutional uncertainty, on the persistence or weakening of the landowning and industrial elite who had consolidated their power during the Porfiriato period (1876–1911).     

“Cultures of populism: institutions and hegemonic practices” – a brief introduction

ABSTRACT

This short Introduction sets the context for the nine articles included in Safundi’s special issue on “Cultures of Populism: Institutions and Hegemonic Practices” (Vol. 21, no. 3) by establishing connections with the colloquium of the same name that was hosted at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg from 10th until 13th July 2019. At the conference, populism (whether of the political right or the left) was examined in relation to democracy, the role of elites, and possible futures for the Humanities. Drawing on a range of theoretical perspectives, papers considered the diverse histories of populism, as well as varied occurrences of this phenomenon across the globe.     

Institutional Foundations of Legislative Turnover: A Comparative Analysis of the Swiss Cantons

Abstract: The rate of turnover within parliaments remains an understudied area of research. The present paper contributes to filling this gap by presenting the first comparable macro‐level data on legislative turnover in the 26 Swiss cantonal legislatures. In examining the strikingly different levels of turnover in sub‐national Swiss parliaments between 1993 and 2011, the focus is on politico‐institutional features. Multilevel models reveal that two hitherto neglected institutional variables are correlated with legislative turnover. In addition to the reduction of parliamentary size, we find the strength of a cantonal parliament to affect turnover rates on the Swiss sub‐national level. Moreover, we show that proportional representation significantly promotes parliamentary elite circulation. Among the non‐institutional covariates, we find that electoral volatility is also relevant in explaining legislative turnover rates.     

Power elites,war and postwar reconstruction in Africa: Continuities,discontinuities and paradoxes

This article interrogates the manner in which the composition, character, regeneration, and accumulation strategies of power elites and the organisation of their hegemony is being affected or unaffected by recent developments, most especially, civil wars and their corollary, postwar reconstruction, in Africa. By seeking to understand how conflicts and post-conflict reconstruction alter or transform the character, recruitment and role of power elites, and the operational context (the nature of the state) in Africa, this article draws attention to the prospects of transforming the nature of leadership in Africa. I contend that the capacity for violence and terror by individuals (especially young combatants who were previously marginalised) and armed groups has become a new marker of elitism and a leverage on peace agreements. Moreover, post-Cold War conflicts in Africa have accentuated the emergence of war-making power elites as ‘executors’ and ‘trustees’ of peace treaties, or ‘peace celebrities’ with considerable leverage on the course and outcomes of postwar reconstruction. The instability in post-1989 Liberia is used as a case study to reflect this claim. I also cite examples of members and leaders of armed groups in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of Congo where the capacity for violence translated into political rewards and gains in peace agreements.     

Political culture,state elites and regional security in West Africa

This article analyses the dominant patterns of political culture among West Africa's state elites in an attempt to understand what standards, beliefs and principles they cherish. We suggest that although there are significant differences across the region's states, the dominant political culture can be characterised as neopatrimonial, that is, systems based on personalised structures of authority where patron–client relationships operate behind a façade of ostensibly rational state bureaucracy. In order to explore these issues the article proceeds in four parts. After providing a definition of political culture and why it is an important topic of analysis, we examine the central characteristics of the political culture held by state elites in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) region. The section ‘The Nigerian factor’ briefly discusses some of the malign effects that this culture has had upon governance and political economy issues in the regional giant, Nigeria. The final section explores whether the region's elites are living up to their own claims that they are embarking upon a serious attempt to engage in state reconstruction or are instead simply searching for alternative ways to sell their more traditional concern with regime protection. We conclude that, without a fundamental recasting of the political culture guiding the region's elites, a security culture that prioritises democracy and human security is unlikely to emerge within ECOWAS.     

Nobody Is a Prophet in their Own Land? Evaluations of Pope Francis in Latin America

Using data drawn from surveys of Latin American elites and citizens, this article aims to analyse the determinants of evaluations of Pope Francis, with a special focus on ideology and religious denomination, religiosity, and trustworthiness of the Catholic Church. Results show that the Pope remains linked to opinions on the Church, but not to religiosity, and that differences in personal religious affiliations (or lack thereof) among respondents are sharper among citizens than among elites. Furthermore, Pope Francis is found to be not closely associated to the left–right axis in Latin America, except in the case of Argentine MPs, where the right-leaning members express lower opinions of the Pope.     

Covid-19 Pandemic,Social Mitigation and Taxation: The Open Veins of Inequality in Latin America

The pandemic of Covid-19 has exposed the veins of inequality in Latin America. With a socioeconomic disaster looming, social emergency policies seemed inevitable. Yet while governments argue over the continuity of such policies and whether the fiscal rules in place should be respected, no sustainable response has come out. This essay problematises whether the pandemic could represent a critical juncture to forge ahead with political narratives that highlight tax exemptions and privileges enjoyed by the rich. We analyse the mitigation measures adopted by Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay and their repercussions on the debate surrounding progressive tax reforms to fund social schemes.