The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

The European Union as the next step of delegation and accountability

Abstract. The Principal–Agent approach guides a comparison of the scrutiny and implementation records of the EU member states. The main argument is that there is systematic co–variation. Cross–nationally, an influential scrutiny process is associated with a strong implementation record. But because both of these variables also co–vary with the North–South dimension of EU politics, a fundamental challenge for future research is to evaluate the importance of existing between–country variation relative to the new Principal–Agent relationships that are emerging within the integration process.     

International Organization as a Seal of Approval: European Union Accession and Investor Risk

Much of the literature on international institutions argues that membership regularizes expectations about members' future behavior. Using the accession of the postcommunist countries as a test case, this article argues that the EU can send strong signals to financial markets about the trajectory of a particular country. Examining spreads on sovereign debt from 1990 to 2006, this article shows that closing negotiation chapters on domestic economic policy—in other words, receiving a seal of approval from Brussels that previously existing policy reform is acceptable to the wider EU—substantially decreases perceptions of default risk in those countries. That decrease operates independently from policy reform that the country has taken and is also distinct from selection processes (modeled here with new variables, including UNESCO World Heritage sites and domestic movie production, that proxy for cultural factors). Thus, this particular international organization has played an important role in coordinating market sentiment on members, conferring confidence that policy reform alone could not accomplish.     

Policy Transfer in the European Union: Institutional Isomorphism as a Source of Legitimacy

This article examines public policy in the European Union (EU) by drawing upon the framework of policy transfer, which has been recently refined by comparativists, and the concept of isomorphism developed within organizational theory. Three case studies—namely, the single currency, tax policy and media ownership policy—are discussed and compared with the aim of assessing the potential of isomorphism for the analysis of policy dif-fusion. The author argues that European institutions, which have a serious limitation in terms of legitimacy, stimulate policy transfer by catalyzing isomorphic processes. Policy transfer, however, is constrained when there are no national cases to be imitated. Yet European institutions, most notably the European Commission, can overcome the problem by "inseminating" solutions into national political systems.     

Double-Speak: The European Union and Gender Parity

Ideas about pursuing a more equal balance between men and women in decision-making bodies and ‘parity democracy’ have been promoted by both the Council of Europe and the institutions of the European Union for nearly 20 years. In the early 1990s, the institutions of the EU played an important role in providing a platform for discussion and debate and thus brought these notions into mainstream political discourse in some of the member states. In response, during the late 1990s and early 2000s, several member states implemented policy to encourage more balanced participation for men and women in national and sub-national decision-making bodies. However, despite its own policy statements to the contrary, the EU decision-making bodies themselves remain male-dominated. This article asks how the EU on the one hand provided an impetus for some of the member states to take action to increase gender balance in decision-making while, on the other hand, its own institutions have remained largely unchanged.     

Bicameralism in the European Union: parliamentary scrutiny as a tool for reinforcing party unity

During recent years, the European Union has increasingly been portrayed as a bicameral political system in which political parties build bridges across the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. From this perspective, national parties’ representation in the Council should affect their members’ voting behaviour in the EP. Survey evidence reveals that most members of the EP (MEPs) frequently receive voting instructions from ‘their’ ministers. Accordingly, these MEPs should have a higher likelihood of defecting from their European Political Group. The observed voting instructions imply that the voting preferences of MEPs and their ministers differ. This article argues that parliamentary scrutiny may be one way effectively to coordinate on a common position at an early stage and, consequently, reinforce party unity at the voting stage. However, effective scrutiny depends on national parliaments being strong enough. On the empirical side, this article studies the voting behaviour of MEPs from eight member states during the Sixth EP. We include four national parliaments which the literature conceives of as being strong (DK, DE, SF, SK) and four parliaments conceived of as being weak (FR, IE, IT, UK). Overall, the results support the theoretical argument, thereby demonstrating how domestic-level scrutiny affects EU-level voting behaviour.     

Coalitions in European Union Negotiations

Coalitions will probably become an increasingly important theme in European Union (EU) politics. The spread of decision making by majority voting promotes coalition‐building behaviour. The impending enlargement is predicted to differentiate and polarize policy standpoints within the EU. Increasing levels of policy conflict imply increased propensities for coalition building. Still, the role and nature of coalitions in EU negotiations are obscure. This article raises important research questions: What characterizes coalition building in the EU? How important are coalitions? What coalition patterns are discernible?Using data from a questionnaire to Swedish participants on EU committees, it is shown that coalitions are more frequent when majority voting occurs than when unanimity rules. Coalition behaviour is, however, important also under unanimity. The existence of consensus norms diminishes the propensity to form coalitions. As regards coalition patterns, there is a prevalence of coalitions based on policy interests and/or on cultural affinity. Contrary to conventional wisdom, consistent and durable coalition patterns seem to exist. The north–south divide is one such persistent pattern. The Swedish respondents thus reveal a close cooperation between the Nordic member states and Great Britain, whereas France and Spain are seldom approached for coalition‐building purposes. As to future research, evidence from other member states and from case studies is needed in order to learn more about the bases for coalition building in EU negotiations.