公司表决权例外排除制度研究

公司表决权例外排除制度包括股东表决权例外排除制度和董事表决权例外排除制度,是指当股东(大)会(董事会)表决的决议事项与某一或某些股东(董事)存在特别利害关系时,这些股东(董事)或其代理人不能以其所持表决权参与表决的一种法律制度。作为矫正失衡的股东利益关系,防止控制股股东、公司“内部人”滥用资本多数决和控制权,完善公司法人治理结构,激活股东(大)会制度、董事会制度的一种表决权行使机制,与表决权限制制度不同,公司表决权例外排除制度有其独特的价值取向和行使规则。我国公司法对此一制度予以借鉴和移植,将对完善公司内部治理结构,保护中小股东利益,促进公司经营的稳定,甚至对推动我国资本市场的理性运作等均具有重要的理论与实践指导意义。     

股东会通讯表决制度研究-兼评《上市公司股东大会规范意见》的相关规定

股东不出席股东会议而通过通讯表决行使自己表决权,参与公司决策,可以实现股东会结构"全员性"要求,也有利于公司、股东的利益.但是无论是中国证监会的<上市公司股东大会规范意见>,还是上市公司的实践,通讯表决只是作为股东会议的一种召开形式而存在,而不是股东行使表决权的一种方式.这一误区导致了实践中众多问题的存在,应还通讯表决以本来面目,修正<公司法>有关规定,建构我国的通讯表决制度.     

构建上市公司股东大会网络通讯表决制度的法律思考

我国上市公司股东大会已演变成“大股东会”。随着信息技术的发展,国际上已经出现了通过电子网络以方便股东行使表决权的趋势。构建股东大会网络通讯表决制度,能有效避免现行制度的局限性,最大限度保护投资者利益。股东大会网络通讯表决是股东大会现场表决的补充手段,其制度设计的目标、适用范围、操作程序及信息披露均有其特殊性。基于控股股东的义务,应当禁止控股股东通过网络通讯方式行使表决权。     

浅谈股东的重整计划表决权

新《企业破产法》中的重整制度填补了中国市场经济法律的一个空白,但对于股东具体如何行使重整计划表决权却几乎没有规定。立法者注意到对债权人利益的保护和债务人的东山再起,而忽略了对股东权益的保护。笔者对如何保护股东表决权的提出了具体建议,包括出资人会议的开会形式、表决标准、投票方式等,以完善立法。     

论股东表决权信托制度

在现代市场经济社会中,股东表决权是公司法中十分重大的基本问题之一,而我国《公司法》对其规定比较简单,尤其对股东表决权信托这一起源于美国并在其他国家行之有效的表决权制度更是根本没有涉及,这在制度上影响了公司的经营活动和司法实践运作．本文拟通过分析股东表决权信托制度的内涵及法律特征,思考我国建立表决权信托制度的可行性,以期对完善我国表决权信托制度提出立法论建议。     

股东大会通讯表决的运行规则

通讯表决的有效运行需要法律规则的保障,这些规则主要是与议案内容有关信息的披露、通讯表决的具体行使方式与对特殊问题的处理规则。有关信息的充分披露是实行通讯表决的前提,应披露的主要信息及披露方式,由主管机关以规范性文件规定。股东以书面表决或电子表决不同方式行使表决权时,应明确规定具体行使方法与送达时间,并明确对临时动议或修正案与多重投票的处理规则。     

国外公司立法中的中小股东特殊保护制度及其启示

鉴于股份有限公司股东的广泛性与流动性等客观事实,各国公司立法中一般都包含了中小股东保护的特殊条款,以提高中小股东在股份有限公司中的实际地位,防止出现少数大股东利用股份数额的优势操纵公司经营的消极现象。纵观各国公司立法,对中小股东的特殊保护措施主要有以下几项: (一) 确立限制表决权制度。股份有限公司的股东会一般实行“一股一票”表决方式,在“多数规则”(即少数服从多数)的支配下,大股东掌握一定数量的股份(如公司股份总数的50％以上),就可形成表决权的绝对或相对多数状态并达到控制公司决策的目的。为了削弱大股东的这种表决力量,有的国家规定了限制表决权制度,即通过法律或章程规定,对股东表决权的绝对量予以适当的限制。一旦该股东持有股份的表决     

表决权差异安排与科创板治理

差异化表决安排,是推动新兴经济发展的制度创新,是企业家与投资者之间的一种治理契约机制、风险分配机制、激励机制与自我保护机制。围绕我国首例采纳差异化表决安排的"优刻得公司"的治理安排,引发学者重新反思监事会与独立董事的监督模式、不宜强制性推行时间日落条款、肯定科创板的现实治理安排。立法者应寻求控制股东特质企业愿景与少数股东权益保护之间的最佳平衡。监管者应坚持监管强度与投资者博弈能力相匹配的严格监管机制。司法者应充分尊重差异化表决下的公司自治,兼顾防范控制股东滥用表决权。我国进行差异化表决制度的法律移植过程中,必须立足于我国投资者保护偏弱、监事会与独立董事监督形式化、监管措施仍在摸索中、科创板治理商事裁判刚刚起步的现状,寻求适合本土的科创板治理体系。     

浅议上市公司的股东分类表决机制

按照同股同权的基本原则,在股东大会的表决中一般适用一股一表决权制度,由此形成的资本多数决也被认为是风险与收益相适应的结果。但在股份之间明显出现差异时,容易引起占多数股份的股东对占少数股份股东的侵害,出现实质上的不平等。在我国证券市场上,流通股股东就面临如此情况。因此,在存在不同种类的股份或互相之间利益有明显差异的股份时,应引入股东分类表决制度。     

公司章程修订中的小股东权益保护

近年来,不论在有限责任公司还是在股份有限公司,控股股东和大股东压迫小股东的事情十分常见。新公司法根据现实生活中小股东利益屡次受侵害的突出矛盾,规定了累积投票制、表决权回避制、异议股东股份收买请求权、表决权代理制、少数股东权制度、派生诉讼等一系列制度,为小股东维护自身正当合法权益作了非常好的制度设计。这些制度将成为小股东维权的重要法律武器。但是,新公司法规定的制度中,部分制度是粗线条的,尚需在具体实施时设置操作条件和步骤;部分制度本身就存在缺憾需要合理补充;而部分制度又授权公司可以根据实际情况排除适用。小股东要最大限度地保护自我,还需要在公司实际操作中通过自己的努力进一步扩展权利的空间。小股东扩展权利空间的最理想途径是在修订公司章程中有所作为。新公司法赋予公司更大的自治空间,最重     

Is Personal Vote‐Seeking Behavior Effective?

Does representatives' legislative activity have any effect on their electoral performance? A broad theoretical literature suggests so, but real‐world evidence is scarce as empirically, personal and party votes are hard to separate. In this article, we examine whether bill initiation actually helps MPs to attract preference votes under flexible list electoral systems. In these systems, voters can accept the party‐provided rank order or vote for specific candidates, which allows a clear distinction between personal and party votes. The empirical analysis uses data on bill initiation by Belgian MPs in the period 2003–2007 to explain their personal vote in the 2007 elections. We find that particularly single‐authored proposals initiated shortly before the upcoming elections are associated with a larger personal vote.     

Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 National Chambers

The paper looks at the relationship between institutions and vote unity in national parliaments with the help of a large data set of votes from 33 national parliaments. The tests run are the first to confirm empirically the relationship between vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. The paper also provides a theoretical explanation for why the existence of the confidence procedure influences vote unity despite being used only rarely. The vote of confidence influences votes through the development of control mechanisms as well as the selection of party members who are more ideologically united. This study also challenges the view that electoral rules which make candidates individually accountable to voters necessarily lead to more vote defections. The findings suggest that higher personal accountability decreases vote unity only if party leaders do not control candidate nomination. Parties that rely on government finance for campaigns are also more united.     

Party Unity in the Swiss Parliament: The Electoral Connection

This study investigates the connection between legislative and electoral politics in Switzerland. The authors postulate that party unity is higher in an election year, and more specifically in votes on issues that are important for the party platform and that are of greater visibility to voters. The authors analyse the entire voting record of the Swiss parliament (lower house) on legislative acts between 1996 and 2007, which consists of roll call votes as well as unpublished votes. The authors find a strong effect of elections on voting unity among certain parties, and also find encouraging support for the hypotheses that this effect is mediated by the visibility of the vote and related issue salience.     

小额诉讼救济机制比较研究——兼评新修改的《民事诉讼法》有关小额诉讼一审终审制的规定

2012年8月31日新修改的《民事诉讼法》对小额诉讼规定了一审终审制,比较世界各国有关小额诉讼的立法规定,这一规定的科学性与合理性是值得研究的。在有关小额诉讼程序的立法设置中,基于权利救济的需要,以及不同的救济思想与立法目的,某些国家和地区设置了诸如"动议"、"特殊上诉"、"裁判异议"等多种救济方式。这些不尽相同的救济方式,不仅类型各异,而且从救济机制的角度上看也存在较大差异。我国有关小额诉讼救济机制的设置,从缩短诉讼时间、减少诉讼环节以及方便当事人诉讼等角度考虑,应当采用类似于"裁判异议"的立法规定形式与救济方式。     

投票权信托的本土化方式探讨

肇端于英国的信托制度在美国获得了极大的发展,其弹性机制被运用于众多的领域,投票权信托就是信托制度在美国公司法中的一种发挥.它是享有投票权的股东根据协议将其股份转让给受托人,由受托人持有该股份并行使投票权.投票权信托的灵活机制在促进公司治理与保护中小股东利益方面有着独特的价值,故中国目前应着手引进该制度.     

浅析公司人格否认制度

《公司法》颁布实施已有十年,《公司法》虽对某些滥用公司法人行为作出了规定并加以调整,但单纯依靠现行公司法律框架体系不足以保护债权人的利益。在现实生活中仍出现有些人利用公司人格及有限责任从事不正当行为的现象,严重危害交易安全,损害债权人利益。因此,为完善现行《公司法》,有必要引进公司人格否认制度,对我国现行公司法人制度进行补充、完善。本文针对公司人格被滥用的现状,对公司人格否认制度确立的必要性、可行性作了初步分析并提出了具体的立法设想。     

私法中的“人”——法人体系的序列化思考

与传统的私法视角下、交易场合中，法人与自然人一律平等，皆为无差别的“私法中的人”的思维不同，在历史观中，“社团法人”与“财团法人”是具有法社会学意义的两大法人“模型”。两模型之角力，体现为不同的法人类型通过消长其“社团性”，调整团体与团体成员各自就法人财产进行支配的“法律上的距离”，而排列为与其公、私域属性相适应的，促进社会整合的法人类型序列。在历史上这可呈现为各法人本质学说流派的论争，在当代则反映为某些民法典中，不同社会功能法人类型的财产权强弱之差序安排。最终这将促使民法扬弃对法人的狭隘私法定性，正视与回应法人跨越公、私体制的“复合人”特质，进而也提高民法应对社会分化与转型的能力。     

Disputes about corporate expression absorption and their legal remedies

Corporate expression is the expression that a company gives to the outside in its capacity as a legal entity. Often referring to resolutions made by shareholder meetings and the board of directors, based on good faith and bound by contractual spirit, a company must be held liable for its expression. Corporate expression absorption refers to the corporate behaviors and situations wherein the majority voting shareholders and directors replace the will of the minority voting shareholders and directors within their own will. Among them, the majority voting shareholders at a shareholders’ meeting (shareholders’ general meeting) are decision-making shareholders, and directors, managers and other senior management staff that decide corporate affairs are called decision-making members. Corporate expression absorption consists of two sorts: absorption by shareholders’ meeting and absorption by the board of directors. Shareholders’ meeting is a company’s authoritative organization; when the voting rights of some shareholders exceed the statutory limit, they will be able to manipulate the expression of shareholders’ meetings and replace the will of other shareholders with that of their own. The expression absorption by the board of directors refers to the practice wherein the majority directors decide on important corporate matters in accordance with the majority rule. Thus, it can be seen that the corporate expression absorption is a double-edged sword, not only capable of uplifting operational efficiency but also likely to help decision-making shareholders achieve personal gains and transfer corporate interests. As for the disputes of corporate expression absorption, the following legal remedies might be adopted: (1) Limit the voting rights of decision-making shareholders. (2) Provide shareholders with veto power over specific events. (3) Ask the chambers of commerce (industry associations) to arbitrate specific events. (4) Preserve the market value of shares held by dissenting directors. (5) Expand cumulative voting; (6) Provide shareholders the right to exit. (7) Legal remedies for corporate deadlock. (8) Shareholders’ derivative lawsuits. __________ Translated from China Law, No. 4, 2005     

行政声明异议制度研究

行政声明异议制度作为一个法律制度其价值是十分明显的 ,其实体上的价值包括对行政相对人权益的保护和对行政机关行政权威的维护两个方面。其程序上的价值是使行政救济制度有了最为方便的救济程序 ,是对整个救济程序的一个补充 ,且使原来类似于或者归属于司法程序的救济程序行政化 ,既补充了司法程序的不足 ,又对行政程序概念进行了适当延伸。行政声明异议的主体是行政相对人 ,对象是行政主体 ,标的是未进入实质阶段的行政行为。目前我国行政程序法和行政实体法尚无这一制度的规定 ,所以 ,应对我国设立行政声明异议制度的相关问题 ,尤其是技术问题予以探讨 ,以求我国行政救济制度的完善     

Passing and Strategic Voting on the U.S. Supreme Court

Analyzing strategic aspects of judicial decisionmaking is an important element in understanding how law develops. In this article, we examine sophisticated voting on the U.S. Supreme Court by empirically modeling justices' decisions to pass when it is their turn to vote during conference discussions. We argue that, due to the opinion assignment norm, the chief justice may pass when one of the key conditions necessary for sophisticated voting—certainty about the views held by other justices and the agenda—is lacking. By passing, the chief can view his colleagues' votes in order to determine which vote will allow him to assign the majority opinion and, ultimately, forward his policy preferences. Using data from Justice Lewis F. Powell's conference notes, we show that the chief passes for this purpose, and that doing so is an effective strategy. In addition, we show that the senior associate justice in a case, who has a nontrivial chance of assigning the majority opinion, also passes for strategic reasons. As we expect, the data indicate that the remaining associates seem not to pass for strategic purposes.