Learning from the Danish case: A comment on Palle Svensson's critique of the Franklin thesis

Abstract. Palle Svensson in this issue of EJPR has objected to the characterisation of Danish voters made by Franklin and others who, in various publications, expounded the thesis that on issues of low salience, referendum votes tend to follow party lines. Svensson finds evidence that the Maastricht Treaty was not an issue of low salience to Danish voters in the ratification referendums conducted there, and gives other details of the evolution of public opinion regarding Europe that clarify the circumstances in which our thesis should apply. In the light of his arguments, this Comment presents a more nuanced version of the thesis that learns from the Danish case, and should be of greater utility than our earlier version in helping to interpret the role of government standing in referendum outcomes.     

Federalism and the European Union: A constitutional perspective

Constitutional questions have resurfaced in the last few years with regard to the European Union. The Maastricht Treaty is a kind of constitutional reform. The rejection of this treaty by Denmark in its first referendum, and the subsequent debate of the treaty that has taken place, raise questions about both the nature of the European Union, and the process by which its rules (constitution) get revised and approved. Similar questions surround the entry of Austria and the three, additional Scandinavian countries into the Union. Perhaps, no event called the European Union's constitution, or lack thereof, into question more that way in which a new President of the Commission was chosen during the summer of 1994. This paper will reexamine the European Union's structure and procedures from a constitutional perspective. Drawing upon the author's recently completed book, Constitutional Democracy, the paper will review the purpose for the Union's existence, the implications of this purpose for the structure of the Union (federalism versus confederation), the rules for making collective decisions in the Union, citizenship, and in particular, the procedures by which the European Union's “Constitution” is written and revised. The constitutional perspective adopted is taken from public choice. The political institutions of the European Union are examined relative to those rational, self-interested individuals would choose to advance their interests.     

Experimentalist governance in the European Union: A commentary

Sabel and Zeitlin's Experimentalist Governance offers an insight into European governance in those cases where the EU institutions do not have clear competence and where member states are not prepared to accept a unified policy on a problem at hand. Experimentalist Governance identifies four steps of action: agree on common goals, have lower levels propose ways to meet goals, then report on their meeting of goals, and, finally, periodically reevaluate the review procedures. By looking at the developments in EU policymaking through the lens of experimentalist governance (EG), one obtains an appreciation of how goals might be achieved that would otherwise not likely have been achieved through the community method. Sabel and Zeitlin highlight how EG can be effective in obtaining results, integrating peers, and incorporating deliberation, and offer a different way to deal with accountability and legitimacy. This article closes by taking the next step, namely, asking what challenges EG poses to democratic processes.     

A Demos for the European Union?

The European Union's alleged shortage of democratic legitimacy is said to be caused partly by the polity's lack of a demos which makes it unsuitable for majoritarian decision-making. However, this problem is often overshadowed by – sometimes even confused with – the lack of public enthusiasm as regards European integration. But, although clearly related, these are not synonymous. The no-demos thesis focuses on the lack of a transnational political relationship between individuals and is related mainly to the legitimacy of the EU's decision-making processes , whereas the issue of popular support primarily relates to the legitimacy of European integration itself. In this article, I address the former by attempting to answer the following questions. Firstly, what do we mean when we say that the EU has no demos? Secondly, does the EU really need a demos, and if so, how can one be created?     

Coping with a two-dimensional political space: Party mobilisation in referendums on European integration

European Union referendums invite national electorates to vote on transnational cooperation and regional integration, thereby creating tension between transnational ballot issues and domestic electoral mobilisation. Because of the tension, domestic political parties are forced to confront a two-dimensional political space in EU referendums. In the referendum-generated political space, unless integration issues are more salient than domestic concerns, intra-divided and inter-converged mainstream parties tend strategically to abstain from the campaigns. Yet, explicit inter-party collusion may allow the pro-integration mainstream to form a party cartel in EU referendums. Suggestive evidence is drawn from a case study of the two Irish referendums on the Nice Treaty. Based on a party-candidate survey, Irish parties are mapped onto a latent two-dimensional political space. The findings shed new light on the initial abstention of Irish mainstream parties in the first Nice campaign and their subsequent mobilisation in the second referendum.     

A Primer on the Budget of the European Community

The integration of twelve Western European countries into a single market in 1992 will make the European Community (EC) a major force in world affairs. To familiarize the reader with the EC, this article examines the EC budget-how is it prepared, what it includes, and how it is financed. Some selected comparisons with U.S. institutions and processes are also offered in order to facilitate understanding.     

The European Community: A Balancing Act

The European Community has traditionally been analyzed usingtheories and concepts drawn from international relations ratherthan from federalism. This article emphasizes the balance betweenthe representation of territorial and nonterritorial interestsin the Community and argues that concepts drawn from federalismcan be useful in analytically understanding the Community aslong as the American model of federalism is not viewed as thenecessary federal referent. It describes the relative importanceof the territorial dimension within the major Community institutions—theCommission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council,the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice.The Court of Justice, it is argued, is particularly importantin giving the Community a "federal" contour. However, its methodof operation differentiates it in important ways from the Americanjudiciary. The role of territorial politics within the Communityis such that the Community's policymaking process, while unique,is certainly recognizable to students of comparative federalism.     

Taking Cues on Europe? Voter competence and party endorsements in referendums on European integration

Abstract.  One of the criticisms often levelled against direct democracy is that citizens lack sufficient knowledge to vote directly on policy issues. The 'No' votes in the French and Dutch referendums on the Constitutional Treaty have highlighted the importance of examining voter competence in referendums. This article proposes a theoretical framework for evaluating competence in EU referendums. It suggests that competent voting in EU referendums is based on issue-specific preferences and requires political information. Since most voters have little detailed knowledge of European integration, they rely on heuristics and cues when deciding how to vote. The important question is how much and which type of information voters require to make competent choices. This article examines whether and under what conditions the use of party endorsements as information cues can enhance competent voting in EU referendums. These theoretical questions are examined in an analysis of the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership.     

A priori power measures and the institutions of the European Union

Abstract. The a priori voting powers of member countries in the council of ministers of the European Union have been discussed in the literature mainly from the view–point of Banzhaf and Shapley–Shubik indices. This paper discusses — in the light of these and other more recent (Colomer's, Holler's as well as Deegan and Packel's) power indices — the interaction of the council ministers and the European Parliament (EP) under the assumption that the consent of both bodies is needed to carry a motion or piece of union–wide legislation. Moreover, the double–majority principle is discussed from the view–point of voting power distribution. Finally we consider the voting power distribution in a three–chamber system consisting of Commission, Council and EP.     

The European Council and The Council of the European Union: Shapers of a European Confederation

The European Council and the Council of the European Union playkey roles in the European Union. The European Council is largelyconcerned with system-steering, while the Council of the EUundertakes sectoral policymaking. What is common to these rolesis the balancing act carried out by both institutions. Bothhave to mediate the centripetal dynamics of integration, termedcooperative confederalism here, and the centrifugal dynamicswhich are found in the strongly entrenched territorial natureof power, centered on the member states. Using new institutionalistanalysis, the article illuminates different facets of the twoinstitutions1 functioning in mediating the two dynamics.     

Normative transformations in the European Union: on hardening and softening law

Abstract

Until the late 1980s, European integration was generally said to be based on ‘integration through law’. However, in the 1990s, a group of scholars observed that law seemed to be increasingly challenged and new modes of governance tended to distance themselves from legal integration. They were confronted with another group arguing that the EU was still subject to processes of judicialisation, juridification and Eurolegalism. Against this background, this special issue aims at understanding what triggers normative transformations, be it the hardening or the softening of law, at both EU and national levels. In this introduction, soft and hard law are given a definition based on obligation and enforcement. Then, normative transformations are situated in a framework which makes a distinction between processes, normative levels and political/administrative levels of transformation. Finally, three types of explanations are suggested to help us understand when and why transformations occur.