Preventing construction deaths: The role of public policies

Are stronger direct financial incentives or regulatory enforcement effective in reducing fatalities in the construction industry? We examine two important policies—state workers' compensation (WC) programs and federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) activities—which embody those strategies. We examine their impact by looking at state-level fatality rates in the construction industry from 1992 to 2016. Setting aside highway crashes and violence, the majority of employee deaths occur in construction. We find that states which exempt small firms from the requirement to buy WC insurance have higher fatality rates. When eligibility for compensation is restricted by longer waiting periods, fatality rates are substantially higher. More frequent federal or state OSHA inspections and, especially, consultation visits are associated with lower fatality rates, but higher average penalties are not. Limited variation in these policies over our sample period, especially for WC, makes these results suggestive rather than definitively causal.     

The Regulation Dilemma: Cooperation and Conflict in Environmental Governance

Across the United States and around the world, businesses have joined voluntary governmental and nongovernmental environmental regulations. Such codes often require firms to establish internal environmental management systems to improve their environmental performance and regulatory compliance. Meanwhile, governments have been offering incentives to businesses that self-police their regulatory compliance and promptly report and correct violations. This article examines how governmental regulatory enforcement can influence firms' compliance with mandatory and voluntary regulations. Cooperative regulatory enforcement—in which firms self-police their environmental operations and governments provide regulatory relief for voluntarily disclosed violations—yields optimal win–win outcomes, but only when both sides cooperate. If firms are likely to evade compliance, governments are better off adopting a deterrence approach. If governments insist on rigidly interpreting and enforcing laws, firms may have incentives to evade regulations and not voluntary codes. Cooperation is possible through credible signals between firms and government.     

Should you turn yourself in? The consequences of environmental self‐policing

Facilities that self‐police under the Environmental Protection Agency's Audit Policy are eligible for reduced penalties on disclosed violations. This paper investigates whether self‐policing has additional consequences; in particular, whether self‐policing reduces future enforcement activity. Using data on U.S. hazardous waste enforcement and disclosures, I find that facilities that self‐police are rewarded with a lower probability of inspection in the future, although facilities with good compliance records receive a smaller benefit than facilities with poor records. Additionally, facilities that are inspected frequently are more likely to disclose than facilities that face a low probability of inspection. The results suggest that facilities may be able to strategically disclose in order to decrease future enforcement. © 2007 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

The re-occurrence of violations in occupational safety and health administration inspections

How well do firms in the United States maintain compliance with occupational safety and health administration (OSHA) standards after being cited for a violation? How and why does this vary among standards? This paper identifies serious violations of 91 frequently cited standards at manufacturing plants during 1992–2002 and tracks compliance with that standard in later inspections over 10 years. While formal measures of Repeat violations are quite low, we find considerably higher re-violation rates for some standards once we look separately at how often health standards are cited in later health inspections and safety standards cited in later safety inspections. Characteristics of the standards affect re-violation rates, but not always in the expected direction. Standards whose violations are rated as more hazardous or which received higher initial penalties tend to have more re-violations. These findings could reflect inspector behavior, with those standards getting more attention and thus being cited more frequently. When, as in the case of OSHA and other enforcement agencies, we know about violations only when inspectors cite them, we need to consider bureaucratic behavior as well as employers' incentives.     

Identifying the causes of road traffic accidents in India: An empirical investigation

This study utilizes data for the period 2006–2015 to estimate the determinants of road fatality rates in the Indian states. We employ baseline regression, where the total traffic fatalities, total traffic injuries, rural road fatalities, and urban road fatalities are the functions of human errors in driving, weather conditions, and some control variables. This paper is exclusively focussed upon different sets of human‐driven factors in influencing the road fatality across the Indian states. Our empirical results show that reckless driving, defective motor conditions, bad weather, and reckless driving by bus, truck, and car drivers are found to cause road accidents. We further find that the increase in motorization rates and rash driving are the primary causes behind the road fatalities, and bad weather play a major role in causing road fatalities and injuries in urban areas. However, road fatalities are increasing; still, cases of under reporting, lack of proper road safety regulation, improper investigation procedures, increasing vehicle usages, and higher urbanization have made the matters quite worse in India.     

Secondary learning and the unintended benefits of collaborative mechanisms: The Federal Aviation Administration's voluntary disclosure programs

Along with other types of process‐oriented regulation, voluntary disclosure programs are increasingly used by regulatory agencies to supplement traditional inspection activities. Voluntary disclosure programs provide incentives, such as immunity or reduced regulatory enforcement to those submitting reports, while providing regulatory agencies with valuable information on existing risks and areas of non‐compliance. This article contributes to the discussion of voluntary disclosure programs by highlighting an important unconsidered benefit of such programs: the secondary learning they generate, above and beyond information about violations. Beyond the information submitted by firms contained in the self‐disclosures, the programs generate information and insights about the usual practices of the industry, the division of labor, typical problems, and ways to handle them – those details often invisible to those outside an organization or inside the organization but not “on the ground.” This additional information provides important benefits to both industry management and agency officials. We demonstrate the existence of secondary learning and describe the effect of the structure of voluntary programs on secondary learning with evidence from two case studies of the Federal Aviation Administration's voluntary disclosure programs: the Aviation Safety Action Program and the Voluntary Disclosure Reporting Program.     

Standard setting with incomplete enforcement revisited

Many regulatory agencies enforcing quality standards across diverse populations of firms lack sufficient resources to promote full compliance. Based on a model with lump-sum noncompliance penalties, W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser have advocated that, in most circumstances, an agency with insufficient enforcement resources should choose a less stringent standard than it would choose if it could induce full compliance. I show that the recommendation for regulatory restraint depends upon the shape of the penalty function. A review of inspection and penalty policies suggests that U.S. administrative law encompasses a diversity of variable expected penalty policies. The inspection and penalty policies employed in recent environmental statutes suggest, however, that agencies should compensate for insufficient resources by increasing the stringency of standards.     

Non-random assignment,vehicle safety inspection laws and highway fatalities

In this study, the distribution of inspection laws across states is endogenously determined by the relative strengths of lobbying groups within states. Previous studies that treat the laws as exogenous and find a 5 to 15 percent reduction in fatalities may have produced biased results. A selection bias model is developed in which non-random assignment is taken into account. Two equations are estimated: one explaining how many inspections are required, and the other explaining the effects of the inspections on fatalities per capita. Using single-equation techniques, results are obtained that are similar to prior studies. In the two-equation model that accounts for non-random assignment, inspection laws are not found to significantly reduce fatalities per capita.     

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CHILD SAFETY SEAT LAWS IN THE FIFTY STATES

This study evaluates the effectiveness of state child safety seat laws in the United States. Data for all fifty states for the period 1975 to 1994 are used. Pooled time series analysis is employed to estimate a model of the rate of fatalities suffered by children ages 0–5 years as occupants in automobile crashes. The occupant fatality rate for children 6–11 years of age is used as a comparison group to control for other trends not introduced in the estimated models. The results show that child safety seat policies have significantly reduced fatality rates among children 0–5 years of age. For each additional year of age covered by a state statute, this fatality rate drops 4.8%. A similar reduction in the fatality rate of the older age cohort (6–11 years old) was not observed.     

Agency governance and enforcement: the influence of mission on environmental decisionmaking

Administrative agencies seeking to impose sanctions for regulatory violations can handle matters internally or through civil or criminal courts. Organizational culture, legal constraints, and political and private actors may influence governance and hence choice of enforcement venue. An enforcement behavior model is constructed and tested empirically using a 1990–1997 sample of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) air, water, and hazardous waste penalty cases involving individuals. While EPA's enforcement arm embraces the mission of its regulatory arm—minimizing environmental harm—in part, it also has attributes of a police and prosecution force—specifically deterring (and maximizing social welfare) or incapacitating individual violators. Nevertheless, EPA may fail to minimize violations of and generally deter non‐culpable individuals who are affiliated with large firms. © 2002 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Framing policies to mobilize citizens' behavior during a crisis: Examining the effects of positive and negative vaccination incentivizing policies

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the issue of mobilization policies, that is, government practices directed at making the mass public voluntarily perform various behaviors for the collective benefit during a crisis. As COVID-19 vaccinations became accessible, governments faced the challenge of mass vaccination mobilization in order to achieve herd immunization. Aiming to effectively realize this goal, policy designers and regulators worldwide considered various mobilizing tools for vaccination compliance, including rewards and penalties, as they targeted vaccine opposers and hesitators, while trying to avoid the crowding-out effect among individuals who were intrinsically motivated to get vaccinated. However, the unique circumstances of the Coronavirus pandemic may have eliminated the crowding-out effect. Thus, our study explored the effect of regulation in the form of positive and negative incentivizing tools (i.e., rewards and penalties) during the coronavirus pandemic on vaccination intentions of 1184 Israeli citizens, prior to the national vaccination campaign. Results indicate that (1) both negative and positive incentives have a similar positive effect on individuals who declare they will not get vaccinated and those who hesitate to get the shot; (2) both positive and negative incentives induce the crowding-out effect; and (3) negative incentives generate a larger crowding-out effect in individuals who report preliminary intentions to get vaccinated, compared to positive ones. This emphasizes the need to avoid the crowding-out effect during the current and similar crises, and suggests considering applying a gradual and adaptive policy design in order to maximize regulatory efficacy and compliance.     

Managing Mass Fatalities during COVID-19: Lessons for Promoting Community Resilience during Global Pandemics

In the United States and around the world, COVID-19 represents a mass fatality incident, as there are more bodies than can be handled using existing resources. Although the management and disposition of bodies is distressing and heartrending, it is a task that local, state, and federal governments must plan for and respond to collaboratively with the private sector and faith-based community. When mass fatalities are mismanaged, there are grave emotional and mental health consequences that can delay recovery and undermine community resilience. Using insights from one author's mass fatality management research during the 2010 Haiti earthquake, this Viewpoint essay explores how mass fatalities are being managed in response to COVID-19. Based on the researcher's findings a decade ago, it is apparent that many lessons have not been learned. The essay concludes by providing governments with practical lessons on how to manage mass fatalities to facilitate and promote community resilience.     

Gasoline prices and motor vehicle fatalities

Fatal motor vehicle crashes per capita remained relatively stable over the 1990s, in spite of new traffic safety laws and vehicle innovations. One explanation for this stability is that the price of gasoline declined, which resulted in more vehicle miles traveled and potentially more fatalities. By using 1983–2000 monthly gasoline price and fatality panel data and fixed effects specifications, this study exploits within‐state variation over time in gasoline prices and found that a 10‐cent decrease in gasoline prices increased motor vehicle fatalities by 2.3 percent over a 2‐year period. The effect on higher‐risk younger adults is more than twice as large. The secular decline in real gasoline prices over the 1990s may partially explain why motor vehicle fatalities per capita have not decreased even with the adoption of more stringent state policies. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Public choice and the EPA: Empirical evidence on carbon emissions violations

This study provides evidence of public choice determinants of the penalties assessed by the Environmental Protection Agency for carbon emissions violations. Following the work of Stigler (1971), Peltzman (1976), Tollison (1982), and Tullock (1989), this study points out that powerful business interest groups are able to use their political influence to shape EPA environmental policy for urban areas. The statistical estimates presented here suggest that business groups have limited power (through lobbying activity) in affecting the probability of the occurrence of an EPA citation for carbon emissions violations, while they may have considerable power in influencing thedegree of an EPA citation for carbon emissions standards, once a citation occurs.     

A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL REGULATION

The emphasis of this paper is on the development of a framework for analyzing the impacts of governmerit intervention on issues of public health and safety. Government policies are classified into three general strategies: regulatory, fiscal, and educational. In most issues, governments pursue policies in all three categories. The authors explain how the effects not only of specific policies, but also of these general policy types can be assessed over the range of social issues. The conceptual framework is tested with regard to a particular issue–alcohol-related traffic accidents–across the American states from 1979-1 984. The results suggest that fiscal and educational policies had little effect, but certain of the regulatory policies tended to be related to traffic fatalities involving alco- hol. The empirical analysis demonstrates the utility of the conceptual framework presented.     

Assessing OSHA Performance: New Evidence from the Construction Industry

The determinants of OSHA performance can be examined by breaking the regulatory process into three elements relating to enforcement, compliance behavior, and the adequacy of standards in addressing safety outcomes. This paper develops and applies this framework to the U.S. construction industry during the period 1987 to 1993. Enforcement activity among the firms in the sample was substantial, with firms facing a high probability of annual inspection. But, despite this significant enforcement effort, inspections have a modest effect on firm compliance with OSHA standards. Finally, the health and safety standards cited most frequently diverge from the major sources of fatalities and injuries on construction projects. These results suggest that historic enforcement policies toward construction make less sense as OSHA moves into its fourth decade of operation. More generally, the paper illustrates the problem of focusing enforcement resources on large, high‐profile companies even though they often are not the major source of regulatory problems in an established area of public policy intervention. © 2001 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Institutional Sources of Legitimate Authority: An Experimental Investigation

Unelected officials with coercive powers (e.g., police, prosecutors, bureaucrats) vary markedly in the extent to which citizens view their actions as legitimate. We explore the institutional determinants of legitimate authority in the context of a public goods laboratory experiment. In the experiment, an “authority” can target one “citizen” for punishment following citizen contribution choices. Untargeted citizens can then choose to help or hinder the authority. This latter choice may be interpreted as a behavioral measure of the authority's legitimacy. We find that legitimacy is affected by how authorities are compensated, the transparency with which their decisions are observed, and an interaction between these. When transparency is high, citizens are more willing to assist authorities who receive fixed salaries than those who personally benefit from collected penalties, even when citizens' material incentives are controlled for. Lower transparency reduces support, but only for salaried enforcers.     

Development of the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Economic and Legal Aspects

The path of gradual commercialization of current space applications, such as launch services, satellite communication services, direct broadcasting services, satellite remote sensing and navigation services, and satellite weather monitoring services, will most likely be followed by future activities of use of space resources. Ventures, like mining the natural resources of the Moon and asteroids, are likely to become technologically feasible in the near future. The question is what would be the most appropriate approach to address the future needs of exploitation of space resources: should it remain the exclusive province of state governments; should the private sector take over such space activities; or should a public-private partnership type of venture be encouraged? As state governments are becoming constrained by budget deficits, an increased reliance on private sector involvement in space activities involving the extraction and use of space resources is to be expected. When deciding whether to invest in commercial ventures of resource use exploitation, any potential private investor will be faced with the issues of economic costs, risks, and perceived regulatory barriers. This study argues that the perceived regulatory barriers, i.e., the licensing requirement, the “common heritage of mankind” principle of international space law, and protection of intellectual property rights, are not obstacles to economic development. Governments should provide both policy and regulatory incentives for private sector participation in the area of space natural resource use by funding basic research and development and by sponsoring liability insurance for private ventures among other incentives.     

Managing Racial Diversity: Matching Internal Strategies with Environmental Needs

Although demographic diversity has been of paramount concern to researchers and practitioners in public management, studies exploring managerial strategies to capitalize on and respond to the needs of diverse client populations are scarce. This article examines strategies for managing diversity as a way to buffer environmental challenges in service delivery and performance resulting from heterogeneous client demands. Findings suggest that administrators prioritize diversity efforts when faced with higher levels of regulatory violations (a performance measure). A higher percentage of black residents is associated with lower service quality. However, the effect of managerial strategies for diversity on performance is conditioned by the racial composition of the clients: as the percentage of black nursing home residents increases, diversity management efforts are associated with a lower number of regulatory violations. Similarly, at higher levels of racial heterogeneity, diversity management efforts are associated with fewer regulatory violations.     

Doubling the estimated value of life: Results using new occupational fatality data

Using a new series of data on occupational fatalities compiled by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, the authors reassess value-of-life calculations based on labor market tradeoffs between fatality risks and wages. The new data are less subject to the problems of measurement error that plague previously used measures of risk. They indicate higher risk levels than previously believed and a significantly different composition of risk levels within industries. The more comprehensive risk data yield value-of-life estimates of $5 million or more—at least twice as large as estimates obtained using the Bureau of Labor Statistics risk data employed in previous studies.