Beyond labeling: The case of the mentally retarded

This paper provides a review of the sociological literature on the mentally retarded. It attempts to analyze the reasons why the mentally retarded have been so thoroughly de-valued in our society that even social scientists ignore them as an object of study. The literature that does exist is primarily confined to the mildly retarded and generally applies labeling theory to understand the processes by which individuals unable to succeed in institutions such as schools are diagnosed as retarded. Studies employing labeling theory either ignore the severely retarded or allow the medical model as the only appropriate framework for understanding these populations.The failure to include the severely retarded in the general analysis of the problems of the handicapped by labeling theorists indicates a deficiency in the theory rather than the group excluded. A more critical perspective on the handicapped is required which ties the analysis to the study of other surplus populations such as the poor, the illiterate and other disposessed groups. The treatment of the severely retarded provides a looking-glass into the way our society can so de-value a dependent population that its very survival can be questioned.A version of this paper was presented to the Southern Sociological Society Meetings, Memphis, Tennessee, 1982.     

The language of deceit: An investigation of the verbal clues to deception in the interrogation context

We examined the hypothesis that reliable verbal indicators of deception exist in the interrogation context. Participants were recruited for a study addressing security effectiveness and either committed a theft to test the effectiveness of a new security guard or carried out a similar but innocuous task. They then provided either (1) a truthful alibi, (2) a partially deceptive account, (3) a completely false alibi, or (4) a truthful confession regarding the theft to an interrogator hired for the purpose of investigating thefts with a monetary incentive for convincing the interrogator of their truthfulness. Results indicated that only 3 out of the 18 (16.7%) clues tested significantly differentiated the truthful and deceptive accounts. All 3 clues were derived from the Statement Validity Analysis (SVA) technique (amount of detail reported, coherence, and admissions of lack of memory). Implications for credibility assessment in forensic interrogations are discussed.     

Vertical mobility and the naturalized swede: A research note on racism

The vicious circle of job restrictions, poverty, and all that follows with it tends to fix the tradition that Negroes should be kept out of good jobs and held down in unskilled, dirty, hot or otherwise undesirable work. Residential segregation and segregation at places of work hinder whites from having personal acquaintance with Negroes and recognizing that Negroes are much like themselves. In the eyes of white workers the Negroes easily come to appear different, as a low grade people, and it becomes a matter of social prestige not to work under conditions of equality with them. The fact that Negroes actually work almost only in menial tasks makes it more natural to look upon them in this way. The occupations they work in tend to become déclassé [1].     

Conflicts of Rights and Action-Guidingness

In this paper, we raise two points. First, any rights-based theory should provide a method by which to guide reasoning in addressing conflicts of rights. The reason, we argue, is that these theories must provide guidance on what should be done. Second, this method must contain two key recommendations: (1) We should try to find a deliberative mechanism through which none of the rights is simply eliminated from the scene; (2) these rights may be balanced against each other to define which right should prevail, but without considering non-rights-interests as if they were rights in the process. These recommendations instantiate two crucial principles that underlie our common intuitions on rights, namely, the principle that rights deserve equal respect and the principle that rights should be taken seriously.     

Economics of discriminatory sentencing

The legal and social professions have long been concerned with the problem of whether the fact that those incarcerated in prison tend to be drawn from the ranks of the poor unemployed and low social status is indicative of willful discrimination against the underprivileged. In this paper we apply the traditional analytical tools of economics to develop the conditions required for an efficient tradeoff between the probability of conviction and the length of prison sentence for both rich and poor. We show that the generally accepted approach of equal punishment for equal crimes tends to overdeter the rich and underdeter the poor, which results in a gross overrepresentation of the poor in the prison population. In order to eliminate this overrepresentation, the poor must receive a more severe sentence than the rich for an equivalent crime. This appears to contradict normal definitions of equity and we address this issue. We also show that an increase in the total crime budget when used efficiently must always result in longer sentences but can, under appropriate conditions, require a lower probability of apprehension.     

Saleem A. Shah

This article introduces a special section ofLaw and Human Behavior entitled Commenorative Articles in Memory of Saleem Shah. The six articles that it introduces describe Shah's lifetime contributions to the development of concepts and research in law and mental health, as well as his substantial influence on the quality of forensic mental health services nationally and internationally.     

重构法的价值基准

将“人的权利”作为学界公认的法律价值基准，其本身存在着法的目的与其二元论哲学基础的背反。在权利本位学说主导下，传统法的价值基准决定了法律的伦理基础是利己主义的，而以人类自私为正当性的法律价值基准实际上是人类沙文主义的一种表现。21世纪构建人与生态环境之间和谐秩序的要求必然导致法律价值基准从“人权本位”向“生命本位”的转移与重构。在新的法律价值基准中，人的权利不再是对其他生命权利的排斥，而是对其他生命权利的包容和支持，人将构成其他生命在法律权利方面的代言人。     

“Ice is strong enough for a man but made for a woman”

This paper is concerned with the cultural and gendered context of crystal methamphetamine use among Asian Pacific Americans, and draws on recent sociological discussions on masculinities and feminities. The data are based on an ethnographic study of moderate to heavy ice users, and compares the experiences of Asian Pacific American women and men in their initiation to use, their motivations to continue using, and the changing nature of their relationship to the drug and significant others. The paper concludes with a gender comparison of the violence associated with crystal methamphetamine use.The research for this paper was supported by a grant to theInstitute for Scientific Analysis from the National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01-DA06853) awarded to Patricia Morgan, Ph.D., entitled Ice and Other Methamphetamine Use: An Exploratory Study. The data collected for this paper was helped by the collaborative efforts of the study research staff: Jerome Beck, Douglas McDonnell and Rachel Gutierrez. The author also acknowledges the Social Science Research Institute at the University of Hawaii. The opinions and conclusions are those of the author.     

Why People are Committed to Human Rights and Still Tolerate Their Violation: A Contextual Analysis of the Principle–Application Gap

We report results from two experimental studies that show a large gap between support for general principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and denunciation of concrete violations of these principles. Participants in both studies read different scenarios involving human rights violations committed by various authorities in Western contexts. In all situations, attributes or actions of the victims could be used to justify the violations. Participants indicated their level of support for each human right and the unacceptability of violations of it. A dual principle was found to organize positioning towards the violations: participants with a rights-based orientation denounced the violation independently of the victims attributes, whereas context-oriented respondents relied on the perceived deservingness of victims and considered the violation a just sanction of an unacceptable act. Judgmental differences were moderated by the situational context and participants extent of agreement with human rights.     

On deriving rights to goods from rights to freedom

This paper examines a particular type of argument often employed to defend welfare rights. This argument contends that welfare rights are a necessary supplement to liberty rights because rights to freedom become hollow when their bearers are not able to take advantage of their freedom. Rights to be provided with certain goods are thus a natural outgrowth of a genuine concern to protect freedom.I argue that this reasoning suffers from two fatal flaws. First, it rests on an erroneous notion of what it is to have a right, neglecting the fact that the exact source of a person's inability to exercise a right is crucial to determining whether that right is being respected. Second, the argument equivocates as to the freedom that rights are intended to protect, sometimes confusing freedom with ability, sometimes confusing not being free with not having other desired things, and sometimes confusing what a person is able to do with what a person is entitled to do.     

Justifying law: An explanation of the deep structure of American law

Conclusion Charles Darwin argued that human beings are what happen whenphysical laws act upon a planet with the characteristics that earthhad five billion years ago. Similarly, I have argued that theprimacy of individual will is what eventually happens when asociety allocates and limits coercion based upon rights. From timeto time particular visions of the good or the right dominate publicbehavior, but they are eventually enframed by rights — the authoritative claim of each person to respect.I have argued that the propositional structure of American law—the laws themselves — can be seen to be a logically consistentsystem of propositions stemming from the axiom that the will ofeach person is worthy of respect. This is an explanatory, not anormative, proposition. The axiom was not put there by anyoneand the law derived from it, any more than the human brian wasput there and the theory of relativity derived from it. The axiomcame to be embodied in k because of a fact — the single universalcharacteristic of human beings that is relevant to the question ofarranging coercion is individual will — and a process — the right ofeach person to demand a justification for coercion used upon him.Since will is universal to human beings, this would suggest thatany rights-based legal system would evince a general structuresimilar to our own. Particularities of national culture, naturalresources, population density, and so on would produce a verydifferent liberty frontier from the one facing this country andhence, different laws. But the general structure of law — the relationship between principle and policy decision, the role of thebasic rights, and so on — should be similar. This similarity shouldprovide a common basis for cooperation between states, transcending particularities of economic structure, political structure and ideology. We have seen that a very broad range ofeconomic and political institutions may be justified. The essential difference between states lies not in the different ways that theyarrange institutions but in the different ways that they justifythem. Those that justify them to people as persons are similar.Those that justify them by conformity to a design are different.The theory set out here is not a design. It is an explanation. Onevirtue of explanations is that they draw forth other explanations.More importantly, they offer perspective — they tell us what weare up to. As the social relations which law must rationalizebecome ever more complex, perspective becomes ever more necessary. The simple laws have already been written. The connectionbetween the doctrine of consideration and the first principle isobvious. The connection between the hard look doctrine ofreviewing administrative agencies and the second principle isnowhere near so obvious (though it is a lovely example of thejudicial process enframing the realm of uncertainty). The morecomplex and artificial the institution, the poorer the guidance ofintuition and the more necessary are conscious guides to decision.Justification comes easy to printers. Most of them don't knowwhy a page of print that has straight margines left and right isjustified. They don't need to know, for the idea has immediateintuitive appeal; it is easy to accept and to remember, and, onceremembered, it is an effective guide to behavior. It is easy to seethat this line of print is not justified and to do somethingabout it. It is not so easy to tell whether the hard look doctrine orthe enforcement of a surrogate motherhood contract sits fairly on itspage. Justification of law requires an understanding of thecriterion against which it is being done. There is an intuitive core— a sense — to any act of judgment, but that core can be illuminated and developed by an understanding of the framework withinwhich it operates.     

Narcotics trafficking and the American mafia: The myth of internal prohibition

Numerous books assert that the Mafia long had a prohibition against engaging in narcotics trafficking, either for reasons of morality, or else because of the public stigma attached to drugs. In reality, there are many problems with the belief in voluntary abstention. The mythical nature of internal prohibition, and the far different reality, will be illustrated from the case of Philadelphia, supposedly the base for one of the most powerful and traditional-minded of all the American Mafia groups, the family headed from 1959 to 1980 by don Angelo Bruno. We will attempt to explain the roots of the prohibition myth, both for writers and for the wider public that appears so endlessly enthusiastic about sagas of organized crime. Finally, the paper examines the implications of this myth for policy makers in successive wars on crime.     

The rule of power in the language of law

Conclusion Thus power appears as both a topic within an already constituted realm of legal analysis, and as one of the motors that drives the constitution of this realm. This second foundational level is only available to reflexive thought that can place its analysis within the world of law it analyses so as to monitor its own possibility-conditions. Power therefore presents itself as shaping the very language employed to articulate it so that the analytic language of legal education can become a resource in its own right. In drawing upon this resource we have found that power and truth are mutually implicated. Contrary to the counter-reflexive and implicit view of legal culture, this means that knowledge of the power/truth relation is also an outcome of this relation. This suggests that power is a positive factor in the determination of any legal meaning and developments within legal disciplines. Through the disowning of legal culture's counter-reflexivity it is possible positively to characterise the character and operation of power across the constituted and constituing levels. At the constituted level it shapes discourse and speakers from the inside as well as externally. At the constituting level — which can no longer be treated separately — it individualises/collectivises those very subjects, their positions and world, and distributes a conceptual and linguistic framework for its self-comprehension.     

Psychology,law, and the black community

Summary The present paper presented key applications of psychology and the law to the black community, embracing both civil and criminal law and legislation. The breadth of its focus preluded a more in-depth treatment of other areas relevant to black people which include issues related to psychiatric emergencies and involuntary hospitalization, child custody, and right-to-treatment litigation in prison and mental health facilities. In focusing attention on these applications and areas for activity, hopefully, I have not presented an unrealistic depiction of a responsive, socially sensitive, legal system capable and willing to exercise its powerful tools in the interest of the black community. To the contrary, there is considerable literature that identifies the historic role of the legal system in the enactments of laws to institutionalize and cement slavery, its failure to aggressively protect constitutional and civil rights of blacks, in imposing penalties differentially to blacks and whites in the criminal justice system, and more recently, conspiracies of law enforcement officials to deprive blacks of basic civil rights (Bell, 1975; Burns, 1973; Higgenbotham, 1973). The legal system, rather than being an effective instrument for justice and positive social changes, has often been a major source of racism. Thus, any meaningful attempts by lawyers or behavioral scientists in the interest of black people cannot ignore the racism that is embedded in the fabric of the legal profession and the behavioral sciences. Particular aspects of the law with significant social-psychological dimensions are: the cultural inertia, the archaicness of the law due to its roots in English common-law, historic and contemporary racism, conservatism associated with the principle of stare decisis, judicial elitism, and the substitution of administrative and judicial discretion for overt racism. Thus, in order for the legal system, or the field of psychology, to be reponsive to the needs of blacks and other oppressed groups, they must eradicate racism and injustice in their own ranks.Traditionally law has functioned as the hand maiden of the propertied class in our society. So it was to be expected that lawyers in the legislative halls, lawyers on the bench and lawyers in the executive branch of government would combine their talents to perpetuate by law this peculiarly American doctrine of racism predicated upon a claimed color inferiority.     

Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert Evidence in a Post-Daubert World

Drawing on the responses provided by a survey of state court judges (N = 400), empirical evidence is presented with respect to judges' opinions about the Daubert criteria, their utility as decision-making guidelines, the level to which judges understand their scientific meaning, and how they might apply them when evaluating the admissibility of expert evidence. Proportionate stratified random sampling was used to obtain a representative sample of state court judges. Part I of the survey was a structured telephone interview (response rate of 71%) and in Part II, respondents had an option of completing the survey by telephone or receiving a questionnaire in the mail (response rate of 81%). Survey results demonstrate that judges overwhelmingly support the gatekeeping role as defined by Daubert, irrespective of the admissibility standard followed in their state. However, many of the judges surveyed lacked the scientific literacy seemingly necessitated by Daubert. Judges had the most difficulty operationalizing falsifiability and error rate, with only 5% of the respondents demonstrating a clear understanding of falsifiability and only 4% demonstrating a clear understanding of error rate. Although there was little consensus about the relative importance of the guidelines, judges attributed more weight to general acceptance as an admissibility criterion. Although most judges agreed that a distinction could be made between scientific and technical or otherwise specialized knowledge, the ability to apply the Daubert guidelines appeared to have little bearing on whether specific types of expert evidence were designated as science or nonscience. Moreover, judges' bench philosophy of science seemed to reflect the rhetoric, rather than the substance, of Daubert. Implications of these results for the evolving relationship between science and law and the ongoing debates about Frye, Daubert, Joiner, and Kumho are discussed.     

(When) Are Rights Wrong? Rights Discourses and Indeterminacy in Gay and Lesbian Parents’Custody Cases

This paper examines the paradoxical and problematic position of rights discourses in lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) parents'custody and adoption cases. In it, I analyze the ways in which different types of rights are framed by the litigants and, alternatively, by the judges, as well as how the same constitutional rights (e.g., the right to privacy) are often deployed both in defense of and in opposition to gay /lesbian parents. An in-depth analysis of judicial decisions over a 50-year period and interviews with key family law players reveal the indeterminacy and therefore complexity of rights as a strategy and a discourse in the family law context. Consistent throughout this analysis are the problematic intersection of the collective and the individual in rights-based claims, and evidence of the distinct nature of LGBT rights claims as revolutionary in both their bases and their implications. The analysis confirms in some ways, but also contradicts and complicates many assertions of the "rights critique" of the past two decades. It also suggests a more complex and less dichotomous relationship between rights, status, and contract.     

Human and fundamental rights: What are they about?

Conclusion Human rights, distrusted by Bentham, through emergence ofGesellshaft, have sometimes been identified with rights of market men and gradually on an ad hoc basis and so have been given a relational or relativist character for that reason. Such a view ignores the test of humanness or the tele of human rights surviving any political association and the need for full development of human personality as an autonomous being inherent in full respect for all as moral persons. This disposes of the view of human rights in terms of rules of a game, or of connection between human rights and human action, or of the standard of the prudent man or, finally, of the ideology of the rising bourgeoisie. Equally, that very test of humanness disposes of criticisms of the human rights theory based on a concern for implementation of rights, on concentric circles based on the specific and concrete, on the impossibility of liking the billions, on the distinction between negative, positive and administrative rights, on the condition of being able to make valid claims and thereby denying human rights to the deprived millions in poor countries, on the social justice model, on the potential for violence and conflict and, finally, on the vagueness or subjectivity of human rights. An eclectic synthesis not between good and evil nor between right and wrong but between the extremes of the views presented in such critical explanations e.g. between the New Right and the New Left and between Hobbes and Rousseau) is what is needed in order to present a workable theory of human rights in the modern-day world.     

Putting fault back into products liability: A modest reconstruction of tort theory

This paper postulates that the proper function of tort law is to provide protection from, and redress of, non-consensual invasions of individual rights of person and property. It then proceeds to analyze and criticize, in that context, several theories of the law of unintentional torts including traditional English negligence law and the models of Posner, Fletcher and Epstein. That analysis proceeds in terms of the answers of each theory to a uniform set of questions which must be answered by any theory of the law of unintentional harms. The paper concludes that none of the theories examined is rights-based or, indeed, consistent with the existence of individual rights of person and property.The paper goes on to elucidate a theory of liability which is rights-based. That theory turns out to be variant of traditional English negligence law in which reasonable foreseeability of harm to legally recognized rights or interests is the sole criterion of liability, the burden of precautions on the agent of the harm being explicitly excluded from consideration.Finally, the rights-based theory is applied to the area of products liability. It is demonstrated that this area of the law of unintentional harm does have the same moral foundations as the general law of negligence so that resort to the anomalous, and amoral, constructs of fictitious warranties, strict liability, enterprise liability and the deep pocket is neither appropriate nor necessary.     

Psychopathy,Treatment Involvement,and Subsequent Violence Among Civil Psychiatric Patients

Individuals with psychopathy typically are viewed as incurable cases that should be diverted from treatment settings to environments where their behavior can be monitored and controlled. The prevailing clinical conviction that psychopaths are untreatable has crucial implications, given the scarcity of mental health care resources, the number of legal contexts that call for assessment of treatability, and the explosion of research on psychopathy and violence risk over recent years. Based on a sample of 871 civil psychiatric patients (including 195 potentially psychopathic and 72 psychopathic patients), this study explores the relations among psychopathy, receipt of outpatient mental health services in real-world settings, and subsequent violence in the community. The results suggest that psychopathic traits do not moderate the effect of treatment involvement on violence, even after controlling statistically for the treatment assignment process. Psychopathic patients appear as likely as nonpsychopathic patients to benefit from adequate doses of treatment, in terms of violence reduction. We interpret these results in light of prior research with offenders and analyze their implications for future research, policy, and practice.     

The New Water Legislation of Zimbabwe and South Africa – Comparison of Legal and Institutional Reform

Recently, several new pieces of water legislation have been promulgated in both Zimbabwe and the Republic of South Africa. The new acts are an attempt to correct injustices of a colonial past and to trigger development towards effective, equitable and efficient integrated water resources management influenced by the policy decisions in Agenda 21 and the need to respect economic and social human rights. This article aims at identifying and describing factors of prime importance in the process of legal and institutional reform. Major factors are earmarked and derived from the proceedings in Zimbabwe and are compared with the situation in South Africa. Thorough analysis by the author of proceedings, preambles, memoranda, legislation and addenda has induced roughly 5 major reform issues: The call for equitable water distribution based on a widely consented water resources management strategy; The need for effective and efficient integrated water resources management conducive to stakeholder participation through decentralisation processes; The redressing of legal shortcomings in former water legislation with the emphasis on the introduction of integrated approaches; The introduction of instruments of cost recovery for water resources management; The need to develop human resources capacity and institutional strength within the implementing agencies.For both Southern African states, these issues appear to be of comparable importance as major triggers for legal and institutional reform, although not always in the same sense.The resulting most important legal and institutional changes are presented, discussed and compared. Finally, prospects for and constraints on implementation of the new water legislation in these countries are compared.