Federalism and Consociational Regimes

Federalism and consociationalism are useful means of understandingpolitical systems. Federalism and consociationalism are bothbased on compound majoritarianism rather than simple majoritarianism,and both represent modern attempts to accommodate democraticcomplexity and pluralism, but the two systems are not quitesymmetrical, and territorial organization is not the only characteristicthat differentiates them. Instead, it can be said that federalismrelates to the form of a polity, while consociationalism relatesto the character of a regime. To the extent that federalismmay also function as the character of a regime, then federalismand consociationalism may be more symmetrical. One of the ambiguitiesof federalism is that it is often both form and regime. Consociationalism,however, relates only to regime.     

The Shadow of Sharia Over Nigerian Federalism

The sentencing under Sharia law in Nigeria's northern stateof Katsina in 2002 of a 31-year-old woman, Amina Lawal, to bestoned to death for adultery highlighted the rising religiousconflict and violence that has occurred since the resumptionof civilian democratic governance in 1999. Although the practiceof Sharia in personal and civil matters had been accommodatedby the British and by Nigeria's various constitutions, whatwas new in 1999 was the extension of Sharia from civil to criminalmatters, thus producing such punishments as decapitation, amputation,and stoning to death, threatening the well-being of non-Muslims,endangering fundamental rights protected by Nigeria's federalConstitution, and posing significant challenges to elected officialsand federal courts. The extension of Sharia to criminal lawin 12 northern states also has increased intercommunal and intergovernmentalconflict, threatening the fabric of Nigerian federalism.     

The Literature on Nigerian Federalism: A Critical Appraisal

There is a large body of literature on federalism in Nigeriacovering such major issues as the origins of Nigerian federalism,requisites of federalism, federalism versus other forms of association,the number of state units in the federal system, fiscal issues,political parties, distributional issues, and intergovernmentalrelations. However, a number of issues have received relativelylittle scholarly attention, including the economic aspects ofNigerian federalism, population movements and the federal arrangement,language policies, federal ethics, and various critical governmentaland nongovernmental institutions. There is a need to establishinstitutions for the study of federalism in Nigeria and to reduceethnic and ideological biases in research on Nigerian federalism.     

Federal Preemption Under Reagan's New Federalism

Ronald Reagan defined his federalism program in terms of returningpolitical power to state and local governments. In practice,he was Janus-faced with respect to his views on domestic policyissues. His "public" face emphasized initiatives promoting areturn of political power to the states and local governments.His "silent" face encouraged additional centralization of politicalpower in several functional areas, and he signed bills prohibitingstate economic regulation of certain industries. Most of Reagan'sinitiatives were administrative, and increased to a limitedextent the discretionary authority of states. In general, thepresident favored a smaller federal regulatory role but notnecessarily a larger state and local government role. He signedtotal preemption bills granting greater freedom of action tothe banking, communications, and transportation industries,and tax sanction and crossover sanction bills. At the closeof his administration, intergovernmental relations were morecoercive than they had been in 1980.     

The Economics of Nigerian Federalism: Selected Issues in Economic Management

Nigeria's economic difficulties are due primarily to public-sectormismanagement exacerbated by the dynamics of federalism andstate creation and by the growth in centralized federal power.Monetary policy has been inadequate, fiscal policy has rewardedstate governments but not brought their spending policies inline with their own resources and with national economic objectives,and resources have been consistently misallocated, largely becauseof the principle of "federal character." Recent efforts to deregulateand privatize the economy show promise, but the success of economicdevelopment will depend greatly on the future civilian or militarygovernance of Nigeria.     

Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State

The origins of Nigeria's federalism lie not in the pluralitiesof economic and geographic regions or of ethnic nationalities,but in the plurality of colonial administrative traditions imposedby the British. Different administrative traditions were especiallyevident in the Northern and Southern Regions of Nigeria. Thesetraditions produced regional rivalry and conflict that wereentrenched in the Nigerian polity by the processes of consolidationand nation-building. After independence, this regional rivalrybecame the basis for triggering the conflicts between economicand ethnic areas present in Nigeria's federal system and forcreating more states in attempts to accommodate various groupinterests.     

Between Either/Or and More or Less: Sovereignty Versus Autonomy Under Federalism

The concept of sovereignty arose with the appearance of themodern state. It has survived because the state has survivedas the seemingly necessary basis for political order. The persistenceof cultural and ethnic nationalism and international anarchyhas given the state a new lease on life. Countertendencies.includingareactionagainstthemonarchicalabsolutismassociatedwith sovereignty, have given rise to federal systemsoffering a more flexible, if less certain, combination of governmenton a large scale with relative autonomy on a smaller, localscale. Given modern realities promoting interdependence andmaking autarky both difficult to sustain and a threat to therights of minorities, it may be better to settle for the "moreor less" of federalism and autonomy than the "either/or" ofthe state and sovereignty.     

States to the Rescue? Aid to Central Cities Under the New Federalism

Central cities have been caught in a financial crisis caused by tax revolts and decreases in federal funding for cities during the Reagan administration. The impact of these events are examined, with particular attention to the response by states to the problems these circumstances have created for central cities and cities in general.     

Federalism and Decentralization: Ownership Rights and the Superiority of Federalism

The benefits and costs usually ascribed to federalism are benefitsand costs of decentralization; they are, therefore, presentin unitary states that are in fact all decentralized. The benefitsand costs specific to federalism pertain to ownership rightsin constitutional powers. Federalism is superior to confederalismand unitarianism because the ownership rights peculiar to thatsystem of government are such that they ensure the perduranceof competition when one or more competitors are unsuccessful.They do so because under federalism, powers cannot be repossessedunilaterally. Ownership rights have to be enforced; as a consequence,there are also costs that are specific to federalism.     

Devolutionary Federalism and Elazar's Typology: The Arkansas Response to Reagan's New Federalism

This article examines the relationship between the federal andstate governments with regard to the Reagan administration'sNew Federalism. The underlying concern centers on the financialrelationship among governments portrayed by Elazar's typologyof federal aid. The focus of this investigation is directedtoward the adjustments being made by the states to accommodatethe financial and administrative changes occurring on the nationallevel, as illustrated by the case of Arkansas. The analysiscenters on two questions: 1) Has the New Federalism initiativeachieved Reagan's goals of decentralizing governmental authorityback to the states? 2) Has a major redirection in the federalsystem been achieved by reducing the federal financial obligationin the intergovernmental system? The changes being made in thefederal system, as reflected by the adjustments occurring amongthe states, may signal an important realignment of federalism.     

New Federalism and Environmental Policy

This article examines the degree of correspondence between theconceptual underpinnings of President Reagan's New Federalismand the willingness and capacity of states to assume a largershare of environmental responsibilities. The findings indicatethat many of the states have not replaced federal aid reductionswith own-source revenues. Replacements that did occur were limitedto a single year and primarily in the area of hazardous wastemanagement grants. The implications of these findings are that"decentralization and defunding" of federal programs in theenvironmental area may have had an adverse effect on the states'ability to provide solutions to pressing environmental problemsin the first half of the 1980s.     

Federalism and Workforce Policy Reform

Workforce development policy encompasses a broad array of federaland state programs designed to foster improved workforce utilization,maintenance, and development. Federalism in U. S. workforcepolicy is examined in terms of the Workforce Investment Actand the Carl D. Perkins Vocational and Technical Education Act,laws enacted in 1998 authorizing two of the more important componentsof national workforce policy: job training and work-relatededucation. Coercive federalism in workforce policy began inthe late 1970s and is expected to persist into the future, evenas states serve as "laboratories of democracy." Whether enhanceddiscretion for workforce policy is forthcoming from Washington,states and localities will continue to demonstrate new, andpossibly better, ways of delivering workforce services. Workforcepolicies and programs will also feature an even more prominentrole for market-oriented service delivery. The comprehensivenessof national workforce policy, including broad concerns overefficiency, has yet to be addressed fully.     

Federalism and America's Public Works

On 24 February 1988, the National Council on Public Works Improvementsubmitted its final report on the nation's public works to thepresident and the Congress. The report concluded that America'sinfrastructure is not in ruins, as charged by the landmark bookentitled America in Ruins. The report did say, however, thatthe nation's infrastructure is only barely adequate and gettingworse. The council urged the nation to reverse course and givegreater attention to infrastructure renewal and expansion. Inthe council's view, federalism will be a major factor in thesuccess of the needed turnaround. Such change will require sharedresponsibilities involving the federal, state, and local governmentsplus the private sector. Significant changes in the relationshipsamong these actors have made the 1980s a decade of transition,diminishing federal influence on infrastructure issues.     

Congress and Reagan's New Federalism

This article analyzes the congressional response to the Reaganadministration's New Federalism proposals in terms of party,region, and constituency during Reagan's first term. While theCongress approved various spending cuts in grants to local andstate governments and in means-tested benefit programs to thepoor, even in 1981 when New Federalism initiatives enjoyed themost success, Congress terminated only one program, CETA publicservice jobs. A stalemate developed in 1982. The Reagan administrationand the congressional Republicans could not impose further majorspending cuts or program terminations, and the congressionalDemocrats could not restore the 1981 cuts or add new aid programs.Although the stalemate continued on New Federalism's dismantlingof aid programs as a grand scheme even into 1985, after PresidentReagan's reelection, Congress continued to approve incrementalcuts in overall spending, and the $200 billion budget deficitremained as a lever to force even greater cuts and program terminationsin the years ahead.     

Federalism and the shadow economy

This paper analyzes the relationships between federalism and the shadow economy. The theoretical analysis leads to the conclusion that the shadow economy is smaller in federal countries than in unitary states. The mobility of individuals among competing jurisdictions leads policy makers to adopt policies that are more efficient in terms of taxation and public good provision. This increases the return for activities in the formal sector relative to those in the informal one, thus reducing activity in the shadow economy. A cross-sectional empirical analysis of a sample of 73 countries confirms this theoretical prediction.