Municipal Bond Insurance: Trends and Prospects

Privately sold bond insurance is the most common form of credit enhancement for municipal bonds. Research generally finds that bond insurance reduces interest costs for lower rated, long–term debt issues. Researchers have concluded that these results are consistent with presumed investor risk aversion, as well as more "rational" risk management behaviors, and with theories concerning the efficiency–enhancing properties of financial intermediation in imperfect markets. We propose a research agenda based both on traditional theories and on additional hypotheses that seek to account for the observed use of bond insurance where net savings would not normally be predicted.     

No Guaranties: The Decline of Municipal Bond Insurance

The credit crisis that roiled the financial and housing markets in late 2007 and early 2008 resulted in well‐publicized budget challenges for state and local governments. Less visible has been a dramatic change in the bond insurance market, which alters how governments issue long‐term debt. Debt issuance data from Texas are used to model bond insurance premiums and examine utilization following the crisis. The results provide evidence that insurance premiums rose dramatically following the fiscal crisis, even when controlling for widening credit spreads and changes in the underlying credit quality of issuers.     

Is Management Performance a Factor in Municipal Bond Credit Ratings? The Case of Texas School Districts

Municipal bond ratings are an important determinant of interest costs that a bond issuer must pay. The three major bond rating firms profess that economic and management factors are considered in assigning a bond rating. The management component is of particular interest to public administrators because they can exert more direct control over management factors. Management factors have not been studied empirically in the literature because management performance is generally difficult to quantify. However, the public education sector has seen advances in performance measures and at the same time has increasingly relied on municipal bonds to finance construction. The ordered probit estimation provides support that management performance, as measured in the districts performance on standardized test scores and success in student college admission rates, does influence Texas school district bond credit ratings.     

State Mandated Accounting, Auditing and Finance Practices and Municipal Bond Ratings

The accounting, auditing, and finance practices of municipal governments often are legally constrained by regulations imposed by state governments under whose jurisdiction cities are created. These practices may impact on municipal security risks and returns, either directly in the bond market or indirectly through such market intermediaries as bond rating agencies. The purpose of this article is to assess the impact of state mandates on municipal bond ratings.     

Accounting for Natural Disasters: The Impact of Earthquake Risk on California Municipal Bond Pricing

While Katrina has raised awareness of the potential impact of hurricanes on municipalities along the Gulf Coast, it remains unclear if the municipal bond market considers other types of natural disaster risk in other areas. We attempt to fill this gap by conducting an analysis to determine if underlying geologic earthquake risk affects interest costs for municipal bond issuers in California. We find that earthquake risk does matter in determining the interest costs for municipalities issuing debt, but not universally—only for municipal bonds issued after Hurricane Katrina and only in relation to underlying geologic earthquake risk.     

The Credit Rating Agencies and the Subprime Mess: Greedy,Ignorant, and Stressed?

The credit rating agencies (CRAs) were an important component of the subprime mess. This article describes what the CRAs are, what they do, what roles they play, and how they fit into the regulatory system. It outlines the types of mortgage securities that the CRAs rate and outlines the evolution of the subprime mess. It then assesses three prime suspects in the CRAs' problems: incentives, ignorance, and stress. The author concludes that all three factors were important, that public officials were slow to react, and that additional safeguards have been put into place to prevent such problems in the future.

I feel that the rating agencies are somewhat of a mystically anointed monopoly, not unlike our good friends Fannie and Freddie, but with even less accountability.
—Representative Richard H. Baker, 2005
Everyone assumed the credit agencies knew what they were doing.
—Joseph Mason, credit expert at Drexel University, 2008

     

Dueling Revenue Caps and Municipal Bond Yields: The Case of Houston,Texas

Two competing revenue cap proposals, one from a citizen's group and the other proposed by the mayor, were on the November 2004, election ballot of the City of Houston, Texas. Both propositions passed, yet the citizen's group had to sue to have their initiative enforced. This study examines the effect on Houston bond yields of the series of events (from June 2004 through March 2006) surrounding these dueling revenue cap propositions. The empirical findings suggest that the budget‐related events can have a significant effect on yields demanded by investors in the secondary market for outstanding uninsured tax‐exempt general obligation debt.     

Municipal Bond Sales in Foreign Markets: Experience and Results

This article reviews the issue of state economic development financial incentives and the more development specific issue of engaging foreign capital markets as a source of funds for state industrial incentive in the post-TRA86 environment. An ex post empirical analysis of such a transaction is provided by revisiting the KDFA yen bond transaction. Observations and policy conclusions are also discussed.     

Legislative Capacity and Credit Risk

Legislatures differ in their institutional capacity to draft and enact policy. While strong legislatures can increase the congruence of policy outcomes to the electorate's preferences, they can also inject uncertainty into markets with their ability to alter the political economic landscape. We argue that this uncertainty will manifest in a state's ability to borrow and hypothesize a negative relationship between legislative capacity and creditworthiness. Using ratings of general obligation bonds issued by the American states over nearly two decades and data on the institutional capacity of state legislative assemblies, we find support for the claim that having a legislature that is better equipped to affect policy change increases credit risk evaluations. The results we present broaden our understanding of the importance of legislative institutions, the determinants of credit risk, and the economic implications of democratic responsiveness.     

The Credit Rating Agencies and Their Contribution to the Financial Crisis

The credit rating agencies that dominated the ratings of mortgage‐backed securities were Moody's and Standard & Poor's. The two agencies rated some 4.3 trillion dollars of bonds as triple AAA, yet within a period of 18 months these same rating agencies downgraded these bonds to below investment grade. This paper seeks to show that the ratings agencies business model, the issuer pays approach, led to major conflicts of interest with both the ratings agencies unable to walk away from a rating. The evidence given by analysts to Congressional Inquiries confirms a cultural revolution within the rating agencies, with analysts feeling unable to question the quality of a rating. Analysts who were described as being awkward by issuers were removed from the rating process. In the meantime, the income for the rating agencies increased from 3 billion dollars to 6 billion dollars, with the CEOs of the rating agencies receiving incomes comparable to the incomes to the CEOs of investment banks.     

Competition and Selection in Municipal Bond Sales: Evidence from Missouri

This article describes the results of an interest cost analysis of local government debt issuance in the State of Missouri. In Missouri the vast majority of municipal bonds are sold on a “no bid” basis. We discuss the theoretical arguments for and against competition and selection. Then we determine the degree to which cost differences exist while correcting for any potential selection bias. We use data on local government general obligation bonds sold from May 2004 to May 2005 provided by the Missouri State Auditor's office. We find that this substantial lack of competition imposes significant costs on Missouri governments.