Defense Supplementals and the Budget Process

Supplemental appropriations provide emergency adjustments to the current year, usually for national defense contingencies and natural disaster emergencies. Recently, they have adopted some of the complexities of the regular appropriation process. For example, both the president and Congress may suggest when a supplemental is a dire emergency and thus beyond spending discipline and when it must be offset. Some supplementals have paid for nonemergency activities, others have resulted in funding decreases, and still others have resulted in spending in future years. Compared to the normal appropriation process, supplementals are usually passed expeditiously. Defense supplementals are generally precisely priced, whereas disaster supplementals tend to be lump sum estimates.     

The OMB Budget Examiner and The Congressional Budget Process

This is the second of a two-part retrospective on the evolving role of the OMB budget examiner. The examiner has become more active in negotiations with the legislative branch and tracking the legislative status of various fiscal measures. A new central budget management system was created to monitor appropriation bills. The OMB budget examiner has also been increasingly used to provide information for advocacy purposes before Congress and the public. The institutional effect on OMB of these changing roles is examined and suggestions for organizational reform are made.     

Reforming the Expenditure Budget Process: The Canadian Experience

During the past twenty years the government of Canada has introduced three distinct approaches to managing its expenditure budget. The approaches were all introduced with considerable fanfare and also with the promise that they would enable the government to finally get a firm handle on its expenditure budget.
This paper looks at the three approaches and outlines their most important features. The paper also presents the reasons that led to the downfall of both the Program Planning Budgeting System (PPBS) and the Policy and Expenditure Management System (PEMS). The paper goes on to argue that the recently introduced approach—labeled the Expenditure Review Committee (ERC)—is also unlikely to meet expectations. It also provides an historical context for understanding why each particular approach was adopted.     

Budget Process Reform: Waiting for Godot

The unraveling of the budget process described by Irene Rubin will have extraordinary consequences for the long-term budget outlook facing the nation. The retirement of the baby boom generation will prompt unprecedented and unsustainable structural fiscal imbalances for decades to come. Early policy action on the spending and revenue sides of the budget is critical to avert fiscal and economic crisis and to phase in changes in order to avoid precipitous and politically perilous actions in the future. Yet such actions constitute what amounts to a politically unnatural act, as one generation of political leaders is asked to make sacrifices in current policies benefiting future generations. Budget process reforms can serve to highlight the salience of these issues and help deal with the significant political hurdles faced by decision makers in making these intertemporal budgeting trade-offs. Ironically, the need for budget rules and processes has intensified as policy makers have become more vulnerable to polarized political parties, ever more watchful media, and mobilized interest groups. Budget rules and processes can help policy makers cope by protecting their ability to make the hard choices that will be necessary. The pressures for budget process reform will accelerate as the current financial crisis increases near-term budgetary pressures, promoting greater alignment between near-term and long-term fiscal problems.     

Factors Explaining Public Participation in the Central Government Budget Process

This paper attempts to examine which factors explain public participation in the budget process in an international comparative approach. In particular, we investigate which socioeconomic, institutional, and political factors promote public engagement in the central government budget process. Using a sample of 93 countries, our results indicate that Internet penetration, population diversity, governmental financial situation, and budget transparency determine opportunities for public engagement in the central government budget process. In addition, we show that not only budget transparency promotes public participation but also public participation is necessary to enhance budget transparency.     

Searching for a Role for Citizens in the Budget Process

Citizen participation in the local budget process is not prevalent, despite encouragement from scholars and professional organizations. This case study of two Kansas cities that have used a variety of input mechanisms in the budget process analyzes the effectiveness of citizen budget participation. Limited effectiveness was found, which may largely be due to the timing of the input, unstated or unclear goals, implementation difficulties, and political and environmental constraints. Citizen input appears to have had little effect on budget decisions, and neither city has institutionalized participation in the process. However, the input mechanisms serve other purposes, such as education and support for specific proposals. Describing the benefits as well as the difficulty of involving citizens in a meaningful way is beneficial to other governments as they wrestle with the issue of defining the citizens' role in the budget process.     

Decentralizing the Development Budget Process in Indonesia: Progress and Prospects

Decentralization of the development budget process in Indonesia has been a high priority of official reform efforts for over fifteen years, but in many respects the process remains highly centralized. This article describes the forces that helped shape this centralized process, in which central planners traditionally have had a degree of influence over budgeting that is unusual in the developing world. Efforts to help local officials play a more meaningful role in this process are reviewed, including innovative training programs introduced recently in response to enduring problems affecting local level participation. Although these recent efforts appear to be productive, government reformers recognize that meaningful decentralization over the longer term will be difficult to achieve without more fundamental changes in policies, procedures, and attitudes at the central level of government.     

State Revenue Forecasts and Political Acceptance: The Value of Consensus Forecasting in the Budget Process

Concerns about political biases in state revenue forecasts, as well as insufficient evidence that complex forecasts outperform naive algorithms, have resulted in a nearly universal call for depoliticization of forecasting. This article discusses revenue forecasting in the broader context of the political budget process and highlights the importance of a forecast that is politically accepted—forecast accuracy is irrelevant if the budget process does not respect the forecast as a resource constraint. The authors provide a case illustration in Indiana by showing how the politicized process contributed to forecast acceptance in the state budget over several decades. They also present a counterfactual history of forecast errors that would have been produced by naive algorithms. In addition to showing that the Indiana process would have outperformed the naive approaches, the authors demonstrate that the path of naive forecast errors during recessions would be easily ignored by political actors.     

The Ups and Downs of State Budget Process Reform: Experience of Three Decades

From zero-base budgeting to the Government Performance and Results Act, state budgeting systems have been synonymous with budgeting reform for over 30 years. This article examines the trends, both long-term and short-term, which have been identified through analysis of state budgeting office practices. Particular emphasis has been placed on understanding the changes in performance measurement over the period of 1970 to 2000. The findings reveal trends such as changes in the makeup of budget office personnel, a lack of budget offices in moving toward cost accounting, and trends in budget preparation and budget documents. Some budget reforms seem to have plateaued, beginning in the mid-1990s, while other reforms have exhibited "backsliding." It is clear that the states are not all marching in unison in reforming their budget systems. As with earlier phases of this study, the 2000 data raise many questions that will be explored in future research.