Does Direct Democracy Hurt Immigrant Minorities? Evidence from Naturalization Decisions in Switzerland

Do minorities fare worse under direct democracy than under representative democracy? We provide new evidence by studying naturalization requests of immigrants in Switzerland that were typically decided with referendums in each municipality. Using panel data from about 1,400 municipalities for the 1991–2009 period, we exploit Federal Court rulings that forced municipalities to transfer the decisions to their elected municipality councils. We find that naturalization rates surged by about 60% once politicians rather than citizens began deciding on naturalization applications. Whereas voters in referendums face no cost of arbitrarily rejecting qualified applicants based on discriminatory preferences, politicians in the council are constrained to formally justify rejections and may be held accountable by judicial review. Consistent with this mechanism, the increase in naturalization rates caused by switching from direct to representative democracy is much stronger for more marginalized immigrant groups and in areas where voters are more xenophobic or where judicial review is more salient.     

The European Parliament in the External Dimension of EU Counter-terrorism: More Actorness,Accountability and Oversight 10 Years on?

The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, considerably reinforced the powers of the European Parliament. This article examines to what extent the European Parliament has become an important actor in EU counter-terrorism by focusing on the external dimension of this policy. It also analyses the impact that this potentially changing role has had on the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism. This article puts forward two inter-related claims. Firstly, the role of the European Parliament in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism has significantly grown in recent years. Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the European Parliament has become a fully-fledged actor in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism. Secondly, the reinforcement of the role of the European Parliament has also led to a strengthening of both accountability and oversight in the external dimension of EU counter-terrorism, although there are still some limitations in that respect.     

Drifting Further Apart: National Parties and their Electorates on the EU Dimension

Whether parties are representative of their voters over the EU is a key concern in modern European governance. Using European Election Studies data, this article compares opinion congruence between parties and their electorates on the EU dimension in 2004 and 2009 and examines, at the levels of both member states and individual parties, which factors explain variation in opinion congruence between parties and their supporters over integration. The article shows that parties have become less representative of their voters and that they adopt more convergent positions on the EU dimension than their voters. Congruence is higher in smaller parties and in ideologically more extremist left-wing parties. Overall parties are thus drifting further apart from their voters on the EU dimension.     

Bargaining Constitutional Design in Italy: Judicial Review as Political Insurance

Why would politicians, who expect to hold political power in the future, choose to create a constitutional court with the power of judicial review that can veto politicians' policies? Some theories suggest that international forces may be causal, as institutions or ideas are diffused geographically or within legal systems. Others focus on domestic politics as driving the decision to institute judicial review. Among these are the commitment, hegemonic preservation, party alternation and insurance theories. This article looks at the decision to establish a constitutional court in the Republic of Italy, the first post-World War II court in Europe that was not in a federal system. It argues that the insurance model drove the decision of the Italian Christian Democrats to support creation of a constitutional court at the point of constitutional design, but later to delay implementation once in power. Conversely, the Italian Communist–Socialist bloc opposed establishment of the court at the Constituent Assembly that wrote the post-war constitution on the ideological ground that it was contrary to popular sovereignty. However, once the leftist bloc found itself in the role of the opposition, it became a champion of the Constitutional Court and judicial review. The insurance theory is shown to explain the behaviour of the Christian Democrats in both design and implementation phases and the actions of the Communist–Socialist bloc during implementation.     

Ideological dimensions and vote choice: Age group differences in Austria

How and how much are ideological dimensions associated with vote choice among different age groups? Distinct socialisation experiences and life-cycle effects should lead to age group differences in the use of ideological dimensions. We test our hypotheses using a 2009 Austrian cross-sectional survey. We find that the extent of the association between ideological dimensions and vote choice is significant and similar across all age groups. However, the nature of the association depends on the type of party considered. Positions on the socio-cultural dimension are associated with voting for New Politics parties far more than positions on the socio-economic dimension; the latter distinguishes well between support for the two Old Politics parties. Overall, age group differences are surprisingly small in both the extent and nature of the association between ideological views and vote choice: there is only isolated evidence that the use of ideological dimensions differs across age groups.     

Coalition formation on the U.S. Supreme Court: 1969–2009

We apply a fallback model of coalition formation to decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, focusing on the seven natural courts, which had the same members for at least two terms, between 1969 and 2009. The predictions of majority coalitions on each of the courts are generally borne out by the 5–4 decisions, whereas the predictions of the Martin-Quinn (Political Analysis 10(2):134–153, 2002) model, which assumes a single underlying dimension along which the justices can be ordered, are not. The present model also provides insight into the dynamic process by which subcoalitions build up into majority coalitions and, in addition, identifies “kingmakers” and “leaders” on the natural courts. Furthermore, it provides evidence, from coalitional memberships, that a few justices shifted over time from one ideological camp to another.     

The European elections of 1994

Legislatures frequently enact primary legislation that delegates secondary law making powers to administrative agencies. Judicial review designed to ensure that this secondary legislation is in accord with the primary legislation necessarily involves judicial interpretation of the primary legislation and hence also some degree of judicial law making. Both the relative degree of judicial law making and its causes may vary from country to country. Judicial review of secondary legislation in three countries is examined. Judicial activism is great in the United States and probably related both to congressional inefficiency in passing amending statutes and judicial recruitment and career patterns. The level of judicial activism in the UK has been low but may be increasing. It is severely constrained by the capacity of parliament rapidly to 'correct' judicial interpretations but encouraged by judicial career patterns. The formal decisions of the French Council of State show little judicial intervention against administrators' secondary legislation but such intervention may occur extensively at the stage of agency regulation drafting rather than through formal review processes.     

Beyond Gratz and Grutter: Prospects for Affirmative Action in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court's Michigan Decisions

This article explores the meaning of the Supreme Court's Michigan decisions and their implications for higher education in the judicial, political, and social–cultural context. It concludes that the complex and dynamic interplay of judicial policymaking, politics and public opinion, and demographic changes could have important consequences, including unanticipated ones, in the years ahead.     

Politics by denunciation: Political whistleblowing against members of parliament in Italy

Judicial investigations into politicians are a fundamental component of politics, with these investigations often leading to public scandals. Yet, empirical evidence of the strategic determinants of judicial investigations is intrinsically hard to gather, a problem that has significantly limited the study of this important phenomenon. This paper studies the politics behind judicial investigations by leveraging new data on prosecutors’ informants in 1125 episodes of misbehavior of Italian MPs involved in different crimes (1983–2019). Results provide evidence in favor of a political use of denunciations for corruption crimes: when a party weakens, the likelihood that political enemies denounce past misbehavior of members of the weakened party increases, suggesting that the political use of denunciation is elastic to changes in the electoral performance. Furthermore, weakened MPs are more likely to be accused of misbehavior that happened a long time before the accusation, which further supports the argument that accusations are politically motivated.     

Balancing Procedures and Outcomes Within Democratic Theory: Core Values and Judicial Review

Democratic theorists often distinguish between two views of democratic procedures. 'Outcomes theorists' emphasize the instrumental nature of these procedures and argue that they are only valuable because they tend to produce good outcomes. In contrast, 'proceduralists' emphasize the intrinsic value of democratic procedures, for instance, on the grounds that they are fair. In this paper. I argue that we should reject pure versions of these two theories in favor of an understanding of the democratic ideal that recognizes a commitment to both intrinsically valuable democratic procedures and democratic outcomes. In instances in which there is a conflict between these two commitments, I suggest they must be balanced. This balancing approach offers a justification of judicial review on the grounds that it potentially limits outcomes that undermine democracy. But judicial review is not justifiable in any instance in which a bad democratic outcome results from democratic procedures. When the loss that would result from overturning a democratic procedure is greater than the gain to democracy that would result from ensuring against an undemocratic outcome; judicial review is not justifiable. Loss or gain to democracy is defined by the negative or positive impact of each action on the core democratic values of equality and autonomy, aspects of the democratic ideal. Even when judicial review is justified, the fact that it overturns intrinsically valuable procedures suggests that such review is never ideal from the standpoint of democracy.     

Constitutional law in social choice perspective

Constitutional scholars do not typically employ spatial reasoning in their work. And yet, constitutional jurisprudence and much work in judicial politics implicitly rest on assumptions best cast in spatial terms. These include assuming that positions in constitutional disputes, and the views of Supreme Court justices, generally lie along a common liberal-to-conservative ideological dimension. Although the single dimension assumption is often appropriate, it suffers inherent limitations. First, Supreme Court decision-making rules, both within and across cases, expose problems of dimensionality. Second, important substantive doctrines likewise reveal dimensionality. Third, and finally, throughout the Supreme Court’s history, positions deemed liberal (or conservative) in one period have emerged as conservative (or liberal) in a later period, suggesting that dimensionality is a persistent feature in our jurisprudential history. Social choice proves uniquely suited to explaining these important aspects of constitutional law. After briefly introducing the discipline of constitutional law and its relationship to social choice, this article offers three illustrations of how social choice analysis deepens our understanding of important substantive areas. The analysis exposes dimensionality within Supreme Court decision-making rules, within separation-of-powers doctrine, and over historical shifts in the liberal and conservative valence of once-prominent jurisprudential positions. Failing to appreciate dimensionality, which lies at the core of social choice theory, when studying the Supreme Court and constitutional law risks a truly one-dimensional understanding of a richer and multidimensional institution and body of doctrine.     

State Constitutional Limits on Legislative Procedure: Legislative Compliance and Judicial Enforcement

Most state constitutions contain detailed restrictions on thelegislative process. Violations of some of these restrictions(e.g., single-subject requirements) are reflected on the faceof a final enactment. Other violations (e.g., alteration ofa bill to change its original purpose) are not evident in thefinal enactment, but require investigation of the legislativeprocess. State courts have developed a variety of approachesto these second types of violations, from excluding all evidencebeyond the enactment to permitting any evidence of constitutionalviolations. The Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act was passedin apparent violation of both types of constitutional restrictions.The legislative debates reflected legislators' attitudes aboutsuch restrictions, but the Pennsylvania courts refuse to enforcethem. After surveying other judicial approaches, the articlediscusses the legislative and executive obligation to followconstitutional restrictions, regardless of judicial enforcement.The article then advocates increased judicial enforcement, whilemaintaining proper deference to the legislature.     

Gender,intersectionality, and religious manifestation before the European Court of Human Rights

Decisions on Article 9(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights—the right to religious manifestation—evidence the importance of intersectional considerations of gender, religion, and even nationality. This article uses qualitative comparative analysis in order to find patterns of litigation victory and defeat by intersectional groups in their claims of violation of this provision. Our analyses show that intersectionalization, operating through a methodology particularly well suited to do so, was essential to render visible important patterns in the judicial arena. These patterns show the different outcomes of litigation by intersectional groups. In particular, Muslim women, whose cases frequently had a clear dimension of “claim intersectionality” related to religious clothing, systematically were defeated before the European Court of Human Rights. This contrasts with cases brought by male Muslims, a successful category of litigants, therefore emphasizing the importance of gender dimension when understanding cases on religious manifestation.     

A Tale of Two Courts: The Judicialization of Electoral Politics in Asia

This article examines the judicialization of electoral politics in Asia, an important but understudied trend, as demonstrated in Thailand and Indonesia. Though the constitutional courts in both have similar histories and institutional arrangements, their electoral interventions vary radically. We argue that the diffusion or concentration of power among post‐transition elites determines whether the effect of judicial activism will be to shore up or undermine electoral governance. Where power is diffused, as in Indonesia, political actors, less able to impose their own will on the judiciary, seem to prefer a credible referee, which fosters electoral competition. Where power is concentrated, as in Thailand, elites have both the motive and the means to turn judicial activism to antidemocratic ends. By focusing on the ends, rather than the means, of judicial activism, this account goes beyond personalities and institutional design to enhance understanding of the role of the courts in transitional democracies.     

Collusion in auctions for emission permits: An experimental analysis

Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and that have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms—uniform and discriminatory price sealed‐bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximize profits. Our main result is that the discriminatory and uniform price auctions produce greater revenues than the clock auction, both with and without explicit communication. The clock appears to facilitate successful collusion, both because of its sequential structure and because it allows bidders to focus on one dimension of cooperation (quantity) rather than two (price and quantity).© 2009 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

To adapt or to defend? Comparing position shifts among Bundestag candidates between 2013 and 2017

In this research note, candidate survey data from the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) is used to analyse positional shifts of German Bundestag parties between 2013 and 2017. Two developments make Germany a particularly interesting case: (1) the liberal but also controversial policies of the Merkel cabinet during the European refugee crisis and (2) the change of leadership within the right-wing populist party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD). Applying scaling techniques to locate candidates of both elections in the same two-dimensional policy space, the analysis demonstrates that in 2017 the AfD took a distinct radical right position in the party system of Germany. Moreover, the study finds that almost all parties moved to the right on the cultural left–right dimension in 2017, whereas for the economic left–right dimension this has not been the case. Contrary to the mantra of an ideological delineation against right-wing populism, there has been a robust socio-political conservative shift in the German party system.     

Reconsidering Nordic Party Space1

The erosion of the social and economic bases underlying traditional party systems has led analysts to search for new cleavage structures undergirding the present party systems. Meanwhile, analysts have identified a range of issue dimensions that also bear on voters’ party preferences. This article studies the degree to which grid-group theory's four political biases of hierarchy, egalitarianism, individualism, and fatalism can make inroads into the left–right dimension's stronghold in accounting for voters’ party preference. The analysis draws on a 1999 survey in the five Nordic countries (N= 4,832). The method combines voters’ party preferences with their scores on issue dimensions, or political dimensions. Analyses show that conventional party families, with one exception, are not identified along any of the five political orientations. Only the five conservative parties are exclusively identified as a party family on the left–right dimension. Party preference is more closely associated with the left–right dimension than the political biases. Sweden has the purest and simplest party cleavage, whereas Denmark has the most composite one. Across the Nordic countries, the green party family is most dissimilar, whereas the progress siblings are most alike. The left–right dimension accounts well for differences between parties within polities, whereas political biases, and egalitarianism in particular, account well for differences between parties of similar origin across polities.     

Cyber asset in judicial discourses: a socio-semiotic interpretation

Issues concerning cyber asset in cyberspace have intrigued the legislators, the judicial practitioners, the netizens, and even the onlookers in real world; simultaneously, academia is discussing the disputes aroused by this intangible object. However, various studies in the past refined the discussions in domains of law but the refinement fails to clarify the cyber-asset issues and to resolve the disputes. Therefore, a better understanding of what “cyber asset” is can be achieved by exploring cyber asset in the judicial discourses from a socio-semiotic perspective. In this study, judicial discourses are tantamount to the semiotic resource. Then, incorporating in a generic model of judicial discourses, we examine (1) how cyber asset as a sign has been framed by agents of the judicial institution of the People’s Republic of China; (2) how the judicial institution justified their framing; and (3) whether any temporal change in the semiotic system of cyber asset took place. Furthermore, by applying the five questions introduced by Van Leeuwen, we examine why the quandaries of cyber asset are aroused. In conclusion, we propose that the cyber-asset disputes can hardly be resolved unless joint efforts are made by the legislature and the judiciary of the People’s Republic of China.     

Testing the Effects of Independent Judiciaries on the Likelihood of Democratic Backsliding

We test the efficacy of judicial independence in preventing regime reversals toward authoritarianism. Using a dataset of judicial constraints across 163 different countries from 1960 to 2000, we find that established independent judiciaries prevent regime changes toward authoritarianism across all types of states. Established courts are also capable of thwarting regime collapses in nondemocracies. These results provide some of the first large‐n evidence confirming the ability of the judiciary to maintain regime stability. Unfortunately, however, the beneficial effects of court systems seem to take time to develop. The evidence indicates that newly formed courts are positively associated with regime collapses in both democracies and nondemocracies.