The Concept of Jurisprudence*

Abstract. The first part of this article contains (i) considerations as to the relationship between jurisprudence and legal dogmatics, legal philosophy, and sociology of law; (ii) considerations about the status of jurisprudence both as a meta- and an object-theory. These lead to the suggestion that jurisprudence should be defined as a general juristic theory of law and legal science. In the second part, the character and elements of this definition are explained systematically. The article's main thesis is that jurisprudence is not distinguished from legal philosophy and sociology of law by its subject or its method, but by the specifically juristic research aspect or perspective it is based upon.     

Carl Schmitt on the Secularisation of Religious Texts as a Resacralisation of Jurisprudence?

Carl Schmitt, an increasingly influential German law professor, developed a provocative and historically oriented model of “political theology” with specific relevance to legal scholarship and the authorship of constitutional texts. His “political theology” is best understood neither as an expressly theological discourse within constitutional law, nor as a uniquely legal discourse shaped by a hidden theological agenda. Instead, it addresses the possibility of the continual resurfacing of theological ideas and beliefs within legal discourses of, for instance, sovereignty, the force of law and states of emergency (or “exception”) that present themselves as relentlessly secular, even—in the case of Kelsenian jurisprudence—”scientific”. This article illustrates and then critically evaluates Schmitt’s theory in terms of the authorship of constitutional texts in particular. It includes two case studies—genocidal colonial land appropriation and Kelsenian positivism in order to illustrate aspects of his political theology. Whilst Schmitt is defended against reductionist interpretations, I show that there remains considerable unfinished business before a Schmittian approach to legal theory merits full acceptance.     

The performance of law students at a London college

This article examines the value of jurisprudence in legal education. It argues that jurisprudence should be mandated at an early stage of the students' law curriculum as the legal ideals that may be imparted through a jurisprudence course cannot be adequately taught in a professional ethics course or through teaching jurisprudential perspectives in doctrinal subjects. Law schools have a special responsibility to get students thinking about what law is, what makes law legitimate, and how law is related to justice, morality, politics and rationality. A mandatory jurisprudence course should be intentionally structured along these themes.     

Taking the Law Seriously: On Political Science and the Role of Law in the Process of European Integration

Abstract: The interdisciplinary discourse on European law seems paradoxical. While the editors of this Journal plead for a contextual jurisprudence, political scientists are discovering the importance of law for the integration process. This article explores the merits and problems of both of these shifts¹. On the one hand, it points to implicit assumptions of legal arguments that need to be contrasted with the insights of political sciences into mechanisms of integration processes and the functioning of inter-governmental bargaining - and is thus to be read as an appeal for a 'contextual' jurisprudence. On the other hand, it argues that political science analyses, even when they take the legal dimension of European integration into account, tend to rely upon an instrumentalist view of the legal system which fails to acknowledge the Law's normative logic and discursive power. This theoretically complex argument is exemplified first by an analysis of the tensions between the legal supranationalism of the European Court of Justice and the German Constitutional Court's defence of national constitutionalism, already intensively discussed in this Journal². What the article adds is an extension of the constitutional debate to the economy. It argues that Europe cannot, and should not, be based upon a dichotomous structure of (national) political rights and (European) economic liberties.     

Towards a Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of Law

This article revisits an infamous incident in colonial India -- the Amritsar massacre of 1919 -- in order to explore larger questions of the place of martial law and emergency in jurisprudence. By focusing on modes of power in the colonial realm, and the productive role of the colonies in the conception of modern law, it tests the claims of a rule of law and declarations of emergency. The argument tries to show how these two terms are, in fact, relational in theories of colonial discourse and of legal positivism. As such, it reads H.L.A. Hart’s, The Concept of Law and instances from the colonial archive against one another. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Prolegomenon to a Southern Jurisprudence

It is good to take stock from time to time and to see how things stand in jurisprudence. So, what is the relationship of doctrine and theory with jurisprudence? Is private law theory apolitical while public law contains politics for the very many constitutional ends in the Global South? In India, legal theorist Chhatrapati Singh very originally asked if legal systems and normative systems were the same? Chhatrapati’s enquiry was however a species of the classical approach to the law that promotes the law’s purity. On the contrary, the postcolonial approaches account for the historical life as well as the political proclivities of the law. The private law theory often seen as impersonal and non-imperial comes under scrutiny in the postcolonial approaches. Duncan Kennedy and Roberto Unger notably problematized contract theory, while Upendra Baxi argued for mass tort as public law—contract and tort are both private law—to offer, if you will, a jurisprudence of the South. A southern jurisprudence essentially rejects an impersonal reading of the private law.

     

Biographing Realist Jurisprudence

This essay reexamines realist jurisprudence through a review of two biographies of leading realists: Dalia Tsuk Mitchell's Architect of Justice: Felix Cohen and the Founding of American Legal Pluralism (2007), and Spencer Waller's Thurman Arnold: A Biography (2005). The essay argues that when biographies of legal realists are considered alongside their academic writing, a more robust jurisprudence emerges. Realist lives crystallize the intuition that the major innovation of legal realism was not, as generally assumed, its attitude toward judges and adjudication. Instead, realist jurisprudence is an institutionalist view of law with a focus on groups rather than individuals. Realist jurisprudence understands courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and nongovernmental groups as important loci of law, lawmaking, and legal reasoning.     

Living on the Boundaries in America

Abstract

In this article I examine marginalized youths' ideas about the United States, the law, and police. My interpretive analysis is based upon in-depth, unstructured interviews with juvenile parolees living in poverty in a large southwestern city. In general, these parolees could be described as uneducated, unemployed, non-white, youth gang members. Through an examination of the youths' narratives and stories about America and its legal authorities, I attempt to illustrate how their ideas can be understood as evolving from their structurally based interactions. I present the general themes of the marginalized youths' legal and political consciousness and attempt to show how this consciousness flows from their hostile interactions with legal and conventional authorities. Ultimately, I suggest that the contrast between the youths' social justice ideals and the reality of their lives on the margins influences how they think about America, law, and the police.     

约翰·奥斯丁法哲学再探

约翰·奥斯丁是现代西方法理学中的重要人物,分析法学的创始人,以提出"法律命令说"而著名,他的法哲学长期以来一直受到人们的批判,这些批判主要来自于两大阵营:一是形形色色的自然法学家;另一是一些后起的法律实证主义者。这些批判影响巨大,以致遮蔽了奥斯丁法哲学的本来面目。其实,"法律命令说"并非奥斯丁法哲学的核心与标志,纵使人们批驳倒了"法律命令说",对奥斯丁的法哲学整体来说损害也并不大。奥斯丁的代表性思想是:倡导对法律进行分析性研究,主张建构起一般法理学与法律教义学,最终使法学成为一门科学。在众多的批判之下,奥斯丁的上述代表性思想不仅没有失去生命力,反而保持着旺盛的生命力,以致在现代西方法理学中,奥斯丁仍然是一个人们无法绕过的思想家。     

Enacting the “Incomprehensible China”: Modern European Jurisprudence and the Japanese Reconstruction of Qing Political Law

The great ambition of Japanese colonialism, from the time of its debut at the end of the nineteenth century, was the reformulation of Chinese law and politics. One of the most extraordinary examples of this ambition is The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire [Shinkoku Gyōseihō], a monumental enterprise undertaken by the Japanese colonial government in Taiwan intended not only to facilitate Japanese colonial administration of Taiwan but also to reorder the entire politico‐juridical order of China along the lines of modern rational law. This article examines the legal analysis embraced in The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire and recounts its attempt to reconstruct the Qing's “political law” (seihō) by a strange, ambiguous, and hybrid resort to “authenticity.” The strangeness of this Japanese colonial production comes from Japan's dual position as both colonizer of Taiwan and simultaneously itself colonized by “modern European jurisprudence”(kinsei hōri). In uncovering the effects of modern European jurisprudence on the Japanese enterprise, we will discover Japan's pursuit of its own cultural subjectivity embedded in The Administrative Law of the Qing Empire, epitomizing the campaign of national identities observable in the process of East Asian legal modernization.     

‘In Vino Veritas’: Truth and Method in Vinogradoff's Historical Jurisprudence

Sir Paul Vinogradoff is widely regarded as the intellectual heir of Sir Henry Maine. As such, he is implicated with Maine in the failure of historical jurisprudence to displace Austinian positivism at the heart of English legal theory. Yet Vinogradoff was of a different generation and intellectual provenance from Maine. By examining the relationship between Vinogradoff's historical jurisprudence and the work of the celebrated German historian Theodor Mommsen, this article aims to reaffirm the distinctiveness of Vinogradoff's contribution to English jurisprudence. It finds at the core of that contribution a Germanic commitment to ‘science’ and ‘method’ that proves both a strength and a weakness in the common law world of the time, and so reflects something of the character of that broader world itself.     

苏联法学对中国法学消极影响的深层原因——从马克思东方社会理论出发所作的分析

苏联法学对中国法学产生过深刻的消极影响 ,其原因除了社会制度、意识形态、国际环境等直接因素外 ,还存在着更深层次的历史传统的因素 ,这就是两国传统政治文化的同质性———基于古代东方亚细亚生产方式而形成的东方专制主义传统———的遗存及其影响。马克思东方社会理论是理解这一同质性的钥匙。认识这种深层原因 ,对我国今后法学研究及法治建设的发展具有重要意义。     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

The Indirect Influence of Politics on Tort Liability of Public Authorities in English Law

The scope of negligence liability of public authorities in English law has undergone significant changes in the Post‐World War II period, first expanding and then, from the mid‐1980s, retracting. This article tries to explain why this happened not by focusing, as is common in most commentary on this area of law, on changing doctrinal “tests,” but rather by tying it to changes in the background political ideology. My main contention is that political change has brought about a change in the law, but that it did so by affecting the scope of the political domain, and by implication, also the scope of the legal one. More specifically, I argue that Britain's Post‐War consensus on the welfare state has enabled the courts to expand state liability in accordance with emerging notions of the welfare state without seeming to take the law into controversial territory. When Thatcher came to power, the welfare state was no longer in consensus, thus making further development of legal doctrines on welfarist lines appear politically contentious. The courts therefore reverted back to older doctrines that seemed less politically charged in the new political atmosphere of the 1980s.     

Challenging EU constitutional law: The Italian Constitutional Court's new stance on direct effect and the preliminary reference procedure

This article seeks to examine the relationship between EU law and the Italian legal order in light of the recent Italian Constitutional Court (ICC)’s jurisprudence attempting to redefine EU core principles. When fundamental rights are at stake, three assumptions are challenged: the determination of direct effect shall be a prerogative of the ECJ; EU directly effective provisions entail the disapplication of conflicting national law; judges have the discretion to refer preliminary references to the ECJ where a clarification on EU law is needed. The contribution argues that the judicial search for a balance between sovereignty and supranationality is undermined by the ICC's new resistance to the well‐established EU jurisprudence. In that respect, the paper posits that the ICC's activism is the result of an unjustified ‘argumentative self‐restraint’ of the ECJ vis‐à‐vis the evolution of EU foundational principles.     

Beyond Constitutionalism: The Search for a European Political Imagination

Two recent books, Joseph Weiler's The Constitution of Europe and Larry Siedentop's Democracy in Europe, seek to address one of the defining issues in contemporary European legal studies; the search for a European public philosophy. Both site their critiques within a particular jurisprudential tradition, the modernist; one that is bound up with anxieties about legitimacy and constitutionalism. This review article suggests that the ‘new’ Europe has been too easily distracted by the lures of constitutionalism, and more particularly by the temptations of Treaties. Public philosophies are not found in Treaty articles. Rather, a public philosophy is a state of mind, a product of the political imagination. And it is the absence of such an imagination which lies at the root of contemporary concerns regarding constitutionalism and legitimacy; the concerns which underpin Weiler's and Siedentop's books. A discussion of these books, in the first two parts of this article, is followed by a discussion of Godfried Wilhelm Leibniz's ‘universal’ jurisprudence. It is suggested that such a jurisprudence is better able to furnish a public philosophy for the ‘new’ Europe; just as, indeed, it was for the ‘old’ Europe. Moreover, such a jurisprudence is far more than a mere theory of laws and constitutions. Leibniz's jurisprudence requires that we think, not merely ‘beyond’ sovereignty, or even beyond democracy, but beyond constitutionalism.     

Genealogy and Jurisprudence: Nietzsche, Nihilism, and the Social Scientification of Law

In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche presents a history of metaphysics that can also be read as a history of jurisprudence. Nietzsche shows how—via Platonism, Christendom, Kantianism, and utilitarianism—the “real” or “true” world of ideals gives way to an “apparent” phenomenal world that is itself ultimately brought into question. This article shows how 20th-century legal thought, broadly construed, also moves away from “ideals” of law toward an understanding of law as observable social phenomena. It suggests that the move to the “apparent” world in legal thought raises questions similar to those raised by Nietzsche's work: Does sociological law point to a nihilistic destruction of the legal tradition or to a joyous possibility of overcoming that tradition?     

The Evolutionary Game‐Theoretic Foundations of Law

Interdisciplinary work in the law often starts and stops with the social sciences. To produce a complete understanding of how law, evolutionary game‐theoretic insights must, however, supplement these more standard social scientific methods. To illustrate, this article critically examines The Force of Law by Frederick Schauer and The Expressive Powers of Law by Richard McAdams. Combining the methods of analytic jurisprudence and social psychology, Schauer clarifies the need for a philosophically respectable and empirically well‐grounded account of the ubiquity of legal sanctions. Drawing primarily on economic and social psychological paradigms, McAdams highlights law's potential to alter human behavior through expressions that coordinate. Still, these contributions generate further puzzles about how law works, which can be addressed using evolutionary game‐theoretic resources. Drawing on these resources, this article argues that legal sanctions are ubiquitous to law not only because they can motivate legal compliance, as Schauer suggests, but also because they provide the general evolutionary stability conditions for intrinsic legal motivation. In reaction to McAdams, this article argues that law's expressive powers can function to coordinate human behavior only because humans are naturally and culturally evolved to share a prior background agreement in forms of life. Evolutionary game‐theoretic resources can thus be used to develop a unified framework from within which to understand some of the complex interrelationships between legal sanctions, intrinsic legal motivation, and law's coordinating power. Going forward, interdisciplinary studies of how law works should include greater syntheses of contemporary insights from evolutionary game theory.