Democratic Deficit or the Europeanisation of Secession? Explaining the Devolution Referendums in Scotland

This article deals with the variation in the demand for self-government in Scotland – as measured by the vote in the two referendums – between 1979, when devolution was rejected, and 1997, when devolution was endorsed. The existing literature mainly deals with each of the two referendums in isolation and does not offer an explicitly comparative analysis of them. However, implicit comparisons contained in analyses of the 1997 referendum tend to identify as the main cause of the variation the 'democratic deficit' created by Conservative rule between 1979 and 1997, which was consistently rejected in Scotland. I take issue with this explanation on theoretical and empirical grounds and advances an alternative account grounded in an explicit comparison of the two referendums. Based on a rationalist approach, the analysis presented here identifies three key elements in the voting dynamics at the two points in time – a gap between support for self-government and the actual vote in the referendum; an interaction effect between attitudes to devolution and to independence; and the role of the European context in shaping perceptions of independence. I argue that significant change in these three variables (rather than a 'democratic deficit') appear to have been the most important determinants of the different results of the two referendums.     

Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation in the United States?

The framers of the U.S. Constitution explicitly designed federalismto enhance representation. Because powers are divided amongmultiple governments, citizens are able to exert pressure onthe elected officials of various governments in an effort toachieve desired outcomes. If one government is not doing whatcitizens prefer, they can seek it from a different government.This assumes that individuals form opinions about the functionsperformed by different governments. Given the complexity offederalism, this may be an unrealistic assumption for many citizens.Original survey data uniquely suited to explore this questionsuggest that citizens do behave in a fashion consistent withthe federalist framework. Moreover, the actual change in theassignment of functional responsibilities across governmentsbehaves as if it responds to public opinion.     

People,Territory, and Legitimacy in Democratic States

Who are the people who should govern themselves in a democracy? This is the famous boundary problem to which this article offers a new approach. Most democrats, even nationalists and cosmopolitans, delimit the demos by relying on territorial jurisdictions. However, territory is not explicit in their arguments. This article urges democrats to recognize territory's normative importance rather than overlook the role it already plays in their theories. Acknowledging territory is a risky, yet promising, strategy. Risky, because it may lead to a vicious circle: one needs well‐defined territorial borders to delimit the people, yet one needs a well‐defined people to establish legitimate territorial borders. Promising, because it forces democrats to scrutinize implicit assumptions and find new resources for dealing with the vicious circle. The article describes four possible tacks by which theorists could navigate the waters of people, territory, and legitimacy in democracies: asserting, circumventing, solving, and dissolving the circle.     

Democratic Oversight in Fragile States: The Case of Intelligence Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina

In most transition countries the main aim of ‘democratizing intelligence’ is to weaken the authoritarian governmental structures by introducing more transparency, legality and oversight. In Bosnia and Herzegovina however, the state-building efforts driven by international parties combined formal democratization processes such as independent oversight with the strengthening and operational capacity building of previously weak-to-non-existent intelligence structures. In parallel with the descent into war when Yugoslavia collapsed in the early 1990s, the State Security Service (SDB) in the Republic of Bosnia had split into three ethnically-based outfits answering to the political and military leaders of war. ‘Democratization’ of intelligence in Bosnia and Herzegovina since the establishment of a unified, state-level Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA) in 2004 has followed its own unique path reflecting the fragmented nature of politics in Bosnia and the leading role of international organizations in proposing and effectuating institutional reforms. Nevertheless, in terms of habits, operational methods and values many Bosnian intelligence officers went through similar adaptations and transitions as their colleagues in countries where institutions at the time of democratic transition were too strong and authoritarian rather than, as in the case of Bosnia, being deemed too weak and ineffectual.     

The Reagan Deficit

This paper analyzes the U.S. federal budget deficit during the Reagan administration and its short- and longer-term consequences for the aggregate economy. While budget policies of the Reagan administration do not account for all of the increases in annual deficits or in outstanding federal debt during the Reagan era, an analysis indicates that the administration's program of tax reduction and defense spending build-up were the major sources of deficit growth after the recovery from the recession of 1981-82. For the near-term future, the legacy of the Reagan deficits includes (1) the failure of domestically owned capital formation to expand at rates comparable to our major trading partners, (2) the necessity of diverting U.S. products and income to servicing foreign creditors, and (3) the need for rates of interest and profits to be high enough to induce foreigners to retain their holdings of U.S. assets lest divestiture cause a virtual collapse in the exchange rate. The final evaluation of the impact of the Reagan deficit hinges on whether the Reagan era of high consumption prosperity proves a good trade-off with the consequences of attenuated macropolicy responses to recession, lower levels of U.S. owned capital stock, and remittances to foreign creditors.     

Patterns of Disagreement in Democratic Politics: Comparing Germany, Japan, and the United States

An important ingredient in democratic politics is the experience of disagreement through social communication and political discussion. If people fail to encounter contrary viewpoints, their own views are never challenged, they are never forced to reconsider initially held opinions, and they are effectively excluded from democratic deliberation. This article examines patterns of political agreement and disagreement within the communication networks of citizens in Germany, Japan, and the United States. Several questions are addressed. Are there cross‐national differences in patterns of agreement and disagreement among citizens? To what extent are these patterns subject to individual attitudes, to the structure of communication networks, and to levels of aggregate support for particular preferences and opinions? Finally, what are the implications of disagreement for civic capacity and political engagement? Empirical analyses are based on cooperative election surveys conducted in each country during the early 1990s.     

New Public Management Reforms of the Danish and Swedish Welfare States: The Role of Different Social Democratic Responses

This article investigates market-type reforms of the service welfare states in Sweden and Denmark. Sweden has implemented such reforms to a greater extent than Denmark. The explanation should be found in the different responses of the Social Democratic parties to the NPM agenda in general and market-type reforms in particular. In Denmark, the Social Democrats have opposed market-type reforms, whereas in Sweden they have been more open towards these ideas. With this focus, the paper differs from most other writings about variation in the extent of NPM.     

The Scandinavian Democratic Model

Given the continuing importance of democracy as an analytic concept. this article seeks to compare Scandinavian practice with accepted general definitions and theories. Definitions that recognize contemporary political democracy as consensual and procedural seem most appropriate to the Scandinavian cases. Although remaining dynamic. political democracy has not been a contested principle for more than 50 years.
Efforts since 1945 to extend democracy to social and economic spheres have been more controversial, however. Welfare state measures enjoy broad support, not least for functional reasons. For many, however, such policies seek a broader social democracy instead of merely a humane 'safety net'. Economic democracy remains the most contested dimension. Seeking to transcend corporatism and rational collective bargaining, economic democracy seeks simultaneously to promote greater economic equality and participation while maintaining an efficient productive system.
The dynamic and expanded democratic model has engendered much domestic debate about means and ends. This has been, on balance, a source of reinvigoration.     

The elimination paradox: apportionment in the Democratic Party

To award delegates in their presidential primary elections, the US Democratic Party uses Hamilton’s method of apportionment after eliminating any candidates (and their votes) that receive less than 15% of the total votes cast. We illustrate how a remaining candidate may have his or her delegate total decline as a result of other candidates being eliminated; this leads to a new elimination paradox. We relate that paradox to the new states, no show, and population paradoxes and show that divisor methods are not susceptible to the elimination paradox. We conclude with instances in which the elimination paradox may occur in other contexts, including parliamentary systems.

     

Implementation Deficit — Why Member States do not Comply with EU directives?

This article discusses factors effecting the implementation of European policies at the national level. Four main independent variables are distinguished: political institutions, the degree of corporatism, citizens' support for the EU, and political culture in the member states. The impacts of these variables on the success of implementing EU directives in ten policy areas are then tested with the multiple regression model. The results suggest that political culture and the design of political institutions in the member states had the most significant impact on implementation behavior. Countries with a high level of trust and political stability combined with efficient and flexible political institutions had the most success in implementing European policies.