Context and the Economic Vote: A Multilevel Analysis

Randy Stevenson Department of Political Science, Rice University, P.O. Box 1892, Houston, Texas 77251–1892 e-mail: rduch{at}uh.edu (corresponding author) e-mail: stevenso{at}ruf.rice.edu Voters use observed economic performance to infer the competenceof incumbent politicians. These economic perceptions enter thevoter's utility calculations modified by a weight that is minimizedwhen the variance in exogenous shocks to the economy is verylarge relative to the variance in economic outcomes associatedwith the competence of politicians. Cross-national variationsin the political and economic context systematically increaseor undermine the voter's ability to ascertain the competencyof incumbents. We test one hypothesis: As policy-making responsibilityis shared more equally among parties, economic evaluations willbe more important in the vote decision. We employ two multilevelmodeling procedures for estimating the contextual variationsin micro-level economic voting effects: a conventional pooledapproach and a two-stage procedure. We compare the multivariateresults of a pooled method with our two-stage estimation procedureand conclude that they are similar. Our empirical efforts usedata from 163 national surveys from 18 countries over a 22-yearperiod.     

Economic Voting and Multilevel Governance: A Comparative Individual-Level Analysis

An important component of incumbent support is the reward/punishment calculus of economic voting. Previous work has shown that "clarity of responsibility" within the central state government conditions national economic effects on incumbent vote choice: where clarity is high (low), economic effects are greater (less). This article advances the "clarity of responsibility" argument by considering the effect of multilevel governance on economic voting. In institutional contexts of multilevel governance, the process of correctly assigning responsibility for economic outcomes can be difficult. This article tests the proposition that multilevel governance mutes effects of national economic conditions by undermining responsibility linkages to the national government. Individual-level data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems Module 1 are used to test this proposition. Results demonstrate that economic voting is weakest in countries where multilevel governance is most prominent. Findings are discussed in light of the contribution to the economic voting literature and the potential implications of multilevel governance.     

Spillover Effects: Immigrant Policing and Government Skepticism in Matters of Health for Latinos

To what extent do people become less trusting of the government under threatening policy contexts? The authors find evidence that Secure Communities, a bureaucratic program that enhances immigrant policing through collaboration between local law and immigration enforcement agencies, spurs mistrust among Latinos but not non‐Latinos. This article focuses on the politics of immigration and health, two issue areas marked by large‐scale bureaucratic developments over the last 50 years. The authors argue that a major consequence of expanding immigrant policing is its trickle‐down effect on how individuals view public institutions charged with the provision of public goods, such as health information. The results indicate that Latinos in locales where immigrant policing is most intense express lower levels of trust in government as a source of health information. Through a policy feedback lens, the findings suggest that the state's deployment of immigrant policing conveys more widespread lessons about the trustworthiness of government .     

Individual Ambidexterity and Performance in the Public Sector: A Multilevel Analysis

In this study, we examine individual ambidexterity (i.e., individuals’ balanced pursuit of exploitative and explorative activities) in a public management context. In particular, we combine survey data from junior scholars and secondary data from the Center for Higher Education to investigate the role of individual ambidexterity in an academic context. We conduct multilevel analyses and find that individual ambidexterity is positively related to research performance, indicating that individual ambidexterity positively influences individual performance in the public sector. In addition, we observe a negative relationship between the supervisory ratio and research performance, indicating that having a lower number of employees supervised by a single person leads to lower performance in the public sector.     

Learning More from Political Communication Experiments: Pretreatment and Its Effects

Research on political communication effects has enjoyed great progress over the past 25 years. A key ingredient underlying these advances is the increased usage of experiments that demonstrate how communications influence opinions and behaviors. Virtually all of these studies pay scant attention to events that occur prior to the experiment—that is, in “pretreatment events.” In this article, we explore how and when the pretreatment environment affects experimental outcomes. We present two studies—one where we control the pretreatment environment and one where it naturally occurred—to show how pretreatment effects can influence experimental outcomes. We argue that, under certain conditions, attending to pretreatment dynamics leads to novel insights, including a more accurate portrait of the pliability of the mass public and the identification of potentially two groups of citizens—what we call malleability reactive and dogmatic.     

Spillover Effects of Voluntary Environmental Programs on Greenhouse Gas Emissions: Lessons from Mexico

We compare the environmental performance of voluntary environmental programs (VEPs) with different attributes. Using club theory, we argue that the differential performance of VEPs is due in part to their specific design attributes that will either enhance or diminish their ability to improve both targeted and untargeted environmental impacts. We analyze two VEPs in Mexico, the global standard ISO 14001 and the local standard Clean Industry. These two VEPs differ in the stringency of the standards and in their ability to sanction noncompliant facilities. These differences ensure that firms adopting the local standard are less likely to shirk their responsibilities and enhance potential spillover effects on untargeted environmental emissions. Our empirical results support our hypotheses and show that the local Clean Industry program is more effective in improving both targeted (toxic emissions) and untargeted environmental impacts (greenhouse gas emissions).     

The Role of Theory in Experimental Design: Experiments Without Randomization

Some who have written about the logic of experimentation arguethat random assignment of subjects to treatment conditions isan essential attribute of an experiment. Others disagree. Ratherthan treating this as a matter of dueling definitions, we considerexperiments without randomization from a theoretical perspective.Our central contention here is that, for some research questions,theory dictates systematic (not random) assignment of respondentsto experimental conditions. Two such areas of inquiry are researchon political tolerance and on institutional legitimacy. Thisarticle gives cursory attention to the former body of work anddetailed attention to the latter, based on an experiment conductedin a survey in 2001 on the consequences of the American presidentialelection for institutional legitimacy. Because in both instancestheory requires nonrandom assignment, the problem becomes oneof identifying the costs of nonrandomization (threats to internalvalidity) and specifying analytical techniques that might amelioratethose costs. Consequently, we present results from a statisticalapproach that addresses the problem of nonrandomization. Themost important claim of this article is that theory ought tospecify research design, including experimental designs, andthat dogmatic attachment to one definition of experiment willnot serve the discipline of political science.     

At the Nexus of Observational and Experimental Research: Theory,Specification, and Analysis of Experiments with Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

Experimentalists are increasingly examining heterogeneous treatment effects, in which observed individual-level characteristics are hypothesized to moderate an experimental treatment effect. Such work places researchers at the nexus of experimental and observational approaches. In this paper, we discuss the theoretical and statistical issues that can arise in testing such hypotheses. We note that inclusion of an observed (as opposed to randomly-assigned) moderator introduces the possibility of confounds that are commonplace in observational data analysis but too-easily ignored in experimental data analysis. We simulate several different data generating processes that include heterogeneous treatment effects, and we discuss the implications of various statistical models. We aim to provide researchers who examine heterogeneous treatment effects with background and advice that enable them to identify where common issues may arise and to develop research designs and implement statistical tests that will mitigate them.     

Analysis of Cluster-Randomized Experiments: A Comparison of Alternative Estimation Approaches

Lynn Vavreck UCLA, Department of Political Science, 4289 Bunche Hall Box 951472, Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472 e-mail: lvavreck{at}ucla.edu (corresponding author) Analysts of cluster-randomized field experiments have an arrayof estimation techniques to choose from. Using Monte Carlo simulation,we evaluate the properties of point estimates and standard errors(SEs) generated by ordinary least squares (OLS) as applied toboth individual-level and cluster-level data. We also compareOLS to alternative random effects estimators, such as generalizedleast squares (GLS). Our simulations assess efficiency acrossa variety of scenarios involving varying sample sizes and numbersof clusters. Our results confirm that conventional OLS SEs areseverely biased downward and that, for all estimators, gainsin efficiency come mainly from increasing the number of clusters,not increasing the number of individuals within clusters. Wefind relatively minor differences across alternative estimationapproaches, but GLS seems to enjoy a slight edge in terms ofthe efficiency of its point estimates and the accuracy of itsSEs. We illustrate the application of alternative estimationapproaches using a clustered experiment in which Rock the VoteTV advertisements were used to encourage young voters in 85cable TV markets to vote in the 2004 presidential election. Authors' note: We thank Rock the Vote for permission to usetheir public service announcements in this field experiment.The authors are grateful to Alan Gerber for suggestions throughoutthe design phase of this project. We are also grateful to DanKotin and Margaret Coblentz, who worked with cable operators,distributed the advertisements, and assembled the data. We thankTerence Leong for his programming expertise. Replication materialsare available on the Political Analysis Web site.     

The Enduring Effects of Social Pressure: Tracking Campaign Experiments Over a Series of Elections

Recent field experiments have demonstrated the powerful effect of social pressure messages on voter turnout. This research note considers the question of whether these interventions’ effects persist over a series of subsequent elections. Tracking more than one million voters from six experimental studies, we find strong and statistically significant enduring effects one and sometimes two years after the initial communication.     

Design Experiments: Engaging Policy Makers in the Search for Evidence about What Works

This article presents an argument for the greater use of design experiments, which can assist policy making because they provide both robust and timely evidence. We discuss their origins in education research, set out the methodology and propose some adaptations to the techniques used in these education studies to foster their application to a range of policy fields and problem areas. Design experiments need to meet two challenges. Can they provide valid evidence? Can they provide evidence that will be used by policy makers? Our argument shows how design experiments are robust when set against the classical canons of scientific study. We further claim that the design experiment approach offers a more viable means to developing evidence-based policy making than other forms of evaluation because of the timeliness of the insights that it provides.     

The Institutional Context of Tolerance for Ethnic Minorities: A Comparative, Multilevel Analysis of Western Europe

Drawing on recent insights in the nationalism and citizenship regime literatures, this article develops a macrotheoretical framework for understanding cross-national variations in tolerance of ethnic minorities. Specifically, it tests the hypothesis that the degree to which the dominant ethnic tradition or culture is institutionalized in the laws and policies of a nation-state affects citizen tolerance of ethnic minorities. Employing a multilevel regression model, it systematically tests the framework, as well as competing individual and country-level explanations, for all member states of the European Union in 1997. Results confirm a strong relationship between the laws governing the acquisition and expression of citizenship, that is, citizenship regime type, and individual tolerance judgments. Moreover, citizenship regime type has a strong mediating effect on three individual-level variables previously shown to predict tolerance: ingroup national identity, political ideology, and satisfaction with democracy.     

Using Experiments to Estimate the Effects of Education on Voter Turnout

The powerful relationship between education and voter turnout is arguably the most well-documented and robust finding in American survey research. Yet the causal interpretation of this relationship remains controversial, with many authors suggesting that the apparent link between education and turnout is spurious. In contrast to previous work, which has relied on observational data to assess the effect of education on voter turnout, this article analyzes two randomized experiments and one quasi-experiment in which educational attainment was altered exogenously. We track the children in these experiments over the long term, examining their voting rates as adults. In all three studies, we find that exogenously induced changes in high school graduation rates have powerful effects on voter turnout rates. These results imply that the correlation between education and turnout is indeed causal. We discuss some of the pathways by which education may transmit its influence.     

Policy Entrepreneurship and Institutional Change: Multilevel Governance of Central Banking Reform

Recent studies on institutional theory and the public policy field called for efforts to pry open the black box of institutional and policy change. This article offers a response to this call. It demonstrates that historical and discursive institutionalist approaches are complementary to explain how and why institutional change occurs. In addition, it shows how these approaches can add value to and benefit from the public policy and administration fields that seek to explain policy change and success. In particular, it emphasizes the interactions between structure and agency that contribute to the change. The empirical finding is based on qualitative analysis of central banking reform in Turkey. It suggests that institutional and policy change is more likely to occur when policy entrepreneurs, with joint membership in domestic and transnational policy communities, mediate various ideas and discourse within and among these communities in a punctuated institutional equilibrium.     

Piling On: Multilevel Government and the Fiscal Common‐Pool

This article discusses the common‐pool problems that arise when multiple territorially overlapping governments share the authority to provide services and levy taxes in a common geographic area. Contrary to the traditional Tiebout model in which increasing the number of competing governments improves efficiency, I argue that increasing the number of overlapping governments results in “overfishing” from the shared tax base. I test the model empirically using data from U.S. counties and find a strong positive relationship between the number of overlapping jurisdictions and the size of the local public sector. Substantively, the “overlap effect” amounts to roughly 10% of local revenue.     

Multilevel governance and organizational performance: Investigating the political‐bureaucratic labyrinth

Research on governance has extensively explored the complex interactions of governmental, nongovernmental, and for‐profit entities in the execution of public policy. It has consistently failed, however, to model empirically the joint effects of political and bureaucratic actors in governance systems. To address this issue, a theory of multilevel governance built upon the foundation of representative bureaucracy was developed and tested. Results from an analysis of Texas school districts suggest that Latinos at all levels of the governance system, political and managerial, influence representation at other levels. Findings also indicate that Latinos at each level of governance have positive effects, directly and indirectly, on outcomes for Latino students. The influence of both political and managerial actors at times extends beyond the immediately adjoining level; the effects of such actors cascade through the governance system. The results show that a priority for systematic research should be the identification of approaches and settings for examining the multilevel aspect of governance. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

How the European Union constrains the state: Multilevel governance of taxation

This article challenges the common assumption that the European Union (EU) has little power over taxation. Based on a comprehensive analysis of EU tax legislation and European Court of Justice (ECJ) tax jurisprudence from 1958 to 2007, the article shows that the EU exerts considerable regulatory control over the Member States' taxing power and imposes tighter constraints on Member State taxes than the American federal government imposes on American state taxation. These findings contradict the standard account of the EU as a regulatory polity that specialises in apolitical issues of market creation and leaves control of highly politicised core functions of government (defence, taxation, social security, education, etc.) to the Member States; despite strong treaty safeguards, national tax autonomy is undermined by EU regulation.