列宁是如何执行民主集中制的

列宁是民主集中制原则的创立者，也是共产党执行民主集中制的楷模。为了全面贯彻民主集中制，加强社会主义民主和法制，当前研究、学习列宁执行民主集中制的经验仍有重大的现实意义。     

列宁时期党内"民主的集中制"研究

列宁时期"民主的集中制"可以概括为十一项基本内容.战争时期的极端集中制是特定历史条件下的特殊产物.国内外战争刚刚结束,俄共十大与列宁即对和平时期"民主的集中制"作了初步设计:考虑一种"新的政治政策".     

试论十月革命前西伯利亚独立布尔什维克党组织的形成简

二月革命后,西伯利亚地区的布尔什维克与孟什维克还处于统一的社会民主工党之中,没有独立的布尔什维克党组织,这严重影响了革命向纵深发展.列宁《四月提纲》的发表和四月会议的召开,推动了西伯利亚独立布尔什维克党组织的建立,至十月革命前夕,大部分地区都完成了这一工作.这对布尔什维克夺取苏维埃领导权、取得革命的最终胜利具有重要意义.     

苏共民主集中制的异化及其启示

在苏共瓦解的众多原因中,官民对立的官僚集中制难辞其咎.苏共的民主集中制存在着先天性不足,主要在于过多地强调"少数服从多数原则"而轻视"保护少数原则".斯大林等人正是利用了这一制度的内在缺陷,有意无意地将之放大,使之常态化、制度化,结果民主集中制被异化为官僚集中制,致使苏共的权力沦为党内官僚特权阶层的私有工具,这是诱发苏共瓦解的根本原因.     

苏维埃政权初期列宁的基层党组织建设理论与实践

十月革命胜利后,布尔什维克党掌握了国家政权,成为执政党。列宁在执政党基层组织建设中,坚持民主集中制,将共产党基层组织活动与工会、青年团等组织结合起来,由党领导其他群众组织共同发挥作用,这些理论和实践活动对苏联共产党的建设产生了深远影响。     

试论坚持和健全民主集中制

民主集中制作为无产阶级政党的根本组织制度和领导制度，经过长期的实践，已充分证明，它是科学的、合理的、有效率的制度。民主集中制把民主和集中有机地统一起来，二者互相包容，相辅相成。当前，我国正在进行一场广泛而深刻的社会变革，在建立社会主义市场经济体制的过程中，利益关系的调整会带来许多新的矛盾和复杂情况，只有坚持和健全民主集中制，正确地把握民主和集中的辩证统一关系，才能使党始终保持组织上团结统一，领导上坚强有力，带领人民顺利实现中国社会主义的现代化。     

革命的根本问题就是政权问题——十月革命前后布尔什维克党在政权问题上的实践和思考

1991年的苏联剧变使苏联共产党失去了政权,丧失了1917年十月革命的胜利果实.十月革命是列宁领导的、建立在坚实理论基础之上的伟大革命,其根本问题是政权问题.二月革命之后,列宁根据俄国不断变化的实际情况调整策略,由和平夺取政权发展为武装夺取政权.十月革命胜利后,列宁坚持原则,始终捍卫布尔什维克党的领导和执政地位,同时根据革命实践提出了多党合作原则.十月革命前后列宁在政权问题上进行的一系列实践和探索,为我们留下了宝贵的经验和财富.     

党内民主视域下列宁反对官僚主义的思想

反对官僚主义是列宁党内民主理论的重要组成部分,是列宁的重要贡献之一。列宁揭露了官僚主义的表现形式,剖析了官僚主义的严重危害,深入分析了官僚主义产生的社会历史根源。列宁把反对官僚主义和腐化堕落之风作为无产阶级政党党内民主建设的一项重要任务。列宁认为＂需要有千百个措施＂来防、反官僚主义。     

反动时期俄国社会民主工党与工人运动的发展

1907年六三体制建立后，俄国进入沙皇专制的反动统治时期，直至1914年7月第一次世界大战爆发。俄国革命也随之陷入低潮。其间，俄国社会民主工党总结1905年革命的经验、教训，修正党的战略、策略，在革命斗争的影响和党内矛盾的作用下，最终分裂为两个最有影响的党派：孟什维克和布尔什维克。两派发起并领导的工会运动客观上促进了1910—1914年新的革命高潮的到来，不断推动俄国革命解放运动的发展。     

列宁党内民主理论的形成和发展

列宁党内民主理论是在同各种机会主义思潮和派别进行不调和的交锋中形成的.各种机会主义思潮和派别为列宁党内民主理论形成提供了反面素材,执政实践为列宁党内民主理论发展提供了鲜活内容和经验.     

Capitalism,Democracy and the War in Iraq

Although Saddam Hussein was a bloody tyrant, and although deposing him served a noble purpose, one still may doubt the wisdom of the American war against Iraq. It is quite dubious whether the democratisation of Iraq can serve as a justification of the American war effort. Properly understood, the democratic peace proposition does not promise that poor, emerging, and illiberal democracies surrounded by autocracies are more peaceful than autocracies. By itself, the transition towards democracy is quite likely to imply some semi-democratic phase when the country is at risk of civil war. Moreover, the democratic peace proposition says nothing at all about the likelihood of success of democratisation in a poor, oil-rich, Arab and Muslim country where there is little common ground to unite the democracy-imposing occupier and the defeated country. Finally, defeating the insurgency in the Sunni triangle of Iraq might require means which a democracy cannot even wish to apply. Whereas the promotion of democracy by war looks like a dead end and is doomed to failure, the prospects of promoting peace by exporting capitalism, growth, and prosperity look much better. Such a strategy even serves the purpose of later democratisation of those countries that now accept only creeping capitalism.     

A theory of democratisation through peace-building

Abstract

This contribution presents a theory of democratisation through peace-building. Peace-building is seen as an interactive process between external peace-builders and domestic elites; whether a post-war state develops into a democracy or not depends to a large extent on the outcome of the bargaining process between domestic elites and peace-builders. It is argued that domestic elites typically face many constraints which make adopting democratic reforms a risky and costly proposition. Also, peace-builders usually have much less leverage over domestic elites than one would expect given their resources and man-power. High adoption costs and low leverage explain the outcome of the interaction between peace-builders and domestic elites often results in a peace which is not democratic. The paper uses an analysis of 19 major peace-building missions for exemplifying the theory.     

Understanding support for democracy in new and old democracies in the Americas: the role of democratic experience

This article develops and evaluates a set of expectations regarding the mechanisms via which democratic experience could shape support for democracy. In line with previous studies, one straightforward possibility considered is that experience with democracy fosters greater affective support for democracy, making citizens of old democracies more supportive of this regime independently of government performance and other characteristics. Another possibility considered is that democratic experience mediates the importance of performance assessments in citizens’ judgments about democracy, decreasing the importance of economic performance assessments, while increasing that of political performance assessments. Statistical analyses of public opinion data from 23 countries in the Americas indicate that the effect of democratic experience on support for democracy is not statistically significant. Rather, democratic experience conditions the effects of performance assessments on support for democracy. The evidence also supports the assertion that experience with democracy, and not economic development, is what conditions the effects of performance assessments on support for democracy.     

The evolution of South Africa's democracy promotion in Africa: from idealism to pragmatism

South Africa is an emerging power with fairly strong democratic institutions that were crafted during the transition from minority to majority rule twenty years ago. How has South Africa used its position and power to promote democracy in Africa? Against the backdrop of debates on democracy promotion by emerging powers, this article probes attempts by successive post-apartheid governments to promote democracy in Africa. We argue that although democracy promotion featured prominently in South Africa's policy towards Africa in the immediate post-apartheid period under Nelson Mandela, the administrations of Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma faltered in advancing democratic norms. This is largely because South Africa has confronted pressures to maximize pragmatic national interests, which have compromised a democratic ethos in a continental environment where these values have yet to find steady footing.     

Ideological radicalism and democratic experience in new democracies

In comparing publics’ ideological self-placements between established and new democracies, it has been observed that there is a higher proportion of citizens who express radical views in the latter countries. This is likely due to sharp differences with regard to evaluations of past authoritarian rule, the legitimacy of the new regime, or new institutional arrangements governing the distribution of power when countries embark on democratic transition. Studies on the attitudinal aspect of democratic consolidation lead one to expect a decrease in extreme views in new democracies with the passage of time, as questions of regime principles and institutions are settled, and citizens come to accept democracy as the “only game in town”. The present article investigates whether this proposition is applicable to “Third Wave” new democracies in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and East Asia by examining longitudinal public opinion data from 23 countries. In addition to the length of democratic regimes, We also analyse the impact of economic performance, quality of governance, and electoral systems on the proportion of radical citizens. Results show that while longer democratic experience does contribute to reducing extremist leanings, factors such as the level of corruption, rule of law, and plurality electoral rules play a more substantive role.     

Regime Change and Foreign Policy: Portugal,Indonesia and the Self-determination of East Timor

This article argues that the nature of interim governments is not a satisfactory explanation of foreign policy initiatives, or their absence, during particular types of transition to democracy. The proposal is rejected for two main reasons. On the one hand, both the Portuguese (1974-76) and Indonesian (1998-99) transitions to democracy provide evidence that contradicts the proposal. On the other hand, the proposition does not explain which foreign policy decisions are taken and the reasons why. This article argues that we should focus instead on the new individual and corporate evaluations and strategies that come about inside a country as a result of new elite alignments, following the installation of a democratic regime, which opens a window of opportunity for making foreign policy changes. Moreover, the perceptions of the international community also influence the decision-making of individual and corporate interests and their strategies. Where the preceding authoritarian regime pursued foreign policies that the international community regarded as illegitimate, then there will be incentives to change policy. This approach sheds more light on the case studies involving Portugal, Indonesia and East Timor, by identifying correctly the foreign policy initiatives that were taken during the regime transitions to democracy and by explaining the underlying reasons.     

Is democracy the only game in town? Tension between immigrants' democratic desires and authoritarian imprints

This article borrows from the literature on transitional democracies to examine levels of support for democracy and non-democratic alternatives among immigrants travelling from partly and non-democratic countries to Canada. It evaluates how immigrants who grew up under authoritarian rule come to adapt to democracy. The findings indicate that immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries experience tensions in their adaptation to democracy, expressing strong democratic desires but also manifesting what could be interpreted as lasting imprints of their socialization under authoritarian rule. Immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries exhibit strong support for democracy (they almost all believe it is a good form of government, the best one, and understand democracy in broadly similar terms as the rest of the population). Yet, if democracy is the main game in town for the immigrants, it is not the only one; immigrants from partly and non-democratic countries are significantly more likely than people socialized in a democratic political system to support other forms of governments that are non-democratic. The article thus argues for the lasting impact of authoritarianism on people's democratic outlooks despite the presence of strong democratic desires.     

Are democratic sanctions really counterproductive?

Previous research has shown that sanctions have a negative impact on the level of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. This runs counter to substantive comparative literature on democratization which finds that economic stress is connected with regime collapse and democratic liberalization. To solve this puzzle, we focus on the effects of “democratic sanctions” (those that explicitly aim to promote democracy) which have become the most common type of sanction issued against authoritarian states. We introduce a new data set of imposed sanctions in the period 1990–2010 that clearly separates sanctions according to the explicit goal of the sender. Our cross-sectional time-series analysis demonstrates that although sanctions as a whole do not generally increase the level of democracy, there is in fact a significant correlation between democratic sanctions and increased levels of democracy in targeted authoritarian countries. A fundamental mechanism leading to this outcome is the increased instability of authoritarian rule as democratic sanctions are significantly associated with a higher probability of regime and leadership change.