Contracting out local road and park services: economic effects and their strategic,contractual and competitive conditions

ABSTRACT

The economic rationale for contracting out local services is increasingly contested by empirical research. This article aims to contribute to this literature, first by scrutinising the economic effects of contracting out in local road and park services and, second, by exploring how characteristics such as markets, contracts, municipal strategies and contracting history influence these outcomes. Drawing on original survey data from Danish municipalities, we find that competitive tendering has on average reduced costs. Further analysis shows that savings are not associated with lower quality, thus indicating that ‘quality shading’ was not taking place. Another finding is that municipalities that repeatedly contract the services experience smaller savings, suggesting that competitive tendering is subject to declining marginal returns. Finally, we find that larger municipalities and those emphasising expenditure cuts realise larger savings, whereas the characteristics of markets and contracts do not seem to explain variations in cost savings.     

CONTRACTORS' EXPERIENCE OF COMPULSORY COMPETITIVE TENDERING: A CASE STUDY OF CONTRACT CLEANERS IN THE NHS

Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) has been an important instrument of Conservative government economic policy since 1979. Its effectiveness in generating cost-effective services depends on competition to supply the service in question.
The NHS domestic market is large and, prior to the introduction of CCT, promised to be profitable for contractors. Many contract cleaners with office cleaning experience entered. In the event the costs of entry were heavy, and the profit margins of established firms were reduced. When contracts have been awarded to firms, they tended to be to those with a track record. Many firms therefore withdrew; and the few that remained have profit margins in the NHS little different from those found elsewhere. Of more than by firms with a serious interest in entry, probably no more than a handful can have come out of the experience in net profit in the first seven years.
The experience of CCT in the market for NHS domestic services has shown that a degree of competition in the market can be achieved, arguably because of the presence of direct service organizations. Competition for this market, on the other hand, can be limited by the high costs of entry.     

PUBLIC‐PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP CONTRACTS: A TALE OF TWO CITIES WITH DIFFERENT CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS

This paper analyses regulation by contract in public‐private partnerships (PPPs) for infrastructure services. Although the benefits of competition for the market and subsequent regulatory contracts are recognized, the literature also identifies contract design failures. When considering these limitations, it is useful to distinguish between contracts associated with purely contractual PPPs (concessions) and contracts for institutionalized PPPs (mixed company). Two cases from the Portuguese water sector are used to illustrate problems arising in the preparation of public tender documents: the ‘best’ bidder is often not the winner. Often, risks are not allocated correctly nor is effective monitoring ensured. Comparisons between the two types of contracts show how external regulation can be useful in mitigating contractual problems. This examination of bidding procedures and contract design yields several implications for policy‐makers; in addition, the study presents recommendations for improving regulatory contracts.     

ON THE PERFORMANCE OF COMPETITIVELY TENDERED, PUBLIC SECTOR CLEANING CONTRACTS

Quantitative analysis of competitive tendering and contracting typically focuses on their effect on the cost of providing public sector services. In this article we turn to the systematic factors that appear to influence the performance of cleaning contracts. This is defined as compliance with contract specification, public perception of service quality and other qualitative measures of service characteristics as observed by the contracting authority. Our analysis attempts to isolate particular features of contract design, monitoring and enforcement that influence performance positively or negatively. Econometric results based on a sample of public sector cleaning contracts suggest that contractor selection procedures and contract enforcement mechanisms have the greatest influence on performance.     

THE ODYSSEY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS IN GREECE, 1981–2009: A TALE OF TWO REFORM PATHS

In Greece, two distinct reform paths led to institutional building and economic managerial types of reform. These two reforms, with the exception of the period 1996–2004, when both institutional and economic reforms were attempted, did not attract the same degree of attention. Institutional reforms were more successful than attempts at managerial reforms; reform implementation on the other hand varies. Economic and managerial reforms can be observed with regard to economic competition, the opening up of the market, and reducing the size of public sector, all areas where pressure from the EU has been stronger. Decentralization reforms were more important politically than administratively. Citizens' rights and service delivery were conceived as reforms of democratization and modernization rather than as managerial reforms. ‘Agencification’ amounted to circumventing existing ministerial structures. Change was incremental, and reforms were minimally guided by the New Public Management paradigm, because of little emphasis on changes imbued by managerial and economic values. Reform dynamics benefited not only from outside pressures but also from the operation of internal, ‘modernizing’ forces.     

THE ENABLING STATE: THE ROLE OF MARKETS AND CONTRACTS

Contracts have been a key element in the recent reform of British public services. Their introduction has formed part of a broader process of change in which the market structures and values have featured prominently. In practice, contracts have both brought benefits and presented problems. More particularly, greater organizational formality has raised some important issues – the role of trust and the form and practice of accountability prominent among them. Evidence from a recent esrc -supported study shows that some services (the simpler ones) have generally gained from the reforms; but the evidence for more complex ones is equivocal at best.     

ENGLISH METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT SINCE ABOLITION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ABOLITION OF THE ENGLISH METROPOLITAN COUNTY COUNCILS

The Local Government Act 1985 abolished the Greater London Council (GLC) and the six English metropolitan county councils (MCCS); but it did not abolish the services for which they were responsible. It transferred them: some directly to the lower-tier borough or district councils, others to a variety of joint boards, joint committees, residuary bodies, and special purpose agencies. As a result, there are, in at least some of the former MCC areas, many services still operated wholly or partially on a county-wide basis. The first part of this article compares the contrasting approaches adopted in the six metropolitan areas to the retention or re-creation of county-wide services after abolition. The second part attempts to explain these contrasting approaches: why, for instance, significantly more county-wide institutional arrangements were voluntarily negotiated by the districts in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester than by those in South Yorkshire and Merseyside.     

COMPETITION OR MONOPOLY? COMPARING PRIVATIZATION OF LOCAL PUBLIC SERVICES IN THE US AND SPAIN

Differences in national traditions of public intervention, institutional arrangements and public service markets make local public services an area of great diversity. In this paper we undertake a comparative study of how local governments arrange for delivery of water and waste services in the US and Spain. We find levels of privatization are higher in Spain than in the US. We review organizational reform in the two contexts and compare service delivery data using national surveys from each country. We find lower and less stable privatization in the US stems in part from adherence to public choice emphasis on the benefits of market competition over public monopoly. By contrast, Spanish municipalities reflect an industrial organization approach, and create hybrid public/private firms which benefit from both market engagement and economies of scale available under monopoly production. We conclude that managing monopoly may be more important than competition in local service delivery.     

Cooperation,not cost savings: explaining duration of shared service agreements

Among local governments, inter-municipal cooperation is the growing reform; but the literature is silent regarding the determinants of longer-term shared service agreements. We conducted a survey of all local governments in New York State in 2013 to assess the level of sharing across 29 public services. The duration of shared service agreements varies from 1 to 80 years. What explains this difference? Our hierarchical linear model shows that service sharing agreements fall along a cooperation continuum, where cost savings are a determinant of shorter agreements, while the public values of service quality and cross-jurisdictional coordination explain longer-term agreements. We also find that positive past experience with sharing partners increases the duration of sharing agreements. Our analysis lays the foundation for new theories of shared services that build directly from the benefits of improved regional coordination, inter-municipal reciprocity and service quality, not from theories based solely on competition and costs.     

THE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES OF CONTRACTING WITH NONPROFITS for SOCIAL SERVICES

ABSTRACT

States and municipalities increasingly pursue privatization as a way to deliver public goods and services because of two expected outcomes, reduced costs and quality improvements. Several reasons are frequently cited for these anticipated benefits ranging from market competition to increased management flexibility and discretion to fewer rules and regulations. One policy area in which government has privatized many services through contracting with nonprofit organizations is social services. Contracted services are as diverse as providing shelters for the homeless, vocational education and job retraining, domestic violence services, refugee esettlement, child and elder abuse services, and food banks. A proliferation of public administration and nonprofit organizational scholarship has examined a range of issues associated with the government-nonprofit social service contracting relationship, not the least of which are topics related to management, measurement, and accountability. This article examines the public management challenges and implications of contracting with nonprofit organizations for the delivery of social services.     

THE NEW SYSTEM OF LOCAL TAXATION IN SCOTLAND: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE

This article examines the new system of Scottish local government finance in theory and practice. It argues that reform is based on an economic theory of local fiscal behaviour, and examines the empirical evidence regarding the application of marginal cost pricing principles through the linking of marginal spending to taxation. The research reveals that the application of such principles in practice will be difficult, as only a few services offer direct benefits to all individuals, and as yet the technical precision needed in assessing needs for grant distribution has not materialized. There is little evidence of any impact of financial reform on local expenditure, as a number of intervening variables and assumptions can skew the accountability process.     

A replication of “Contracting out: For What? With Whom?”

In the 1980s, governments around the world adopted New Public Management ideas about inserting competition into government as a way to improve the performance of public organizations. In many nations, contracting out was one method of making governments more businesslike. Yet, there have been few studies of how government contracting behaviors have changed since the early 1980s. We replicate Ferris and Graddy's classic 1986 study of local government production and sector choice to assess how public procurement has changed over the past 35 years. Our findings show that today, contracting out is more commonly used across 25 local government service areas. In contrast to the original study, much of the growth has been in government-to-government contracts. For profit firms are also winning more contracts for high transaction cost work, while nonprofits are receiving fewer government contracts in nearly every service area. Our analysis suggests that contracting out remains of the highest importance in 21st-century governance and that additional research is needed on how to manage contracts to achieve the best value.     

Understanding the Accumulation of Local Government Savings: A Dynamic Analysis

Government savings can be a conundrum that perplexes taxpayers. Excessive savings indicate that taxpayers either pay unnecessarily high taxes, or they do not receive adequate returns on services. Insufficient savings leave government officials little financial flexibility. The Great Recession and its aftermath have renewed interest in understanding government savings. This article uses dynamic panel modeling to analyze the determinants of municipal discretionary savings. Results show that risk factors are the primary drivers of municipal savings, and high-risk factors have greater impact on the amount of savings. This finding confirms organization theory’s view of savings as a crucial buffer against risk.     

Does Ideology Matter? Incentive,Efficiency and Management in the Public Sector

Contracting out has become increasingly popular as a strategy for public sector management for reducing costs, alleviating the burden on government agencies providing services, as well as taking advantage of the practices that have succeeded in the private sector. Generally, the system of management in capitalist liberal democratic systems of government that emphasize rule of law, transparency, performance measurement, and accountability are expected to be more efficient, while socialist regimes are considered to be inefficient due to the lack of these features. This article compares two dissimilar cases of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and Shenzhen Special Economic Zone of China. An examination of the management of contract in the area of public housing in these cities reveal that the socialist city of Shenzhen has achieved a higher level of efficiency, while capitalist Hong Kong lags behind in establishing an effective system of management of contracts in the public sector. The finding challenges the traditional assumptions related to efficiency under different ideological regimes.     

DESIGNING CONTRACTS FOR COMPLEX SERVICES

In this article, we employ transaction cost economics and the contingency stream of organization theory to answer two related questions. First, when contracting for complex services, do governments design contracts for flexibility? Second, is the contingency perspective relevant to understanding contract design? Examining 130 professional service contracts awarded by state government agencies in the USA, we find that task complexity and task unpredictability, two dimensions of task uncertainty, increase the probability of flexible governance. This research highlights for managers the important fact that the potential for opportunism and task complexity are different sources of uncertainty that pose different challenges and call for different governance solutions. The study enriches our understanding of transaction costs by probing the conditions under which task uncertainty matters most (and least), and further shows the utility of integrating transaction cost economics with contingency theory to better understand contract governance.     

The relationship between competition and efficiency of waste-collection services in the Czech Republic

This paper examines the role of the competition on the waste-collection market. Based on the case study of the Czech Republic, we evaluate the influence of competition intensity on supply side of the market on efficiency of waste-collection services. The rate of competition was approximated by the number of submitted bids to public tenders and efficiency was measured by per capita expenditures for municipal waste-collection services. We developed two regression models – the first model verified a competitive effect on the public procurement market for the provision of waste-collection services; the second model identified factors that affected municipal expenditures for waste-collection services per capita. We concluded that the competition in the waste-collection market increases by organising open tenders for suppliers at regular intervals, by adapting the duration of contracts to economic life of fixed assets, by sustaining pressure on service providers through a change in suppliers or the distribution of contracts among jurisdictions.     

Planning,Budgeting, and Health Care Performance in Ukraine

Abstract

The Government of Ukraine has not pursued health care reforms now commonplace in the rest of Europe and Central/Eastern Europe that rely less upon centralized, state delivery of services and more on decentralized operational responsibilities and competition for services that increase patient choice. The Ukrainian health sector suffers from personnel overspecialization and facility overcapacity, resulting in high-cost, low productivity services. Budget funds are unavailable for operations and maintenance resulting in poor quality services. The state provides health care as a constitutionally-protected monopoly, relying on the traditional command and control model which ignores cost/quality competition options and responsibilities to patients. Overall, the system which produces these results is over-centralized, requiring achievement of physical service norms without providing sufficient funds. The centralized system does not monitor or evaluate services beyond narrow financial accountability and control requirements. The health care system is paradoxically over-centralized but unable to regulate or control local health care official decisions to ensure compliance with national standards. Needed are reforms in the health care policy and operational areas to produce the supply of services needed for national economic recovery. In the short-term, the budgetary framework can be improved as an operational/management guide through development of comparative information on results. Most of this information can be based on the economic classification consistent with the chart of accounts. Funding stability can be increased to improve expenditure control by implementing a new fiscal transfer formula that provides discretion (i.e., block grants) and performance criteria (i.e., outcome measures). In the medium-term, building on the technical foundation of physical norms and statistical reporting, the health care budgeting and financial management system should shift emphasis to: program planning, policy and management analysis, and public communications. The results of these reforms should lead to decentralized health care operations, service analysis, and delivery responsibilities. At the same time, the reforms should lead to proper centralization of responsibilities for strategic policy decisions, safety regulation, national standards, and program evaluation.     

INTER‐MUNICIPAL COOPERATION AND COSTS: EXPECTATIONS AND EVIDENCE

Austerity and fiscal crisis make the search for cost‐saving reforms in local government more critical. While cost savings from privatization have frequently proven ephemeral, inter‐municipal cooperation has been a relatively understudied reform. We analyse the literature on cost savings under cooperation and find that savings are dependent on (1) the cost structure of public services, particularly those related to scale and density economies and externalities, (2) the structure of local government (size, metropolitan location, powers granted by the nation or regional state), and (3) the governance framework at the local/regional level where cooperation varies from informal to formal. European studies give more emphasis to cost savings, while US studies focus on coordination concerns arising from the higher degree of devolution in the US local government system.     

Municipal Service Delivery: The Role of Transaction Costs in the Choice between Alternative Governance Mechanisms

Service provision by local governments can be delivered using in-house bureaucracies, private firms, and partnerships with other governments or the not-for-profit sector. This production decision has been a major focus of discussion among scholars, practitioners and political agents for the last quarter of a century. The transaction costs framework is an important tool to analyse decisions regarding the production of local services. In this paper, the authors employ this framework to analyse service delivery in Portugal and find that service characteristics and the local political environment play a key role in local officials' choice among the three governance mechanisms to deliver public services.     

THE PRACTICE OF CONTRACTING IN PUBLIC PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: TRANSACTION COSTS AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTING IN THE IRISH SCHOOLS SECTOR

This paper explores the practice of contracting in public private partnerships (PPP). Focusing on the first Irish PPP to provide secondary schools, it draws on perspectives from transaction cost economics and socio‐legal theory. It finds that the ex ante contractual setting was undermined by pushing forward with the PPP before conducting an adequate level of project appraisal. It explores the experiences of key stakeholders in the ex post contracting stage and concludes that the conduct of contracting practice was not characterized by the shift to relational contracting expected under PPP. Whereas this approach to contractual governance did not hinder the development of broadly trusting relations between the client and contractor, this was not manifest in terms of relations between the contractor and schools. A significant degree of conflict was evident in some schools‐contractor relations, something which can be attributed to sources of transaction costs, including incomplete information, bounded rationality and uncertainty.