The UK Politics of Overseas Voting

The enfranchisement of non‐resident citizens has always been controversial in the UK, where for historical reasons, voting rights are not as closely associated with citizenship as elsewhere. The introduction of ‘overseas’ voting in the 1980s by the Conservatives was contested by Labour as a form of ‘international gerrymandering’ since expatriates were widely assumed to be disproportionately wealthy and therefore more likely to vote Tory. Expatriate campaigners have been increasingly vocal in denouncing the ‘electoral injustice’ of the ‘fifteen‐year rule’ which disenfranchises them after fifteen years abroad, and the exclusion of so many from the EU referendum highlighted their cause. A recent private member's bill proposing ‘votes for life’ for UK expatriates aimed to meet their demands to abolish the time restriction, now considered anachronistic. But their arguments were hijacked by historically embedded attitudes and disputes driven by party politics, ending in a dramatic and bewildering filibuster which this paper elucidates.     

Breaking the Mould? Roy Jenkins’ ‘Radical Centre’ and British Social Democracy in the ‘New Hard Times’

Social democratic politics in Britain requires compelling answers to three animating questions that Roy Jenkins posed in his landmark 1979 Dimbleby lecture. Firstly, how can the British system of democracy be reformed to develop a culture of political participation and pluralism that leads to more equitable economic and social policies? Secondly, how can the centre‐left and left unite to forestall long periods of Tory dominance in electoral politics, thereby avoiding calamities such as the 2016 referendum on EU membership? And, thirdly, how can a flourishing intellectual ecosystem be cultivated on the progressive left that generates radical ideas for economic and social reform, recognising the importance of concerted dialogue between political traditions? This article revisits Jenkins’ 1979 lecture by considering the prospects for ‘breaking the mould’ of British politics in the ‘new hard times’ of Brexit and ‘permanent austerity’.     

The Strange Career of British Democracy: John Milton to Gordon Brown

Political debate in modern Britain has been structured by four narratives or traditions, called here ‘Whig imperialist’, ‘Tory nationalist’, ‘democratic collectivist’ and ‘democratic republican’. The Whig imperialist tradition goes back to Edmund Burke; it is a tradition of responsive evolution, flexible statecraft, genial optimism and abhorrence of dogmatic absolutes. It prevailed for most of the nineteenth century, for most of the interwar period and for most of the 1950s and early‐1960s. Its Tory nationalist counterpart is tense, rebarbative and often shrill. At its core lies a primal fear of the dissolution of authority and a collapse of the social order. Its most notable exponents include Lord Salisbury, Enoch Powell and Margaret Thatcher. The democratic collectivist tradition stresses ineluctable progress towards a just and rational society, to be achieved by a strong, essentially technocratic central state, with the power and will to replace the wasteful, unjust chaos of the market place by planned co‐ordination. Formative influences on it were the great Fabian socialists, George Bernard Shaw and Sidney and Beatrice Webb; it achieved its apotheosis under the Attlee Government of 1945‐51. The democratic republican tradition is much more inchoate: its exponents have been the awkward squad of British democracy. The most glittering stars in the democratic republican firmament were probably John Milton, John Stuart Mill and R.H. Tawney. It stresses active self‐government and republican self respect, embodied in a vigorous civil society and strong local authorities. During the ninety‐odd years since Britain belatedly acquired a more‐or‐less democratic suffrage, the first three traditions have all been tested, almost to destruction. But though the fourth has had great influence on social movements of all kinds, governments at the centre have done little more than toy with it, usually for brief periods. The great question now is whether Britain is about to experience a democratic republican moment.     

Rising Damp in the Suburbs. Or ‘Whatever Happened to the Villa Tory?’

The suburban areas that were initially stereotyped in the late nineteenth century as ‘Villa Tory’ strongholds and exemplified by Hackney and Islington had, by the 1980s, become ‘bedsitter’ areas dominated by the political left. An examination of the evolution of electoral behaviour in these areas shows that conservatism did indeed dominate the villa suburbs, and that although there were previous intimations of decline, it was not until 1945 that Labour broke the Conservatives’ grip. The causes of this are identified as an outward movement of the population to interwar suburbia, the breaking up of villas into flats, and Labour's increasing appeal to middle class electors. In this category of seats, Labour has outperformed the party's national achievement consistently since 1955; the party's exceptional results here in the 2017 election are, therefore, a new peak on a long‐term trend rather than a breakthrough.     

Civil society: Bringing the family back in

This article explores the complex and contradictory positioning of the family within civil society literature. In some accounts, the family is seen as the cornerstone of civil society. In others, the family is positioned firmly outside – even antithetical to – civil society. This paradox arises from the ways in which civil society is variously defined through a series of binary oppositions – in relation to each of which the family sits uneasily. And while feminist critiques have tried to bring women back into view, they too tend to marginalize the family. In addition, the normative nature of these oppositions has meant that while civil society tends to be seen as the property of the political ‘left’, the family is often associated with the political ‘right’. The article argues that we need to move beyond oppositional definitions of civil society and assumptions about the family if we are to understand the multiple ways in which the family is implicated as not only the ‘reproducer’ of particular resources and dispositions but as a principal source and focus of civil society engagement and activism.     

Foxhunting and the Conservatives

The Conservatives are pledged to have a free vote in Parliament on legislation in Government time to reverse the 2004 Hunting Act. This Act bans hunting with dogs. The Countryside Alliance has opposed the Hunting Act as part of campaigns to defend its notion of rural interests. The Countryside Alliance's success in gaining the Tory pledge could be underscored by a Tory hope that hunting supporters give decisive support for Tory candidates in marginal Parliamentary constituencies. However, the Tory leadership may find it politically difficult to give early priority to legislative attempts to repeal the Hunting Act. Moreover, it is likely to require a large Tory majority and years of waiting before a Tory government is able and willing to complete a repeal of the hunting ban.     

The memorial day statement: women's organizations in the ‘peace offensive’

This contribution examines the gendered aspect of the American response to the issue of peace in the Cold War. In 1949, the US government accused the Soviet Union of launching a ‘Peace Offensive’, designed to represent the Soviet Union as ‘peace-loving’ whilst painting the Americans as ‘warmongers.’ In recognition of the undeniable appeal of ‘peace’ as a rallying cry, the United States sought to re-define the term in such a way as to illustrate the difference between what East and West meant by their commitment to the cause of peace. American women's associations had a particularly active role in US efforts to counter the Soviet ‘Peace Offensive’. Leaders of US women's associations and policy-makers within the government were concerned that the ‘Peace Offensive’ specifically targeted women, on the basis of their special gendered interest in peace. They tried to convince women across the globe that Soviet-backed peace campaigns lacked sincerity and that women's special interest in peace was best represented by the United States.     

The Committee on Standards in Public Life: Twenty Years of the Nolan Principles 1995–2015

In his recent memoir, William Waldegrave wrote that no country run by John Major and Robin Butler was likely to be in much danger of systemic corruption. The fact remains that a quarter of a century ago, John Major, with the guidance and support of his cabinet secretary, decided to establish the Committee on Standards in Public Life under the chairmanship of Lord Nolan. The apparent prevalence of ‘sleaze’ issues in public life—most notably the ‘cash for questions’ scandals involving Tory MPs—provoked the decision. Lord Nolan's committee immediately enunciated seven principles of public life: honesty, accountability, integrity, selflessness, openness, opportunity and leadership. Over the years, many of the Committee's recommendations have been accepted. There is today vastly greater transparency. The principles have been widely accepted; it is clear the public expects that they should be observed by public servants, including, perhaps especially, MPs. Yet it is equally clear that there is a widespread and still deepening mood of public cynicism on standards matters. The Committee is determined to defend the Nolan principles, but without more help from the political class it will be like Mrs Nupkins in The Pickwick Papers: inculcating moral lessons of great importance and generally ignored.     

Improving Governments' Response to Local Communities — is Place Management an Answer?

The notion of place management is emerging in public sector discourse as a potential solution to improve governments' responses to issues confronting local communities, particularly those experiencing high levels of economic and social disadvantage. Despite the increased currency of the term, there is a degree of confusion surrounding what it actually means. And it is not always clear what is meant by the notion of ‘place’. This article attempts to clarify a working definition of ‘place management’ and to explore the policy and administrative implications for governments in adopting a place management approach.     

Ideological hybrids: the contrary case of Tory anarchism

This article provides an account of ideological hybridity. It describes and categorizes four main types of ideological hybrid in order to examine a range of sub-ideologies and cross-breeds but concentrates on identifying and assessing the particular phenomena described as conservative (or ‘Tory’) anarchisms. The article demonstrates how an ideological hybrid’s morphological relationship to its parent ideologies can alter in different geographical or historical contexts. Using this model, it argues that some differences between conservatism and anarchism are overstressed (such as those over the role of the state and individual rights), whilst some important similarities are often overlooked, namely those surrounding their political epistemologies. However, because apparently shared concepts are structured next to radically different core principles (defence/rejection of hierarchies and prioritizing/negation of dominant economic institutions), these shared principles are interpreted in radically different ways. As a result, conservative anarchism is a deeply unstable hybrid rather than an innovative new ideological form. It is one which, in most contexts, stabilizes into a form of conservatism rather than a form of anarchism.     

A critical reappraisal of some voting power paradoxes

Power indices are meant to assess the power that a voting rule confers a priori to each of the decision makers who use it. In order to test and compare them, some authors have proposed ‘natural’ postulates that a measure of a priori voting power ‘should’ satisfy, the violations of which are called ‘voting power paradoxes.’ In this paper two general measures of success and decisiveness based on the voting rule and voters' behavior and some of these postulates/paradoxes test each other. As a result serious doubts are cast on the discriminating power of most voting power postulates.     

The Gordon Brown Problem: New Labour and the Two ‘Adam Smiths’

As is well known, New Labour is often presented as an alternative to the conventional preferences of the left and right in British politics. Less commented upon is Gordon Brown's self‐conscious appeal to the thought of Adam Smith in doing so. Brown claims to have rescued Smith from those on the right that interpret his ‘invisible hand’ metaphor from The Wealth of Nations to represent dogmatic advocacy of free markets. Rather than interrogate this view, Brown attempts to complement it with the ‘helping hand’ that Smith supposedly proffers in The Theory of Moral Sentiments, in order to stress New Labour's resolution of ‘enterprise and fairness.’ I argue that Brown instead reiterates the academically discredited Adam Smith Problem, in which the moral ‘Smith’ is deemed subordinate to the economic ‘Smith,’ and that his use of these erroneous characterisations highlights his commitment to a set of preferences usually associated with the right.     

Between ideology and social representations: Four theses plus (a new) one on the relevance and the meaning of the political left and right

This study analyses the relevance and the meaning given by Italians to the political labels ‘left’ and ‘right’ between 1975 and 2006. Based on responses to the open‐ended question ‘What do you mean by “left/right” in politics?’, the study compares five alternative hypotheses on the meaning of the left‐right axis and show that, despite the alleged end of ideologies, the relevance of the axis has increased over time. A core of abstract meanings persists throughout the thirty‐year period considered. As the importance of abstract meanings has increased over time, reference to more concrete contents (such as ‘parties’ and ‘leaders’) has decreased. The findings thus support the hypothesis that the left‐right axis has the functional characteristics of social representations.     

Having One's Cake and Eating It Too: Cameron's Conservatives and Immigration

The May 2010 general election represented a change in tone on immigration and asylum policy for the Conservative party. Although its manifesto still contained a promise to limit numbers and expressed concern about the abuse of student visas, the Party's previous fixation with asylum seekers had disappeared. This article considers the rationale for these developments in the light of David Cameron's election as leader in late 2005 and his efforts from then on to reposition his party. Cameron's initial silence on this issue and his appointment of a moderate as immigration spokesman were part of an attempt both to shift the focus onto the economic impact of migration and, more broadly, to ‘decontaminate the Tory brand’ in order to gain ‘permission to be heard’ by small‐l liberals who were critical to the Party's electoral recovery but alienated by hard‐line stances. That said, immigration was never entirely forgotten even in this early period and was always seen, so long as it was carefully handled, as an issue capable of benefitting the Tories. As such, it was skilfully factored back into the Party's offer from late 2007 onwards. In government, the Conservatives may have the upper hand on immigration over their junior coalition partner, but this is no guarantee that they will be able to deliver the outcomes they promised     

Renormalizing citizenship and life in Fortress North America

The relation between the concepts of sovereignty and citizenship are being rearticulated through what is popularly referred to as ‘Fortress North America’. The ‘War on Terror’ has amplified previously emerging shifts in governance, control and surveillance. One significant consequence is the development of increasing border harmonization schemes between the United States of America and Canada. This development has led to newly emerging technologies of citizenship in both Canada and the USA. This paper pays particular attention to the shifts that are taking place with regards to the revocation of citizenship, the creation of new categories of citizenship through programs such as ‘Nexus’ and the proposed introduction of bio‐metric ID cards in Canada and the introduction of the discourse of the ‘new normal’. Through new border harmonization programs established in the ‘Smart Border Declaration’ citizens and non‐citizens in both Canada and America will be organized, controlled and subjected to new forms of state surveillance. The discourse of the ‘new normal’ is meant to signal a shift in our expectations of daily life. Whether we are experiencing the ‘new normal’ due to disease, fear, risk, loss of faith or security, we are being called into place as subjects of this discourse. The ‘new normal’ is used in reference to the need for greater control, the expectation of greater security and surveillance of cells, microbes, bodies and society. This paper will explore the logic that is embedded within the discourse of the ‘new normal’.     

Notes on contributors

International comparisons of new radical right‐wing parties usually focus on differences in electoral fortunes, party organisations and leadership. This article uses a different angle by focusing on public policy impact and the role these parties play in the parliamentary and executive arenas. The research is driven by the hypothesis that under the conditions of stable democracy, holding office produces a net result in a ‘taming effect’ on radical right‐wing actors rather than a sharp ‘right turn’. Evidence f rom four countries (Germany, France, Italy and Austria) shows that parliamentary presence alone does not result in policy effects. When the radical right holds executive office, a ‘right turn’ occurs primarily in cultural policies. Overall, real effects of radical right‐wing politics occur largely as a result of the interaction between the radical right and established actors ‐regardless of the radical right's assuming power.     

The Pegida Movement and German Political Culture: Is Right‐Wing Populism Here to Stay?

This article outlines the rise and fall of the ‘Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West’ (Pegida), a right‐wing populist street movement that originated in the city of Dresden in October 2014 and peaked in January 2015. The Pegida movement combined fear of ‘Islamisation’ with general criticism of Germany's political class and the mainstream media. This ambivalent and largely undefined political profile proved its strength in mobilising a significant minority of right‐wing citizens in the local context of Dresden and the federal state of Saxony, but generally failed to spill over to other parts of Germany. The social profile of the Pegida movement, which included ‘ordinary citizens’ with centre‐right to far‐right attitudes, points to significant overlap between general disenchantment of the political centre ground in Germany with the political system, as outlined in recent sociological research, and the ability of a largely leaderless populism to mobilise in the streets.     

Caring for the elderly in the family or in the nation? Gender,women and migrant care labour in the Lega Nord

This article aims at gendering our understanding of populist radical right ideology, policy and activism in Italy. It does so by focusing on migrant care labour, which provides a strategic site for addressing the relationship between anti-immigration politics and the gendered and racialised division of work. Three arrangements and understandings of elderly care are analysed, whereby care work should be performed ‘in the family and in the nation’, ‘in the family/outside the nation’ and ‘in the nation/outside the family’. Party documents and interviews with women activists are used to show how the activists’ views and experiences partly diverge from the Lega Nord rhetoric and policy on immigration, gender and care work. The article locates populist radical right politics in the context of the international division of reproductive labour in Italy and suggests the relevance of analysing gender relations in populist radical right parties in connection with national care regimes.     

An Elected Upper House and Other Fallacies

All fashionable political talk is of an elected House of Lords. Doing this smart, new unthought‐out thing, says Edward Pearce, means dissolving the reliably rebellious upper house regularly rejecting bad bills from Tory and Labour governments, for a House as submissive as the Commons. Second‐line politicians will replace the difficult individual people, soldiers, doctors, academics, scientists, assorted and distinguished experts who, by lucky muddle, go there today. Far better, he says, to abolish actual titles which create a false idea of privilege, but continue drawing upon independent professional specialists. Also, Ministers should be barred from the pernicious Mandelson Effect, of making an instant Minister by life‐ennoblement, huge powers conferred without a voter in sight. An upper house called ‘The Upper House’, chosen as now for competence, will be a House of Commoners, of Independence, of Contradiction. Elected Party‐liners under guidance would be a House of Sheep.     

A ‘Property‐Owning Democracy’ or ‘Generation Rent’?

‘A property owning democracy’ has been at the centre of Conservative Party social policy since Noel Skelton coined the phrase in 1924. The idea has been underpinned by contrasting the independent, hygienic, suburban homeowner with the urban, managed, flat‐dwelling, high‐density council tenant. No Conservative‐led government has left office with a homeownership rate lower than when it came to power and the right to buy has enabled this growth to be maintained. However, in 2005, homeownership started to decline and this drop has continued into the Coalition government's term of office with more households now exiting owner‐occupation into the private landlord sector than entering owner‐occupation from private renting. The ‘reinvigorating’ the right to buy is an attempt put a ‘property owning democracy’ back on track but, should it fail, the Conservative Party may turn to more radical policies such as sale on vacant possession of ‘high value’ local authority and housing association houses.