Post‐Democratic Party Politics

In recent years many scholars have diagnosed a crisis of party politics. This article considers recent changes in the UK and Europe that appear to challenge this idea. Exploring Colin Crouch's notion of ‘post‐democratic’ party politics and considering his diagnosis of shifts in parties' agenda setting, organisation and communication, the article considers evidence of post‐democratic politics and the possibility for future renewal.     

The Line‐Item Veto in Georgia: Fiscal Restraint or Inter‐Branch Politics?

This article about use of the line‐item veto in Georgia concludes that the item veto has been used not as an instrument for reducing the budget total or the size of state government, but as an instrument for protecting the executive budget. Using appropriations data and drawing upon interviews with participants in the budget process, including seven governors, the authors present evidence that in Georgia the item veto (1) is not frequently used, (2) when used, is more likely to remove legislative language than delete dollar amounts, and (3) enables the spending priorities and fiscal policy preferences of the governor to prevail as state policy.     

A Lib Dem Perspective on Centre‐Left Politics Post‐2015

This article analyses the political crisis faced by the centre‐left, not just in the UK but throughout the Western world, with few exceptions (Canada). The Liberal Democrat party has been a victim of that crisis, though there are encouraging signs of recovery and there is scope for a wider realignment on the centre‐left.     

Post‐Democracy,Press, Politics and Power

Transnational media corporations now wield enormous power and influence. Never has this been displayed so starkly and so shockingly as in the revelations that emerged during the Leveson Inquiry into the culture and ethics of the press in the UK. This paper considers the implications of the relationship between media elites and political elites for democratic culture and media reform. The paper argues that the culture of press–politician mutual interest in which media executives and party leaders collude will continue as long as the solutions proffered focus on the ethical constraints of professional journalists rather than wider structural issues relating to plurality of ownership and control and funding of news in the public interest.     

Politics of E‐Government: E‐Government and the Political Control of Bureaucracy

This case study reports an innovative e‐government experiment by a local government in Seoul, South Korea—Gangnam‐gu. A new local political leadership in Gangnam made strategic use of e‐government applications to exert greater political control over the local civil service bureaucracy. The authors find that e‐government applications possess political properties that can be applied effectively by the political leadership as instruments to improve control over the government bureaucracy as well as to enhance essential government accountability and transparency. The political circumstances underlying e‐government development as well as its impact on local government are reported, along with key variables associated with this innovation and directions for future research.     

Accountability in Accounting? The Politics of Private Rule‐Making in the Public Interest

Over recent decades governments have increasingly delegated domestic and international regulatory functions to private-sector agents. This article examines the reasons for such delegation and how private agents differ from public ones, and then analyzes the politics of regulation post delegation. It argues that the key difference between delegation to a public agent and delegation to a private one is that in the latter case a multiple-principals problem emerges that is qualitatively different from the one usually considered in the literature. An agent's action will be determined by the relative tightness of competing principal–agent relationships. This tightness is a function of the relative importance of each principal for the agent's financial and operational viability as well as its effectiveness in rule making. Further, the article posits that exogenous changes in the macro-political climate can deeply affect the nature of principal–agent relationships. The authors test their hypotheses about the politics of regulation in the postdelegation period through the study of accounting standards setting in the United States, a case of delegation of regulatory authority to a private agent that goes back to the New Deal era and has received renewed public attention in the wake of recent corporate financial scandals.     

Micro‐foundations for the Science(s) of Politics

This is a revised version of a talk I gave on 25 August 2009 to the Department of Government at Uppsala University when I received the Johan Skytte Prize. In it, I make a number of assertions about contemporary politics and those who currently practice the discipline of political science that I am convinced are correct, but have not documented with proper references. This will not please hardcore positivists, but either there exist no apposite quantitative sources of proof or the observations seem (to me) to be so qualitatively obvious as not to merit confirmation. Needless to say, I alone am responsible for all errors or omissions and welcome any assistance in discovering them.