Campaign allocations under probabilistic voting

We develop a probabilistic voting model where candidates compete by advertising in different media markets. Ads are viewed by everyone within a market and cannot be targeted to subgroups such as one candidate??s partisans. Candidates estimate the distribution of voter preference intensities in a market, and campaign ads then shift this distribution. Individuals with any intensity vote with some probability for each candidate. We derive comparative static implications of changes in a variety of factors on the advertising decisions of each candidate. Using campaign advertising data from 2002, we find these results to be consistent with actual campaign allocation behavior.     

Multiparty spatial competition with probabilistic voting

I develop a general model of multiparty competition in which parties model voters' choices by means of probabilistic choice rules. The model is specified in terms of an issue salience coefficient which varies with the importance voters attach to issues, as opposed to unmeasured nonissue motivations. I show that when the policy salience coefficient is sufficiently low, then both vote-maximizing and rank-maximizing parties have a dominant strategy: to adopt the “most popular platform,” which maximizes voter utilities over the entire electorate. This most popular platform therefore represents a convergent equilibrium when all parties are vote- or rank-maximizing. Numerical estimates suggest that this equilibrium result holds for degrees of issue voting which exceed the parameters behavioral researchers have estimated for various historical elections.     

Equilibrium in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

This paper presents a multicandidate spatial model of probabilistic voting in which voter utility functions contain a random element specific to each candidate. The model assumes no abstentions, sincere voting, and the maximization of expected vote by each candidate. We derive a sufficient condition for concavity of the candidate expected vote function with which the existence of equilibrium is related to the degree of voter uncertainty. We show that, under concavity, convergent equilibrium exists at a “minimum-sum point” at which total distances from all voter ideal points are minimized. We then discuss the location of convergent equilibrium for various measures of distance. In our examples, computer analysis indicates that non-convergent equilibria are only locally stable and disappear as voter uncertainty increases.     

Policy divergence in multicandidate probabilistic spatial voting

Existing models of multicandidate spatial competition with probabilistic voting typically predict a high degree of policy convergence, yet in actual elections candidates advocate quite divergent sets of policies. What accounts for this disparity between theory and empirical observation? I introduce two variations on the basic probabilistic vote model which may account for candidate policy divergence: 1) a model which incorporates candidate-specific variables, so that candidates may enjoy nonpolicy-related electoral advantages (or disadvantages); 2) a model which allows nonzero correlations between the random terms associated with voters' candidate utilities, thereby capturing situations where voters view two or more candidates as similar on nonpolicy grounds. I report candidate equilibrium analyses for each model, which show far greater policy divergence than exists under the standard probabilistic vote model. I then analyze the strategic logic which underlies these results.

     

Interest groups,campaign contributions,and probabilistic voting

This essay develops a simple model to analyze the impact of campaign contributions on electoral-policy decisions of candidates for office. Interest groups here are firms that select contributions under the assumption that candidates' policies and opposing groups' donations remain unaltered. Candidates, however, recognize that their policy choices affect contributions. Campaign contributions are used by candidates to affect policy-oriented voters' perceptions of candidates' positions. In this framework the introduction of campaign contributions may affect candidates' electoral policies, and if they do then they benefit surely exactly one of the two interest groups.     

Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting

This paper studies the Pareto optimality properties of policy proposals and electoral outcomes when there is probabilistic voting. Theorem 1 proves that, when the position of one candidate is taken as fixed, the other candidate will propose a Pareto optimal alternative. This implies that whenever there is an electoral equilibrium (in pure strategies) the electoral outcome is Pareto optimal. It also implies that, even if there is no such equilibrium, the electoral outcomes from a sequence of elections will be Pareto optimal (except, possibly, for an initial status quo).     

Class voting and left voting in Scandinavia

Abstract. This article examines the effects of different definitions of the working class on the measurement of class voting and left voting in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. First, the similarities and differences in how the working class has been operationalized in the three countries are summarized. To determine the effects of different operationalizations, Swedish election survey data are recoded to conform more closely to the classification procedures used in Danish and Norwegian studies. The analysis shows that if a similar operationalization is used, the level of left voting in both the Swedish working and middle classes increases and the Alford index of class voting declines. Class voting and left voting in the younger and older generations and among women and men are also discussed. Dissimilar patterns of class voting and left voting among women in the three countries are largely a product of different classification schemes. The concluding discussion points to a number of problems in using the Alford index as a summary statistic in cross-national comparisons.     

A comparison of cumulative voting and generalized plurality voting

In market based societies consumers are able to express the intensity of their preference for an object by paying more for it. However, under some voting systems, consumers are unable to express the intensity of their preference for a candidate due to the constraint of the “one person, one vote” principle. Cumulative voting maintains the equality of the “one person, one vote” principle by allotting each voter the same number of votes, while also allowing for expression of intensity of candidate preference. This paper provides an experimental analysis of voter behavior under different voting systems.     

Bargaining and voting

Government by majority rule voting is a mixture of voting and bargaining. Bargaining among people with moderately different objectives is indispensable for the passage of laws and the formation of public policy. Little of the nation’s business could be transacted without an ability on the part of the legislators and members of political parties to strike bargains, but that same ability to strike bargains makes possible the exploitation of minorities by majorities which, beyond some limit, destroys democratic government. Rules and customs are designed to foster bargaining in the one context and to thwart bargaining in the other.     

Robust voting

The formal equivalence between social choice and statistical estimation means that criteria used to evaluate estimators can be interpreted as features of voting rules. The robustness of an estimator means, in the context of social choice, insensitivity to departures from majority opinion. In this paper we consider the implications of substituting the median, a robust, high breakdown estimator, for Borda's mean. The robustness of the median makes the ranking method insensitive to outliers and reflect majority opinion. Among all methods that satisfy a majority condition, median ranks is the unique one that is monotonic. It is an attractive voting method when the goal is the collective assessment of the merits of alternatives.     

Party brands and voting

Some scholars argue that Western societies have seen a decreasing impact of voting behavior based on cleavages and party identifications. Equally, issue ownership voting is seemingly not increasing its relevance by filling this gap. From this departure we seek out an alternative variable by posing the question: Do party brands influence voting behavior? Currently, we do not know because the two research fields of voting behavior and party brands are currently not explicitly linked. Traditionally, the study of voting behavior has gained powerful insights from concepts such as cleavage structure, party identification and issue ownership. On the other hand, the study of political brands has illuminated how people employ brands in their identity construction and how voters use party brands to differentiate between political parties. In this light, the article first distinguishes the brand concept from related heuristics and voting models. Next, the article measures the brand value of Danish parties by utilizing a representative association analysis. Finally, this measure is used to conduct the very first empirical analysis of a party brand's effect on voting behavior. Overall, the primary finding demonstrates that political brand value (PBV) has an effect on voting behavior—also when a number of other relevant explanatory variables are held constant.     

Systemic polarisation and spatial voting

The controversy between proximity and directional models of issue voting has not been settled. Instead of appointing an ultimate winner, this article explores the conditioning impact of the level of systemic polarisation and provides evidence that proximity is a more relevant determinant of voter behaviour in less polarised systems, whereas there is a centrifugal and directional dynamic in more polarised contexts. By so doing, the article shows how a largely forgotten notion – namely Sartori's idea of the spatial elasticity of the political spectrum – leads to different spatial viewpoints. In distinguishing between party (supply side) and voter (demand side) polarisation, this framework provides a comprehensive picture about the conditions that turn a centripetal electoral dynamic into a purely centrifugal one.