Cycles of the third kind

Abstract. This paper delineates three kinds or senses of the cycle concept as used in social science theory and research. Cycles of the weak or first kind merely refer to fluctuations or state changes. Cycles of the moderate or second kind refer to fluctuations with some constant periodicity in fact or in principle. Cycles of the strong or third kind have several analytical properties that require explanation. I argue that the term cycle should be reserved for cycles of the second or third kinds and that the terms fluctuation or alternation should be used for cycles of the first kind. The paper concludes with some comments on sources of resistance to the cycle concept.     

Political Cycles and Organizational Life Cycles: Delegation to Anticorruption Agencies in Central Europe

A large number of “independent” anticorruption agencies (ACAs) sprung up around the world in past decades. Yet little comparative work has been done to explain the diversity of their organizational forms or development trajectories. Using insights from regulatory theory and the regulation of government literature, this article argues that the formal powers and independence ACAs are granted crucially depend on whether external and/or domestic impetuses for setting them up can counterbalance governments' incentives for no action, or only symbolic action. The ACAs' initial mandate influences but does not determine how they fare in later life: Support or obstruction from ruling governments, their own ability to use strategic resources, and leadership shape the extent to which the agencies are able to carry out their tasks in practice. These arguments are examined through comparison of three ACAs in the European Union's “new” member states—Latvia, Poland, and Slovenia.     

The merits of Neo-Downsian modeling of the alternative vote: A reply to Horowitz

In Professor Horowitz’s rejoinders (2004, 2006) to Fraenkel and Grofman (2004, 2006a), he mischaracterizes our formal results, retreats from previous claims about the conditions for the alternative vote electoral system to generate centripetal outcomes, renders explicit his dubious assumptions about voter behavior in divided societies, and greatly exaggerates the global evidence in support of pro-moderation outcomes under the alternative vote. Here we respond to Horowitz's (2004), criticism in this journal of the formal model of Fraenkel and Grofman (2004) and to the broader defense in Horowitz (2006) of majoritarian vote pooling arrangements as means of mitigating ethnic conflict in deeply divided societies.     

On Marx's theory of agricultural rent: A reply to Ben Fine

This article criticizes both the 'Marxist' and 'sociological' conceptualizations of money to be found in the recent debate between Fine, Lapavitsas and Zelizer in Economy and Society . They neglect important contributions to the theory of money, especially the 'credit' and 'state' theories of money in the social sciences. These emphasize, as did Keynes, the central theoretical importance of money of account . These approaches were banished from orthodox economics and lost to sociology in the post- Methodenstreit division of intellectual labour in the social sciences. Marxist economics has never properly addressed this monetary analysis. Although neglected, it is not obscure and informs the more widely known post-Keynesian theory of money. This article argues that these heterodox theories of money are essentially sociological in that they involve the conceptualization of money as abstract value constituted by the social relation of the 'promise to pay'.     

A puzzling effect of unemployment: A reply to Dülmer and Klein

Abstract.  Dülmer and Klein's comments on our article (see European Journal of Political Research 38: 63–94) fuels once more the discussion about the contextual effects of unemployment on the likelihood of voting for extreme right-wing parties. Unfortunately, the Dülmer and Klein do not properly evaluate their findings and misrepresent their own results. They do everything to suppress the negative effect of unemployment we previously also found, and miss an opportunity for in-depth research into the relationship between unemployment and extreme right-wing voting. They uncover an interesting effect of education varying according to the proportion of immigrants – something we previously ascertained for exclusionist attitudes, but not for voting behaviour.     

正念疗法的兴起、发展与前景

正念疗法包括正念减压疗法、正念认知疗法以及辩证行为疗法等。美国的禅宗热潮与实用主义文化促使了正念疗法的产生与发展。正念疗法越来越为人们所接受,并成为心理治疗领域一个新的趋势。     

Getting the basic nature of systemic corruption right: A reply to Marquette and Peiffer

In reply to Marquette and Peiffer's article “Grappling With the ‘Real Politics’ of Systemic Corruption: Theoretical Debates Versus ‘Real‐World’ Functions,” this article employs three criticisms: Marquette and Peiffer's call to grapple with the “real politics of corruption” does not bring much new to the table, is conceptually flawed, and risks serving as an excuse for corrupt elites to pursue “business as usual.” In response, we reaffirm three insights gained from collective action‐based approaches toward corruption. Although corruption might solve individual‐level problems in the short term, it is still a de facto problem at the aggregate level, the tools derived from principal–agent theory will not solve the collective action problem of systemic corruption, and elites will be the least likely to implement reform. We conclude by calling for the continued fight against corruption—a fight informed by empirical and theoretical knowledge.     

Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games: A reply to Sloof

Randolph Sloof has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signalling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium I missed and criticizes my emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium (see this issue). In this response, I discuss how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities.