Bureaucratic control and information processing: An institutional comparison

Standard models of bureaucratic control argue that politicians vulnerable to asymmetric information rely on third‐party monitoring to expand information supply. This solution to information asymmetry assumes that politicians can process all information that comes their way. However, advocates strategically oversupply information to crowd out rivals, making such a solution counterproductive. Using data on administrative reorganization in Hong Kong, we examine the alternative proposition that bureaucratic control is contingent not only on how information is obtained but also on how it is processed under two different institutional arrangements: one that splits attention across domain‐specific streams and one that concentrates attention in a single sequence. In both cases, bureaucrats refrain from major changes when politicians break from these arrangements. Moreover, bureaucratic action is significantly more likely to respond to changes in attention allocation when politicians process information in multiple streams.     

Bureaucratic Posture: On the Need for a Composite Theory of Bureaucratic Behavior

This article examines the underlying assumptions and main findings of four streams of research on bureaucratic postures. It explores the utility of each school of thought for understanding how perspectives on bureaucratic postures are associated with the advancement of the public interest and bureaucratic performance. A main conclusion is that, although limited in scope of application, each stream has merit. Nonetheless, the existing research is too narrow: The field needs to consider a more complex model of bureaucratic behavior that draws from these four fields to offer a framework that is widely applicable to the range of motives for work found in the public bureaucracy and the variety of behaviors that individuals exhibit. Some attributes that may characterize such a model are sketched out.     

A Strategic Theory of Bureaucratic Redundancy

Do redundant bureaucratic arrangements represent wasteful duplication or a hedge against political uncertainty? Previous attempts at addressing this question have treated agency actions as exogenous, thus avoiding strategic issues such as collective action problems or competition. I develop a game‐theoretic model of bureaucratic policy making in which a political principal chooses the number of agents to handle a given task. Importantly, agents have policy preferences that may be opposed to the principal's, and furthermore may choose their policy or effort levels. Among the results are that redundancy can help a principal achieve her policy goals when her preferences are not aligned with the agents'. But redundancy is less helpful if even a single agent has preferences relatively close to the principal's. In this environment collective action problems may cause multiple agents to be less effective than a single agent. Redundancy can also be unnecessary to the principal if the agent's jurisdiction can be terminated.     

Bureaucratic Neutrality among Competing Bureaucratic Values in an Ethnic Federalism: The Case of Ethiopia

This article uses Kaufman's theory of competing bureaucratic values as a foundation for studying bureaucratic values in a developing society. It discusses civil service reform within a socio-bureaucratic-political exchange, as well as characteristics associated with bureaucratic values and ethnic federalism. The inherent conflicts between a civil service grounded in the values of bureaucratic neutrality, representativeness, or executive leadership and practices within a government structured on the basis of ethnicity are explored. Factors related to Ethiopia's postconflict status, which further complicate the governance environment, are identified, and building blocks for postconflict governance are suggested.     

Electoral Manipulation as Bureaucratic Control

Bureaucratic compliance is often crucial for political survival, yet eliciting that compliance in weakly institutionalized environments requires that political principals convince agents that their hold on power is secure. We provide a formal model to show that electoral manipulation can help to solve this agency problem. By influencing beliefs about a ruler's hold on power, manipulation can encourage a bureaucrat to work on behalf of the ruler when he would not otherwise do so. This result holds under various common technologies of electoral manipulation. Manipulation is more likely when the bureaucrat is dependent on the ruler for his career and when the probability is high that even generally unsupportive citizens would reward bureaucratic effort. The relationship between the ruler's expected popularity and the likelihood of manipulation, in turn, depends on the technology of manipulation.     

Bureaucratic Responsiveness to LGBT Americans

Marriage rights were extended to same-sex couples in the United States in 2015. However, anecdotes of bureaucratic noncompliance (in the form of bias or denial of license issuance) raise the possibility that de jure marriage equality has not led to equality in practice. We investigate this by conducting a nationwide audit experiment of local-level marriage license–granting officials in the United States. These officials vary in the constituencies they serve, as well as how they are selected, allowing us to evaluate long-standing hypotheses about bureaucratic responsiveness. Overall, we find no evidence of systematic discrimination against same-sex couples—regardless of responsiveness measure, institutions, ideology, or prior state legal history. We find, however, that among same-sex couples, officials tended to be more responsive to lesbian couples. In contrast to evidence in other areas of service provision, such as policing and federal assistance programs, we find bureaucrats tasked with provision of marriage services show little evidence of discrimination.     

Emotional Responses to Bureaucratic Red Tape

Although red tape has a long history in public administration research, the emotional consequences of bureaucratic procedures for citizens have received little attention in the literature. Within the framework of behavioral public administration, this article investigates how varying conditions of administrative delay, administrative burden, and rule dysfunctionality in citizen-state interactions spark discrete emotional reactions. Physiological measurements of emotions (e.g., facial coding, electrodermal activity, heart rate) from 136 participants in a laboratory study show that bureaucratic red tape evokes significant negative emotional responses, especially confusion, frustration, and anger. Experimental evidence also indicates that delay is less stirring than burden, while rule functionality has little placatory effect, regardless of the favorability of outcomes. These results support the conceptualization of red tape as an affective rather than a cognitive phenomenon. They also suggest that negative emotions of citizens are linked to the modus operandi of public administrations.     

Bureaucratic capacity and state-society relations in China

In view of the efforts of post-Mao state-rebuilding, how does bureaucratic capacity affect the pattern of state-society interaction in China, where a robust civil society is still missing? Using the case of China’s population control, we analyze the linkage between bureaucratic capacity and state-society relations. The study demonstrates remarkable resilience of the party-state and its transformative thrust in reformist China. Through a mix of mass mobilization and institutional building, the Chinese state remains puissant in extending social control over its people. Equally important, bureaucratic capacity is a major predictor of state coerciveness. Other things being equal, localities with stronger bureaucratic capacity tend to develop a less antagonist and more cooperative state-society relationship. Bureaucratic capacity can serve as remedy to despotic or authoritarian rule despite the lack of an autonomous civil society. This finding has important implications for the potential of democratization in China.     

The Effect of Bureaucratic Responsiveness on Citizen Participation

What effect does bureaucratic responsiveness have on citizen participation? Since the 1940s, attitudinal measures of perceived efficacy have been used to explain participation. The authors develop a “calculus of participation” that incorporates objective efficacy—the extent to which an individual's participation actually has an impact—and test the model against behavioral data from the online application Fix My Street (n = 399,364). A successful first experience using Fix My Street is associated with a 57 percent increase in the probability of an individual submitting a second report, and the experience of bureaucratic responsiveness to the first report submitted has predictive power over all future report submissions. The findings highlight the importance of responsiveness for fostering an active citizenry while demonstrating the value of incidentally collected data to examine participatory behavior at the individual level.     

官僚自主性与官僚控制模式——复合型、单一性、轴心化模式的归纳及比较

控制官僚是政治学研究中的一项重要主题。若以控制力的来源、向度和制度化水平作为分类依据,再基于对不同制度空间下控制官僚策略的比较,可以概括出复合型、单一性与轴心化这三种总体性的官僚控制模式。当代中国的控制官僚模式在权力制衡与社会制衡方面尚存在不足,需要改进和突破。     

Bureaucratic politics and the translation of movement agendas

Research on social movement outcomes focuses on the publicly visible stages of government policymaking. It rarely opens the black box of government's translation of movement demands beyond the agenda‐setting stage and before their materialization into legislative bills. Using a bureaucratic politics perspective, we suggest that bureaucrats play a central role in translating movement agendas into concrete problems and policy solutions, which they tend to link with their bureaus' missions and existing programs. We further suggest that relative consensus among bureaucrats when coupled with politicians' disinclination to intervene in the translation process tends to advantage conservative interpretations of movement agendas. Conversely, interbureau confrontation and political intervention are associated with more radical policy responses. Empirically, we examine the responses of the Israeli government to the large‐scale mobilization, in 2011, surrounding the rising costs of housing and living. We build on archival research and interviews with senior bureaucrats located in 11 central‐government ministries.