Pleasing the Principal: U.S. Influence in World Bank Policymaking

How do policies in international organizations reflect the preferences of powerful institutional stakeholders? Using an underutilized data set on the conditions associated with World Bank loans, we find that borrower countries that vote with the United States at the United Nations are required to enact fewer domestic policy reforms, and on fewer and softer issue areas. Though U.S. preferences permeate World Bank decision making, we do not find evidence that borrower countries trade favors in exchange for active U.S. intervention on their behalf. Instead, we propose that U.S. influence operates indirectly when World Bank staff—consciously or unconsciously—design programs that are compatible with U.S. preferences. Our study provides novel evidence of World Bank conditionality and shows that politicized policies can result even from autonomous bureaucracies.     

World Bank Technical Assistance: The Relational Dynamics of Policy Movement

The World Bank has been widely critiqued as a global governance actor capable of coercing and persuading its developing member countries to accept its policy recommendations. This article contributes to academic discussion by drawing upon the policy transfer and policy mobilities literatures to analyse the World Bank's two main pillars of technical assistance (TA): TA components (advisory services contained within lending operations) and stand‐alone TA projects (loans and credits that solely finance TA). Beginning from the constructivist position that ‘development’ is a social construct, the article argues that relational dynamics between TA provider and recipient affect the perception of the legitimacy of policy norms transferred from the ‘international’ to the ‘domestic’. The value added of the article is thus that policy legitimacy is not simply conferred by whether advice is technically sound but moreover through the social and political interactions—the relationship—between TA provider and recipient. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Efficiency,equity and girls' education

This article analyses World Bank strategies for education in the context of gender equity. Developing countries face the challenge of expanding education with limited resources. At the same time, promoting gender equity is vital to achieving basic development goals. Appropriate governance strategies are needed to provide education in a way that is cost‐effective and inclusive. Privatisation, decentralisation and citizen participation are three strategies that are promoted by the World Bank to control costs and improve transparency in education. Intended to promote efficiency, these strategies can harm equity. This study compares World Bank strategies to proven effective programs in girls' education. Empirical analysis reveals that while many World Bank projects include effective strategies for girls' education, governance reforms generally do not promote awareness of gender. Implications for expansion of girls' education are discussed. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.     

Institutional development in World Bank projects: Analytical approaches and intervention designs

This article examines a random sample of World Bank projects in order to identify the methods of institutional analysis (IA) and resulting institutional development (ID) strategies employed. The findings confirm impressionistic data which indicate that IA in World Bank projects is highly standardized, and concentrates on factors internal to the organization at the expense of external environmental factors, particularly as these are reflected in the needs of stakeholders and customers. ID is an integral part of most Bank projects, and the trend is shown to be towards increasing attention to ID. The nature of ID in World Bank projects reflects the inward orientation of IA, with strong emphasis given to training and development as a standard solution. It is concluded that IA and ID which are broader in scope will improve project design and impact.     

Chrik Poortman: A World Bank Professional

Chrik Poortman, an international civil servant, worked for the World Bank for more than three decades. This profile uses his career and experiences to illustrate the functions and roles played by World Bank staff at each level of its "flat" hierarchy and the capacities needed to face challenges that are unique to their ilk. Each section explores a different range of functions, including working as a country director, working as a vice president, and working as a member of the World Bank's senior management team.     

Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in?the?UN General Assembly?

Using panel data for 188 countries over the 1970–2008 period, this paper analyzes empirically the influence of the IMF and the World Bank on voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. Countries receiving adjustment projects and larger non-concessional loans from the World Bank vote more frequently in line with the average G7 country. The same is true for countries obtaining non-concessional IMF programs. Regarding voting coincidence with the United States, World Bank non-concessional loans have a significant impact, while IMF loans do not. This overall pattern of results is robust to the choice of control variables and method of estimation.     

The Politics of Governance Ratings

ABSTRACT

Some international organizations, and most prominently the World Bank, play a leading role in the supply of cross-country governance ratings. The paper draws on interviews of World Bank staff to understand why the World Bank produces cross-country comparable indicators and to bring to light the current controversies within the World Bank about existing indicators and future work on governance indicators. It also attempts to explain why so many external users rely on the Worldwide Governance Indicators, despite the limitations of these indicators and the large number of more meaningful, alternative indicators available. It argues that both robust and meaningful indicators and more qualitative research are necessary to give better reform advice to developing countries.     

Pay for politicians and campaign spending: evidence from the French municipal elections

Public Choice - This paper investigates the relationship between taxation and firm performance in developing countries. Combining firm-level data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys and tax data...     

Explaining Institutional Change: Policy Areas,Outside Options,and the Bretton Woods Institutions

I propose and test a theoretical framework that explains institutional change in international relations. Like firms in markets, international institutions are affected by the underlying characteristics of their policy areas. Some policy areas are prone to produce institutions facing relatively little competition, limiting the outside options of member states and impeding redistributive change. In comparison, institutions facing severe competition will quickly reflect changes in underlying state interests and power. To test the theory empirically, I exploit common features of the Bretton Woods institutions—the International Monetary Fund and World Bank—to isolate the effect of variation in policy area characteristics. The empirical tests show that, despite having identical membership and internal rules, bargaining outcomes in the Bretton Woods institutions have diverged sharply and in accordance with the theory.     

The Creeping Politicisation of the World Bank: The Case of Corruption

This paper looks at the increasing politicisation of the World Bank through its work on corruption. Historically, the Bank's Articles of Agreement, which forbid it from involving itself in the politics of its recipient countries, have excluded work on corruption. In the 1990s, internal and external demands grew for the Bank to address the problem of corruption, despite earlier reticence. Much research done over the past decade, often commissioned by the Bank or done in-house, has worked to turn corruption into an economic and social issue, rather than a political one, in order to conduct anti-corruption work while evading accusations that it is violating this non-political mandate. Now this pretence is gradually slipping away and the Bank is becoming overtly political, despite its Articles and a lack of international consensus that this is the direction in which it should be heading.     

The training and development of top executives in developing countries: A tanzanian approach

The training and development of public service employees is now accepted to be a major contributor to organizational performance. In the Third World, however, much of the training effort has been directed at junior, supervisory and middle-level personnel. Top personnel were, for a long time, presumed to be ‘above training’. There is now, however, an awakening to the need for training all categories of personnel. The major constraint in most countries remains the lack of facilities and trainers able to handle senior personnel. Tanzania has recently embarked on a concerted effort to train its top public service personnel through the mobilization of all management/administrative training capabilities in a joint, concerted endeavour, under the aegis of the Ministry of Manpower Development and a body known as the National Standing Training Team on Top Executive Development (NSTT). More than 20 6-week courses have been run and a recent evaluation of the programme suggests that they are popular and have reactivated an interest in training among top executives. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that the training has resulted in improved performance in public organizations although some executives have introduced some innovations in their organizations which they derived from the training programme.     

The World Bank and social capital: Lessons from ten rural development projects in the Philippines and Mexico

Social capital is widely recognized as one of the few sources of capital available to the poor, yet the processes by which development policies affect the accumulation of that social capital are not well understood. The World Bank, through its funding of development projects, affects the institutional environments for the accumulation of such social capital. The question is how to determine whether that institutional context is enabling, and to what degree. This paper compares ten recent World Bank-funded rural development projects in Mexico and the Philippines to explore how the processes of project design and implementation influence the institutional environments for the accumulation of horizontal, vertical, and intersectoral forms of pro-poor social capital. The findings have conceptual and policy implications for understanding the political dynamics of creating enabling environments for social capital accumulation by the poor.     

Context-sensitive monitoring and evaluation for the World Bank

This article sketches a preliminary design for a new system of monitoring and evaluation in support of a program on New Bank Practices in Civic Engagement, Empowerment, and Respect for Diversity (CEERD) in the World Bank. The new practices bring to the foreground uncertainties and ambiguities arising from the human factors in empowerment and development. Consequently, a system of monitoring and evaluation must be context-sensitive, taking into account differences and changes in context. Meaningful indicators of success or failure, and assumptions about responsibility for them, cannot be specified reliably in project agreements in advance of implementation. Specification in advance could inhibit the improvisations necessary to deal with unanticipated problems and opportunities in the implementation process on the ground.     

A Modest Defense of Politically Engaged Best Practices: The Case of Legislative Strengthening

Critics of donor‐funded democracy promotion claim that these programs are frequently designed to reproduce social and governmental models drawn from developed countries and imposed on the recipient country without regard to local conditions, with experts parachuted in to provide guidance based on international “best practices.” The critique focuses on first‐generation development with a neutral, technical focus, whereas democracy promotion has evolved toward a more politically engaged approach to programming—what we label as second‐generation and, more recently, third‐generation development practices. We apply this distinction to the area of legislative strengthening (LS) by describing its history from the post–World War II period to the present and provide examples of LS projects to support the argument. The challenge is to combine valuable insights from best practices from decades of experience while adapting them through political engagement with local partners and with bilateral donors.     

Integrated rural development in Tanzania

Tanzania did not have the kind of agricultural policies, popular participation, or government bureaucratic capacity necessary for integrated rural development projects to perform well. Nonetheless the World Bank, EEC, and United States each implemented such projects there during the 1970s. The implementation and achievements of the projects varied considerably due to differences in their design as well as decisions made by the implementation teams. However the experiences of all three projects demonstrate two things: no agricultural development project can adapt to producer price disincentives; and both participation and project management require a ‘critical minimum’ level of finance and resources which the Tanzanian bureaucracy does not have. The latter observation raises the question of whether donors should attempt to build management capacity in fourth world bureaucracies or, as Goran Hyden suggests, avoid the government and work through other institutions and local organizations.     

Ecological socialism and human needs∗

The proposed Sardar Sarovar Project (SSP) is the keystone of India's Narmada Valley Project, consisting of 30 large, 130 medium, and 3000 small dams. Backed by the Indian government and the World Bank (the tatter to the tune of $450 million in loans), the SSP has generated unprecedented opposition from farmers and others whose lands would be submerged by the project, as well as from many Indian environmentalists and environmental and human rights groups around the world. In 1990, under tremendous pressure, former World Bank President Barber Co noble called for the Bank to make an independent review of the project. The Team's Report of the Independent Review, which evaluated the resettlement and environmental impacts of the SSPt backed up the criticisms of the projecfs opponents. One of India's best known engineers, CNS Editorial Consultant KM. Datye, his associates, and other scientists working on sustainable development alternatives have produced a wealth of critical studies of large dam projects including the SSP project in India. Their conclusion is that there are technical alternatives to the project which better serve the interests of democratic control of water and energy resources, economic and social equity, and economic efficiency.     

Conditionality,coercion and other forms of ‘Power’: international financial institutions in the Pacific

Research on conditionality has cast doubt on its effectiveness. Nevertheless, international financial institutions have continued to apply policy conditions to loans to developing country governments. The article aims to contribute to the current debate about conditionality in two ways. Empirically, it introduces recent evidence from countries and institutions not included in earlier studies (the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Papua New Guinea, and the Asian Development Bank in the South Pacific). Conceptually, it introduces arguments from political science to extend our understanding of the power relationships involved. Some conditions have clearly been applied coercively, particularly on ‘Green’ issues. Donors have also controlled the agenda of negotiations. But more productive and disciplinary forms of power are shown to be at work in conditionality, as in other forms of aid. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

World Bank Support for Public Financial Management and Procurement: From Theory to Practice

The advice provided by the World Bank on improving public financial management and procurement is influenced by debates on theory and practice in developed and developing countries. This article touches on some of the highlights of these debates, drawing from the indicative literature mainly since 1990 from scholars and practitioners. It goes on to examine the Bank's diagnostic work, design, and implementation of project and policy support in this area. It also assesses evidence of outcomes and attribution, and ends with questions for further research.     

The participatory principle in development projects: the costs and benefits of cooperation

Many development theorists and practitioners, including those in key agencies like the World Bank and UNDP, now see participation as critical to successful project implementation, and strongly support cooperative organizational systems. This article cautions against undue optimism about such forms of organization, and attempts to explain their limited success when they compete with private firms by applying rational choice theory to behaviour in cooperative systems. It examines the relevance of assumptions of self interest, opportunism and bounded rationality in such solidaristic organizations, then uses them to calculate the costs and benefits of using participatory systems. It shows that these costs are likely to outweigh the benefits in large organizations unless participatory processes are effectively associated with managerial autonomy, appropriate incentives, sanctions and hierarchies. © 1996 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Evaluation in the ODA. A view from the inside

Evaluation is an important part of the project cycle, but it is not confined to projects: any aid-funded activity can be evaluated. ODA spends about £1/2 million per annum on evaluation (including in-house staff costs). The policy on evaluation is controlled by the Projects and Evaluation Committee which receives the reports. As the same Committee approves all major new projects there is instant feedback. It is vital that senior management learn recent lessons from experience to supplement their own personal experience which may be out of date. Evaluations need to be done as soon as useful lessons are to be learned—if left too late the findings are likely to have been overtaken by recent changes in ODA procedures. Using outside evaluators brings a welcome element of impartiality. But a balance of in-house and out-of-house evaluators yields the best results. Evaluation reports need to be presented in a systematic way (as appraisals are), and they should be made widely available. Two lessons stand out: the need for in-depth appraisal and careful monitoring and the importance of good management for successful projects.