Cooperation and competition in public welfare policies

Present public welfare policies and various proposals for reforming them do not often exploit the advantages of cooperation between otherwise competing altruists. The article examines this principle from a number of perspectives. It shows first how the advantages of the existing cooperative payments structure could be lost in some widely-publicized welfare reform proposals, and it makes a suggestion for retaining these advantages. The article next shows how the same principle could be used to improve existing incentives for private giving. Finally, it uses the same logic to rationalize newly evolving notions of sharing responsibility between governments and the recipients themselves.     

Choice versus sensitivity: Party reactions to public concerns

Abstract.  Most discussions of democratic theory assume that parties should offer clear choices to voters but also show themselves sensitive to public concerns. Under certain circumstances, however, party convergence on these may preclude electoral choice, thus creating conflict between two democratic 'goods'. We examine possible tradeoffs between choice and responsiveness, and see which actually occur in 16 postwar democracies. Party policy positions turn out to be more strongly related to party ideology than popular concerns, thus privileging differentiation and choice over sensitivity and responsiveness. Implications for democratic theory and practice are considered.     

Strategic planning for state enterprise performance in Africa: Public versus private options

This article presents methodologies to assist government officials in various African countries who have to deal with ill-defined policy problems arising out of perceived performance shortcomings on the part of state enterprises. It reviews the historical role and record of state enterprise in African economies, the assumptions and major arguments of the ‘privatization option’ and the major forms in which the latter may be carried out. In a situation where debate has tended at times to generate more heat than light, the approach is a pragmatic one, involving careful review of all policy alternatives, including public enterprise rehabilitation and a step by step application of privatisation feasibility analysis in cases where public enterprise rehabilitation proves unviable.     

The flypaper effect and competition in the local market for public goods

In this paper, we explore how the ability of bureaucrats to extract resources from their community may be limited by competition in the local market for public goods. Specifically, we examine intergovernmental aid as a resource bureaucrats seek to control. Intergovernmental aid has been found to be more stimulative of local government expenditures than predicted by neo-classical economic theory. In this research, the ‘flypaper effect’ is used as an indicator of the ability of bureaucrats to control local resources in excess of local demand and preferences. We empirically relate variation in the flypaper effect to the extent of competition in the local market for public goods. Competition does not consistently limit the flypaper effect. The implications of this finding for theories of competition in the local market for public goods are then discussed.     

Economists and public policy: Chicago political economy versus conventional views

Both conventional welfare economics and public choice analysis suggest that economists have an important educational role to play in the public policy process — in improving the decision-making process. In sharp contrast, information and incentive problems related to voting rules, the bureaucracy, and the legislature do not arise in CPE because these processes are all perfect agents of interest groups. Consequently, the political process is efficient and there is no scope for beneficial economic analysis as it relates to the sugar program or other public policies. That is, the polity is efficient or it would be reordered by competing interest groups to make it so. But, as Mitchell (1989: 290) stresses, the important unanswered question in CPE remains: if there is no scope for improvement how and why does change occur?The analysis here suggests that the sugar program (and similar policies) may persist not because they are beneficial to the public at large but rather because information and incentive problems in the collective choice process lead to perverse results. Consequently, economic analysts can make a positive contribution to the public policy process by providing information about the responsiveness of alternative institutional arrangements to the values and choices of individual citizens (Wiseman, 1989). The Friedmans' Tide in the Affairs of Men view holds that economic analyses are important in changing public opinion, which is an important precursor to changes in public policy.     

公共政策冲突:内涵、表现及其效应分析

公共政策是政府行政机关为实现一定的目标而确定的行动方案与行为准则,公共政策冲突就是公共政策系统内部各种政策之间以及政策的各种要素之间所发生的对立、抵触、矛盾现象.公共政策冲突的本质是政策主体之间的利益冲突.公共政策冲突的表现形式多种多样,当前中国公共政策冲突具有普遍性,既具有正面的效应,也具有负面的影响.但最主要的是负面影响.     

Recurrent cost and performance comparisons within public administration: A method of generating efficiency-promoting competition

Economists (e.g., Niskanen) usually advocate increased competition in order to increase efficiency within public administration. To bring about competition that promotes efficiency, it is not necessary to oblige the public body (e.g., central government authority, municipal administration) to compete with other producers concerning who is to provide the public service. Such competition can also be generated with the aid of continuous productivity and efficiency comparisons between public bodies which provide similar services.     

Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens

This paper raises an old question and proposes a new answer. The question is, “Must public goods be produced by governments?” The consensus answer is “Yes,” on the grounds that transaction costs related to group size prevent all potential consumers of a public good from entering into voluntary arrangements to produce efficient levels of that good. Government intervention thus is required to achieve efficiency. Yet many obvious examples of public goods are not financed or even subsidized by government. Conspicuous examples of this phenomenon include the development of important innovations in technique in fields such as music (Bach and Beethoven), literature (Defoe, Dickens and Shakespeare, not excepting Homer or Adam Smith), and the visual arts (Cezanne), not to mention many crucial scientific discoveries. Indeed, the obvious public-good aspects of scientific knowledge induced many private societies to offer prizes for particular innovations. Two questions are raised by the private, voluntary provision of nonrival outputs or inputs: (1) what conditions contribute to this phenomenon, and (2) can voluntary provision come “close” to efficient provision? We suggest in this paper that, under certain conditions, the gains from many public goods whose benefits reach nationwide populations are largely realized at group sizes far smaller than even county or municipal jurisdictions.     

Informational limits to democratic public policy: The jury theorem, yardstick competition, and ignorance

Condorcet’s jury theorem provides a possible explanation for the success of democracies relative to other forms of government. In its modern form, the jury theorem predicts that majority decisions are well informed, because they are based upon far more information than possessed by any single individual. On the other hand, it is evident that democratic politicians and policies are not always as good as the jury theorem implies they should be. This paper uses simulated elections to explore the power and limitations of majority rule as an estimator of candidate quality or policy effectiveness. The simulations demonstrate that slightly informed voters can make very accurate choices among candidates using majority rule. However, as the ratio of slightly informed voters relative to ignorant voters falls, the accuracy of majority decisions declines. The latter implies that institutions, policies, and technologies that promote the dissemination of information also tend to improve the efficiency of democratic governance.     

Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic

Public attitudes towards welfare policy are often explained by political values and perceptions of deservingness of welfare recipients. This article addresses how the impact of values and perceptions varies depending on the contextual information that citizens have available when forming welfare opinions. It is argued that whenever citizens face deservingness‐relevant cues in public debate or the media, a psychological ‘deservingness heuristic’ is triggered prompting individuals spontaneously to think about welfare policy in terms of who deserves help. This is an automatic process, equally influential among the least and the most politically sophisticated. Moreover, when clear deservingness cues are present, the impact of values on opinions vanishes. These arguments are supported by data from two novel experimental studies embedded in separate nationwide opinion surveys. The findings revise conventional wisdom of how values and heuristics influence public opinion and have major implications for understanding dynamics in aggregate welfare opinion and attempts from political elites to manipulate public opinion.