Bouvia v. Glenchur

Bouvia, a quadriplegic with cerebral palsy, earlier had failed to win Superior Court injunctions to restrain personnel at Riverside General Hospital from force feeding her if she attempted to starve herself to death while in their care [Bouvia v. County of Riverside, Trial court decision (in Bouvia I), No. 159780, 8 Feb 1984]. In this case, she sought a preliminary injunction restraining the staff of High Desert Hospital from continuing to feed her through a nasogastric tube, and from placing her on a special bed to control bed sores. In denying her request, the Superior Court ruled that, despite her claims to the contrary, Bouvia's refusal of nutrition and medical treatment was motivated by an intention to kill herself using public facilities, and not by a desire to exercise her right of privacy.     

Bouvia v. County of Riverside

The plaintiff, a quadriplegic with cerebral palsy, had admitted herself voluntarily to the psychiatric department of Riverside General Hospital in September 1983. She then revealed her intention of starving herself to death, requested that hospital personnel administer only pain medication and hygienic care, and sought preliminary and permanent injunctions to prevent the hospital from either force feeding, transferring, or discharging her. The essence of her legal claim was that society was obliged to honor, and to assist her in carrying out, her privacy right to end her life. While the Superior Court recognized a patient's right to refuse life-sustaining care under some circumstances, it ruled that because Bouvia's condition was not terminal, her rights must yield to the interests of the state and other third parties in preserving life.     

Morgentaler v. The Queen in the Supreme Court of Canada.

In Morgentaler v. R., the Supreme Court of Canada struck down the abortion provisions in the Criminal Code. In a five to two split, a majority of the Supreme Court judges found that section 251 offended a pregnant woman's constitutionally protected right not to be deprived of her "life, liberty, and security of the person." Sheilah Martin reviews the three majority judgments and focuses on the decision written by Madame Justice Wilson. She believes that Madame Justice Wilson's opinion merits special attention in several regards: her conclusions on the constitutional rights of pregnant women; her recognition and validation of women's perspectives on abortion; and her approach to balancing women's interests in reproductive self-determination against the state's interest in regulating reproduction. Sheilah Martin concludes that this decision will reverberate far into the future. Even though it fails to establish clear guidelines concerning governmental power to control access to abortion, its principles outline the legal framework in which future litigation will occur, and it will limit and shape the terms of any ensuing political debate. In addition, Madame Justice Wilson's judgment holds great promise for those looking to the Court to promote the rights of women and other historically disadvantaged groups.     

Willis v. Wu. In the Supreme Court of South Carolina

South Carolina does not recognize a common law cause of action for life brought by or on behalf of a child born with congenital defect because it is impossible to prove that being terminated by elective abortion, and thus never being born, is better than being born and living a life with disabilities.