Majoritarian miracles and the question of party system change

The 1996 elections in Italy may be evaluated using a dual means of inquiry: which novelties (or the absence thereof) appear with respect to 1994? And, how many and in what way (if any) do they contribute to the definition of a new type of party system and a new logic of political competition? As regards the former perspective, we address three questions which represented fundamental issues at the time of the vote: (a) Would the new electoral system manage to provide a clear and stable governmental majority where it had failed to do so in 1994? (b) Would the political parties and alliances have changed their offers to the voters? (c) Would the voters have changed their behaviour, adapting it not just to any new offers, but especially to the logic of majoritarian competition? Regarding the latter perspective, these questions can be amalgamated into a single enquiry: Do the 1996 elections constitute a decisive step in the direction of a new party system, or are they a step backwards, or do they simply present a static picture?     

Microeconomic Reform and National Competition Policy: Misconceptions and Problems

Microeconomic reform and the so-called National Competition Policy (NCP) have entered political discourse but often with little discussion of their specific meaning. The terminology tends to be emotionally and intuitively appealing. It implies that any microeconomic reform per se is necessarily 'good' for the achievement of economic efficiency. Moreover, misconceptions about the meaning of economic efficiency frequently result in the belief that a higher level of competition is always 'good' for the achievement of that objective.
While there are many features in the new competition policy which deserve the wide acceptance and support it has been given, there are also aspects of it which do not stand up to closer scrutiny. It is those aspects, including the problems which will arise when ambitious but vague principles are put into practice, which will receive attention in this article.     

Recalibrating social protection: Electoral competition and the new partisan politics of the welfare state

This article investigates the new party politics of welfare states with a particular focus on electoral competition. The argument is that welfare state politics are no longer just about more or less, but involve trade-offs among ‘new’ versus ‘old’ social rights, and hence social investment versus social consumption. However, party priorities on these issues are highly dependent upon their electoral situation. As electoral competition becomes more intense, parties focus more on vote maximisation than on their traditional policy goals. For left parties, this means focusing more on social investment, which appeals to their growing constituency of progressive sociocultural professionals, and less on defending the traditional income maintenance programmes favoured by their core blue-collar voters. Centre-right parties, on the other hand, should hesitate to retrench old social rights when electoral competition intensifies because they need to prioritise their appeal to culturally conservative working-class voters over their traditional fiscally conservative policy profiles. Using a new dataset and a recently published measure of electoral competitiveness, the article shows that as electoral competition intensifies, left governments are willing to prioritise social investment by reducing pension rights generosity in order to expand programmes for new social risks, while centre-right governments by contrast avoid retrenchment of pension rights and pension expenditures. The findings demonstrate that this relationship is moderated by the presence of a credible radical right challenger, which increases the electoral risk of welfare state recalibration.     

Redistributive policies in decentralised systems: The effect of decentralisation on subnational social spending

This article uses cross‐national data to examine the effects of fiscal and political decentralisation on subnational governments’ social expenditures. It revisits the benefit competition hypothesis put forward by fiscal federalism research, which posits that subnational governments in decentralised countries match welfare benefit reductions by their peers to keep taxes low and avoid an in‐migration of welfare dependents. As a consequence, subnational social expenditures are assumed to plateau at similar and low levels. Using a new cross‐national dataset on social expenditures in 334 subnational units across 14 countries and 21 years, the author explores whether benefit competition causes subnational governments to converge on similar levels of social spending. The analysis reveals that as countries decentralise, subnational social spending levels begin to diverge rather than converge, with some subnational governments reducing their social expenditures and others increasing them. Furthermore, decentralisation is not likely to be associated with lowest common denominator social policies, but with more variability in social expenditure. The article also examines the effects of other macro‐level institutions and demonstrates that policy coordination influences the relationship between decentralisation and subnational social spending levels.     

Forecasting the 2010 general election using aggregate local election data

The paper presents a revised method for estimating national vote shares using aggregate data from local government by-elections. The model was originally developed to forecast the annual outcome of local elections but was adapted in time to provide an accurate forecast of Labour’s landslide victory at the 1997 general election. However, over the past decade the changing pattern of party competition which has seen parties becoming more selective about which elections to contest has led to more elections being excluded from the modelling because they failed to meet the exacting criteria that all three major parties, Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrats, had contested both the by-election and the previous main election, normally held in May. Relaxing these criteria, although increasing the number of available cases would adversely affect the forecast, over- or under-estimating party votes. Instead, the revised method overcomes the problem of differential competition by estimating vote shares for parties that contest one but not both elections. A further innovation is the calculation of a weighted moving quarterly average which takes account of the number of days elapsed between the by-election date and the date of forecast. Using the new method we provide estimates for likely party shares for the 2010 general election.     

Bündnisse für Arbeit: Nationale Handlungsfähigkeit im europäischen Regimewettbewerb

In recent years, new forms of tripartite concertation between governments, employers’ confederations and trade unions have re-emerged in the form of social pacts. The paper aims at explaining the emergence of social pacts under the impact of European regime competition. It argues that governments increasingly seek structural reforms of the labour market in order to solve the employment crisis. These structural reforms are however hardly attainable without the co-operation of the social partners. Using tripartite agreements, governments try to get the acceptance of trade unions to a reform policy which is conducive for employment growth. While social pacts are struck under the impact of regime competition, the political exchange between trade unions and governments does not have to foster this competition, but social pacts can facilitate European co-ordination of employment policies, since they strengthen the role of social partners.     

Ideological mavericks or party herd? The effect of candidates’ ideological positions on intra-party success

Political candidates' ideological positions have been used to explain success in inter-party competition, but little is known about how they impact success in intra-party competition. Here, candidates' positions on the Left–Right and GAL–TAN dimensions are analysed in three Finnish parliamentary elections (2011, 2015, 2019). Candidates' ideological positions are measured in terms of their ideological distance from their own party's median candidate. Absolute ideological distances between candidates and their party's median candidate decrease candidates' preference votes. Furthermore, the effects are contingent on the general ideological position of the candidate's party. However, these interactions do not follow any clear pattern, as more rightist candidates in right-wing parties and more green-alternative-libertarian candidates in traditional-authoritarian-nationalist parties all experience a decrease in their preference votes. This effect is large enough to be a decisive factor in intra-party competition between the last candidate that was elected and the first one that was not.     

The Effect of Political Competition on Democratic Accountability

Representing uncompetitive, homogeneous constituencies is increasingly the norm for American legislators. Extensive research has investigated how competition affects the way representatives respond to their constituents’ policy preferences. This paper explores competition’s effect on the other side of representation, how constituents respond to their legislators’ policy record. Combining multiple measures of state competitiveness with large-N survey data, I demonstrate that competition enhances democratic accountability. Voters in competitive states are more interested in politics, more aware of the policy positions their U.S. senators have taken, and more likely to hold them accountable for those positions at election time. Robustness checks show that these effects are not due to the intensity of campaigning in a state: general competition, not particular campaign activities, drives citizens’ response. The recent increase in uncompetitive constituencies has likely lessened the degree to which legislators are held accountable for their actions in office.     

Union members at the polls in diverse trade union landscapes

This article investigates to what extent social democratic parties still benefit from the support of union members at the polls. Not only are social democratic parties confronted with new competitors in the party systems, but also the union confederations of the socialist labour movement are in some countries losing their dominant position due to the rise of separate professional confederations. It is argued in the article that the effect of union membership on voting choice is conditioned by the structure of the trade union movement. The support of union members for social democracy is fostered by the strength of the confederations historically close to this party family, while it is hampered when strong separate (or politically unaffiliated) white‐collar confederations exist. Using European Social Survey and Swedish Public Opinion data, the article shows that social democratic parties still enjoy important support from trade union members, but at the same time are under fierce competition from bourgeois and green parties among members of white‐collar confederations. This reinforces the challenges for social democracy to build new voters’ coalitions in post‐industrial societies.     

新农村建设中政府公共服务能力的限制因素及其对策

社会主义新农村建设是一个系统工程,仅靠市场机制的自发调节是无法完成的。政府必须承担起相应的责任,然而,政府责任不在于直接参与市场竞争,而在于提供公共服务。政府公共服务能力直接影响一个国家公共服务的总体水平。因此,政府必须强化农村公共服务职能,提升公共服务能力,提高公共服务水平。     

Party subsidies and the freezing of party competition: Do cartel mechanisms work?

The number of countries offering public subsidies to political parties has vastly increased in recent decades, but there have been few attempts to assess how these subsidies affect political competition. Expectations about their likely impact vary widely. Some have described subsidies as key devices used by so-called ‘cartel parties’ to buttress their status and exclude new challengers. Others see subsidies as incentives that encourage new party formation and sustain fledgling parties that otherwise might disappear. The research reported here investigates the circumstances under which subsidies seem more likely to play one or the other of these roles by considering the development of party systems and party subsidies in European democracies. It finds little evidence that subsidies freeze out new parties, but there are signs that certain schemes may encourage party fragmentation.     

The measurement of electoral competition,with application to Indian states

We investigate the measurement of three distinct, but related dimensions of electoral competition in a majoritarian electoral system: contestability in the struggle for governing power; competition among candidates at the constituency level; and competition among existing parties at the level of the legislature. At each step, the analysis is made concrete by calculating our preferred indexes of these dimensions of competitiveness for 14 major Indian states from 1972 to 2009 (and from 1952 in some cases), while comparing them to others that have been widely used, though not always calculated for Indian states. We also use our preferred indexes to study the importance of the level of development for an understanding of how competition has evolved across the states. The paper concludes by posing questions about the measurement of competitiveness, in general and in the Indian case, that arise in the course of our investigation.     

Primary Elections for Britain

The coalition's programme for government promises to fund 200 open postal primaries during the current Parliament, targeted at seats which have not changed hands for many years. The lessons from the two open postal primaries used in 2009 are that they will change the numbers and characteristics of those involved in choosing candidates, the criteria for selection and the type of candidates chosen. Much will remain unchanged. Primaries are unlikely to affect the controlling influence of party in the House. The limits to their number and duration will leave most safe seats unaffected and prevent the development of any new form of accountability. Primaries will provide some voters with intra‐party competition but inter‐party uncompetitiveness will remain the norm.     

The European refugee crisis,party competition,and voters’ responses in Germany

Studies show that globalisation creates political potentials that can transform electoral competition in Western societies. The specific process of how these potentials become effective is not completely understood. It is argued in the article that attention-grabbing events can trigger the transformation of electoral competition as they force actors to take clear positions and thereby allow citizens to align their partisan preferences and policy attitudes. The article analyses the case of German parties’ reaction to the arrival of large numbers of refugees at Europe’s borders in 2015/16. Using panel data that bracket this event, it is shown how German citizens responded to party behaviour by changing partisan preferences on the basis of prior immigration attitudes. The so-called refugee crisis may thus have been a critical juncture transforming party competition in Germany. As such, the crisis represents a striking example of how events may focus attention on a new policy dimension and catalyse the evolution of new cleavages.     

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission and the New Regime

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is the national regulator in the new competition regime. It acts as the public guardian against anti-competitive or unfair business activities. The ACCC's task is to promote competition where it is limited; to preserve competition where it is effective; and to safeguard the position of consumers in their dealings with business. Its efforts are directed primarily at fostering business compliance with the national competition and consumer law, the Trade Practices Act 1974. The commission tries to persuade, coax or cajole businesses into pursuing their interests within the legally defined boundaries of fair competition. Where that proves insufficient, the commission becomes the enforcer. The ACCC can coerce businesses — through court orders and penalties — into rectifying their behaviour where they operate outside the boundaries of the law. It also has the capacity to hold businesses publicly accountable for the prices they set. Underlying these ACCC functions is an ulterior objective: to enhance the material welfare of Australians by promoting, wherever practical, a more competitive and efficient economy.     

Do voters affect or elect policies? A new perspective, with evidence from the U.S. Senate

Using quasi-experimental evidence from close elections, Lee et al. (2004) - henceforth LMB - argue competition for voters in U.S. House elections does not affect policy positions, as incumbent Senate candidates do not vote more extremely if elected than non-incumbents. Despite stronger electoral competition and greater legislative independence, similar results, shown here, hold for the Senate. Yet, the hypothesis that voters do not affect policies conflicts with how Senators moderate their positions prior to their next election. LMB-style estimates appear to be biased downwards as junior members of Congress prefer to vote more extremely than senior members, independently of their electoral strength. Corrected estimates are more favorable to the hypothesis that candidates moderate their policy choices in response to electoral competition.     

In through the back door: Social equity and regional governance

Abstract

A leading impulse for new regionalism in the 1990s was the sense that suburban and central cities are economically interdependent and should work cooperatively toward common regional welfare in the face of globalized competition. If this is so, we should witness an emergence of regional policies that combat concentrated poverty, segregation, and place‐based inequalities that impose significant economic costs. This article assesses the extent and types of metropolitan equity efforts under new regionalism, the pathways through which they arise, and their prospects.

Research finds that equity‐based regional policies are increasing; they take diverse forms and are commonly shaped by state or federal programs, but they are not explicit and primary parts of regional agendas. While regional entities have not advanced explicit discussions about equity, a confluence of intergovernmental programs and quality of life issues has added regional equity to the portfolio of metropolitan goals.     

The Interest Cost Implications of the Financial Advisor Turned Underwriter

The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) does not prohibit municipal financial advisors from participating in the bidding process to serve as underwriter on issues for which they provided advisory services. Some municipalities prohibit the practice, viewing such an arrangement as a conflict of interest. Using data from nearly one thousand competitively sold municipal debt issues in the state of Texas from 1991 to 1995, I test whether or not competition alone in the bidding process is sufficient to protect the interests of the issuer. For general obligation debt and state-backed school district debt these data indicate that there are no interest cost implications for the practice. For municipal and special district revenue debt I find weak evidence of some additional interest (about six basis points) when the advisor serves as underwriter, but the effect is not consistent enough throughout the data to reach statistical significance at the p<0.001 level (see note 10). What I do find is that unrated issues are much more likely to be bid on and won by the advisor, indicating that cities should be concerned about the guidance of their advisor when that advice is to take an unrated issue to market.     

Correspondence

The viability and desirability of a finance-led growth regime is first assessed against the historical evidence about the many alternative regimes that have been proposed as successors to Fordism. A purely hypothetical model is then built by assembling various hypotheses derived from the observation of current American trends. The imposition of financial norms, such as shareholder value, requires a new and coherent architecture for the mode of governance of firms, the form of competition, the wage labour nexus and the objectives of monetary policy, public budget and tax system. According to the model, any requirement for increased profit has a variable macro-economic impact on wages and economic activity according to the size of accelerator effects and the relative importance of wage and profit in income formation. The stability of an equity-based regime depends on monetary policy which controls financial bubbles and thus the diffusion of finance may push the economy into a zone of structural instability. The next major financial crisis may originate in the USA whose economy approximates most closely to the model. But, the so-called American 'new economy' combines diverse but interdependent structural transformations: diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies, search for new rules for competition, increased flexibility in wages and employment, shift from manufacturing to services. Finance is an element in, but not the whole of, this complex emerging regime.     

Do parties perceive their voter potentials correctly? Reconsidering the spatial logic of electoral competition

Political parties strive for maximizing their vote shares. One way to achieve this goal is to attract voters from competitors. A precondition for strategies aiming at attracting these voters is that parties perceive their voter potentials among their rivals' electorates correctly. Yet, hardly anything is known about such perceptions. To fill this gap, we develop analogue measures of a party's perceived and its actual voter potential for each competitor in a party system. Combining elite and mass surveys conducted in Germany, we show that perceived and actual voter potentials depend on spatial considerations but also that not all parties are able to correctly evaluate their potentials. These deviations can be traced back to differences in the perceived placement of political actors between elites and citizens. This supports the spatial logic of party competition but it also points to potential pitfalls for strategic behavior of political parties.