"Sticking One's Neck Out": Reducing Mistrust in Sri Lanka's Peace Negotiations

Lack of trust has been widely used as an explanation for the failure of peace negotiations. However, we know little about how mistrust can be reduced between belligerents involved in negotiating peace. Why are some confidence‐building strategies more successful than others? For theory‐building purposes, this article explores how a party can send conciliatory signals to the other party that increase trust by exposing itself to three different kinds of political risks. More specifically, it compares the variables that reduced mistrust — or failed to reduce mistrust — during two peace negotiations in Sri Lanka: in 1994–1995 and in 2002. Using a theoretical framework that combines social psychology and rational choice approaches, this article examines the communicative signaling process between the parties. In addition, by drawing out the implications from this argument, we offer some insight into why the peace process in Sri Lanka became politically stalemated in 2003. We also use our comparison of Sri Lanka's peace processes to develop general propositions about the dynamics that can reduce mistrust. The main proposition that remains to be tested empirically is whether obstacles to peace can be transformed into important catalysts for the reduction of mistrust.     

Staying in the Game or Changing It: An Analysis of Moves and Turns in Negotiation

As parties bargain over the terms of an agreement, they are concurrently negotiating their relationship. In this parallel negotiation, parties seek to position themselves to advantage by using a variety of strategic moves. In so doing the other party can be put into a defensive position making it difficult to advocate effectively. Turns, such as interrupting, correcting, questioning, naming, and diverting, challenge these moves. Turns can be used restoratively to move out of a defensive position or participatively, to engage the other in collaboration. Anticipating strategic moves and having turns in mind is part of preparing to negotiate.     

Toward a Program-Based ADR Research Agenda

Program evaluation research is often too narrowly focused to build theoryabout dispute resolution while theory-driven ADR research is frequentlytoo far removed from programmatic realities to inform practice. To developan ADR evaluation research agenda that connects theory and practice, weneed to consider: making ADR context a central focus of research; undertakinga fuller account of the processes and the work of third parties inrelation to what skills and orientations parties bring with them to ADR asnegotiators; widening our view of ADR impact or result; and reexaminingwhat research methods are best for studying ADR programs. By shiftingour perspectives, placing negotiating parties closer to the center of ourstudy of ADR, and grounding research in the contexts that matter to policy-makersand practitioners, we could significantly advance research onthird-party intervention.     

Negotiating Umbrella Agreements

Experienced negotiators know that it is often impossible to define all terms of a complex agreement. By negotiating umbrella agreements, the negotiating parties try to balance the need for certainty and calculability of give-and-take processes with the need to remain sufficiently flexible to embrace new or emerging business opportunities. Umbrella agreements describe a joint consent that explicitly articulates a framework of rules and principles that guides future agreements. It is argued that negotiators are better able to maximize their joint gains if they differentiate between agreements and the framework in which agreements are made.     

The Influence of Emotional Intelligence on Negotiation Outcomes and the Mediating Effect of Rapport: A Structural Equation Modeling Approach

Although early research on negotiation focused on cognition and decision‐making processes, recently, negotiation scholars have started to pay attention to the importance of emotion in negotiation and have suggested that emotional intelligence is likely to improve negotiation performance. Few studies, however, have tested the relationship between emotional intelligence and negotiation outcomes. This study contributes by empirically testing the influence of emotional intelligence on specific negotiation outcomes (joint gain, trust between parties, and the desire of parties to work together again) and also examines the mediating effects of rapport. We used a laboratory experimental design with 202 participants to test the hypotheses. We found that a negotiator's emotional intelligence was correlated with his or her counterpart's trust level and desire to work again but had no effect on joint gain. In addition, rapport fully mediated the relationship between emotional intelligence and desire to work again, and between emotional intelligence and trust.     

Civil-Military Tensions and the US Civil-Military Bargain

Civil-military relations (CMR) are concerned with the interactions among the people of a state, the political institutions of that state, and the military of the state. In the United States, these interactions can be understood as a bargain regarding the allocation of military prerogatives and responsibilities. A history of US civil-military relations shows that this bargain has been periodically re-negotiated to take account of political, social, technological, or geopolitical changes. Often, such a renegotiation creates civil-military tensions. Yet, always underlying healthy civil-military relations is a fundamental degree of trust and respect between the uniformed military and the other two parties to the civil-military bargain. The absence of such mutual trust and respect has contributed to recent US civil-military tensions.     

Diplomatic Interactions and Negotiations

This article examines the role of state actors, organization agencies, and individual agents in diplomatic interactions and negotiations. States as diplomatic actors, organizations as diplomatic agencies, and individuals as diplomatic agents enter into complex and interdependent relationships. Proposing a three‐level analysis of interstate interactions and diplomatic negotiations, I argue that no diplomatic negotiation happens without interactions between parties at the state, organizational, and individual levels. The agency–structure paradigm provides a conceptual framework for understanding behavioral and structural properties of international interactions and their influence on diplomatic negotiations. Diplomatic negotiation employs specific forms of interaction, using a distinct language, protocol norms, symbols, ceremonies, and rituals. The state's “self” (as a social conception of its identity, values, and interests) affects the process of diplomatic negotiation. By managing, organizing, and improving international interactions at the actor, agency, and agent levels, negotiating parties can advance the process and effectiveness of diplomatic negotiation.     

Interpretive Filters: Social Cognition and the Impact of Turning Points in Negotiation

A number of studies have shown that certain events that occur during a negotiation can alter its course. Referred to as "turning points," these events are precipitated by actions taken either outside or inside the talks that have consequences for outcomes. In this article, we report the results of two experiments designed to examine the impacts of two types of precipitating actions, external and internal. In the first experiment, which focused on external actions, we found that crises — as opposed to breakthroughs — produced more movement in negotiations in which parties viewed the social climate positively (high trust, low power). We found that parties achieved less movement in negative social climates (low trust, high power).
In the second experiment, which focused on internal actions, we found that cooperative precipitants (factors inducing change) were more likely to occur when parties negotiated in the context of positive social climates. Negotiation outcomes were also influenced by the climate: we found better individual outcomes for negotiations that occurred in positive climates (high trust, cooperative orientations). Inboth experiments, the social climate of the negotiation moderated the effects of precipitating factors on negotiation outcomes. Perceptions of trust and power filter the way negotiators interpret actions that occur outside or are taken inside a negotiation, which can lead to agreements or impasses.     

Third Parties and Culture

This essay describes the four broad themes that emerged from our discussionabout the role of process in cross-cultural negotiations and considerstheir implications for future research. First, we address the nature of theconflict, in particular whether a negotiation is classified as a dispute or atransactional exchange. Second, we contrast the role of cognition and rapportin negotiations and consider when rapport replaces the centrality ofcognition. We also discuss the extent to which negotiating processes createrelationships based on trust or power, and consider how cultural valuesinfluence the development of these underlying relationships. Finally, weconsider the role of culture in defining what is perceived as an optimal outcomeand raise the possibility that suboptimal outcomes may holdsymbolic value in cross-cultural negotiations.     

Parasitic Integration: Win-Win Agreements Containing Losers

Parasitic integration involves agreements that are Pareto-superior for two or more of the negotiating parties, while being inferior for one or more of the remaining negotiating parties. The contrast between parasitic integration and integrative bargaining is highlighted. A taxonomy and examples of parasitic integration are provided, as well as linkages to specific areas in the negotiation literature.     

Hard Bargaining in the Classroom: Realistic Simulated Negotiations and Student Values

Empirical research into the negotiation practices of lawyers shows that “hard bargaining,” including at least some unethical conduct, is an inescapable fact of a lawyer's life. To prepare students for legal practice, negotiation instructors must expose them to hard bargaining in the classroom. In doing so, however, instructors should be sensitive to the moral and ethical values of their students, so that the classroom experience does not unduly pressure students to compromise their values. The simulation is the primary tool of negotiation instruction. By selecting and manipulating simulations, a negotiation instructor can expose students to a wide range of negotiating behaviors, from distributive negotiations marked by the use of power tactics to value‐creating negotiations in which participants must consider many interests and collaborative strategies predominate. With that flexibility, however, comes the potential for classroom exercises to pressure students, in ways both subtle and overt, to adopt behaviors that feel uncomfortable. In this article, I examine the use of simulations to teach different types of negotiating behavior, including hard bargaining. Referring to a number of widely available simulations, I suggest ways to focus student attention on three dimensions of negotiation behavior — the issues over which the parties are bargaining, the objectives the parties seek, and the tactics the parties use to achieve their objectives — in order to push students to reflect on their own negotiation behaviors and to prepare for the tactics of others. I assess the potential for simulations to pressure students to compromise their values, and I conclude with my own thoughts on the goals of a negotiation course.     

Process in Cross-Cultural Negotiations

This essay describes the four broad themes that emerged from our discussionabout the role of process in cross-cultural negotiations and considerstheir implications for future research. First, we address the nature of theconflict, in particular whether a negotiation is classified as a dispute or atransactional exchange. Second, we contrast the role of cognition and rapportin negotiations and consider when rapport replaces the centrality ofcognition. We also discuss the extent to which negotiating processes createrelationships based on trust or power, and consider how cultural valuesinfluence the development of these underlying relationships. Finally, weconsider the role of culture in defining what is perceived as an optimal outcomeand raise the possibility that suboptimal outcomes may holdsymbolic value in cross-cultural negotiations.     

试析伊朗核问题的困境与走势

2011年11月8日,国际原子能机构公布报告认为,伊朗核计划可能具有军事用途,使伊朗核问题再次成为国际社会关注的焦点。伊朗核问题实质上是美国与伊朗围绕各自的国家战略目标进行的战略博弈,双方从战略互信的缺失发展到战略疑虑的加剧。新一轮伊朗核问题与当前复杂的中东局势交织在一起,加剧了地区的紧张局势。尽管目前的伊核问题形势复杂,但对相关各方来说,通过和平手段解决矛盾与冲突仍是最可行、也是最现实的方式。     

What Makes Parties Trust Mediators?

The relationship of trust between mediators and parties is a key element of the mediation process. This article reviews the trust relationship from the parties' perspectives. A qualitative research methodology was used to identify five key factors explaining why parties trust their mediator: degree of mastery over the process, explanation of the process, warmth and consideration, chemistry with the parties, and lack of bias toward either party. The theoretical and practical implications of the results are discussed.     

Great effort,little help? Peace and conflict resolution organisations in Northern Ireland and Turkey

This article offers a comparative analysis of the role played by peace and conflict resolution organisations (P/CROs) in Northern Ireland and Turkey in negotiating solutions to ethno-nationalist conflicts in these countries. It argues that P/CROs have been instrumental in de-escalating violence and encouraging conflicting parties to resolve conflict peacefully. Examining both the elite and grass-roots levels, the article assesses P/CROs that have advanced middle-range approaches and track-two dialogue towards peace. Drawing on data from multiple sources, including semi-structured interviews, archival material and official documents, the analysis indicates that P/CROs have a range of tools at their disposal to influence political decision-makers. These include public (and closed) conferences, forums and events attended by current or former politicians, representatives of the conflicting parties and prominent figures and intellectuals in the conflict-affected society, as well as other grass-roots initiatives. The article finds that P/CROs provided help shaping and promoting non-violent processes of conflict resolution between the British Government and the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and the Turkish Government and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK).     

Immovable Positions: Public Acknowledgment and Bargaining in Military Basing Negotiations

Why might public acknowledgment of cooperative security negotiations generate bargaining constraints that provoke stalemate? Previous scholarship points to aroused public opinion. Yet in many cases where hard-line bargaining stances develop and talks collapse following public acknowledgment, it is not domestic political pressures that tie leaders’ hands. This article examines instead an international constraint attendant to publicity: opposition by third-party states. I argue that international power position shapes the balance of vulnerability between the negotiating parties to abandonment and entanglement. The act of official acknowledgment can constrain the more vulnerable partner by enabling third-party states to credibly scrutinize its intentions. By threatening strained relations, such scrutiny can create a security dilemma that reduces the weaker partner's bargaining range to a choice between cooperation on its terms and noncooperation. I evaluate this argument by studying foreign military basing negotiations. Statistical analyses and a comparative case study produce strong support for my argument.     

Assessing the Television Campaign: The Impact of Party Election Broadcasting on Voters' Opinions in the 1997 British General Election

Although paid television and radio political advertising is banned in the United Kingdom, parties fielding sufficient candidates are entitled to free air time during election campaigns for a fixed number of party election broadcasts (PEBs). Over the years, parties have experimented with a variety of different PEB formats. But the impact of PEBs on voters is underresearched. This article therefore analyzes the influence of PEB viewing in the 1997 British General Election. Though a majority do not view PEBs, those who do are influenced by them, especially in terms of their evaluations of parties and their leaders: Other things being equal, viewers of a party's PEBs become more favorably disposed to the party and its leader than those who do not see the broadcast. Labour and Conservative PEBs have no impact on vote intentions, however. But viewers of Liberal Democrat broadcasts become more likely to support that party. We speculate that this reflects different background levels of media exposure for the major parties as compared to the third party.     

Negotiating the Marcellus: The Role of Information in Building Trust in Extractive Deals

New technology has expanded the opportunities for energy companies within the United States, often bringing them into populated communities and requiring them to negotiate deals with landowners. This case study focuses on how one group of landowners in northeastern Pennsylvania creatively reimagined the process of negotiating in a natural gas deal. They used collective bargaining for leverage, and the Internet and social media to level the informational playing field. These techniques allowed them to develop trust within the group and ultimately with one company, as they sought to protect their environment and enhance their financial gain.     

Negotiating Military Alliances: Legal Systems and Alliance Formation

Do domestic legal systems affect states' propensity to form military alliances? This article, building upon the existing research in international relations, adopts a socio-legal approach to understanding international treaty making. By focusing on the essence of international negotiations—communication between states' representatives—I argue that negotiating parties who share a common legal language have a common a priori understanding concerning concepts under discussion. Domestic laws operating within states impact the process of creation of international law embodied in treaties. Empirical analyses show that states with similar legal systems are more likely to form military alliances with one another. Additionally, domestic legal systems influence the way that states design their alliance commitments. In general, my findings suggest that the influence of domestic laws does not stop at “the water's edge.” It permeates the interstate borders and impacts the relations between states, especially the treaty negotiating and drafting process. International negotiators bring their legal backgrounds to the negotiating table, which influences both their willingness to sign treaties and the design of the resulting agreements.     

Compliance without enforcement: State behavior under regulatory treaties

Conclusion The common conception is that treaties are not complied with because they are unenforceable, and that the cure for this condition is treaties with teeth. Our study shows that there are good reasons why states resist formal enforcement measures in treaties and are likely to continue to do so.On the other hand, negotiation, which is the principal method for dealing with compliance problems, has had a significant measure of success. This should not surprise us. Negotiation often produces agreements between parties who are not bound to agree to anything. In the context of a set of treaty norms accepted by the parties and acknowledged as having binding force, bargaining takes place in the shadow of the law as surely as when there is a possibility of ultimate recourse to coercive sanctions.In this article, we suggest some approaches that appear to enhance the effectiveness of this process. Some have close links to general negotiating theory, such as the importance of transparency between the parties and the need for careful attention to the possibilities for non-binding third party involvement. Others are more closely related to the structural features of national and international decision-making. It remains to elaborate on these themes and integrate them with others in a comprehensive account of how and why states comply with treaties. Abram Chayes is the Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, Mass. 02138.Antonia Handler Chayes is a principal in Endispute Inc., 955 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02139. Abram and Antonia Chayes are co-directors of the Project on International Compliance and Dispute Settlement, a research project based at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School.