Partisan Influence on Immigration: The Case of Norway

Do governments decide the size of immigration? This article analyses partisan impact on refugee immigration to Norway. The first part maps party positions on refugee immigration and demonstrates that the views of Norwegian parties are far from consensual. The second part tests whether the number of refugees admitted has been affected by changes of government by way of a panel analysis covering the period 1985–2005 and 143 sending countries. Controlling for other determinants of immigration both in receiving and sending countries, the analysis suggests that that the number of refugees admitted to Norway has been significantly lower during Conservative rule. Among parties with government experience, the Conservative Party also has adopted the most restrictive stand in its manifestoes. No significant differences between Labour Party and centre governments were found, even though the centre parties express more liberal preferences.     

Voter responses to refugee arrivals: Effects of settlement policy

In this paper we leverage a sudden shift in refugee settlement policy to study the electoral consequences of refugee settlements. After the 2013 Norwegian parliamentary election, the newly elected right-wing government made a concerted effort to spread newly arrived immigrants across the country, with the consequence that some municipalities with limited experience in settling refugees accepted to do so. We propose that such policy changes have political consequences, increasing the salience of immigration issues and shifting voters’ preferences to the right. We further propose that successful refugee integration can move (parts of) the electorate to the left, with stronger political polarization as a possible effect of the policy change. Applying difference-in-differences techniques, we find no evidence of unidirectional shifts in voter sentiments, but support for the hypothesis of stronger political polarization.     

Extreme right-wing voting in Western Europe

Abstract. In this study we explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour in the countries of the European Union and Norway from a micro and macro perspective. Using a multidisciplinary multilevel approach, we take into account individual-level social background characteristics and public opinion alongside country characteristics and characteristics of extreme right-wing parties themselves. By making use of large-scale survey data (N = 49,801) together with country-level statistics and expert survey data, we are able to explain extreme right-wing voting behaviour from this multilevel perspective. Our results show that cross-national differences in support of extreme right-wing parties are particularly due to differences in public opinion on immigration and democracy, the number of non-Western residents in a country and, above all, to party characteristics of the extreme right-wing parties themselves.     

Acts of citizenship as a politics of resistance? Reflections on realizing concrete rights within the Israeli asylum regime

This paper investigates how Eritrean refugees in Israel and civil society organisations who engage with refugee issues contest the exclusionary politics of asylum in Israel. It presents various acts of claims-making initiated by Eritrean refugees themselves or in response to hostility by others, as well as acts inaugurated by Israeli civil society organisations on behalf of or with refugee populations. Drawing on the concept of activist acts of citizenship developed by Engin Isin, the paper subsequently analyses to what degree those acts have redefined aspects of social and political membership for Eritrean refugees in Israel. In a further step, it shows the limitations of such acts in terms of developing a solidaristic refugee-citizen agenda that profoundly challenges hegemonic public discourse and political debate. The paper concludes by arguing that activist acts of citizenship are best studied in relation to the transformative power they may have on the various individuals engaging in them, but not as a strategy for a wider politics of resistance, as ultimately nation state politics continue to determine the actual realisation of concrete rights.     

What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety,Group Cues,and Immigration Threat

We examine whether and how elite discourse shapes mass opinion and action on immigration policy. One popular but untested suspicion is that reactions to news about the costs of immigration depend upon who the immigrants are. We confirm this suspicion in a nationally representative experiment: news about the costs of immigration boosts white opposition far more when Latino immigrants, rather than European immigrants, are featured. We find these group cues influence opinion and political action by triggering emotions—in particular, anxiety—not simply by changing beliefs about the severity of the immigration problem. A second experiment replicates these findings but also confirms their sensitivity to the stereotypic consistency of group cues and their context. While these results echo recent insights about the power of anxiety, they also suggest the public is susceptible to error and manipulation when group cues trigger anxiety independently of the actual threat posed by the group.     

Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor, ... But Make Sure They Have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion Toward Immigration

Although few controversies in our political environment are as contentious as the current debate over immigration policy, the research on public opinion toward immigration is quite limited. In particular, we know relatively little about the contextual determinants of opinions on immigration issues. We address this issue by investigating the impact of migrant context on Anglo opinions toward immigration. We find that Anglo support for increased immigration is directly related to the size of the documented migrant population. Conversely, as the relative size of the undocumented migrant population increases, Anglo support for increased immigration decreases. We conclude with a discussion of the relevance of our findings for the study of immigration opinion, in particular, and the study of intergroup relations more generally.     

Biased Altruism: Islamophobia and Donor Support for Global Humanitarian Organizations

Providing humanitarian assistance to displaced individuals is a critical policy challenge. Many refugee camps are run by charities supported by Western donors. If refugees are predominantly Muslim, might Islamophobia suppress donations to these charities? Using a survey experiment conducted in the United States, the authors examine whether donors' willingness to support a charity is influenced by the dominant religion of the refugees, the regions in which refugee camps are located, and/or the religious affiliation of the charity. The authors find modest support for Islamophobia: while willingness to donate is not affected by the location of camps or the predominance of Muslim refugees, it declines significantly for Islamic charities. Respondents overall tend to be especially willing to donate to a charity that serves Christian refugees in the Middle East. Among self‐identifying Christians, respondents are more willing to donate to a charity serving Christian refugees than one serving Muslim refugees.     

The Externalities of Civil Strife: Refugees as a Source of International Conflict

Domestic strife and civil war frequently produce large population dislocations and refugee flows across national boundaries. Mass refugee flows often entail negative consequences for receiving states, particularly in developing countries. Moreover, civil violence frequently extends across national boundaries as “internal” conflicts are not constrained by borders. This article argues that refugee flows between states significantly increase the likelihood of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) in that dyad. Refugee‐receiving states are more likely to initiate MIDs as they intervene to prevent further externalities, and refugee‐sending states initiate MIDs as they violate borders in pursuit of dissidents. Moreover, this research challenges conventional theories of international conflict that focus exclusively on distributional bargains between states. These propositions are tested in a quantitative analysis of the relationship between refugees and MID initiation, 1955–2000. Results confirm that refugees significantly increase the probability of international conflict.     

Welfare Dualism in Two Scandinavian Welfare States: Public Opinion and Party Politics

Recent research on the legitimacy of the welfare state has pointed to a potential negative impact of immigration. While much of this research has been concerned with a possible weakening of the general support for economic redistribution, this article analyses popular support for the introduction of a two-tier (dualist) welfare system, and focuses on the interplay between public opinion and party competition. It uses survey data from Denmark and Norway: two similar welfare states where elite politics on migration and welfare dualism has been markedly different over the last decade. It finds that the level and structure of popular support for welfare dualism are fairly similar in the two countries, but that attitudes toward dualism have a stronger impact on left–right voting in Denmark where the politics of welfare dualism has been actively advocated by the populist right party and pursued by a right-wing coalition government.     

Nonparticipation as Self-Censorship: Publicly Observable Political Activity in a Polarized Opinion Climate

In a polarized opinion climate, people may refrain from participating in publicly observable political activities that make them vulnerable to scrutiny and criticism by others who hold opinions that differ from their own. We took a dispositional approach to testing this claim by determining whether people who are relatively more influenced by the climate of opinion when choosing whether or not to voice an opinion, measured with the Willingness to Self-Censor scale [Hayes et al. International Journal of Public Opinion Research 17 (2005) 298], are also relatively less likely to engage in public political activities. In a poll of residents of the United States, we found that even after controlling for interest in politics, political ideology, ideological extremity, political efficacy, attention to political news, dispositional shyness, frequency of political discussion, and demographics, dispositional self-censors reported having engaged in relatively fewer public political activities over the prior 2 years compared to those less willing to censor their own opinion expression. These results are consistent with our interpretation of political participation as a social process that is governed in part by the social psychological implications of participation to the person. At a larger theoretical level, our findings connect the literature on opinion perceptions and opinion expression with research on political participation.

New challenges in immigration theory: an overview

Normative political theory over recent decades has focused mainly on what ought to be done as far as migration policies are concerned. It faces a basic challenge, which stems from two competing, yet equally fundamental, ideals underpinning liberal democratic societies: a commitment to moral universalism and the exclusionary requirement of democracy. The objective of this special issue, ‘New Challenges in Immigration Theory’, is to provide a conceptual overview of (some) immigration theories and to highlight the challenges new streams of immigration pose for normative (political) theory and liberal democratic practice. The issue will consider how to reconcile state-based exclusion with a commitment to equal moral concern for all persons, by focusing on the non-standard immigration questions that have so far been ‘neglected’ by normative political theory. In line with this objective, the issue will discuss some of the inadequacies of the dominant political theories of immigration and show how such theories can be expanded to take account of new migration challenges such as brain drain, climate migration, detention of irregular migrants and asylum seekers, rights of labour migrants, transnational networks of movement, and so on.     

Refugees: The security dimension

In the 1990s doors have been closing in the Western world against refugee claimants. Although there are multiple causes for declining generosity towards refugees, arguments that refugees pose security problems to host nations have been particularly prominent. An historical analysis reveals that the so‐called ‘golden age’ of postwar refugee settlement from the 1940s to the mid‐1970s was a by‐product of Cold War security and propaganda considerations. The end of the Cold War and the pressures of refugee movements generated by Third World and former Communist bloc conflicts has restructured Western refugee discourse. Refugees now tend to be seen as importers of external political conflicts into the West. At the same time growing European and North American resentment of ‘foreigners’ competing for declining job opportunities and reduced social services have encouraged anti‐immigrant political movements. By tightening barriers and controls over refugees on security grounds, Western governments are able to respond in part to these pressures. The Cold War policing and security alliance in Europe has been retooled to form the basis of a new post‐Cold War cooperation over immigration and refugee security, without the necessity of creating a new framework of supranational institutions.     

Trading Refugees: The Governance of Refugee Settlement in a Decentralized Welfare State

In a decentralized welfare state, central and local governments need each other to settle refugees. Using the case of Norway, the article studies how these interdependencies have been governed over time, including through the 2015–2016 refugee crisis. Norway's refugee settlement programme is a conscious hybrid of market and network governance and it has remained essentially stable for more than 20 years, despite several changes in government, large fluctuations in the number of refugees, and long periods of poor performance vis-à-vis settlement targets. This surprising programme stability is explained by a combination of extraordinary political adherence to the democratic value of local government autonomy, the cupidity of local governments, and abundant state economic resources during the period under study.     

On filtering longitudinal public opinion data: Issues in identification and representation of true change

The Kalman filter is a popular tool in engineering and economics. It is becoming popular in political science, touted for its abilities to reduce measurement error and produce more precise estimates of true public opinion. Its application to survey measures of public opinion varies in important ways compared to the traditionally understood Kalman filter. It makes a priori assumptions about the variance of the sampling error that would not usually be made and does so in a way that violates an important property of the Kalman filter. Consequently, the behavior of the filter modified for public opinion measures is less well-known. Through simulations we assess whether and to what extent filtering: reliably detects the characteristics of time series; does so across series with different rates of autoregressive decay; and does so when the variance of the sampling error is unknown. We also examine whether the filtered data represents the level of true underlying variance and the extent to which filtering assists or hinders our ability to detect exogenous shocks. We learn a numbers of things. Most importantly, taking into account sampling error variance when filtering data can work well, though its performance does vary. First, filtering works best identifying time series characteristics when assuming a stationary process, even if the underlying process contains a unit root. Second, the performance of filtering drops off when we incorrectly specify the variance of the sampling error, and especially when we overestimate it. Third, when estimating exogenous shocks it is better to make no a priori assumptions regarding a measurement error variance unless we are absolutely certain we know what it is. In fact, applying the filter without specifying the measurement error variance is more often than not the best choice.     

Immigration and support for redistribution: survey experiments in three European countries

In times of increasing globalisation scholars put considerable efforts into understanding the consequences of immigration to the welfare state. One important factor in this respect is public support for the welfare state and redistribution. This article presents results from a unique survey experiment and a panel study in three European countries (Norway, Germany and the Netherlands) in order to examine whether and how individuals change their preference for redistribution when faced with immigration. Theoretically, citizens with high incomes should be especially likely to withdraw their support for redistribution because they fear the increased fiscal burden, whereas other types of citizens might ask for more compensation for the increased labour market risks caused by immigration. The empirical evidence reveals that only respondents with high incomes and those who face low labour market competition withdraw support for redistribution when faced with immigration.     

What drives the polarisation and moderation of opinions? Evidence from a Finnish citizen deliberation experiment on immigration

In the study of deliberation, a largely under‐explored area is why some participants polarise their opinion after deliberation and why others moderate them. Opinion polarisation is usually considered a suspicious outcome of deliberation, while moderation is seen as a desirable one. This article takes issue with this view. Results from a Finnish deliberative experiment on immigration show that polarisers and moderators were not different in socioeconomic, cognitive or affective profiles. Moreover, both polarisation and moderation can entail deliberatively desired pathways: in the experiment, both polarisers and moderators learned during deliberation, levels of empathy were fairly high on both sides, and group pressures barely mattered. Finally, the low physical presence of immigrants in some discussion groups was associated with polarisation in the anti‐immigrant direction, bolstering longstanding claims regarding the importance of presence for democratic politics.     

Issue Framing and Engagement: Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy Debates

Conventional wisdom and scholarly research indicate that to win a policy debate political actors should frame the issue strategically—that is, selectively highlight considerations that mobilize public opinion behind their policy position. Engaging the opponent in a dialogue (i.e., focusing on the same considerations) is portrayed as a suboptimal strategy because political actors forfeit the ability to structure the debate. Using over 40 public opinion polls and a detailed content analysis of news stories, I examine the use of framing and engagement strategies during the 1993–94 debate over health care reform. The analysis shows that engagement was more effective at increasing support for reform than framing. This study is the first to document the role of engagement in a policy debate, and it extends work showing that this strategy is more common in election campaigns than scholars once suspected.

Whitehall and the Refugees: The 1930s and the 1990s

Abstract

In this paper, originally presented on the occasion of the launch of her book concerning British immigration policy towards Jewish refugees from 1933 to 1948, London compares that past with present British immigration policy and attitudes towards it. She argues, above all, that the same worry about the long-term effects of immigration—that is, that refugees would settle in the country and not return home or move on—that very much influenced the tendency to inhibit aid to Jewish refugees in the 1930s and 1940s, is still very much alive today. While the legal situation of refugees and the kinds of persecution from which they seek refuge are different in the two periods in question, the 1930s and the 1990s—there are now, for instance, international conventions on refugees to which Britain is a signatory—British immigration policies of both periods are marked by many of the same priorities and many of the same attitudes towards and perceptions of refugees. In closing, she sounds a warning that an understanding of the past, crucial as it is, should not be mistakenly used to justify a lack of humanity in the present.     

After the immigration shock: The causal effect of immigration on electoral preferences

The influx of immigrants to Norway over the last decades is a large-scale natural experiment. This paper exploits municipal-level variations in the immigrant population (1977–2011) to estimate the causal effects on voter support for the right-wing, anti-immigration Progress Party.The results indicate that voters keep incumbents accountable for permissive immigration policies. Immigration from non-Western countries (Africa, Asia, Latin America) has increased electoral support for the Progress Party. However, the effects are quite modest and noticeable only in the initial phases of immigration. Survey data covering ten elections (1989–2011) indicate a similar development in anti-immigration attitudes. The primary immigration shock tends to burn out quite fast as people get direct experience of immigrants on a daily basis.     

Marketing,truth and political expediency

• Countries have been built on the hopes, dreams and courage of refugees. In recent years, the global refugee problem has become more intense, and reactions from governments around the world have been generally negative. This paper explores and describes the way in which a hitherto unpopular Australian Government managed and communicated an apparent ‘refugee crisis’ to win an election campaign, using information known at the time to be untruthful. It compares the messages used to win the election with the truth that subsequently emerged, and relates this to political marketing, especially the theories of Machiavelli. It concludes by describing the situation post‐election and discusses some potential implications for public affairs.

Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.