Separate versus Equal Treatment Approaches to Parental Leave: Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence*

This article examines the legal and economic arguments behind the separate versus equal treatment approaches to maternity/parental leave. Three sets of legal arguments that were advanced in the U. S. Supreme Court case California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Guerra, 1987 are examined. The economic arguments that correspond to each of these legal arguments are then developed, including the arguments of groups who (1) oppose all versions of mandated leave, (2) support mandated parental leave without qualification (the Separate Treatment Approach), and (3) support some, but not all formulations (the Equal Treatment Approach). Each of these theoretical perspectives generate specific hypotheses regarding the potential compensation and employment effects for women of childbear-ing age. These hypotheses are tested with data from the Current Population Survey, May 1979 and May 1983. Overall the empirical findings suggest that parental leave legislation can significantly improve the labor market position of women of childbearing age, but all approaches are not equal and some methods may undermine, rather than improve their position.     

Who’s Your Daddy?

This paper provides a brief explanation and illustration of the phenomenon of semiotics. It then describes the conceptual tools of semiotics and how lawyers can use semiotics in law to create compelling arguments. Last, the paper applies the tools of semiotics to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court case Ferguson v. McKiernan, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2008), to reveal the shift in social context that made the lines of legal reasoning behind the outcome appear “self-evident.”     

Social science data and the APA

The wisdom of the American Psychological Association's submitting amicus briefs to affect social or legal policy is questioned by an analysis of the brief claimed to be a strong example of the effective use of social science data in the public policy arena; namely, the APA brief (Bersoff & Ogden, 1987) inLockhart v. McCree (1986). The data relied upon in the brief do not appear to support the assertions based upon them, and other data are adduced to develop the critique. It is concluded that it is mischievous for the Association to address itself to the courts by generalizing a data base well beyond its useful limits: The adversarial and scientific methods of establishing truth are in several respects antithetical.     

Physician-assisted suicide and public virtue: a reply to the liberty thesis of "the Philosophers' Brief"

The "Philosophers' Brief," penned by six of today's most influential philosophers, was submitted as an amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court as it prepared to consider the cases of Washington v. Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill. It set precedent as the first such brief submitted by a group representing itself solely as moral philosophers. The brief became an overnight gold standard statement of the liberal philosophical understanding of the relationship of the State to so-called 'private morality.' The main thesis of the brief is that physician-assisted suicide regards the deeply personal event of death, and that individuals have a constitutionally guaranteed right to make decisions for themselves about the intimate details of their lives. In this article, James DuBois calls this the 'liberty thesis,' and he argues that the brief's application of this principle is both contradictory and impracticable. The contradiction arises as the brief proposes restrictions on the right to physician-assisted suicide--restrictions that require the State to abandon neutrality on intimate value judgments about life's worth. The impracticability arises insofar as the brief fails to leave room for a compelling State interest in promoting a minimal level of public virtue. Ironically, one of the strongest arguments that can be proffered on behalf of a State interest in preserving a minimal level of public virtue stems from its role in safeguarding human liberty.     

Does the Unconstrained Legal Actor Exist?

Abstract. The unconstrained legal actor, typically a judge, is a central character in modern jurisprudence. He is feared by legal formalists, legal positivists, and Ronald Dworkin alike. He is lauded by some legal realist and critical legal studies theorists. Stanley Fish says that all of this theorising is pointless because the unconstrained legal actor cannot exist. My paper evaluates Fish's arguments for this surprising position.     

Argumentation and Interpretation in Law

Abstract
The author proceeds from a brief elucidation of the concept "argumentation" through a more extended account of substantive reasons in pure practical argumentation and of institutional argumentation applying "authority reasons" as grounds for legal decisions to an initial account of the nature and place of legal interpretative reasoning. Then he explores the three main categories of interpretative arguments, linguistic arguments, systemic arguments and teleological/deontological arguments; and he examines the problem of conflicts of interpretation and their resolution. His conclusion is that legal argumentation is only partly autonomous since it has to be embedded within widerelements of practical argumentation.     

An Automated System for Argument Invention in Law Using Argumentation and Heuristic Search Procedures*

Abstract. A heuristic search procedure for inventing legal arguments is built on two tools already widely in use in argumentation. Argumentation schemes are forms of argument representing premise‐conclusion and inference structures of common types of arguments. Schemes especially useful in law represent defeasible arguments, like argument from expert opinion. Argument diagramming is a visualization tool used to display a chain of connected arguments linked together. One such tool, Araucaria, available free at http://araucaria.computing.dundee.ac.uk/ , helps a user display an argument on the computer screen as an inverted tree structure with an ultimate conclusion as the root of the tree. These argumentation tools are applicable to analyzing a mass of evidence in a case at trial, in a manner already known in law using heuristic methods ( Schum 1994 ) and Wigmore diagrams ( Wigmore 1931 ). In this paper it is shown how they can be automated and applied to the task of inventing legal arguments. One important application is to proof construction in trial preparation ( Palmer 2003 ).     

The Place of Legal Positivism in Contemporary Constitutional States

The aim of the paper is that of discussing some recent antipositivist theses, with specific reference to the arguments that focus on the alleged incapability of legal positivism to understand and explain the complex normative structure of constitutional states. One of the central tenets of legal positivism (in its guise of methodological or conceptual positivism) is the theory of the separation between law and morality. On the assumption that in contemporary legal systems, constitutional law represents a point of intersection between law and basic moral values, antipositivists contrast legal positivism with two main arguments. First, on a more general level, the positivist theory of the separation between law and morality is questioned; then, and consequently, the neutrality thesis in the juristic study of law is rejected. The author discusses both these antipositivist arguments, and offers a brief defence of methodological positivism.     

Islamic Law in Action: A Historical Discussion

This review essay engages Kristen Stilt's recent book, Islamic Law in Action: Authority, Discretion, and Everyday Experiences in Mamluk Egypt (2011), in a fashion that highlights its contributions to the study of Islamic law. In particular, it underlines the methodological arguments made in the book that might help us think about Islamic legal practice in sophisticated and historically grounded ways. As elaborated in the article, these arguments have important implications for modern as well historical settings. Specifically, Stilt's discussion of “Islamic law in action” reveals the inherent flexibility of Islamic legal practice to accommodate political change. The article also discusses how further research on the topic could benefit from specific approaches and orientations.     

Procedural Justice and Dutch Victim Policy

This paper opens with a brief discussion of the traditional role of the victim in the criminal justice system and the changes which have been made in the Netherlands in order to improve the position of victims of crime. In addition, the author discusses the arguments put forward by policymakers and examines the implementation of victim policy. Next, procedural justice is introduced as a theory from which one could consider the possible impact of victims' experiences in the criminal justice system on their relationship with the justice system. The author goes on to present research which examines the impact of procedural justice on victims' attitudes towards legal authorities. The paper closes with a discussion of the importance of procedural justice issues for criminal justice policymakers and legal practitioners.     

Rights, Performatives, and Promises in Karl Olivecrona's Legal Theory

Abstract.  Karl Olivecrona (1971 ) maintains that "right" is a "hollow word," and so also for some other legal terms. "Right," he says, "has no conceptual background." He arrives at this position after an examination of metaphysical and naturalistic accounts, including American legal realism. Some of Olivecrona's arguments will be evaluated here. His position is influenced by Hägerström's theory of legal language, but he argues that Hägerström fails to account for how such terms as "right,""duty," etc. function in legal discourse and why they are useful. A parallel approach is also found in Olivecrona's book The Problem of the Monetary Unit (1957 ). Olivecrona is left with the problem of how such "hollow" terms function. His explanation is largely psychological. Going beyond J. L. Austin's notion of performatory language, he introduces the idea of performatory imperatives. I propose to submit Olivecrona's approach to a critical examination. It is suggested that had he started from everyday, nonlegal promises and commitments he might well have ended up with a different theory of legal language.     

Deduction and Justification in the Law. The Role of Legal Terms and Concepts

Abstract. Legal terms, such as “ownership,”“contract,”“validity,”“negligence,” are used as middle terms in legal deduction. The paper distinguishes two problems regarding this use. One is the logical function of terms for deduction within a normative system. Specific problems dealt with in this connection are meaning, definition, and economy of expression. The other problem connected with middle terms is the “moulding” and possible manipulation of the meaning of legal terms, for arriving at desired conclusions in a given scheme of inference. It is indicated how the moulding of contested legal concepts, if not restricted, will obscure the ratio of legal rules. This problem is relevant, inter alia, to arguments ex analogia in the law.     

Taking Care of Strasbourg: The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in Kosovo’s Domestic Legal System

This paper addresses the position of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law in Kosovo’s domestic legal order. To begin with, it reviews the background of the issue of human rights in Kosovo highlighting its distinct position and perspective. This article then analyses the position held by the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols in Kosovo’s legal order while also addressing the ECHR’s constitutionalization, its direct effect and the constitutional review on basis of it. The paper then examines whether the case-law of the ECtHR is binding in Kosovo, whether it is directly effective, and whether Kosovo’s Constitutional Court can use it as a ground in the conduct of constitutional reviews. This paper argues that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR both hold a privileged status under Kosovo’s constitutional law, despite Kosovo not being a party to the ECHR and, therefore, having no international liability to implement the ECHR. In addition, the paper offers certain arguments regarding the relative positions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR within the current practice of Kosovo’s judicial system. This paper concludes with the argument that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR hold a privileged status in the context of Kosovo’s domestic legal order—one which could serve as a precedent in respecting human rights and freedoms.     

Causality and causation in tort law

This paper considers alternative approaches to dealing with causal uncertainty in strict liability tort regimes. Beginning from the philosophical literature on causing, a distinction is made between the scientific idea of causality and the legal idea of causation. This distinction is generalized to a context of causal uncertainty and associated probabilities are constructed. It is shown that a rule of proportional liability whereby the tortfeasor pays damages in proportion to the probability in causation of them having caused the damage would be socially efficient. This contrasts with the implied use of the probability in causality by the courts and in the law and economics literature on causal uncertainty.     

Inclusive Legal Positivism,Legal Interpretation,and Value‐Judgments

In this paper I put forward some arguments in defence of inclusive legal positivism. The general thesis that I defend is that inclusive positivism represents a more fruitful and interesting research program than that proposed by exclusive positivism. I introduce two arguments connected with legal interpretation in favour of my thesis. However, my opinion is that inclusive positivism does not sufficiently succeed in estranging itself from the more traditional legal positivist conceptions. This is the case, for instance, with regard to the value‐freedom principle, which is commonly accepted by inclusive positivist scholars. In contrast with this approach, I try to show, in the concluding section, how a constructivistic version of inclusive positivism could legitimately acknowledge the presence of value‐judgments in the cognitive activities of jurists and legal theorists.     

A 'European' Conception of Legal Consciousness: Rediscovering Eugen Ehrlich

This paper discusses the present ‘legal consciousness’ literature and seeks to identify two different conceptions of legal consciousness. Most of this literature originated in the United States, but there has also been a growing interest in issues of legal consciousness in Europe. The use of the term ‘legal consciousness ’ in these European discussions is, however, remarkably different from its use in the United States literature. It is argued that the most commonly used ‘American ’ conception of legal consciousness reflects important ideas of Roscoe Pound and asks: how do people experience (official) law? By contrast, a European conception of legal consciousness, which was first introduced by the Austrian legal theorist Eugen Ehrlich, focuses on: what do people experience as ‘law ’? After both perspectives are applied in a case‐study of a run‐down neighbourhood in the Netherlands, it is concluded that future studies of legal consciousness may benefit from an integration of the two conceptions.     

Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II

In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter’s analogy to Quine’s “naturalization of epistemology” does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter’s replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if – contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced – Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is ever justified, it would not help Leiter’s parallel. Given Leiter’s way of drawing the parallel, the analogous position in the legal case would be not the Legal Realists’ indeterminacy thesis, but the very different position that we have no vantage point from which to address whether legal decisions can ever be justified. I then go on to address the more important question of whether the indeterminacy thesis, if true, would support any replacement of important legal philosophical questions with empirical ones. Although Ronald Dworkin has argued against the indeterminacy thesis, if he were wrong on this issue, it would not in any way suggest that the questions with which Dworkin is centrally concerned cannot fruitfully be addressed. The indeterminacy thesis is a bone of contention in an ordinary philosophical debate between its proponents and Dworkin. Of course, if the determinacy thesis were true, no one should try to show that it is false, but this triviality lends no support to the kind of replacement proposal that Leiter proposes. I conclude with some general reflections on naturalism and philosophical methodology.     

Open and distance learning in a New Europe*

Legal education is gradually moving away from the teaching of national law towards a more European, transnational, or even “global” way of teaching. This paper seeks to explain why an international legal education is to be preferred to a national curriculum and what this means for how law is taught and how law schools are ideally organised. The arguments for an international legal education lie in the increasing plurality of legal sources, the desire to attract students from a larger pool, and the need not only to give students a specialised professional training but also to prepare them for global citizenship. It is claimed students should be exposed to alternative ways of achieving justice, thus creating a dialogue with otherness. This can be done by a focus on the arguments behind the choices made by the relevant authorities and not on the doctrinal intricacies of national legal systems. This type of international curriculum, in which competing conceptions of justice are at the centre of attention, requires a specific teaching method. Two methods seem best suited to allow students to construct their own understanding of legal problems: problem-based learning (PBL) and the Socratic method. In addition, teaching law in an international setting forces us to think through the sequence in which the various jurisdictions come to the fore, the assessment of students and the use of teaching materials and language of instruction. Also discussed are the challenges for the law school as a whole, such as the relationship between teaching and research, the recruitment of faculty and the decreasing relevance of the traditional departmental structure.