印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁与重构

21世纪以来,印度洋安全治理制度进入了一个新发展阶段,在此过程中,既创建了新的制度,也有一些旧的制度被改建或者重建。例如,在海盗问题治理领域,就形成了一系列"多层次、多主体"的新制度安排。尽管这些层次不同、范围各异的制度安排大多是非正式的,但新制度安排的出现在某种程度上反映了印度洋安全治理方式的演变。印度洋安全治理制度的发展变迁受到多重因素驱动,包括外部环境变迁、制度学习和不同制度间的竞争、重要的利益攸关国家对制度建设的重视与推动以及非国家行为体积极参与相关治理实践等。由于各种原因,目前制度发展依然面临诸多困境。未来,相关治理主体在制度发展与重构过程中应该继续发挥能动性,在参与治理实践过程中从观念层面和具体操作层面不断推动制度优化发展。     

从区域内贸易视角透视东北亚经济合作机制

从区域内贸易视角考察东北亚合作机制化的经济基础,同时分析区域内贸易具体特征作用于制度化合作的相关机制,有助于探寻东北亚区域合作滞后的深层原因。东北亚目前区域经济关联下各国的分散化利益诉求,很难在统一的制度性框架内实现。区域内贸易增长机制的生产—消费双重困境,又使区外力量必然成为干扰东北亚合作机制构建的因素。加强区域合作、进而扩大区内国家间的共同经济利益,可能成为破解东北亚"安全困境"的重要途径。     

Domestic Institutions,Capacity Limitations,and Compliance Costs: Host Country Determinants of Investment Treaty Arbitrations, 1987–2007

The number of investment treaty arbitrations has exploded in recent years. However, the distribution of known arbitral claims varies among states. Some states have had multiple claims brought against them, while others appear not to have experienced any. This article represents the first study to seek causal explanations for this variation. My principal hypothesis is that a country's institutional capacity for protecting investor rights should be negatively correlated with the number of treaty-based arbitral claims brought against it. A panel analysis suggests that, after controlling for other determinants, countries with greater institutional capacity experience fewer disputes than those with lower capacity. This finding reveals an important truth about investment treaties: while they may be designed to help developing countries compensate for domestic-level institutional deficiencies in order to attract more foreign investment, it is precisely those countries with the weakest institutions for which the costs of treaty compliance are likely to be the highest.     

Who Liberalizes? Explaining Preferential Trade Liberalization

Despite the growth in research on preferential trade arrangements (PTAs), few studies have systematically explored why some PTAs have been more successful than others at liberalizing trade among members. In this paper I test four hypotheses concerning intra-PTA liberalization: a regional system structure hypothesis, an international institutions hypothesis, a domestic institutions hypothesis, and an economic hypothesis. Although all four types of variables are statistically significant, only international institutions have substantively large effects on intra-PTA liberalization. This suggests that policymakers have considerable latitude to promote integration, as the impact of “choice” variables such as international institutions far outweighs that of “given” factors such as regional system structure or the nature of member economies.     

Democracy,Veto Player,and Institutionalization of Sovereign Wealth Funds

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWFs) have become important and controversial in global economy. We analyze why some SWFs have more encompassing and clearly specified governance rules than others. We argue that SWF institutionalization is structurally rooted in a country’s regime type and number of veto players in public policymaking. Democracy promotes SWF institutionalization by its need for strong rule of law, voters trying to constrain opportunistic behaviors of politicians, and the free flow of information. In contrast, the number of veto players has a curvilinear effect. When the number of veto players is very small, institutionalization is too rigid, constraining, and not preferred; when the number of veto players is moderate, it is optimal for veto players to manage their conflict over SWF governance in a more routine and institutionalized fashion; and when the number of veto players grows above a threshold, it becomes too costly to coordinate and produce mutually agreeable institutional rules. Our empirical analysis of 46 SWFs in 30 countries from 2007 to 2009 provides robust confirming evidence. SWF governance is more institutionalized and transparent in democracies and in countries with four veto players. Our research has important theoretical and policy implications for the ongoing debate over SWF.     

Presidential mandates and ministerial institutions: Summitry of the Americas, the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

The periodic Summits of the Americas are the highest form of regional multilateralism in the Western Hemisphere, but summits lack their own means to implement their mandates. Hence, Summit Plans of Action assign many initiatives to existing regional institutions, especially the Organization of American States (OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). But a notable difference exists in the character and degree to which these two institutions have responded to their unfunded mandates, in that the OAS has become “nested” under the hierarchy of summitry, while the IDB has eschewed subordination in favor of a “parallel” relationship pursuing largely convergent activities. Relying on extensive interviews and reviews of open source and internal documents, six variables are found to explain this differential response: ministerial authorities, competing mandates, institutional missions, internal structures, membership and leadership. Yet for both regional institutions there remains a wide gap between the directives emanating from the Summits and what the two regional institutions have been—and could be—accomplishing. The study concludes with recommendations to improve institutional design. JEL codes L31 · F42 · F02 · D73 · F1     

Institutional Similarity and Interstate Conflict

This paper makes two arguments. First, the political and economic institutions of a state affect that state's foreign policy preferences. Second, dyads with similar political and economic institutions are less likely to experience conflict than other types of dyads. After developing the logic of these arguments, I create measures of political and economic institutional similarity and test the hypotheses against the empirical record. The empirical analysis supports the argument that dyadic institutional similarity reduces the likelihood of conflict. The most noteworthy finding is that economic institutional similarity, even when the political institutions in a dyad are dissimilar, reduces the likelihood of militarized conflict.     

Democratization and electoral turnovers in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond

This study criticizes approaches equating opposition electoral victories with democratization in competitive authoritarian regimes. Not only are these approaches theoretically problematic, but there are also important empirical reasons to distinguish between electoral turnovers and democratization. The study goes on to explain why some African turnovers have been successful in bringing about democratization while others have not. This study promotes an approach in which opposition victories may be used as an independent variable that, under certain circumstances, could promote democratization. Using evidence from the cases of Senegal, Ghana, and Kenya, it is argued that electoral uncertainty caused by a low level of party institutionalization has been an important obstacle to democratization by alternation in the African context.     

The emerging economic architecture of the new Europe

The purpose of this paper is to put into historical context and current perspective the ongoing discussions about the economic changes in Eastern Europe and the institutional responses that they have elicited. The paper will review the economic ‘regime? that existed in East‐West relations until about 1988 and discuss the proposals that are emerging for both new institutions and for older ones. The paper's historical scope will be limited to the period until the opening of the CSCE Helsinki Review Conference, that started in April 1992.     

区域经济一体化如何突破安全困境 ——以南亚区域合作联盟为例

20世纪90年代以来，伴随着发展中国家区域经济一体化的再度兴起，地区冲突和动荡的安全局势也为区域经济一体化带来了消极影响。作为摆脱安全困境的一种有效手段，区域经济一体化在抑制成员国间冲突升级、发挥和平效应时会受到不同条件的制约。作者从现实主义的逻辑出发，以南亚区域合作联盟为例，分析了区域经济一体化与区域内成员间冲突形势之间的互动，认为区域经济一体化进程未能产生和平效应的根本原因在于，它未能通过机会成本机制提高成员国的收益预期，高层互动机制和争端解决机制在信息沟通和冲突管理方面的作用也受到很大的制约。冷战的结束、经济全球化的发展为区域经济一体化和平效应的发挥提供了有利的环境和条件，只有进一步强化区域经济一体化的制度水平，扩大和深化区域经济一体化的程度和范围，增加多议题之间的联系，强化高层互动机制和制度的独立性，才能更好地发挥区域经济一体化制度的和平效应，尽快走出安全困境。     

Comparing regional organisations in global multilateral institutions: ASEAN, the EU and the UN

Structural change brought about by the end of the Cold War and accelerated globalisation have transformed the global environment. A global governance complex is emerging, characterised by an ever-greater functional and regulatory role for multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and its associated agencies. The evolving global governance framework has created opportunities for regional organisations to participate as actors within the UN (and other multilateral institutions). This article compares the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as actors within the UN network. It begins by extrapolating framework conditions for the emergence of EU and ASEAN actorness from the literature. The core argument of this article is that EU and ASEAN actorness is evolving in two succinct stages: Changes in the global environment create opportunities for the participation of regional organisations in global governance institutions, exposing representation and cohesion problems at the regional level. In response, ASEAN and the EU have initiated processes of institutional adaptation.     

Democracy,Regional Security Institutions,and Rivalry Mitigation: Evidence From Europe,South America,and Asia

The fact that democracies maintain peaceful relations with each other is regarded as one of the few law-like correlations in international relations, but the causes of this empirical phenomenon remain contested. This paper tries to fill this theoretical gap by attributing the remarkable stability between democracies to inter-democratic institutions. At the same time, it contributes to the debate on the need to differentiate among international organizations in order to assess their peace-building effects. We identify transnational and trans-governmental linkages as crucial features that distinguish inter-democratic from traditional institutions with non-democratic or mixed membership. In order to explain these institutions’ peace-building effect, we analyze the impact of international institutions on rivalry mitigation with a view to five pairs of states: France-Germany, Greece-Turkey, Argentina-Brazil, Indonesia-Malaysia, and Japan-South Korea. Those dyads all look back at a history of rivalry, conflict, and mutual threat perceptions, and they are located in highly institutionalized regional settings but vary with regard to their political regime type. The controlled comparison of cases demonstrates that the embeddedness of international institutions in transnational and trans-governmental linkages corresponds to each member's regime type and that these institutional differences are responsible for the varying extent of rivalry mitigation.     

Grasping the Commercial Institutional Peace

While the commercial institutional peace research program provides empirical evidence that international institutions, especially preferential trade arrangements, help reduce the incidence of militarized inter-state conflict, it fails to delineate clearly how such institutions matter. Building from the logic that low opportunity costs for fighting, private information, and commitment problems constitute important causes of war, this article explores three interrelated causal mechanisms. First, the state leaders' increased expectations about future commerce create an incentive for these actors to consider peaceful bargains as an alternative to costly war. Second, security coordination under the umbrella of a commercial institution provides fuller information about state military capabilities, thus making inter-state bargaining for dispute resolution more efficient. Third, in bringing together high-level state leaders on a regular basis, commercial institutions may create the trust necessary to overcome commitment problems in inter-state bargaining. I explore how these mechanisms have operated within the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Economic Community of West African States.     

Individuals, Institutions, and Inflation: Conceptual Complexity, Central Bank Independence, and the Asian Crisis

Previous research has demonstrated that greater levels of legal central bank independence produce favorable macroeconomic outcomes in the developed countries. This article expands the literature's focus on institutions to include a measure of conceptual complexity designed to capture individual-level variations in the cognitive style of central bankers themselves. I argue that the interaction of the cognitive style of central bankers with their respective institutional environments provides a more comprehensive account of the variation in achieving price stability across countries than the institutional measure alone. This hypothesis is tested in the context of the Asian Crisis as its effects diffused to the developed world between 1997 and 1999. The analysis demonstrates that different types of individuals working within different types of institutions achieved different levels of success in attaining price stability during the Asian Crisis. The most successful outcomes were achieved by conceptually complex central bankers working within legally independent central banks. The findings suggest that more research is needed concerning the individual level of analysis in the study of international political economy.     

The economics and political economy of going beyond the GATS

This paper addresses the economic and political economy factors explaining why countries agree upon services commitments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) going beyond the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), what we call the commitments gap. Using a unique dataset comprising of detailed schedules of services commitments disaggregated by sub-sectors and covering almost all countries that are members of a services RTA, we are able to quantify the extent to which geographical, systemic as well as economic and institutional factors correlate with a country’s pattern of RTA commitments that go further than commitments made at the WTO. Strong explanatory variables are asymmetries between negotiating partners and market size, together with endowments in mid-skilled labor and institutional governance. Whereas some of these forces are strongly positively associated with commitments made beyond GATS, others are significant determinants that correlate negatively with a country’s commitment patterns in RTAs. We also find strong differences between services industries providing evidence that not all economic and political economy factors are of equal importance for all services. For instance, financial and construction services often diverge significantly from our general pattern of explanations.     

中国崛起与全球安全治理转型

中国崛起与全球安全治理转型是21世纪初国际关系领域两个备受瞩目的全球性现象。文章以全球安全治理体系中的安全制度安排和安全规范设定为主要分析路径,以全球政治安全治理和全球经济安全治理为主要分析单元。一方面,自二战结束以来全球安全治理体系可分为"单边全球主义"和"全球单边主义"两个阶段,并且每一阶段的全球安全治理体系均可分解为政治制度、经济制度、政治规范和经济规范四个领域;另一方面,运用比较研究法,对各个时期全球安全治理体系在上述四个领域所体现出来的差异性进行剖析,可以发现,这种差异性集中表现为正在进行中的全球安全治理体系转型,崛起的中国在此次转型过程中开始发挥参与者、建设者和贡献者的作用。在传统全球安全治理体系陷入危机之时,中国崛起在相关领域所带来的制度效应和规范效应正在逐渐潜移默化地嵌入到全球安全治理体系中,中国的政策和实践也将相应日益形成规范化的趋势。     

Structural Sources of Post-Communist Market Reform: Economic Structure, Political Culture, and War

Why did some post-communist countries implement more thorough market reforms than others? Four different structural explanations are considered: (1) relative size of economic interest group coalitions hurt by market reform; (2) predominant religious traditions, which may incorporate norms and institutions more or less favorable to market reform; (3) variation in historically based national economic and political expectations, in which greater pre-communist political and economic achievements may create collective rationales for more aggressive institutional and policy reforms; and (4) duration of large-scale military conflict, which may distract and undermine reformist governments. These explanations are tested both directly, and mediated through plausible process predictors—democratization, party ideological moderation or extremism, strength of the presidency, and party system concentration. The 28 post-communist countries are examined over shorter and longer time spans—2 years after the fall of the old regime and a decade or so after the fall. The two political culture variables—predominant religious tradition and national economic and political expectations—provide the most statistically significant and powerful predictors. War is also a significant and powerful predictor. Relative size of economic interest group coalitions is estimated to have little impact. Among the process variables, democratization and party ideological moderation have the most consistently significant and powerful impacts. One implication is that middle-range theories of political culture, which can be more firmly grounded in rational calculation and historical context, may be a promising way to remedy the weaknesses of political culture theories operating at the broader level of religion or civilization.     

Neorealism,Security Cooperation,and Europe's Relative Gains Dilemma

Most neorealists argue that relative decline constitutes a systemic incentive for European security cooperation. Although this claim is broadly accepted, I argue that the relationship between relative decline and European security cooperation is complicated by a number of factors. First, European calculations about relative decline bear both a global and a regional (that is, intra-European) component. If a European country is to effectively mitigate relative decline, cooperation is not sufficient. It is just as important that cooperation develops in a way that underscores that country's comparative strengths and minimizes its weaknesses. In this regard, European countries are often in direct competition with each other. Secondly, when Europeans are thinking about their relative power position, some countries matter more than others: a given European country may accept to incur a relative loss vis-à-vis another country (European or otherwise) but not others. These calculations are further complicated by issue linkage. Some countries may accept relative losses on some issues (for example, security) in exchange for gains on others (economic). This article examines how intra-European considerations of relative gains affect the way in which Europe's main powers seek to cope with relative decline and assesses how those considerations affect security cooperation in a European Union (EU) framework. In doing so, it aims to unpack the otherwise vague notions of relative decline and European security cooperation.     

Multinational corporations and regional integration: Some preliminary reflections

In 1970, the worldwide affiliates of mutlinational corporations (MNCs), headquartered in Europe and the USA, numbered 27,300. Inevitably, they have had a significant effect on regional integration—economic, social, and political. Economically, production and marketing patterns of MNCs have tended to aid regional integration in developed regions. However, they have had a limited impact in the Third World.

The presence of MNCs in pluralistic societies will probably further social integration by first fostering a regionally oriented elite; this orientation may then spread to the populace at large. In the Third World, however, MNCs may actually widen the elite‐masses gap.

Social integration also has political overtones, as the socialization process will inevitably enhance attitudinal integration. The more MNC facilities in a region, the more will decision‐making powers and activities tend to be transferred from national units to regional institutions (institutional integration), and the more governments within the region will be urged to make joint policies (policy integration). However, nationalistic feelings and fears of dependence will probably impede regional political integration in the Third World.     

Democratic consolidation and convergence in Southern Europe: The Italian case

In the analysis of democratic consolidation(s) in Southern Europe the emphasis has been on three main factors: the relevance of institutional rules, the scope and activities of parties (and party elites), and the establishment of certain relationships between institutions, parties and interests, connected to the size of the public sector of the economy. From the varied combinations of these factors different consolidations result: an elite‐based consolidation (Spain), a party‐based one (Italy), a state‐based one (Greece), and also a mixed party‐state model (Portugal). Our analysis also suggests the emergence of different types of democratic regime, mainly characterized by (i) either a ‘chancellor’ democracy or a parliamentary arrangement; (ii) either a pivotal or a secondary role for parties; and (iii) either a large or small public economic sector.

Recently the economic crisis, the resulting problems, and discontent arising from other causes, have brought about change in these democracies. The main transformations include the weakening of parties vis‐à‐vis other actors, the shrinking of both the public economic sector and the welfare institutions and, as a result, the prospect of greater autonomy for civil society. Thus, partially new regimes emerge, while the analysis also suggests the possibility of building a new typology of democratic regimes. Alongside the process of democratic consolidation in Southern Europe, there has also been an accompanying trend towards convergence: in the direction of majoritarianism, confirmed by the most recent national elections.