Unequally egalitarian? Defending the credentials of social egalitarianism

Abstract

In his new book, Luck Egalitarianism, Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen responds to challenges raised by social egalitarians against luck egalitarianism. Social egalitarianism is the view according to which a just society is one where people relate to each other as equals, while the basic premise of luck egalitarianism is that it is unfair if people are worse-off than others through no fault or choice of their own. Lippert-Rasmussen argues that the most important objections to luck egalitarianism made by social egalitarians can either be largely accommodated by luck egalitarians or lack the argumentative force that its proponents believe them to have. While Lippert-Rasmussen does offer a version of luck egalitarianism that seems to avoid some of the main lines of criticism, he mischaracterizes parts of both the form and the content of the disagreement, and thus ultimately misses the mark. In this paper, we provide a substantive, a methodological and a political defense of social egalitarianism by elaborating on this mischaracterization. More work must be done, we argue, if social egalitarianism is to be dismissed and its concerns genuinely incorporated in the luck egalitarian framework. Until this is done, the supposed theoretical superiority of luck egalitarianism remains contested.     

Precís of luck egalitarianism

Abstract

This article provides an overview, chapter by chapter, of the main discussions in Luck Egalitarianism. Inter alia, I define luck egalitarianism and sketch my accounts of the moral equality of persons, the currency of egalitarian justice, the scope of equality, and the relationship between luck egalitarianism and other values, including the value of relational equality and community.     

How generous should egalitarians be?

Abstract

Lippert-Rasmussen has proposed a new version of luck egalitarianism: equality of concern. In this article, I argue that equality of concern is more generous than its two luck egalitarian rivals. That is, against equality of opportunity for welfare, it is more generous in that it recognises shortfalls in the satisfaction of one’s impersonal concerns as potentially inegalitarian. Against equality of resources, it is more generous in that it advocates more extensive compensation. I suggest that equality of concern’s generosity regarding impersonal concerns is justified but its generosity regarding compensation is not. Equality of resources, however, faces other problems, and so I argue that a hybrid of equality of concern and equality of resources would be the more attractive luck egalitarian view.     

Equality,value pluralism and relevance: Is luck egalitarianism in one way good,but not all things considered?

Abstract

Some luck egalitarians argue that justice is just one value among others and is thus not necessarily what we should strive for in order to make the world better. Yet, by focusing on only one dimension of what matters – luck equality – it proves very difficult to draw political implications in cases where several values are in tension. We believe that normative political philosophy must have the ambitionto guide political action. Hence, in this paper we make a negative and a positive point. Negatively, we argue that the inability to offer recommendations on what to strive for potentially weakens Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s account of luck egalitarianism. In order not to be irrelevant for political practice, a more serviceable version of luck egalitarianism that would allow for all-things-considered judgments is needed. Positively, we examine two possible routes toward such a view. One would be to stick to pluralism, but to discuss possible clashes and find a rule of regulation in each case. Another would consist in giving up value pluralism by identifying an over-arching value or principle that would arbitrate between different values. We suggest that Lippert-Rasmussen’s foundation of equality carries the potential for such an overarching principle.     

论生态责任

生态危机已向我国社会经济的发展提出了巨大挑战,政府、企业和普通公众等生态责任主体必须切实履行各自的生态责任,推进中国社会经济的可持续发展。     

我国医疗保障制度改革的公平性与效率性探讨

本文主要从公平性与效率性两个方面对我国改革开放以来的医疗保障制度改革进行了探讨。本文认为我国改革开放以来的医疗保障制度改革从总体上看表现为公平性不足,效率性较差。在此基础上,本文就提高我国医疗保障制度改革的公平性与效率性提出一些政策性的建议。     

中国高、低龄老人日常生活自理能力个体影响因素的比较研究

本文利用中国老年健康长寿跟踪调查2002年数据对比分析了高、低龄老人ADL个体影响因素的异同状况。结果发现:高龄老人和低龄老人ADL状况存在显著差异;年龄、认知能力、慢性病、情绪、躯体健康以及体力劳动是影响老年人ADL下降的关键因素。与低龄老人相比,高龄老人ADL的影响因素更为多元化;从主要致残障性的疾病来看,高龄老人致残障的病因更为广泛。     

如何理解"公平"——从马克思主义的视域看

公平问题是当前的一个热点问题,时代要求构建公平正义的和谐社会。马克思恩格斯的公平观实现了科学性和价值性的统一,是当代正确合理的公平观,本文试从马克思主义哲学的基本精神方面重新理解公平问题的实质。     

落实安全主体责任的思考与实践

文章论述了企业安全生产的主体责任在当前的基本情况,认识到落实企业安全生产主体责任的重要性,结合实际分析了企业安全生产主体责任的第一责任人、落实安全生产主体责任的指导方针、安全生产规章制度及操作规程,通过理论分析和相关实践,为企业安全生产责任主体的目标实现提供了理论指导。     

规范错案追究制,还原司法理性

错案追究制度是司法改革中为消除司法腐败,实现司法公正而推行的一项重要制度,但是,错案追究制度在运行中并没有产生预期的效果。本文从分析这种错案开始,研究错案追究制度在理论上和实践中存在的问题,主张错案责任追究应与法官司法责任制度相结合,确立法官司法责任的主客观标准和程序标准,从法理学的角度对错案追究制度进行理论反思,提出我国司法改革步伐仍然应当保持理性。