On the nature of power: an examination of the governing elite and institutional power in Spain, 1939–92

This article summarizes a study of the political, bureaucratic and economic elites in Spain, from the Franco regime through the democratic transition to the socialist governments of the 1990s. Data on the people holding posts in one or more of these elite groups were used to test and extend the theory of elite circulation first formulated by Vilfredo Pareto. The data confirms that Spanish elites became more open to others in the democratic period. Up to the present time, they continue to be integrated through multi-positionality – many bureaucrats also hold political or economic posts – though to a lesser extent than in the past. Our empirical findings enable finer distinctions to be made about the different modes of elite circulation. These results show the changing nature of the networks that form when posts in different sectors become associated through multiple post-holding. These networks are an important component of the social fabric in Spain and elsewhere and deserve further investigation.     

Morality,Corruption and the State: Insights from Jharkhand,Eastern India

Corruption is analysed by addressing the interrelations between the moral and political economy regulating state-based welfare provision in Jharkhand, India. On the one hand, the article focuses on the rural elite to show that ‘corrupt’ practices are not just guided by financial utility but also by non-material interests, underpinned by a multivarious moral economy. On the other hand, the article shows that the poorest in the rural areas (adivasis or Scheduled Tribes) keep away from the state, seeing it as beyond the moral pale, and instead resurrect an alternative sovereign structure. The adivasi perspectives are influenced by a political economy of historical experiences of the state and interrelations with the elites. The paper concludes that a particular political economy is intimately connected with a moral economy, and that transformations in political economy affect the moral economy.     

Farewell to the Caucasus: Regional ethnic clan politics and the growing instability of the ruling elite after the 2012 presidential elections in Russia

One of the most lingering questions about Russian politics that dominates public discourse and media coverage is the future of political regime after the 2012 presidential elections. The answer to this question is inextricably linked to the extent of differences between President Vladimir Putin and Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev, how long their “tandemocracy” will last and what can bring about regime change as scarce critics of the Kremlin, from ultra-liberals to communists, have been haphazardly co-opted into the power system, leaving no political ambitions that they would not, in principle, be ready to abandon in return for proper compensation.In sharp contrast to the views of many regional experts and commentators, the present-day Russian Federation is the world's most anti-Soviet state. It is based upon a very different set of values: private ownership, dire individualism, the cult of money, a clan-based political system, and pervasive corruption at all levels of government. The North Caucasus ethnocratic elites, however, do not have access to abundant resources for sale, and are forced to look around for alternative sustenance, as rigid centralism and unification limit their rent-seeking capabilities. Alexander Khloponin, the incumbent presidential envoy in charge of the North Caucasus Federal District, seems to continue the policy of buying the loyalty of regional archaic clan-based elites that aggravates rather than improves the situation.The paper addresses this puzzle: why, against rigorous rhetoric and demonstration of tight grip over the region, neither Putin nor Medvedev has real power to bring change to the North Caucasus? In an attempt to solve this puzzle, the paper examines the triadic relationship among central political elite, who benefited from the massive privatisation of lucrative segments of Soviet industry in the early 1990s, regional clan-based ethnocracy, and non-systemic religious opposition. Drawing on the works of Russian scholars and experts in Russian politics, the paper explores the hypothesis that on-going instability in the North Caucasus can no longer be explained by a well-known set of theories of ethnic violence, because it is carefully negotiated by regional and central political elite, who do not see the North Caucasus as an indispensable part of the Russian Federation and whose clan-based rent-seeking agendas have gradually driven Russian statehood into a complete dead-end. Instead of facing the real challenges that are addressed in this paper, it is only able to make a public show of action on the eve of crucial political campaigns: the 2012 presidential elections and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. The paper concludes that the deep freeze in the Russian political system has exhausted its debatable potential for change through the existing tandem model of government with its obscure division of roles between two leaders. What we actually see is an imitation of political reform and the resulting degradation of the entire system of governance. Over the past century, Russian polity has never been as weak as today, because the only legitimate source of power in Russia is corruption.     

Who has led Russia? Russian regional political elites, 1954 – 2006

Quantitative measures are used to compare the age, tenure, gender and change of political elites in 18 Russian regions from 1954 to 2006. The study finds more similarities than differences between regional elites from the Soviet era and from the post-Soviet Russian era. The Russian regional political elite since 1992 is actually older than the Soviet elite and resembles it quite closely in terms of years in office and turnover, comparing both the total time spans of the elites of each era and at 10-year intervals from 1956 through to 2006. Even in relation to differences by region and gender since 1992, there has been a re-emergence of a regional political establishment in a similar pattern to that of the Soviet era.     

Rose,Orange, and Tulip: The failed post-Soviet revolutions

In 2003–2005, democratic revolutions overthrew the Georgian, Ukrainian, and Kyrgyz post-Soviet authoritarian regimes. However, disillusioned citizens witness today their new leaders creating a Bonapartist regime, entering into open conflict with former revolutionary allies or being forced to accept cohabitation with leaders of the previous regime. This article argues that despite internationally acclaimed civic mobilisation, civil society's weakness seriously affected the three revolutionary processes. These were in fact initiated, led, controlled, and finally subordinated by former members of the authoritarian regimes’ political elite. Finally, the supposedly democratic revolutions proved to be little more than a limited rotation of ruling elites within undemocratic political systems.     

Elite recruitment and state-society relations in technocratic authoritarian regimes: The Russian case

This article argues that Russia has a peculiar form of authoritarianism that exhibits pronounced technocratic features. The analysis places in a comparative frame the bases of regime legitimacy and the paths to political, administrative, and economic power in Russia. By locating the Russian state in a matrix that considers the ideology of governance on one axis and the backgrounds of elites on the other, the article highlights areas of overlap and separation between state–society relations in Russia and other regimes in the developed and developing world. It also illustrates the ways in which technocratic elites in Russia differ from their counterparts in other parts of the world.     

Explaining Ethnic Autonomy Regimes in Latin America

Through a systematic examination of nine cases, the author identifies factors that enabled indigenous movements in five Latin American countries to secure formal recognition of politico-territorial autonomy regimes. All nine cases occurred within the framework of a larger regime bargain—either (1) peace talks intended to end armed struggle when the regime faced a serious challenge to maintain political order or territorial control, or (2) a severe crisis of legitimacy and governability that forced political elites to renegotiate fundamental regime structures via the process of constitutional reform. In the five successful cases, changes in the political opportunity structure occurred that favored indigenous autonomy claimants. These changes were the opening of access to decision-making spheres and the emergence of an influential ally. Donna Lee Van Cott is assistant professor of political science at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville. She is author ofThe Friendly Liquidation of the Past: The Politics of Diversity in Latin America and editor ofIndigenous Peoples and Democracy in Latin America.     

The Politics of Dominant Party Formation: United Russia and Russia's Governors

This article analyses the emergence of United Russia (Edinaya Rossiya) as a dominant party by examining the behaviour of Russia's governors. Using original data on when governors joined United Russia, the article demonstrates that those governors with access to autonomous political resources were more reluctant to join the dominant party. By showing that Russian elite members made their affiliation decisions on the basis of calculations about their own political resources rather than simply being coerced by the Kremlin, this article provides evidence for a theory of dominant party formation that casts the problem as a two-sided commitment problem between leaders and elites.     

Village politics: Heterogeneity,leadership and collective action

When comparing stratified Fulani village societies, little direct relationship between the degree of heterogeneity and the success in collective action was found, except when heterogeneity among leadership and elite groups was compared. Small size and homogeneous groups do not seem to be general preconditions for stronger ability to perform collectively. First, it was found that homogeneity among elite groups enhanced capacity for collective action. Second, it was when heterogeneity in economic interests between elite groups intensified and coincided with other dimensions of heterogeneity that collective action became difficult to achieve, such as heterogeneity in economic wealth, access to land and common‐pool resources, and agreement over authority of the leadership. Third, collective action was enhanced by political elites and leaders being a bit better endowed and a bit wealthier than the average community members, but not when their assets were mobilised against the economic interests and sense of fairness of other social groups. Fourth, the coordination power of the leadership related to the management of common‐pool resources was undermined when leadership had extensive recourse to state officials external to the village community, underscoring the importance of autonomy.     

Political Field Dynamics and the Elite’s Interest in Democracy: Insights from the Political Elite’s Role in Consolidating Indian Democracy

In this article, I argue that democracy scholars cannot explain the political elite’s interest in democracy consolidation processes because they have yet to conceptualize the relation between the political elite and structure. This shortcoming can be rectified by using Bourdieu’s field theory insight that subjectivity and structure are constructed, reproduced, or altered due to contests among field actors over the symbolic capital of their field. I illustrate the significance of this solution by using it to explain the stability of Indian democracy during the early postcolonial period. Using data on the Indian political elite’s trajectories in institutional politics and observations on their everyday politics, I show that their differing interest in democracy during the early transition period was shaped by their unique political habitus, which was structured by their conflicts since the late colonial period to establish their respective political capital as the symbolic capital of the Indian political field. The general lesson to be learned from this study is that in order to comprehend democracy consolidation processes, it is important to shift attention from static, disjointed models of the political elite’s subjectivity and structure to the history of contests among the political elite over the symbolic capital of the political field, which couples the political elite’s subjectivity and structure.     

‘I never had a political career’: Russian political actors on politics and morality

This article explores the question of moral discourse among Russian political elites. Morality is reflected in elite narratives in various forms—as an espousal of abstract principles, as a moral–pragmatic hybrid, and as loyalty to one's associates. Proximity to political power correlates with the various versions of moral discourse employed by elite members. Each version, respectively, offers an index of social relations through the prism of morality: in some instances, negatively, as that which prevents the attainment of the good; in others, problematically, as that which makes difficult that attainment; and in a third version, that which contributes to securing the good itself.     

International sanctions against Iran and Tehran's responses: political effects on the targeted regime

This article seeks to explain the combined political effects of international sanctions against Iran and Tehran's domestic responses on the power structure of the targeted regime. It contends that although sanctions have contributed to elite infighting in Iran, they have not weakened the targeted regime. The Iranian leadership's modified reading of the imposed sanctions from targeted United Nations, US and European Union (EU) nonproliferation sanctions as an opportunity to develop indigenous nuclear capabilities to the perception of comprehensive and coordinated US and EU sanctions as regime change efforts marked a critical juncture. Tehran's adjusted responses to these sanctions, shaped by the interplay between Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and President Mahmud Ahmadinejad, affected Iran's balance of power to the detriment of the outgoing president and his faction. This impact sheds a light on the workings of a targeted hybrid regime under intensive sanction pressure.     

Bureaucratic Elitism in Bangladesh: The Predominance of Generalist Administrators

This article briefly examines bureaucratic elitism in Bangladesh, which basically inherited a transformed version of the British colonial administrative legacy. With its distinctiveness as a special social group, the bureaucracy maintains itself as a subsystem with pronounced autonomy. The Administrative Cadre of the civil service preserves the elitist tradition in supportive political conditions. It virtually shields itself from other functional groups and its members occupy key positions in the governmental structure and wield tremendous power and authority over policy making. Indoctrination and training is its own preserve and highly politicised groups within it regulate civil service recruitment and placements. Within the Administrative Cadre, elite integration is strong, while there is wide differentiation between this group and other cadres. Reform attempts failed to make inroads into changing bureaucratic behaviour mainly due to resistance from the elitist cadre, which remains the dominant instrument of the political executive.     

Multiculturalism,memory, and ritualization: Ukrainian nationalist monuments in Edmonton,Alberta

Canadians of Ukrainian descent constitute a significant part of the population of the Albertan capital. Among other things, their presence is felt in the public space as Ukrainian monuments constitute a part of the landscape. The article studies three key monuments, physical manifestations of the ideology of local Ukrainian nationalist elites in Edmonton: a 1973 monument to nationalist leader Roman Shukhevych, a 1976 memorial constructed by the Ukrainian Waffen-SS in Edmonton, and a 1983 memorial to the 1932–1933 famine in the Ukrainian SSR. Representing a narrative of suffering, resistance, and redemption, all three monuments were organized by the same activists and are representative for the selective memory of an “ethnic” elite, which presents nationalist ideology as authentic Ukrainian cultural heritage. The narrative is based partly upon an uncritical cult of totalitarian, anti-Semitic, and terroristic political figures, whose war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and collaboration with Nazi Germany the nationalists deny and obfuscate. The article argues that government support and direct public funding has strengthened the radicals within the community and helped promulgate their mythology. In the case of the Ukrainian Canadian political elite, official multiculturalism underwrites a narrative at odds with the liberal democratic values it was intended to promote. The failure to deconstruct the “ethnic” building blocks of Canadian multiculturalism and the willingness to accept at face value the primordial claims and nationalist myths of “ethnic” groups has given Canadian multiculturalism the character of multi-nationalism.     

State formation,development, and the politics of self-help in Kenya

Issues of rural development, state formation, and political effectiveness are of paramount importance in Africa today. Analysis of Kenya's Harambee self-help approach to development contributes to our understanding of these issues by clarifying not only the ways in which political and economic concerns are linked in one African nation in a hierarchy based on a patrimonial model of political behavior but also some facets of elite behavior and peasant-state relationships. This paper argues that self-help is central to Kenyan politics and hence to the operation of this model of political behavior, serving the interests and needs of both Kenyan elites and rural communities. Through their self-help projects rural Kenyans neither reject the state retreating into the economy of affection nor permit elites exclusive access to the benefits of both public and private resources. Rather, using elite networks to gain support for self-help projects, residents of rural communities improve their access to highly valued collective goods. These processes are currently being modified in some important ways by the Moi government.     

Revolution without regime change: The evidence from the post-Euromaidan Ukraine

What effects does a revolution have on the stability or change of a hybrid regime? Has the Ukraine's regime changed since the 2014 revolution? To answer these questions I examine the changes in formal and informal institutions and the quantitative and qualitative composition of elites after the change of power in Ukraine in 2014. I argue that despite greater than in the post-orange period quantitative renewal of elites, qualitative change has not occurred. Meanwhile, the old operational code, or modus operandi, of elites' political culture, composed of clientelism, secretive deals and quota based nominations to government positions continues to operate. The lack of elites' renewal and the dominance of informal rules over formal procedures – two factors that keep the institutional core of Ukraine's hybrid regime unchanged.     

The politics of ownership in policymaking: lessons from healthcare delivery in post-conflict Timor-Leste

Abstract

This article examines the political economy of national ownership, focusing on the reconstruction of the healthcare system in post-conflict Timor-Leste in relation to the shift from aid dependence to oil dependence. Considering three main approaches to development policymaking, it argues that, from 2002, the government generally used patronage-based strategies that benefitted elite political networks, increasing corruption. Based on empirical research, the study demonstrates that, in several areas, the government of the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (2002–2007) could exercise some autonomous decision-making despite being heavily aid dependent. Later, under the National Congress for Timorese Reconstruction government (2007–2017), empowered by oil resources, elites had greater control over development. However, the creation of a ‘modern’ healthcare system was central to the elites’ political ideology, involving populist rather than patronage-based politics. Analysis of this research indicates that ownership regarding healthcare has become concentrated among powerful groups, while health professionals, who advocate a neoliberal approach, lack a political voice. Thus, the paper problematises the Paris Declaration’s focus on country ownership to ensure better aid delivery as unrealistic because ‘ownership’ becomes subject to contestation.     

Ethiopian federalism: autonomy versus control in the Somali region

This study examines the relationship between Ethiopia's federal and regional authorities since the Tigray led regime came to power in 1991. The redivision of Ethiopia into ethnic regions was aimed to effect two changes: to abolish certain ethnic domination of the state; and to enable various communities to govern their local affairs. Using material from the Somali Region, this article evaluates whether ethnic‐based regional authorities have sufficient autonomy from the centre to be accountable to local populations. The ability of local people to elect their leaders is central to undoing past ethnic injustices. Although communities have gained from the new order, however, the federal ruling party tightly controls regional political authorities. Federal domination of regional governance is partly the result of the ineptness of local elite. This arrangement creates formal ethnic regions without significantly altering power relations in Ethiopia. Consequently, the spirit of the 1991 change is lost as local communities lack leeway while a new ethnic group reigns supreme at the federal level.     

Strategies of legitimation in Central Asia: regime durability in Turkmenistan

Located in current debates on one party dictatorships and regime durability, this article explores continuity and disruptions within the Turkmen political elite in their transition from presidents Saparmurat Niyazov (1991–2006) to Gurbanguly Berdymuhamedov (2007-). We are particularly interested in how the change from an idiosyncratic system, based mainly on president Niyazov's personality cult and visible repression of potential opponents, evolved into a more refined system under his successor, Berdymuhamedov. We will thus look at regime efforts to re-brand Turkmenistan without substantially changing the domestic political structures and dynamics. These include the manufacture of ‘opposition parties’ and holding of formal elections every five years while retaining absolute control over the most important political aspects of the country. We suggest the existence of a two-fold strategy to maintain the status quo based on authoritarian tendencies and learning. Whilst the shift from the first to the second president has brought significant changes, it also demonstrates essential continuities that helped the formation of an official domestic and international narrative proclaiming commitment to a number of international standards and national values; and strict control of most, if not all, aspects of national political life.     

Parliamentary elites as a democratic thermometer: Estonia,Lithuania and Moldova compared

This article assesses how the character of emerging legislative elites conforms to the broader patterns of post-communist social transformation by comparing Estonia, Lithuania and Moldova. We argue that the pace and direction of change among MPs has been significantly shaped by the nature of regime change in each country. We first address the issue of pace and scope of elite replacement. Second, we examine whether and to what extent, over time, changes occurred in the parliamentary representation of major social categories (in particular, ethnic minorities, women, age groups). Third, we examine the dynamics of political professionalization.