New structures,changing identities: the concepts of the Baltic Sea region

The accession of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland to the European Union (EU) has led to an increase in initiatives on Baltic Sea issues and a degree of enhanced confidence in moving towards solutions. While EU policies and instruments, and the provision of significant financial resources, have increased, one might still ask whether people across the Baltic Sea region are ready for the changes implied by the new Baltic strategy and comparable initiatives. Marko Lehti and David Smith have “tried to show that national thinking is by no means self–evident and that the Baltic can be comprehended as a trans–national space”. Yet, how this position is articulated in the various societies warrants close investigation. This position is closely related to dominant identities and images within Baltic societies. How will the EU’s innovative strategy and the resulting change of images impact upon the conceptual understandings of the Baltic Sea and region, including perhaps the search for a common identity as a successful and a pilot scheme?     

Geoeconomics in the context of restive regional powers

Geoeconomic power and its use appear to be a crucial, albeit understudied aspect of today’s international relations. Traditionally, international power has been thought of in geopolitical rather than geoeconomic terms. Indeed, ever since the famous debate about sea power and land power between Alfred Thayer Mahan and Halford MacKinder at the cusp of the twentieth century, scholars have linked geography with the pursuit of political and military power. However, the term “geoeconomics” is of a more recent origin, and also more vexing than geopolitics. The term is commonly associated with Edward Luttwak’s writings in the early 1990s Luttwak (Natl Interes 20:17-24, 1990, Int Econ 7/5:18-67, 1993), although it did not spin a major scholarly discussion at the time. For Luttwak, geoeconomics denoted the successor system of interstate rivalry that emerged in the aftermath of Cold War geopolitics. As a consequence of the rise of major new economic powers, such as China, India and Brazil, there is renewed interest in the concept. Yet, an overview of the literature indicates that there seems to be no agreement on what exactly the term means. This special issue tackles the different ways in which the term geoeconomics is used, in the context of the policies pursued by major regional powers (e.g. China, Russia and Germany). How are we to understand the actions of these regional powers in contexts where economic interests, political power and geography intersect? In the introductory article, we overview the literature and summarise the main arguments of the individual papers.     

The global standardization of regional disaster risk management

Natural disasters have become a heightened security issue in the last decade. Mitigating and responding to disasters, such as the 2004 tsunami in Southeast Asia and the 2011 earthquake in Japan, reflect a new security agenda that has spread across the globe and infiltrated most regional organizations. At first glance, the creation of regional programmes on disaster risk management (DRM) appears to be driven by the functional preferences of states. However, a comparison of ten regional organizations reveals some curious ambiguities. Despite different threat perceptions, financial budgets and geographical environments of regional organizations, a majority of states have formed DRM programmes that exhibit highly standardized features in terms of language, the referent points of protection and the apparent motivations for cooperation. World society theory is used to explain these striking similarities with reference to the global cultural system. This article also illustrates the analytical purchase of world society theory in understanding cooperation through regional organizations.     

The Baltic as a shipping and information area: the role of Amsterdam in Baltic integration in early modern Europe

In early modern times, the Netherlands imported grain from the Baltic, especially Poland, and re-exported it elsewhere in Europe. The Dutch shipping industry was extremely profitable, for transport costs were very high, and the number of Dutch ships was by far the largest among the European countries. Dutch prosperity was based on shipping of grain from the Baltic. Amsterdam was also a center of information because it was a port at which many ships stayed, and which attracted various merchants owing to its policy of religious tolerance. Much commercial information and know-how were accumulated in and spread from Amsterdam which contributed to the growth of the regional European economy from the Baltic because many merchants migrated to Northern Europe via the city, bringing with them the latest commercial techniques. Amsterdam therefore served as a core of Baltic integration in the early modern period, for it was a center of shipping and information.     

Whistleblowing as a new regulatory instrument in global governance: the case of tax evasion

Abstract

The cross-border impacts of whistleblowing recently have become far more visible and consequential, as evident with the ‘Paradise’ and ‘Panama Papers’ leaks, which exposed tax and other financial wrongdoings of prominent personalities around the world, leading to scandals, resignations and prosecutions. Despite its new prominence, whistleblowing often continues to be seen as a series of ad hoc chance acts. We argue instead that whistleblowing is an increasingly institutionalized regulatory tool that is enabled by an emergent ‘whistleblowing system’, with similarities to other new forms of informal global governance. Whistleblowing can be controversial, and we develop a framework for assessing whether any particular whistleblowing event and the system that enables it are in the public interest. We then apply this analysis to the case of global tax evasion. We conclude that a whistleblowing system can make important contributions to difficult cross-border regulatory challenges such as tax evasion, especially where other governance systems fail.     

Fusing the international system: Notes on regional and global integration processes

The relationship between regional integration and global integration is rarely attempted by scholars perhaps because the former appears to have had little impact upon the latter. Those who do examine the theoretical aspects of the relationship are inclined to argue that regional integration is dysfunctional for global integration because it may lead to interregional conflict. There is also the argument that the more unified regions become the more likely will there arise a lack of interest in global collaboration. On the other hand it is possible that in the next twenty‐five to fifty years an array of regionally unified blocs could function cooperatively on the basis of a system of regional coexistence supported by inter‐regional nuclear deterrence. This may not promote global integration but it could contribute to a semblance of order in a future global system.     

Comparing regional organisations in global multilateral institutions: ASEAN, the EU and the UN

Structural change brought about by the end of the Cold War and accelerated globalisation have transformed the global environment. A global governance complex is emerging, characterised by an ever-greater functional and regulatory role for multilateral organisations such as the United Nations (UN) and its associated agencies. The evolving global governance framework has created opportunities for regional organisations to participate as actors within the UN (and other multilateral institutions). This article compares the European Union (EU) and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as actors within the UN network. It begins by extrapolating framework conditions for the emergence of EU and ASEAN actorness from the literature. The core argument of this article is that EU and ASEAN actorness is evolving in two succinct stages: Changes in the global environment create opportunities for the participation of regional organisations in global governance institutions, exposing representation and cohesion problems at the regional level. In response, ASEAN and the EU have initiated processes of institutional adaptation.     

The social construction of international institutions: the case of ASEAN + 3

Slowly but steadily, a new international institution is emergingin East Asia: the ASEAN + 3 forum, comprising the ten membersof the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China,Japan and South Korea. ASEAN + 3 is an interesting case of institution-buildingin that it is constructed around the core of an already existinginstitution, ASEAN, which was founded in 1967. The followinganalysis of this multilateral forum seeks to answer two theoreticalquestions: (i) Why do states cooperate? (ii) What happens totheir interests and identities once they communicate with eachother? In view of this task, I will offer a social constructivistvariant of international relations theory to explain the instigationof the process on the one hand and the processual constructionof the institution on the other. The underlying belief is thatnot only do states influence the development of internationalinstitutions, but that institutions can also exert influenceon foreign policy behaviour. The approach introduced here acknowledges that internationalreality is a social construction driven by collective understandingsemerging from social interaction. This approach to the explanationof the initiation and the subsequent development of an institutionrecognizes the existence of both material and normative groundsof foreign policy action. It differs from neoliberal institutionalismbecause in this theory as well as in realism collective interestis assumed as pre-given and hence exogenous to social interaction.In contrast, we suppose that social interaction ultimately doeshave transformative effects on interests and identity, becausecontinuous cooperation is likely to influence intersubjectivemeanings. This method of analysis corresponds with Moravscik'stripartite analysis of integration decisions: while the initialphase refers to the formation of state preferences, the secondand third involve the dynamic aspect of ‘constructing’international institutions: the outcomes of interstate bargainingand the subsequent choice of the institutional design.     

Towards the global social: sociological reflections on governance and risk in the context of the current financial crisis

This article explores the relationship between contemporary forms of governance and risk. International Relations scholarship tends to locate governance within a theoretical framework derived from sovereignty. I suggest that a Foucauldian notion of ‘governmentality’ entails a better understanding of modes of governance, especially in so-called advanced liberal societies. In these societies, a particular form of rationality and a series of invasive techniques render individuals as objectified, classified and calculable things, in turn, making them more amenable to risk-based technologies of control. Via a survey of credit-rating, auditing, insuring and other calculative practices, I examine that ways in which governance operates as a biopolitical technology. This clears the way for thinking about governance in terms of the ‘global social’.     

Acting small in a large state's world: Russia and the Baltic states

The interest in small states ebbs and flows as important international affairs include small states. Russia's actions and policies vis-à-vis Ukraine, and the resultant intensified apprehension among Russia's smaller neighbours, aim the proverbial microscope at the size and power discrepancies between states. Russia, by most metrics, is a large state and the Baltic states, by those same metrics, are small states. Small-state scholars expect large and small states to act differently. However, the case of Russia and the Baltic states indicates that large and small states do not, in fact, act all that different. This being the case, this article calls into question many of the assumptions made by small-state scholars about the difference between large- and small-state action and argues for changes within small-state studies as a subdiscipline of the larger international relations discipline.     

The failure of a liberal peace: Sri Lanka's counter-insurgency in global perspective

The victory by the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE in 2009 apparently ended over 25 years of civil war. However, the ramifications of the government's counter-insurgency go far beyond Sri Lanka's domestic politics. The military campaign against the LTTE poses a significant challenge to many of the liberal norms that inform contemporary models of international peace-building—the so-called ‘liberal peace’. This article suggests that Sri Lanka's attempts to justify a shift from peaceful conflict resolution to counter-insurgency relied on three main factors: the flawed nature of the peace process, which highlighted wider concerns about the mechanisms and principles of international peace processes; the increased influence of ‘Rising Powers’, particularly China, in global governance mechanisms, and their impact on international norms related to conflict management; and the use by the government of a discourse of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency to limit international censure. The article concludes that the Sri Lankan case may suggest a growing contestation of international peace-building norms, and the emergence of a legitimated ‘illiberal peace’.     

The EU as a global rule of law promoter: the consistency and effectiveness challenges

This paper aims to examine the consistency and effectiveness of the EU as a global promoter of values by focusing on the rule of law, one of the key values on which the EU is based and which is also supposed to guide EU’s external action. The paper first offers the diagnosis that the EU has failed to properly address a number of key issues: (i) what the EU seeks to promote under the heading ‘rule of law’, (ii) how it measures and monitors a country’s adherence to this principle and (iii) the disconnect between its external and internal policies and instruments. To address these issues, four key recommendations are made: (i) the adoption of a guidance note, (ii) the development of a transversal measurement and monitoring instrument, (iii) the adoption of a rule of law checklist and (iv) the revision of the role of EU Fundamental Rights Agency, with the view of transforming it into a ‘Copenhagen Commission’ with new powers and a broader geographical remit.