Social Security: Reliance on Cash Flow Accounting and Projections Disguises an Inherent Upside Cash Flow Bias

The federal unified budget reports social security program results on a cash flow basis. Policy is established through projections of cash flows for 75 years into the future. This paper discusses how reliance on cash flow accounting and projections disguises an inherent upside cash flow bias that makes the program's finances appear better than they actually are and, when combined with the long‐standing pay‐as‐you‐go funding policy, leads to periodic solvency crises. The paper does not propose changing the budgetary accounting basis from cash to accrual but does explore the possible application of accrual accounting to the social security program for reporting purposes.     

Lockbox Government: Segregated Funding Strategies and the Decline of Governmental Flexibility

Proponents of "reinvention" assert that it will produce governments that are more agile, better able to adapt to rapidly changing conditions, and able to produce public services at much lower cost. However, attempts to make government "work better and cost less" have had limited success. Policy-makers have consequently invested their creative energy in another class of institutional innovations: segregated funding strategies, which protect agencies and programs from the impact of fiscal restraint by excluding them from normal budgeting processes. The proliferation of budget "lockboxes" may actually introduce new rigidities into the public sector and erode democratic influence in policy-making. On the other hand, there may be some circumstances in which these devices can be justified as a method of ensuring that critical long-run interests receive appropriate attention.     

Does agency competition improve the quality of policy analysis? Evidence from OMB and CBO fiscal projections

Public management scholars often claim that agency competition provides an effective institutional check on monopoly authority, and hence, leads to improvement of administrative performance in public sector agencies. This logic was central for creating the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in 1975 to challenge the policy information provided by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We challenge this conventional wisdom by demonstrating that CBO has failed to enhance the quality of U.S. fiscal policy analysis on its own terms; nor has it spurred improvements in OMB's performance. Our empirical results indicate that the quality of OMB's fiscal projections has often deteriorated since the establishment of CBO as a rival bureau. We also show that both public and private information is being shared by these agencies to produce a similar caliber of task outputs. The broader implications of our study indicate that although politicians face incentives to employ agency competition in governmental settings, this type of bureaucratic strategy does not necessarily enhance the quality of administrative performance. © 2006 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management     

Using Performance Measures for Federal Budgeting: Proposals and Prospects

The political system, the popular press, and the public have recently been concerned about measuring government performance. This concern for measuring performance should imply a concern for measuring it correctly. With this in mind, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) recently conducted an analysis of the use of performance measures in the budget process. The study attempts to review the issues raised by performance budgeting in the context of past and current efforts to link performance measures and budgeting. This article focuses on two portions of that study: The status of the current federal performance measurement efforts and specific observations designed to inject a note of caution into the current debate about performance measurement and budgeting.     

Whom do you trust? An analysis of executive and congressional economic forecasts

Economic forecasts play an increasing role in U.S. budgetary and fiscal policies. This paper analyzes the accuracy and bias of economic forecasts prepared by the Executive Branch and Congress. Short-run forecasts by the Executive Branch for the forthcoming year do not appear biased. They are as accurate as private forecasts and the forecasts of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO); they are not sensitive to political factors such as the size of the deficit. At the same time, the accuracy of Executive branch's short-run economic forecasts has not improved over the period from 1962 to 1984, and the forecasts themselves can be well approximated by simple, single-equation models that use a small number of variables. In contrast to short-run forecasts, long-run economic forecasts of both the Executive branch and CBO are consistently optimistic. The degree of optimism increases with the length of the forecasting horizon and the degree of fiscal pressure the year in which they are issued. The Reagan Administration's long-run forecasts, while typically optimistic, have not been rosier than those issued under previous administrations.     

State Revenue Forecasts and Political Acceptance: The Value of Consensus Forecasting in the Budget Process

Concerns about political biases in state revenue forecasts, as well as insufficient evidence that complex forecasts outperform naive algorithms, have resulted in a nearly universal call for depoliticization of forecasting. This article discusses revenue forecasting in the broader context of the political budget process and highlights the importance of a forecast that is politically accepted—forecast accuracy is irrelevant if the budget process does not respect the forecast as a resource constraint. The authors provide a case illustration in Indiana by showing how the politicized process contributed to forecast acceptance in the state budget over several decades. They also present a counterfactual history of forecast errors that would have been produced by naive algorithms. In addition to showing that the Indiana process would have outperformed the naive approaches, the authors demonstrate that the path of naive forecast errors during recessions would be easily ignored by political actors.     

Budget Redirection in Georgia State Government

Budget redirection in Georgia state government represents a change from the expectation of continuous budget growth to an expectation that budget expansion will be accompanied by compensating budget reductions through an ongoing process of priority assessment. Its essential features are: the requirement that state agencies identify a minimum of 5 percent of their current year's budget which becomes the primary means for funding new programs and services in the coming fiscal year; and a limit, based upon revenue projections, on the amount an agency may request above the current year's budget. Like budget reforms in any era, it emanated from a combination of fiscal, managerial, and political objectives.     

Promise and peril

The size of the federal budget tells only one part of the tale of government's presence in the market economy. The enormous amounts of non-tax dollars government requires to be spent on regulation – estimated at $647 billion per year – powerfully argue for some sort of regulatory scorekeeping. Regulatory costs are equivalent to over one-third of the level of government spending. A regulatory budget can be an effective tool both for spurring reform and monitoring regulatory activity.At bottom, today's rulemaking process is plagued by the fact that agency bureaucrats are not accountable to voters. And Congress – though responsible for the underlying statutes that usually propel those unanswerable agencies – nevertheless can conveniently blame agencies for regulatory excesses. Indeed, Americans live under a regime of Regulation Without Representation.A regulatory budget could promote greater accountability by limiting the regulatory costs agencies could impose on the private sector. Congress could either specify a limit on compliance costs for each newly enacted law or reauthorization of existing law, or Congress could enact a more ambitious full-scale budget paralleling the fiscal budget, a riskier approach. A comprehensive budget would require Congress to divide to a total budget among agencies. Agencies' responsibility would be to rank hazards serially, from most to least severe, and address them within their budget constraint. In either version of a regulatory budget, any agency desiring to exceed its budget would need to seek congressional approval.Regulatory costs imposed on the private sector by federal agencies can never be precisely measured, and a budget cannot achieve absolute precision. Nonetheless, a regulatory budget is a valuable tool. The real innovation of regulatory budgeting is its potential to impose the consequences of regulatory decisionmaking on agencies rather than on the regulated parties alone. Agencies that today rarely admit a rule provides negligible benefit would be forced to compete for the right to regulate. While agencies would be free to regulate as unwisely as they do now, the consequences could be transfer of the squandered budgetary allocation to a rival agency that saves more lives.Budgeting could fundamentally change incentives. Under a budget, adopting a costly, but marginally beneficial, regulation will suddenly be irrational. Congress would weigh an agency's claimed benefits against alternative means of protecting public health and safety, giving agencies incentives to compete and expose one another's bogus benefits. Budgeting could encourage greater recognition of the fact that some risks are far more remote than those we undertake daily. In the long run, a regulatory budget would force agencies to compete with one another on the most important bottom line of all: that their least-effective rules save more lives per dollar spent (or correct some alleged market imperfection better) than those of other agencies.There are clear benefits to regulatory budgeting, but there are also pitfalls. For instance, under a budget, agencies have incentives to underestimate compliance costs while regulated parties have the opposite incentive. Self-correcting techniques that may force opposing cost calculations to converge are only at the thought- experiment stage. However, limitations on the delegation of regulatory power and enhancing congressional accountability can help.Certain principles and antecedents can help ensure that a regulatory budgeting effort succeeds. Explicitly recognizing that an agency's basic impulse is to overstate the benefits of its activities, a budget would relieve agencies of benefit calculation responsibilities altogether. Agencies would concentrate on properly assessing only the costs of their initiatives. Since an agency must try to maximize benefits within its budget constraint or risk losing its budget allocation, it would be rational for agencies to monitor benefits, but Congress need not require it.Other ways to promote the success of a budget are to: establish an incremental rather than total budget; collect and summarize annual report card data on the numbers of regulations in each agency; establish a regulatory cost freeze; implement a Regulatory Reduction Commission; employ separate budgets for economic and environmental/social regulation; and control indirect costs by limiting the regulatory methods that most often generate them.A regulatory budget is not a magic device alone capable of reducing the current $647 billion regulatory burden. Yet a cautious one deserve consideration. Having good information is an aid in grappling with the regulatory state just as compiling the federal fiscal budget is indispensable to any effort to plan and control government spending.     

Is The National Budget Controllable?

Previous scholarly analyses of national spending have shown a penchant for incre-mentalism in interpreting changes. They have also focused almost exclusively on annual national outlays or annual expenditures. This article argues that, in many cases, budget authority figures provide a better basis for analyzing the national budget. The author gathered annual budget authority (BA) figures from fiscal years 1969 to 1993 and used this BA data for an empirical test of budget controllability. If the national budget has or has not been controlled in the recent past, then it should help us to judge whether or not it is controllable now. Five potential major budget interventions from fiscal year 1980 to 1993 were tested using an interrupted time-series and two regression models. Different intervention results are anticipated depending upon whether one has a policy perspective that is incrementalist, international systemic, or domestic political. The analysis provides more support for the domestic political perspective than for incrementalist or international systemic views. Budget authority was found to be superior to outlays for linking budget results to policy decisions. The national budget responded appropriately to policy decisions in the recent past. In this sense, the budget was controlled and we should view it as controllable.     

The 1990 Budget Package: Redefining the Debate

The debate of budgeting issues in the 1980s culminated in a dramatic change in 1990—the passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. The negotiations leading to this agreement considered the status of the deficit and the philosophical shift from "no new taxes" to "fair taxes." It led to changes in direct spending, enforcement of budget targets, timing of the budget, sequesters usage, tax increases, and entitlement reforms.     

The Ups and Downs of State Budget Process Reform: Experience of Three Decades

From zero-base budgeting to the Government Performance and Results Act, state budgeting systems have been synonymous with budgeting reform for over 30 years. This article examines the trends, both long-term and short-term, which have been identified through analysis of state budgeting office practices. Particular emphasis has been placed on understanding the changes in performance measurement over the period of 1970 to 2000. The findings reveal trends such as changes in the makeup of budget office personnel, a lack of budget offices in moving toward cost accounting, and trends in budget preparation and budget documents. Some budget reforms seem to have plateaued, beginning in the mid-1990s, while other reforms have exhibited "backsliding." It is clear that the states are not all marching in unison in reforming their budget systems. As with earlier phases of this study, the 2000 data raise many questions that will be explored in future research.     

The Fables and Foibles of Federal Capital Budgeting

This article critically evaluates the notions behind proposals to institute capital budgeting at the federal level. Four critical assumptions are found to be behind the contention that capital budgeting will improve federal investment policies: (1) an agreed-upon and accepted definition of a capital budget exists; (2) a capital budget "adds value" by improving the quality of information; (3) better information leads to better decisions; (4) better decisions lead to better actions. Each of these assumptions is evaluated using examples drawn from various levels of government and from the private sector. The general finding is that if these assumptions hold, then it is reasonable to expect that capital budgeting will lead to better programmatic decisions. Unfortunately, one or more of these assumptions usually does not hold and for this reason the case for federal capital budgeting is not very strong     

Managerial Necessity and the Art of Creating Surpluses: The Budget-Execution Process in West Virginia Cities

Budget execution traditionally has been defined as a straightforward process of implementing the budget as approved. Research into the process has been limited, particularly with regard to local government budgets. This article examines the rebudgeting process using a case study of 15 West Virginia cities. Rebudgeting displayed a consistent pattern for the various budget categories—personnel, contracts, commodities, capital, and contributions—closely resembling the "increase-then-decrease" pattern seen in the overall budget. Empirical data on budgetary adjustments and structured interviews with city finance officials helped to describe budget changes and explain probable causes and effects of behavior during budget execution for these smaller cities. Budget changes were found to be the result of managerial necessity and the exercise of discretion to generate and distribute surpluses.     

Who benefits from demand‐driven distribution of HIV/AIDS services? An analysis of the emerging CBO sector in Malawi

Community‐based organisations (CBOs) play a key role in Malawi's multi‐sector programme for responding to the HIV/AIDS pandemic. In this programme they are funded in a demand‐driven manner—which means that only those areas that apply for funds to CBO services are blessed with programme benefits. This paper argues that this funding mechanism is not conducive to either distributing CBO services to areas most in need or enhancing downward accountability. Because areas most in need of services generally also lacked the capacity to attract project funding, the programme did not reach them. Instead, it tended to reach those areas with the greatest capacity to attract funding, though not necessarily the greatest need for it. Furthermore, those CBOs that were funded were unable to facilitate collective action in their communities because of elite capture of decision making. The programme, however, was relatively responsive to the communities' thematic demands. Thus, all in all, the elites were relatively more successful in representing the communities' wishes than in caring for all geographical areas in their constituencies. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The President's FY 1990 Budget: The Last Act in a Decade of Change

This article examines the budget requests of Presidents Reagan and Bush for fiscal year 1990, and how the federal budget has changed during the decade of the 1980s. The author concludes that the federal budget has become less controllable, as the priorities and composition of federal expenditures have shifted during the Reagan years. While the Reagan and Bush budgets do not differ significantly, the manner in which they were constructed does. The effort of President Bush to define his budgetary version of a "kinder, gentler" America may be more illusory than real. The author also traces the change in federal assistance to state and local governments, concluding that, apart from transfer payments, the federal role has markedly declined.     

Accruing Retirement Costs for Federal Employees

The president's 2003 budget proposed that federal agencies pay the full cost of their employees' pension and retiree health benefits as such benefits are earned starting in 2003. The main reason for the proposed change is to provide policymakers and agency managers with a more complete measure of the cost of providing current services. The main disadvantage of the proposal is that estimates of the accrual costs of retiree health benefits are subject to large errors. The proposed change would not increase total outlays, nor would it affect the budget deficit or surplus.     

The "Ball of Confusion" in Federal Budgeting: A Shadow Agenda for Deliberative Reform of the Budget Process

The budget process is seriously flawed, as Irene Rubin suggests, but there is little prospect for its effective reform. Current economic and political conditions could open the window for reform, but the excessive partisanship that helped create these conditions also has reduced the pool of institutionalists who could lead reforms. More important is confusion about which reforms might be most effective. Most proposed reforms would create more rules, but they will not work unless politicians commit to meeting the goals such rules are intended to support. Those commitments could be produced by deliberation over critical issues that have been neglected in recent discussions of budget process reform: how the process could support macroeconomic policy making, how improved budget concepts could accurately measure finances and aid in dealing with upcoming policy challenges, how reorganization could enable intelligent priority setting, and how the process could be better aligned with the constitutional sharing of powers and the electoral system.     

The Influence of EU Membership on Methods and Processes of Budgeting in Britain and France, 1970–1995

This article explores the impact European Union (EU) integration has had on methods and processes of budgeting in France and Britain from 1970 to 1995. It assesses whether convergence of budgetary institutions occurs and, if so, whether it is promoted by an obligation of compliance or by an hybridization effect. Compliance refers to changes in national budgetary institutions made compulsory by membership in the EU. Hybridization emphasizes that national and EU budgetary processes are increasingly interwoven and indivisible. Public budgeting is no longer purely national because part of the decision-making on national expenditure is made at the EU level and because the national budget is closely linked to the EU budget in financial and policy terms. Based on an institutional analysis, combined with elite interviewing, the article suggests that hybridization is a significant factor contributing to a convergence of budgetary practices in Britain and France. Underlying the argument is the fact that an increasingly important function of departmental actors involves negotiating with their EU counterparts at the EU level, in addition to the conventional budgetary game at the domestic level. Regarding compliance, there is an influence as testified by significant formal institutional convergence. However, compliance seems a less effective factor in influencing convergence than hybridization because it conveys a "negative" approach to convergence, based on enforcement and sanctions. The article suggests that the convergence of administrative systems is promoted by the growing similarity of administrative practices more than by the harmonization of rules.     

Biennial Budgeting in the Federal Government

This article examines the possible outcomes of changing from the current annual budget review to biennial budgeting. It looks at the experience of various states and its application to the federal level. It explores all of the supposed benefits , including less time spent on budgeting issues, more accurate budget projections, reduction of congressional workload and increased congressional oversight and, for the president's point of view, increased power of the executive branch. Concluding on a cautious note, the article offers some plausible applications of biennial budgeting to the national budget.     

COMRADES OR CULPRITS? DONOR ENGAGEMENT AND BUDGET TRANSPARENCY IN AID‐DEPENDENT COUNTRIES

Budget transparency has come to be considered a key aspect of governance. Over the past decade, donors have invested increasing resources in strengthening processes through which budget transparency in developing countries can be enhanced. According to the 2008 Open Budget Index (OBI) Report, however, aid dependency and budget transparency appear to be inversely correlated. This article looks at the role of donor agencies in promoting or preventing budget transparency in aid‐dependent countries. It looks at significant correlations across the whole sample of 84 countries covered in the 2008 OBI, and analyzes more specific data for a sub‐sample of 16 aid‐dependent countries, before selecting six countries for which more detailed findings are then presented. All of these countries have implemented reforms aimed at enhancing budget transparency, with substantial donor support. These, however, often had only limited success, partly because they were not well adapted to the local context, and partly because donors put limited emphasis on improving public access to budget information. Donor efforts were also often offset by other characteristics of donor interventions, namely their fragmentation, lack of transparency, and limited use of programme aid modalities such as budget support and pooled sector funding. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.