Expulsion to Face Torture? Non-refoulement in International Law

Non-refoulement is a principle of international law that precludesstates from returning a person to a place where he or she mightbe tortured or face persecution. The principle, codified inArticle 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, is subject to a numberof exceptions. This article examines the status of non-refoulementin international law in respect to three key areas: refugeelaw, human rights law and international customary law. The findingssuggest that while a prohibition on refoulement is part of internationalhuman rights law and international customary law, the evidencethat non-refoulement has acquired the status of a jus cogensnorm is less than convincing.     

Overcoming the challenges posted by technology to traditional copyright law: from Betamax to Grokster

Legal context: Dual use technology, or technology which can be used for bothinfringing and non-infringing uses, raises interesting issuesin the area of copyright law. This note analyses inter aliathe two US Supreme Court decisions on dual use technology, separatedby a gap of over 20 years—Sony v Universal Studios (1984)and MGM v Grokster (2005). Key points: Sony lays down the famous ‘Betamax’ defence—ifthe technology is ‘capable of substantial non-infringinguses’, then it cannot be challenged as infringing. Thistest had stood the test of time, and it is only recently inGrokster that there arose an occasion to reconsider its application.The Court in Grokster, borrowing from the jurisprudence developedin Patent law, recognized a novel test of liability—basedon the active ‘inducement’ to infringe. The flawin Grokster is that despite its attempt to develop new standardsfor a digital age, the ruling leaves areas of uncertainty. Practical significance: Dual use technology has become ubiquitous in this age—fromthe iPod to YouTube to P2P software, all are capable of beingused in lawful as well as unlawful ways. Legal pronouncementshave the potential to impact not just the development of law,but also innovation in technology. Some believe that the ‘brightline’ of Sony has been muddled thereby threatening technologicalinnovation. Others, me included, believe that Sony is inapplicablein the face of new technology, and hail the decision in Groksteras a positive step forward in what it actually decides. However,in what it does not decide, Grokster still represents a lostopportunity by the Court to clear up the muddled waters.     

A Critical Appraisal of 'Triple Divorce' in Islamic Law

The issue of the ‘triple divorce’ is regarded ashighly sensitive among the Muslims, not only in India but elsewhere.The Holy Qur’an is very cautious in matters of divorce.Three talaqs have to be spaced over a period of 3 months togive husband and wife time for reconciliation through the interventionof relatives and friends. Moreover, talaq can be pronouncedonly when the wife is in a state of tuhur, ie purity after menstruation.Yet, despite clear Qur’anic injunctions to the contrary,immediate triple divorce is permitted, destroying marital lifein one breath. The practice of immediate triple divorce is widespreadamong Sunni Muslims and has legal validity. Even then the juristscall it a talaq-e-Bidat (innovative form of divorce). The disputehas been highlighted by reports of some Muslims instantly divorcingtheir wives by mail, over the telephone, and even through mobilephone text messages. This article explains the different theoriesof divorce prevailing in the contemporary Muslim world and whatchecks and restraints have been imposed by Islam over the exerciseof husband's power of talaq. The article critically appraisesthe ‘innovative triple divorce’ by examining whetherit is sanctioned by the Holy Quran or the sunnah and if thereis a consensus of opinion (ijma) on the effectiveness of tripledivorce.     

Does Dworkin Commit Dworkin's Fallacy?: A Reply to Justice in Robes

In an article entitled ‘Dworkin's Fallacy, Or What thePhilosophy of Language Can't Teach Us about the Law’,I argued that in Law's Empire Ronald Dworkin misderived hisinterpretive theory of law from an implicit interpretive theoryof meaning, thereby committing ‘Dworkin's fallacy’.In his recent book, Justice in Robes, Dworkin denies that hecommitted the fallacy. As evidence he points to the fact thathe considered three theories of law—‘conventionalism’,‘pragmatism’ and ‘law as integrity’—inLaw's Empire. Only the last of these is interpretive, but each,he argues, is compatible with his interpretive theory of meaning,which he describes as the view that ‘the doctrinal conceptof law is an interpretive concept’. In this Reply, I arguethat Dworkin's argument that he does not commit Dworkin's fallacyis itself an example of the fallacy and that Dworkin's fallacypervades Justice in Robes just as much as it did Law's Empire.     

Can We Protect How We Do What We Do? A Consideration of Business Method Patents in Australia and Europe

In the long history of monopolies, business method patents area novel and recent edition. In the Digital Age, where time ismoney and speed is everything, innovative methods for undertakingbusiness are as important to a business as the products or servicesit provides to its clients. In recent years several reviews,conducted in both Australia and internationally,⁴ have questionedthe appropriateness of patenting business methods. This paperreviews the availability of business method patents in Australiain light of the 2006 decision of the Full Court of the FederalCourt in Grant v Commissioner of Patents,⁵ which confirmed theneed in Australia for a ‘useful product’ to issuefrom the working of a method (business or otherwise) in orderfor the method to be patentable. This paper will review argumentsboth criticising and defending business method patents and considerwhether business methods warrant special treatment.     

'Trade mark use' in Europe: revisiting Arsenal in the light of Opel and Picasso

Legal context: The European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision in the case ofArsenal Football Club v. Reed led to uncertainty regarding thepractical scope of a trade mark proprietor's property rights. Key points: The uncertainty resulted from a failure of the ECJ to addressclearly the issue of what constitutes infringing trade markuse. The ECJ ignored the question of the High Court as to whetheruse of a trade mark as an indication of origin is necessaryfor establishing infringement. They instead established an ambiguousstandard for what constitutes infringing trade mark use, suggestingthat only use that jeopardises the essential function of a trademark is an infringing use. This ambiguity has had problematicimplications for subsequent interpretations of trade mark law,particularly in the Court of Appeal in Arsenal and the Houseof Lords in R v Johnstone. Two relatively new ECJ cases may help clarify the issue. InOPEL, the ECJ suggested that infringing use of a trade markmust be use that is perceived by the relevant public as a designationof origin. The Picasso decision limits the effect of the Arsenaldecision on the relevance of confusion in non-sale situationsto the facts of Arsenal. In particular, it stresses the pointthat when assessing likelihood of confusion in the context ofan opposition to an application for registration the court shouldfocus on the perception of the relevant public at the pointof sale. Practical significance: The benefit of these two cases is that they create some clarityfor legal practitioners and the Courts when addressing the questionof what constitutes infringing trade mark use.     

Civilized Squatting

This article seeks to trace the origins of the requirement thata squatter must have an intention to possess (animus possidendi)in order to establish title by adverse possession. The requirementhas been confirmed by the House of Lords in the recent caseof Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham [2003] 1 AC 419. Its origins canreadily be traced back to the decision of the Court of Appealin Littledale v Liverpool College [1900] 1 Ch 19, but thereis little evidence of any need for intention before that case,and no convincing authority is cited for it. Possible explanationsfor the source of this requirement are considered by the article(for instance cases on re-entry by landlords and the so-called‘found chattel’ cases), but these are ultimatelyrejected. The article goes on to suggest that the reason forthis is that the intention requirement was ‘imported’into English law from German Pandectist writers of the nineteenthcentury. It suggests that Littledale was the case in which thishappened. It seeks to support this hypothesis by reference tobiographical details of Lindley MR, who gave the leading judgmentin Littledale, and who not only trained in part in Germany butalso took an active interest in German scholarship of the time.A brief survey of the relevant German sources is undertaken,focusing primarily on the work of Savigny, but also consideringthe rival theory of Jhering. Finally, it tracks the developmentand refinement of the content of animus possidendi, first by19th century legal scholars and then by 20th century judges,to make it ‘fit’ with English property law. It seeksto address the question of whether the animus possidendi requirementis a free-standing element (the ‘strong’ will theory),or whether it is simply implied from the acts of the squatter(the ‘weak’ will theory), and suggests a solutionby reference to the German sources and later English cases.Finally, it considers how the House of Lords decision in Pyereflects the logical culmination of the acceptance of this ‘legaltransplant’ into the common law.     

The Spanish Constitutional Tribunal's Decision in Guatemalan Generals: Unconditional Universality is Back

On 26 September 2005, the Spanish Constitutional Tribunal reversedthe decisions of the Audiencia Nacional and the High Court (TribunalSupremo) in the case of the Guatemalan Generals. According tothe two judicial bodies, the exercise of universal jurisdictionover international crimes required a link between the crimeor the victims or the offender and Spain, such as the presenceof the offender on Spanish territory or the Spanish nationalityof the victims. The Constitutional Tribunal held, instead, thatthese requirements are contrary to the principle pro actione,i.e. they result in an unjustified restriction of the constitutionalright to effective judicial protection. The Tribunal also clarifiedthat universal jurisdiction, whose aim is fighting impunity,does not require any link other than the universal characterof the values protected by the provisions criminalizing themost serious violations of international law. The presence ofthe accused in Spain is merely a condition for trial, not adistinct ground of jurisdiction; in other words, the accusedmust be in Spain for the trial to begin, but jurisdiction maybe exercised even in his absence, for example for the issuanceof a request for extradition. The only condition to which theexercise of universal jurisdiction is subject is that the stateof the locus commissi delicti is not already investigating andprosecuting the case effectively.     

The ongoing design duty in Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd Casting the scope of copyright infringement even wider

The Australian Federal Court case of Universal Music AustraliaPty Ltd v Sharman License Holdings Ltd (‘Sharman’)¹is the latest in a series of peer-to-peer (P2P) filesharingcases from various jurisdictions that has found the softwaredistributor/technology provider liable for copyright infringement.² Sharman followed a few months after the groundbreaking US SupremeCourt case of MGM Studios v Grokster Ltd ³ (‘Grokster’)that had acknowledged the Sony safe harbour for technology providersbut also introduced an inducement of infringement doctrine todeal with reprehensible conduct of infringers. While both cases involved similar technology and shared a numberof similarities on the facts and legal principles⁴, a closerexamination of Sharman shows that the net of copyright infringementin P2P filesharing is cast wider than that in Grokster. The effect of Sharman is an increased burden on the technologyprovider and the potentially tremendous consequences on innovationdue to the lack of a clear safe harbour as well as the wideningof the design obligation.     

A useful resource when advising on publishing contracts

The journalist and former Punch editor, Alan Coren, once wrotean article in The Times about his desire to write a best-sellingpublishing contract. This followed a spate of stories in thepress about the large advances then being paid by publishersto ‘trophy’ authors such as Martin Amis. When preparinghis best-selling contract, Mr Coren would have benefited greatlyfrom the precedents in Clark's Publishing Agreements. Originally published in 1980, Clark is now in its seventh edition.It consists mainly of about 25–30 template agreementsfor use in the publishing of books, journals, and related materials,including a substantial section on     

UNITED STATES COURTS AND THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS: A WELFARIST PERSPECTIVE ON EMPAGRAN

E. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. concerned aprivate antitrust suit for damages against a global vitaminscartel. The central issue in the litigation was whether foreignplaintiffs injured by the cartel's conduct abroad could bringsuit in U.S. court, an issue that was ultimately resolved inthe negative. We take a welfarist perspective on this issueand inquire whether optimal deterrence requires U.S. courtsto take subject matter jurisdiction under U.S. law for claimssuch as those in Empagran. Our analysis considers, in particular,the arguments of various economist amici in favor of jurisdictionand arguments of the U.S. and foreign government amici againstjurisdiction. We explain why the issue is difficult to resolve,and identify several economic concerns that the amici donot address, which may counsel against jurisdiction. We alsoanalyze the legal standard enunciated by the Supreme Court andapplied on remand by the D.C. Circuit, and we argue that itsfocus on "independent" harms and "proximate" causation is problematicand does not provide an adequate economic foundation for resolvingthe underlying legal issues.     

Comment on Forni's "Using Stationarity Tests in Antitrust Market Definition"

Economic analyses of prospective mergers must typically be undertakenwith limited data. Often prices are the only available data,so it is tempting to use their time series alone. Certainly,simple and robust measures of the extent of the market basedon limited data would aid merger analysis immensely. However,a couple of examples show how Forni's suggested methodologycan lead one astray. Consider a differentiated products market with demand systemln D_i(p_i, p_j) = 1 – ln p_i + ln p_j, i, j = 1, 2, i j,with associated constant marginal costs c₁ = _t c, c₂     

TRIGGERING INSPECTIONS EX OFFICIO: MOVING BEYOND A PASSIVE EU CARTEL POLICY

The implementation of leniency programs is considered a successboth at a EU Community level and in individual member states.The paper discusses the value of ex officio investigations forcartel detection in light of leniency and complaint-based cases.Are ex officio investigations still needed? Should a competitionauthority concentrate its scarce resources exclusively on theprosecution of leniency or complaint-based cases or follow aproactive market monitoring policy? It is argued that investigationstriggered ex officio are an important complementary enforcementtool to the other passive instruments available to a competitionauthority. A bottom-up methodology for triggering inspectionsbased on economic criteria is presented allowing for a moreproactive cartel policy.     

Who controls the Naomi Campbell information flow? A practical analysis of the law of privacy

Legal context. The House of Lords held that the medical privacyof the glamorous supermodel Naomi Campbell was violated by publicationof details of her drug addiction treatment and a paparazzi picture.English law is developing under the influence of Article 8 (theright of privacy) and Article 10 (the right of freedom of expression)of the European Convention of Human Rights. The court explainedhow the action for breach of confidence protects privacy. So,who controls the Naomi Campbell information flow? Key points. Primarily, the courts control the flow of privateinformation. They do so through the cause of action of breachof confidence and remedies. In deciding liability, the courtsshould ask whether the benefit of publication is proportionateto the harm done by the invasion of privacy. To answer the question,they must balance the public interest in the right of privacyagainst the public interest in the right of freedom of expression.They may settle on a Reynolds type test by considering a numberof non-exhaustive factors. The article examines seven suggestedfactors and the remedies which can be deployed by the courts.Judgments from the English courts and the European Court ofHuman Rights are considered, including Campbell v MGN (HL),Douglas v Hello! (CA), McKennitt v Ash (HC), Peck v UK (ECtHR),Édition Plon v France (ECtHR), and Von Hannover v Germany(ECtHR). Practical significance. There are an increasing number of privacyclaims against the media. The article includes a checklist ofseven factors to help determine where the balance lies betweenprivacy and freedom of expression.     

EXCLUSIONARY PRICING AND CONSUMERS HARM: THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S PRACTICE IN THE DSL MARKET

The assessment of exclusionary abuses by dominant firms is byno means an easy task. This is particularly true for pricingabuses, as there is no clear-cut way of distinguishing a pricecut that is abusive from one that instead is pro-competitive.We argue that there are several shortcomings in the way theEuropean Commission as assessed exclusionary pricing abusesin two important decisions concerning Internet access servicemarkets: Deutsche Telekom AG and Wanadoo Interactive. Firstof all, in computing downstream costs to apply the price squeezetest the incumbent's economies of scale and unavoidable costsshould be factored in, as the test is only meant to establishwhether an as-efficient competitor has been unlawfully foreclosed.Secondly, since the price squeeze test provides only for a necessarycondition for predation to occur, it is also necessary to provethat the recoupment of initial losses is a plausible scenarioso that the conduct under examination may indeed turn out tobe harmful to consumers. This is all but a trivial task, asthere are some sources of endogeneity that may cause a radicalchange in the underlying market structure. Particularly, inmarkets at early stage of development, entry barriers that mayfacilitate the recoupment of initial losses ex-ante may causea change such that market structure no longer supports recoupmentex-post.     

NEXT STEPS IN THE EVOLUTION OF ANTITRUST LAW: WHAT TO EXPECT FROM THE ROBERTS COURT

Under the leadership of Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr.,the Supreme Court has demonstrated a willingness to cast asidethe Court's prior antitrust decisions. The qualified per serule applicable to tying surely will not survive much longer,but what else might be in store is more speculative. This essayidentifies four decisions relating to competitor collaborationin which the Court's prior application of the per se rule doesnot comport with its modern decisions. In two of the cases,the conduct likely would be found lawful today; while in theother two, the conduct most likely still would be condemnedbut only after an abbreviated application of the rule of reason.This essay also identifies three legal doctrines ready for retirement.They are the absolute requirement of market delineation as apredicate for merger analysis, the outmoded approach to marketdelineation of Brown Shoe, and the unhelpful formulation ofthe monopolization offense in Grinnell.     

An Eye for an Eye: Proportionality as a Moral Principle of Punishment

The lex talionis of the Old Testament has been widely perceived—understandably,but mistakenly—as a barbaric law of retribution in kind.It is better understood as a seminal expression of restraintand proportionality as moral principles of punishment. Thishas been recognized from the earliest times. Over the interveningcenturies, the lex talionis has lost neither its moral significancenor its penal relevance. This is reflected in H.L.A. Hart'ssynthesis of modern retributivist and utilitarian theories ofpunishment and, again, in contemporary Canadian law throughthe recognition of proportionality as the fundamental principleof sentencing under the Criminal Code. The tension between thisfundamental principle and Canada's increasing resort to mandatoryminimum sentences of imprisonment is examined briefly in thislight.     

International Patent Law is Obsolete and Copyright is Obsolete

‘A book may be good for nothing; or there may be onlyone thing in it worth knowing; are we to read it all through?’(Samuel Johnson) This section is dedicated to the review ofideas, articles, books, films and other media. It will includereplies (and rejoinders) to articles, the evaluation of newideas or proposals, and reviews of books and articles both directlyand indirectly related to intellectual property law.

International Patent Law is Obsolete By Anna Mancini, 2006,New York: Buenos Books Price: US$35, Paperback, ISBN: 1-932848-17-7E-book Price: US$7, ISBN: 1-932848-16-9 Copyright is ObsoleteBy Anna Mancini, 2006, New York: Buenos Books Price: US$35,Paperback, ISBN: 1-932848-17-7 E-book Price: US$5, ISBN: 1-932848-19-3   In International Patent Law is Obsolete Dr Mancini's openingpremise is     

The Legal Effects of Resolutions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly in the Jurisprudence of the ICJ

This article aims to extract from the jurisprudence of the InternationalCourt of Justice a basic theory of legal effects of unilateralinstruments of international organizations in public internationallaw. These effects can be divided into three categories. Thefirst is substantive effects. These include binding, authorizingand (dis)empowering effects. The second category is causativeeffects, whereby determinations of fact or of law bring substantiveeffects into existence. The third category is modal effects– how and when the substantive effects come into existence(e.g. immediate or deferred, retroactive or non-retroactive,reversible or irreversible effect). Each of these categoriesof legal effects behaves differently according to whether theeffects are intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic effects are basedon the special treaty powers of the United Nations SecurityCouncil and General Assembly. In this hypothesis, all threecategories of effects exist to the full extent that the explicitand implicit powers of the adopting body allow for them. Extrinsiceffects are directly based on general international law, inparticular on the rules of formation of customary internationallaw. Here, there are no causative effects. Substantive effectsdo not strictly speaking exist; only pre-substantive ones do.And modal effects are always immediate, non-retroactive andreversible.