How to not speak the ‘F‐word’: Federalism between mirage and imperative in the euro crisis

The recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about European federalism – a theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. With the adoption of significant policy and institutional measures for tightening macroeconomic and budgetary coordination (including a constitutionally enshrined debt brake), the reforms of the monetary union have undisputedly brought the European Union further on the path towards an ever closer union. In an era where EU integration has been increasingly politicised, and Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti‐system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation. This is all the more crucial for French and German leaders who have brokered the main decisions during the crisis of the eurozone. Against this background, the purpose of this article is not to assess whether, or to what extent, the recent reforms of economic and monetary union have made the EU more federal. Rather, the purpose is to tackle the following puzzle: How have EU leaders legitimised the deepening of federal integration in a context where support for more European federalism is at its lowest? To elucidate this, a lexicographic discourse analysis is conducted based on all speeches held by the German Chancellor Merkel and the two French Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande, previous to, or after European summits from early 2010 until the spring of 2013. The findings indicate that federalism is both taboo and pervasive in French and German leaders' discourse. The paradox is barely apparent, though. While the ‘F‐word’ is rarely spoken aloud, two distinctive visions co‐exist in the French and German discourse. The coming of age of a political union through constitutional federalism is pictured as ineluctable, yet as a distant mirage out of reach of today's decision makers. At the same time, the deepening of functional federalism in order to cope with economic interdependence is a ubiquitous imperative that justifies further integration. The persisting gap between the constitutional and the functional vision of European federalism has crucial implications. Insofar as the Union is held responsible for not delivering successful economic policy, political leaders will fail to legitimise both functional and constitutional federalism.     

The European constitution project from the perspective of constitutional political economy

Three topics of a European constitution are discussed. First, basic arguments from constitutional political economy that aim at restricting representatives’ potential misuse of powers in a European Union with extended competencies are summarized. Since a European demos does not yet exist, an extension of competencies of the European Parliament is not sufficient in order to legitimate political decisions at the EU level. The introduction of elements of direct democracy in the European constitution would shape the creation of such a demos and lead to a stronger control of the European legislature and executive. Second, the introduction of direct democracy in the European constitution is proposed in order to reduce the European democratic deficit. Third, the creation of a European federation requires a more transparent assignment of competencies and rules to resolve conflicts between different centers of power. A European federation should be organized according to the principles of competitive federalism.     

How Nation States 'Hit' Europe: Ambiguity and Representation in the European Union

This article analyses how differences in domestic institutional constellations shape the representational roles of member state officials when attending the EU Council of Ministers. The conceptual framework used draws on theories of political representation, institutional theories and the Europeanisation literature. Our primary argument is that role perceptions are considerably conditioned by actors' domestic institutional embeddedness. Comparing Belgian and Swedish officials attending working groups within the Council of Ministers substantiates this argument. Belgian officials are more supranationally oriented than their Swedish counterparts. This difference is related to varying levels of vertical and horizontal specialisation, federalism, competition among veto-players, the role of the Foreign Ministry, and the level of trust in domestic government compared to the level of trust in the EU.     

Federalism and the European Parliament

The European Parliament has been a source of controversy sinceits inception. Its direct election was seen as endorsing a federalstructure and political future for the European Community (laterEuropean Union). Changes in its authority and legislative powerswere seen as symptomatic of creeping federalism and the emasculationof member states' national sovereignty. The European Parliament'sconscious contribution to developing federalism and constructinga federal Europe relate to its direct election, its powers,and its proposals to hold a constitutional convention. The Anglo-Saxonmisconception of federalism is analyzed, the role of a billof rights examined, and the failures of democratic legitimacyexposed with a view to see what contribution federal bargainsmay make to close the democratic deficit and to impel a reviewof the current institutional arrangements.     

Changing your political mind: The impact of a metaphor on citizens’ representations and preferences for federalism

Federalism is often presented through metaphors, but little is known about the impact of such metaphors. Two experiments were conducted in Belgium presenting federalism as Tetris – with control and treatment groups – in order to grasp the influence of this metaphor. The first experiment reveals that being exposed to text with the Tetris metaphor influences respondents’ representations of federalism towards a more institutional representation and towards more regional autonomy. The second experiment confirms the importance of the text, and more specifically of the metaphor, if political knowledge is taken into account. Respondents with a lower level of political knowledge are those who are influenced by the metaphor, whereas respondents with a higher level are not. Therefore, framing the future of Belgian federalism using the metaphor of Tetris does matter: it affects both individuals’ representations of the federalization process and, consequently, their preferences vis-à-vis the institutional future of the country.     

Europäisierung regionalen Regierens: Mit Sinatra zum „autonomieorientierten Systemwechsel“ im deutschen Bundesstaat?

Within the last years integration theory is focusing on studies analysing the impact of Europeanization on national and regional governance. This contribution demonstrates that the German Länder till the mid 90’ies have developed and still follow a twofold strategy in representing their interests in the European interactive system: interest representation through the German federal system and direct interest representation at the European level. Since some years the guiding ideas of the Länder have changed. Thus, the further development of co-operative and interactive policy-making was no longer on top of the agenda. Despite, the Länder asked for a clear cut of competence within the multi-level system — what is called here Sinatra-strategy, according to the song “I did it my way …”. This discussion at the European level is linked with the demand for reforming German federalism in the sense of “competitive federalism”. The contribution asks whether the Sinatra-strategy at the European level could have an impact on the German co-operative federalism and could help to transform it towards a more “autonomy oriented system”.     

Conclusion to Special Issue on the Institutional Balance and the Future of EU Governance: The Treaty of Nice, Institutional Balance, and Uncertainty

Debates about institution–building within the European Union focus on how national power and transnational representation and accountability should be organized institutionally within the context of regionalism. An "institutional balance" allows the EU to benefit from administrative capacity and the representation of both national executives and national electorates while not being transformed into either a transnational political system or a traditional federation. The Treaty of Nice laid the groundwork for enlargement by re–examining issues of representation that had previously been accepted as givens. In so doing, the member states made clear that the evolution of the EU was going to be subject to uncertainty and institutional fluidity.     

The European Community: A Balancing Act

The European Community has traditionally been analyzed usingtheories and concepts drawn from international relations ratherthan from federalism. This article emphasizes the balance betweenthe representation of territorial and nonterritorial interestsin the Community and argues that concepts drawn from federalismcan be useful in analytically understanding the Community aslong as the American model of federalism is not viewed as thenecessary federal referent. It describes the relative importanceof the territorial dimension within the major Community institutions—theCommission, the Council of Ministers, the European Council,the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice.The Court of Justice, it is argued, is particularly importantin giving the Community a "federal" contour. However, its methodof operation differentiates it in important ways from the Americanjudiciary. The role of territorial politics within the Communityis such that the Community's policymaking process, while unique,is certainly recognizable to students of comparative federalism.     

Zur Politisierung der Europäischen Union

The constitutional treaty of the EU failed. Why so? Does this failure indicate the end of European integration and the beginning of re-nationalization of European politics? This contribution argues that the failure of the constitutional treaty is due to a process of politicization of the EU. As a result, political processes beyond the nation state are judged increasingly not just on the basis of their effectiveness, but also in terms of the criteria for good political order, such as fairness and legitimacy. The respective governments of the EU member states, however, publicly still take an instrumental approach to the EU. This is doomed to failure and thus the future of the European project is open. Either politics adapts to the new evaluation criteria for European integration or a partial re-nationalization of European politics is indeed likely.     

Federalism and Party Interaction in West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria

The federalism established in the constitutions of the FederalRepublic of Germany, Switzerland, and Austria, in addition tothe common language of these countries, distinguishes them fromthe other West European countries, which lean toward centrallyorganized states. After examining the historical foundationand development of the federal systems in the three countries,the article analyzes the segmentation, federal-state interaction,and intraparty effects of political parties in them. While federalismis strengthened by the heterogeneity and regional solidarityof the political parties in Switzerland, federalism has becomea pure "party federalism" in the Federal Republic of Germanyand Austria.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

Government-opposition dynamics in the European Union: The Santer Commission resignation crisis

Abstract.  This article seeks to shed light on the sources of government-opposition dynamics in the European Union (EU). It considers the ideological left-right divide and the sovereignty-integration dimension as potential sources of a government-opposition cleavage in the EU, as well as a 'representation dimension'. The empirical evaluation of these propositions is based on a qualitative and quantitative analysis of the political crisis leading to the collective resignation of the Santer Commission. The article finds that government-opposition dynamics in the EU are related to the sovereignty-integration dimension of EU politics and to representation in EU executive institutions, rather than a left-right divide. Both political beliefs and opportunistic motivations determine government-support and opposition in the EU.     

Representation and the democratic deficit

Abstract In the early years of the Community it was assumed that there was a widespread consensus about the future development of Europe, and that decisions by the Council of Ministers were broadly in line with public opinion. In recent years the growth in the powers and responsibilities of European institutions has been considerable, through the Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty. The Community is now the world's largest trading group, and one of the three most important players on the world economic scene alongside the USA and Japan. The EU has grown from six to fifteen member states, and further waves of enlargement are on the horizon. Yet many fear that processes of representation and accountability have not kept pace with this expansion, producing a legitimacy crisis (Anderson & Eliassen 1996; Hayward 1995). The key issue addressed throughout this Special Issue is the classic one of political representation: how the preferences of European citizens can be linked to decision making within the European Union.     

The Eurozone as a Flawed Currency Area

The European single currency system has come under unprecedented strain during the past three years and there is little reason to assume that this will diminish, in any significant way, in the near future. This article briefly explores the background to the current eurozone crisis before outlining a number of potential solutions. Specifically, we discuss how the credit crunch induced recession of 2008 triggered the problems within the eurozone regarding sovereign debt, looking at the issues of spill‐over and free‐rider effects, together with the implementation of EMU fiscal rules. The analysis is then extended by outlining a series of potential remedies. This consists of a critical evaluation of solutions that the EU has already instigated (i.e. moral persuasion, financial relief measures and debt default), together with a series of alternative propositions (i.e. fiscal federalism and a European Clearing Union) and even the collapse of the euro.     

An Employment Union for Europe? The Role of the Swedish Government

The Swedish Government's proposal for an 'Employment Union' to offset the potential increases in unemployment caused by moves towards Economic and Monetary Union, has put the problem of unemployment at the top of the agenda of the current Intergovernmental Conference. Domestic political pressures coupled with a belief that the EU offers the potential for a solution to this problem, were key factors behind the decision to table an amendment. Forging links with other European social democratic parties to generate support for the proposal, the Swedish Social Democrats need the proposal to succeed for both domestic political ends and to safeguard the future of the European project.     

The impact of information acquisition on EU performance judgements

Public evaluations of EU performance are not only critical indicators of the EU's output legitimacy, but also shape future support for European integration. For citizens to monitor the political performance of the EU they need relevant facts, yet it is anything but clear that gains in information about EU performance cause change in judgements about such performance. Drawing on two‐wave panel data, this article examines whether acquiring information following a real‐world EU decision‐making event alters citizens' judgements about the utilitarian and democratic performance of the EU. It also examines how this effect differs for people with different levels of general political information. It is found that citizens who acquired performance‐relevant information became more approving of the EU's utilitarian performance but did not change their judgements about its democratic performance. Also, individuals with moderate levels of general political information were affected most strongly by new facts about performance. The implications of these findings for EU‐level representative democracy are considered.     

State structure and political representation: Comparing the views of statewide and sub‐state legislators across 14 countries

How the recent creation, re‐invention or reinforcement of regional levels of political decision making across Europe compounds political representation is one of the key issues of contemporary democratic government. Despite growing scholarly interest, the critical question as to whether the regional institutional setting has brought about distinct representational roles among sub‐state legislators has yet to be addressed. To advance research in this field, this study bridges the literature on multilevel politics and legislative studies that to date have developed in isolation. Using innovative survey data from 14 statewide and 56 regional legislatures across Europe, it provides the first comprehensive test of how the state structure affects a legislator's views on representation. The results highlight that, relative to legislators in unitary states and national legislators in multilevel states, legislators at the regional level are more constituency‐oriented. Moreover, this heightened responsiveness to constituents at the regional level is not offset by weaker collective representation operating through political parties. Beyond these findings’ immediate relevance to scholars of federalism/regionalisation and parliaments, they also speak to the wider normative debate about the quality of political representation and public policy.     

Democratic 'Misfit'? Conceptions of Civil Society Participation in France and the European Union

The European Union's attempts to improve its democratic character increasingly often lead to debates about how to include civil society organizations in its decision-making processes. However, this interpretation of participatory democracy seems at odds with democratic traditions in a number of member states. Among those, France is said to be at the diametrically opposite end of the EU democratization debate spectrum. French democratic thought is based on government through electoral representation. The aim of this article is to analyze both theoretically and empirically the discourse and participatory processes in both the EU and France. While normative approaches to democratic patterns in the EU and French political debate show important differences, empirical evidence suggests that the misfit between the European and French conception of democracy is less developed than one might believe.     

Implementation Deficit — Why Member States do not Comply with EU directives?

This article discusses factors effecting the implementation of European policies at the national level. Four main independent variables are distinguished: political institutions, the degree of corporatism, citizens' support for the EU, and political culture in the member states. The impacts of these variables on the success of implementing EU directives in ten policy areas are then tested with the multiple regression model. The results suggest that political culture and the design of political institutions in the member states had the most significant impact on implementation behavior. Countries with a high level of trust and political stability combined with efficient and flexible political institutions had the most success in implementing European policies.