When Ballot Issues Matter: Social Issue Ballot Measures and Their Impact on Turnout

Evidence for whether direct democracy positively affects turnout is mixed, which can be attributed to a theoretical ambiguity about the proper way to measure the institution. The most common measure, a count of the number of initiatives on the ballot, is incomplete, because it unrealistically assumes that all propositions have an equal impact on turnout and focuses exclusively on initiatives. These deficiencies are addressed by looking at the issue content of all ballot measures. I find that the number of social issues on the ballot, because they are highly salient, tap into existing social cleavages, help to overcome barriers to voting, and fit within a framework of expressive choice, had a positive impact on turnout for all midterm and some presidential elections since 1992. In contrast to previous findings, however, the total number of propositions on the ballot was rarely associated with an increase in turnout. I discuss the implications of these findings in the conclusion.     

Mobilizing different types of voters: The influence of campaign intensity on turnout in direct democratic votes

A well-established body of literature links voter turnout to political campaigns. In this view, intensive campaigns increase the perceived salience of a decision, fostering information-seeking and, ultimately, turnout. The existing literature has also advanced our understanding of how direct democratic institutions influence turnout in elections. Yet we still know little about whether and to what extent campaign efforts influence voter turnout in direct democratic votes, and we know even less about who is mobilized. We claim that campaign intensity has differentiated effects across voters, depending on voters’ participation profile. To test this claim we use a rich dataset of official turnout data covering more than 40 direct democratic votes in Switzerland. The results support our claim. While intensive political campaigns overall foster citizens to turn out to vote, they do so especially for “selective” (or “intermittent”) voters, who need to decide anew at each ballot whether to turn out or not. Interestingly, we also find that frequent abstainers are not immune from campaign effects, and get almost as strongly mobilized as selective voters in highly intensive campaigns.     

In the Eye of the Beholder? Motivated Reasoning in Disputed Elections

This study uses an experimental design to simulate the ballot counting process during a hand-recount after a disputed election. Applying psychological theories of motivated reasoning to the political process, we find that ballot counters’ party identification conditionally influences their ballot counting decisions. Party identification’s effect on motivated reasoning is greater when ballot counters are given ambiguous, versus specific, instructions for determining voter intent. This study’s findings have major implications for ballot counting procedures throughout the United States and for the use of motivated reasoning in the political science literature.     

Changes in the menu of manipulation: Electoral fraud,ballot stuffing,and voter pressure in the 2011 Russian election

Vote-buying and voter intimidation are costly, complicated, and risky ways to manage elections. Why, then, do hybrid regimes utilize such tactics rather than ballot stuffing or election falsification? Such methods to mobilize voters require the construction of patronage networks that can be used to mobilize or demobilize clients beyond the election, and to display the incumbent's organizational strength. These networks are most valuable in places where opposition groups are active; consequently direct voter pressure should be more common in competitive areas. This paper uses data from Russia's 83 regions during the 2011 election to compare patterns of extra-legal mobilization with patterns of ballot stuffing and falsification. I conclude that local political competitiveness structures the mix of electoral manipulation tactics employed.     

Supersized votes: ballot length, uncertainty, and choice in direct legislation elections

Voters in polities that make heavy use of direct democracy are frequently confronted with ballots that contain a multitude of propositions. Claims that direct legislation elections overwhelm voters with choices they are not competent to make should particularly apply to such demanding settings. Yet, evidence on the effects of lengthy ballots on voting behavior is scant. This study reviews theories of decision-making under uncertainty, and tests their predictions in a mixed heteroscedastic model of vote choice that is fitted to a unique collection of survey and contextual data on Swiss referendums. Increasing ballot length is demonstrated to interfere with the voters’ ability to translate their political preferences into consistent policy choices.     

Stumbling block or stepping stone? The influence of direct democracy on individual participation in parliamentary elections

This paper evaluates whether direct democracy supplements or undermines traditional representative democracy. While a first approach assumes that a culture of active direct democracy stimulates citizens’ political interest and ultimately bolsters participation in parliamentary elections, a competing hypothesis proposes a negative relationship between the frequency of ballot measures and electoral participation due to voter fatigue and decreased significance of elections. Our multilevel analysis of the 26 Swiss cantons challenges recent studies conducted for the U.S. states: In the Swiss context, where direct democracy is more important in the political process than the less salient parliamentary elections, greater use of direct democratic procedures is associated with a lower individual probability to participate in elections. Furthermore, by distinguishing between short and long-term effects of direct democracy, we show that the relationship observed is of a long-term nature and can therefore be seen as a result of adaptive learning processes rather than of instantaneous voter fatigue.     

The inconsequence of negative statehouse evaluations on ballot measures: Evidence from survey experiments

Existing scholarship about ballot measure voting and elite cuegivers suggests that the express endorsement of an unpopular legislature on a statewide ballot measure will depress voter support. Despite seven tests across two decades on both high- and low-profile measures, it did not. This null finding is in keeping with macro-level patterns of strong public support for the more than 4000 legislative referrals approved by voters in the past century. Consequently, we propose that the influence of an elite endorsement on voter behavior is more complicated than past research suggests. Specifically, in keeping with the seminal observation made by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1995) that American political cynicism is more a matter of distaste for certain political practices than for actual political institutions, we suspect that when voters are overwhelmed by policy proposals that are both unfamiliar and complex, they may find assurance in the imprimatur of their General Assembly.     

“Racial Threat”, Partisan Climate, and Direct Democracy: Contextual Effects in Three California Initiatives

Does context—racial, economic, fiscal, and political—affect whites’ votes on racially-related ballot propositions? We examine non-Hispanic whites’ voting behavior on three California ballot initiatives: Propositions 187, 209, and 227. Unlike previous analyses that lacked individual-level data and were therefore limited to ecological inference, we combine individual-level data from exit polls with county-level contextual variables in a hierarchical linear model. Racial/ethnic context affected whites’ votes only on Proposition 187, economic context had no influence on vote choice, and the effect of fiscal context was limited to Proposition 227. However, across the propositions, whites’ decisions were shaped by their political context. Thus, we do not find support for the “racial threat” hypothesis across all racially-charged issues.     

Do politicians anticipate voter control? A comparative study of representatives’ accountability beliefs

Representation literature is rife with the assumption that politicians are responsive to voter preferences because their re-election is contingent upon the approval of those voters, approval that can be won by furthering their desires or, similarly, that can be threatened by ignoring their wishes. Hence, scholars argue that the anticipation of electoral accountability by politicians constitutes a crucial guarantor of (policy) responsiveness; as long as politicians believe that voters are aware of what they do and will take it into account on election day, they are expected to work hard at keeping these voters satisfied. If, on the other hand, politicians were to think what they say and do is inconsequential for citizens’ voting behaviour, they may see leeway to ignore their preferences. In this study, we therefore examine whether politicians anticipate electoral accountability in the first place. In particular, we ask 782 Members of Parliament in Belgium, Germany, Canada and Switzerland in a face-to-face survey about the anticipation of voter control; whether they believe that voters are aware of their behaviour in parliament and their personal policy positions, are able to evaluate the outcomes of their political work, and, finally, whether this knowledge affects their vote choice. We find that a sizable number of MPs believe that voters are aware of what they do and say and take that into account at the ballot box. Still, this general image of rather strong anticipation of voter control hides considerable variation; politicians in party-centred systems (in Belgium and some politicians in Germany that are elected on closed party lists), anticipate less voter control compared to politicians in more candidate-centred systems (Canada and Switzerland). Within these countries, we find that populist politicians are more convinced that voters know about their political actions and take this knowledge into account in elections; it seems that politicians who take pride in being close to voters (and their preferences), also feel more monitored by these voters. Finally, we show that politicians’ views of voter control do not reflect the likelihood that they might be held to account; politicians whose behaviour is more visible and whose policy profile should therefore be better known to voters do not feel the weight of voter control more strongly.     

Election closeness and voter turnout: Evidence from California ballot propositions

This paper uses a new data set of 885 California ballot propositions from 1912 through 1990 to test the hypothesis that voter turnout increases as an election becomes closer. Various measures of voter participation are regressed on various measures of election closeness. The main finding is that there is not a systematic relation between closeness and turnout. Two conclusions are drawn: (1) voters are not sensitive to the probability their votes are decisive, and (2) other studies which found higher turnout for close elections probably detected an increased mobilization of party elites in tight races.     

What citizens learn from elections: The normative consequences of voter eligibility

Advocates of innovations for ways to expand citizens’ political participation claim that institutions that require more in-depth participation than voting are required to attain a democratic system with profound civic engagement. They often base this claim on the assumption that elections fail to encourage citizens to be socially and politically involved. In this paper I challenge this assumption by exploring whether voter eligibility reinforces the notion that a good citizen participates in politics. Applying a regression discontinuity design that uses the voting-age restriction as the threshold, I find that voter eligibility boosts support for extensive (non-electoral) forms of political participation. Hence, I argue that the importance of elections should not be underestimated in the quest for societies with civic-minded citizens.     

Mobilizing Interests: Group Participation and Competition in Direct Democracy Elections

We examine group mobilization in direct democracy elections by assessing the conditions under which interests will actively support or oppose ballot measures. Motivating our analysis is that the decision to mobilize is driven by the costs and benefits of group participation, a calculus shaped by issue characteristics, state political institutions, and the electoral context. Using data from initiative and referendum measures appearing on statewide ballots from 2003 to 2008, we find that ballot measures involving social and tax issues are likely to produce competition among groups and increase the overall number of groups involved. In addition, we find that group competition and levels of mobilization increased in response to how difficult it would be for the legislature to undo the change brought about from passage of a ballot measure. Lastly, group competition and levels of mobilization increased for ballot measures appearing in nonpresidential election years and for ballot measures featuring a close election. Taken together, our results suggest that groups engage strategically in direct democracy elections to pursue a mix of policy and political goals.     

Candidate Cues and Voter Confidence in American Elections

A primary objective of election administration is ensuring voter confidence. Logically, this entails meeting two conditions: procedures should insure that elections are fair and accurate, and voters should be aware of the procedures. Yet American election procedures such as ballot access and design, post-election audits and recounts, voter registration, and polling place operations are complex and highly decentralized. Given the complexity of the information environment and the relatively limited information most voters have about politics, what (if any) connection is there between election administration and voter confidence? We consider whether candidates fill the gap between election administration and voter confidence in elections. We test several hypotheses using an experimental design with multiple measures of voter confidence. The results show that candidates have a significant effect on voter confidence.     

Voter Choice in the 1995 French Presidential Election

This study estimates a model of voter choice for the first and second ballots of the 1995 French Presidential election. Its objective is to characterize the relative importance of traditional bases of French voter choice such as social class relative to campaign issues and voter evaluations of the economy. The study also seeks to identify candidate-specific bases of voter choice. Multinomial logit analysis of voter choice among the four leading candidates reveals a stronger role for campaign issues than previous studies suggest. Voter-candidate ideological proximity is the strongest predictor of first and second ballot choice, followed by voter perceptions of candidate ability to address unemployment and political corruption. Demographic variables have limited explanatory power in both the first and second ballot models. The parameter estimates demonstrate considerable differences in the bases of voter choice across candidates, with the bases of voter choice for National Front leader Jean-Marie le Pen most distinct from those of the remaining candidates.     

Dual ballot effects on French presidential vote choice

Relatively little is known about how voters behave under dual ballot voting systems. Do voters follow different decision rules at each ballot? Do they weigh relevant considerations differently on the second ballot, as compared to the first ballot? Does political sophistication condition the way people vote on the first and second ballots? Using survey data from five French presidential elections, we examine these questions and find that voters in France do indeed treat first and second ballots differently. More precisely, we find that both partisanship and ideology matter more on the second ballot. Demographics, socioeconomic status, and political issues, on the other hand, weigh more heavily in the first round. Political sophistication, for its part, does not condition nor reinforce these effects.     

Popular Politics and the Ukrainian Presidential Election of 2004

Ukraine's Orange Revolution in 2004 upset the consensus amongst political scientists about Ukrainian voter behaviour, challenging the notion of voter passivity. Careful pre-election planning that anticipated falsification of the ballot brought protesters to Kyiv rapidly. Sustained and overwhelming pressure from protesters eventually forced through constitutional and electoral reforms that led to the democratic resolution of the crisis.     

Estimating the unintended participation penalty under top-two primaries with a discontinuity design

Participation in U.S. elections lags behind most of its developed, democratic peers. Reformers seeking to increase voter turnout often propose changes to the electoral system as means of addressing these shortcomings. One such reform, the top-two blanket primary, has been adopted in California and Washington in part to boost voter participation. Despite the promises of reformers, however, observers disagree as to its efficacy. In this paper, I estimate the participation penalty generated by top-two primaries using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). I estimate that general elections featuring two members of the same party – the arrangement reformers contend would increase turnout – actually decrease voter participation. I find that approximately 7% of voters “roll off” the ballot in the absence of party competition while overall turnout is unaffected. These results suggest that top-two primaries are likely to exacerbate rather than ameliorate trends in participation.     

Self-deception as the root of political failure

I consider models of political failure based on self-deception. Individuals discard free information when that information damages their self-image and thus lowers their utility. More specifically, individuals prefer to feel good about their previously chosen affiliations and shape their worldviews accordingly. This model helps explain the relative robustness of political failure in light of extensive free information, and it helps explain the rarity of truth-seeking behavior in political debate. The comparative statics predictions differ from models of either Downsian or expressive voting. For instance, an increased probability of voter decisiveness does not necessarily yield a better result. I also consider political parties as institutions and whether political errors cancel in the aggregate. I find that political failure based on self-deception is very difficult to eliminate.     

Too much choice,too little impact: a multilevel analysis of the contextual determinants of preference voting

Abstract

Despite the rich and growing body of research addressing how turnout and party choice depend on the institutional context, far less is known about the impact of the political environment on voters’ propensity to vote for candidates – not parties. Recent single-country studies have focused almost exclusively on individual-level resource- and identity-based differences in preference voting. Combining data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and Participation and Representation in Modern Democracies (PARTIREP) election studies in six countries, this article provides the first comprehensive, cross-national test of the impact of macro-contextual factors on a voter’s decision to indicate a candidate preference, instead of simply casting a party list vote. It demonstrates that both the failure of preference votes to affect the allocation of seats and choice overload dissuade voters from marking a candidate name on the ballot. These contextual factors affect informed and uninformed voters differently, moreover. The findings have important implications for electoral scholars and political practitioners when designing electoral systems.