ASSESSING POLICY DIVERGENCE: HOW TO INVESTIGATE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A LAW AND A CORRESPONDING REGULATION

Policy designs are selected to achieve specific policy outcomes. The policy process, however, contains multiple junctures when a policy's design may diverge from its original intents. Despite this fact, few theoretically valid and methodologically reliable approaches exist to assess policy divergence as it occurs during the policy process. This article presents a method for assessing policy divergence during implementation with a comparative analysis of a legislative law and corresponding regulation. The case analysed is US organic food policy in the 1990 Organic Foods Production Act and 2002 National Organic Program regulation. The article draws theoretical leverage from Mazmanian and Sabatier's implementation framework and methodological leverage from the institutional analysis and development framework. The analysis indicates that the designs of both policies are fairly robust with relatively minor divergence. The conclusion discusses the gains and challenges in developing a comparative approach to studying policy designs and assessing policy divergence.     

ENGLISH METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT SINCE ABOLITION: AN EVALUATION OF THE ABOLITION OF THE ENGLISH METROPOLITAN COUNTY COUNCILS

The Local Government Act 1985 abolished the Greater London Council (GLC) and the six English metropolitan county councils (MCCS); but it did not abolish the services for which they were responsible. It transferred them: some directly to the lower-tier borough or district councils, others to a variety of joint boards, joint committees, residuary bodies, and special purpose agencies. As a result, there are, in at least some of the former MCC areas, many services still operated wholly or partially on a county-wide basis. The first part of this article compares the contrasting approaches adopted in the six metropolitan areas to the retention or re-creation of county-wide services after abolition. The second part attempts to explain these contrasting approaches: why, for instance, significantly more county-wide institutional arrangements were voluntarily negotiated by the districts in West Yorkshire and Greater Manchester than by those in South Yorkshire and Merseyside.     

THE EU AS LAWMAKER: THE IMPACT OF EU DIRECTIVES ON NATIONAL REGULATION IN THE NETHERLANDS

The impact of European directives on Dutch regulation is fairly limited when compared to the claims that are made by academics and politicians. We found that 12.6 per cent of all parliamentary acts, 19.7 per cent of all orders in council, and 10.1 per cent of all valid ministerial decisions were actually rules transposing EU directives. The total overall impact for all three types of legislation was 12.6 per cent. Departments generally employ the same type of rules in similar proportions both when transposing EC directives and when producing national rules. Departmental autonomy is a defining feature of Dutch central government in general, and this pattern persists in the coordination and implementation of EU directives. Nearly 90 per cent of the European directives in The Netherlands are transposed through delegated legislation in which no involvement of parliament is required. If we take into account the fact that the majority of formal laws are actually drafted by the executive and submitted to parliament, we could easily state that virtually all national rules that transpose European directives into the Dutch legal system are drafted by the executive.     

POWER, STRATEGY AND GAMES: ECONOMIC REGULATION OF A PRIVATIZED UTILITY

This article rejects conventional 'rational actor' models of economic regulation in favour of a focus on processes of resource exchange and dependence. Using a case-study of Yorkshire Water it identifies the membership and structure of the regulatory arena, the resources available to regulatory actors, the 'rules of the game', and the strategies adopted by regulator and regulated. It highlights the structurally privileged position of investors in water regulation and concludes that decision-making excludes customer interests; decisions are made by professional actors on the basis of co-operation and consensus; the regulator is relatively weak and depends on companies compliance to maintain its own legitimacy; and large companies have a great range of strategic options in pursuit of regulatory advantage.     

INDEPENDENT REGULATORY BODIES AND IMPOSSIBLE JOBS: THE FAILURE OF GERMAN PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING REGULATION

This case study takes the rise and fall of licence fee indexation within German public service regulation as an example and traces mechanisms of re‐politicization of independent regulatory agencies (IRAs). According to the evidence, agency contestation is likely when: (1) administrative cultures result in incoherencies in institutional design; (2) IRAs deal with redistribution; (3) conflicts about principles of regulation persist; (4) IRAs pursue one particular regulatory ideology; (5) controversial regulatory output is highly visible; and (6) affected interests are not given a say. The article points to the relevance of new regulatory technologies that are likely to embody regulatory bias. Moreover, it seems that successful contestation of IRAs requires the conjunction of escalating factors. Nevertheless, such contestation might not result in a return to old modes of command and control.     

'RATIONAL'SOCIAL REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE COST ASSESSMENT

Since 1985 the UK government has promoted the use of compliance cost assessment (CCA) in order to quantify the impact on business of proposed new regulations. The strategy has arisen in response to a perception that there has been a tendency to overregulate, and it currently forms part of a wider deregulation initiative. The paper reviews this development, contrasting it with the use of regulatory impact assessment in the US and examining the extent to which it encourages'rational'social regulation. The authors conclude that, while the process of regulation may have become more informed as a result of the production of cca s, the exercise is narrowly focused. As a consequence, its role in improving the rationality of the legislative process is likely to be limited.     

IRELAND, NORTHERN IRELAND AND 1992: THE BARRIERS TO TECHNOCRATIC ANTI-PARTITIONISM

This article examines the likely effects of 1992 on the relationship between the Republic and Northern Ireland. In particular, it seeks to assess the strategy of undermining partition through economic integration. After looking at the positions of the advocates of such a strategy and of its opponents, the difficulties in the way of the successful pursuit of such a policy are examined. These are: the extent to which the Single European Act will be made fully operative; the economic limits on cross-border cooperation; the administrative and governmental difficulties of pursuing cross-border cooperation; and the degree to which the political and cultural foundations of partition are independent of the economy. The article concludes with the argument that these barriers are such that a reliance on the pressures generated by the Single European Act and on a purely technocratic strategy of cross-border cooperation will not be sufficient to alter the constitutional relationship between the Republic and Northern Ireland.     

ORGANIZATIONAL STRATEGY,EXTERNAL REGULATION AND PUBLIC SERVICE PERFORMANCE

We test the separate and joint effects of strategy and regulation on public service performance. Strategy is measured as the extent to which service providers are prospectors, defenders and reactors. Regulation is assessed on the basis of the number of inspection events and service managers’ perceptions of the supportiveness of regulators. We find that, controlling for prior performance and the level of service expenditure, prospecting is a more successful strategy than defending or reacting. In addition, inspection events generally disrupt the relationship between strategy and performance, but regulation that is supportive reinforces this relationship. The evidence suggests that the impact of organizational strategies in the public sector is contingent on the characteristics of regulatory regimes.     

BLAMING THE VICTIM; THE ROLE OF DECISION-MAKERS IN THE OCCURRENCE OF ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE

ABSTRACT

Past research on environmental justice concerns has focused primarily on the siting of hazardous waste facilities. Less research has been done on other aspects of environmental policy in which concerns of racial or other injustices arise. This study shows that environmental injustice is not limited to the sitting of hazardous facilities or the occurrence of pollution, but occurs also at the policy formation and implementation stages in other areas such as solid waste management. To study this issue, this study focuses on the implementation of the Illinois Solid Waste Management Act of 1988, in two counties in north-eastern Illinois, Kankakee and Will. In neither of the two counties were minorities included in the planning process, and out of a total of 91 advisory committee members, minority interests were represented by only one black male. At the same time racial minorities made up about 15 percent of the total population in the two counties.

The study shows that the main reason for this lack of representation is not a lack of environmental concern among blacks. Nor can it be explained by a lack of interest in participation in environmental decision-making among blacks. Rather, the study shows that the process is led by misconceptions among planners and decision-makers who generally believe that blacks are not interested in environmental issues and therefore not interested in participating in environmental decision-making. The conclusion of this study is that it is the belief held by local planners and decision-makers that there is a lack of interest in environmental issues among blacks, that produced a planning process in which the interest of minorities were not represented.     

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION FOR MINISTERS: THE MINIS SYSTEM IN THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ENVIRONMENT

MINIS, a management information system for ministers in the Department of the Enviroment, was introduced by Michael Heseltine in 1980. The article summarizes the main features of the system and analyses some of the issues arising from its introduction, in particular, whether it is likely to be adopted by other government departments or public bodies. The reasons offered by departments as to why it is difficult to transfer are examined, together with other factors which are likely to inhibit transfer to other public sector bodies. The mechanism for promoting the spread of such systems is also discussed. The conclusion is that MINIS ought to be considered by other bodies and it has almost certainly already had some impact on systems elsewhere in central government, but without a central initiative, more widespread adoption is on past evidence unlikely, although parts of it may be adopted.     

REGULATION AS SOCIAL POLICY: HOME EVICTIONS AND REPOSSESSIONS IN THE UK AND SWEDEN

This article asks how the UK and Sweden regulate, prevent, or mitigate the consequences of mortgage‐related household eviction and repossession. Contrary to initial expectations, the findings show a growth and diversity in both regulation and social spending in the UK intended to address this social issue; something that has not occurred in Sweden. In the UK's liberal ‘regulatory welfare regime’, the aim is to prevent the eviction and repossession of vulnerable borrowers who have defaulted on their housing loan. In the Swedish social democratic ‘regulatory welfare regime’, effort focuses instead on minimizing the risk of default before it occurs rather than after the fact. These findings offer a more nuanced understanding of the relations between regulation and welfare more generally, demonstrating that regulation may be used as a form of social policy once the welfare state has failed, as a safety net of last resort.     

SELF‐REGULATION WITHIN THE REGULATORY STATE: TOWARDS A NEW REGULATORY PARADIGM?

An emerging feature of the modern regulatory state in Britain and elsewhere is the promotion of self‐regulation. This paper examines the relationship between the state and self‐regulation in the context of the challenge of meeting public interest objectives. It draws on research on the policy and practice of self‐regulation in recent years in Britain. The paper argues that the institutions, processes and mechanisms of the modern regulatory state and the ‘better regulation’ agenda in Britain, notably those that aim to foster transparency and accountability, can assist in the achievement of public interest objectives in self‐regulatory schemes. We conclude that a ‘new regulatory paradigm’ can be put forward which involves a form of regulatory ‘subsidiarity’, whereby the achievement of regulatory outcomes can be delegated downwards to the regulated organizations and self‐regulatory bodies while being offset by increasing public regulatory oversight based on systems of accountability and transparency.     

ON THE BUREAUCRACY OF BUREAUCRACIES: ANALYSING THE SIZE AND ORGANIZATION OF OVERHEAD IN PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

Governments across the globe try to rebalance their budgets by rationalizing overhead operations. When overhead‐reducing policies are adopted, it is important to understand why some central government organizations have a higher overhead than others, and why organizational models to produce overhead efficiencies are used to different degrees. This study focuses on the Flemish context to analyse differences between central government organizations in the size and organization of two overhead processes: human resources management (HRM) and finance and control (FIN). Significant effects are found for autonomy, organizational size, spatial dispersion and budgetary stress, yet effects vary according to whether HRM or FIN is considered and whether the focus is on the size or the organization of HRM or FIN. Our findings have practical implications to get a process‐sensitive understanding of the size and organization of overhead, and theoretical implications as they cast light on factors that shape decision‐making in public organizations.     

MECHANISMS AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM: ITALIAN CASES OF BETTER REGULATION AND DIGITALIZATION

This article applies a processual approach to the explanation of administrative reform in Italy over fifteen years. By carrying out a comparison between better regulation and digitalization policies it shows that the oscillation in the level of implementation over time and across policies can be explained by the intensity and direction of spillover and certification mechanisms and that in turn these mechanisms are activated by design features and contextual factors at different levels of analysis.     

SCRUTINIZE ME,PLEASE! THE DRIVERS,MANIFESTATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY‐SEEKING BEHAVIOUR

Voluntary accountability, where people and organizations willingly subject themselves to scrutiny, seems counterintuitive. The common understanding is that increased accountability has negative consequences for the accountor; and so why would anyone voluntarily seek accountability when it is not required? Current explanations hold that external pressures can explain accountability‐seeking behaviour, and the proponents are not convinced by the argument that it is beneficial to the accountor. In contrast, this study finds that accountability often serves the accountor's interests. A six‐part typology of accountor‐beneficial motivations is developed, the empirical adequacy of which is tested through extensive case studies. The results show that public accountability can be a means rather than a burden in the hands of political executive leaders. These findings challenge the conventional principal–agent understanding of accountability and suggest that the study of the poorly understood practice of democratic accountability would benefit from a more leader‐centric perspective.     

REGULATION BY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

Executive Order 12291 requires that all US federal executive agency regulations should pass a cost-benefit test before promulgation. The Reagan Administration's procedures for implementing the Order are described and the strengths and problems of using cost-benefit analysis to restrain and reform regulation are examined. The article then goes on to examine the feasibility of introducing a similar cost-benefit approach in Britain. It is concluded that, apart from the inherent practical and administrative difficulties of using cost-benefit, its introduction would pose special problems. Radical changes would have to be made in British central administration, in judicial training and attitudes and in regulatory law if cost-benefit testing was to be used in anything other than an ad hoc form.     

THE IMPACT OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ON WHITEHALL

This article examines whether the UK Freedom of Information Act 2000 has changed Whitehall. Based on a two‐year, ESRC‐funded study, it evaluates the impact of FOI on five characteristics of the Whitehall model: the culture of secrecy, ministerial accountability to Parliament, civil service neutrality, the Cabinet system, and effective government. Proponents of FOI hoped that government would be less secretive, more accountable and more effective; critics feared that civil servants would lose their anonymity, and collective Cabinet responsibility would be undermined. Drawing on interviews, media analysis, case law and official documents, the article finds that the impact of FOI is modest at most. It is not powerful enough to do much good or much ill, and the feared ‘chilling effect' on candour and record‐keeping has not materialized. Leaks do more damage than FOI disclosures. But ministers remain apprehensive about the effect of FOI on Cabinet records and discussions.     

TEN YEARS AFTER: THE US CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET AND IMPOUNDMENT CONTROL ACT OF 1974

The reformed congressional budget process is no longer new. This fact alone invites an assessment of the experience of budgeting under the procedures enacted in 1974. But there is a more pressing reason for undertaking such an assessment. Today, there is widespread unhappiness with the congressional budget process. In recent years the deadlines of the budget process have repeatedly not been met, resulting in incomplete budgeting and the proliferation of proposals to abolish or reform the budget procedures enacted in 1974.
Consequently, this paper will first outline the reformed budget procedures and establish the goals of the 1974 Budget Act. The second section assesses whether the goals of budget reform have been achieved. In short, the answer is a negative one. The third section explains why the goals of budget reform have not been met, and the final section evaluates the main proposals advanced for changing the budget process.     

THE CAMPAIGN FOR FREEDOM OF INFORMATION: A PARTICIPATORY CHALLENGE TO ELITIST BRITISH GOVERNMENT

The proponents of freedom of information have, since the 1970s, sponsored successive Private Members bills seeking to liberalize Section Two of the Official Secrets Act. Until recently they have had no success. Indeed, the latest Official Secrets Act, which replaces Section Two, represents, in large part, further government determination to control information. Yet some limited success has recently been achieved, for example, in the areas of local government, personal files and environmental safety. This article seeks to explain both the successes and failures of the Campaign for Freedom of Information, and assess prospects for the future. First, the durability of official secrecy is considered, through demonstrating its consistency with governmental and representational principles upon which British government stands. Those underlying freedom of information on the other hand, are in conflict with the British political tradition. The progress of certain 'limited bills furthered by the campaign is then followed. By distinguishing between qualitatively different aspects of freedom of information and British government, the price extracted by government for legislative success can be seen to demonstrate that 'freedom of information' is compatible with 'low politics', but 'open government' conflicts fundamentally with the 'high politics' concerns of British government.     

DIFFUSION OF STANDARDS: THE IMPORTANCE OF SIZE,REGION AND EXTERNAL PRESSURES IN DIFFUSION PROCESSES

Organizational standards or guidelines, although commonly applied in public sector organizations, are rarely studied systematically. We report insights gained here into the circumstances present when organizations adopt standards by studying the diffusion of the Common Language Standard (CLS). Neo‐institutional organization theory constitutes the theoretical framework, which highlights the empirical phenomenon that standards occasionally spread extremely rapidly to some – but not all – organizations within the same field. Empirical evidence from quantitative surveys of civil servants and elected officials in Danish municipalities is used to analyse the field and organizational levels. The levels of external pressure and organizational resources are important in order to understand why some municipal organizations have adopted the CLS whereas others have not. We find that the initial source of the standard as well as regional pressure play a strong role, something which contradicts other studies indicating that diffusion from organization to organization is more significant.