TOWARD A BIFURCATED THEORY OF EMOTIONAL DETERRENCE

Since Hobbes (1957 [1651] and Beccaria (1963 [1764]), scholars have theorized that the emotion of fear is critical for deterrence. Nevertheless, contemporary deterrence researchers have mostly overlooked the distinction between perceived sanction risk and fear of apprehension. Whereas perceived risk is a cognitive judgment, fear involves visceral feelings of anxiety or dread. Equally important, a theory explicating the influence of deterrence on both criminal propensity and situational offending has remained elusive. We develop a theoretical model in which perceived risk and fear are distinguished at both the general and situational levels. We test this theoretical model with data from a set of survey‐based experiments conducted in 2016 with a nationwide sample of adults (N = 965). We find that perceived risk and fear are empirically distinct and that perceived risk is positively related to fear at both the general and situational levels. Certain background and situational factors have indirect effects through perceived risk on fear. In turn, perceived risk has indirect effects through fear on both criminal propensity and situational intentions to offend. Fear's inclusion increases explanatory power for both criminal propensity and situational offending intentions. Fear is a stronger predictor than either self‐control or prior offending of situational intentions to offend.     

人民主权的观念结构 重读卢梭《社会契约论》

<正> 人民主权是卢梭最伟大的政治理论贡献,集中阐述该原则的著作是《社会契约论》。本文尝试把人民主权作为一个政治的道德原则来理解,解读其观念结构,文本范围基本局限于《社会契约论》的第一卷和第二卷的前半部分。卢梭试图把自由和主权置于一个统一的结构,把主权建立在个人自由的道德基础上,并在主权之下实现全体人的自由,从而在纯粹世俗的意义上把政治权力提升为神圣的权利,克服政     

UNDERSTANDING CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THEORY AND PRACTICE

This article discusses the meaning of children's rights in the context of the European Convention on Human Rights and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. Both place primary responsibility for the upbringing and education of children on their parents and families. The freedom of parents to bring up their children in their own way is an important component of a liberal democracy founded on respect for individual differences. So if parents believe in moderate corporal punishment as a means of educating their children in their own religious beliefs, is the state justified in banning such punishment either in school or in the home in order to protect the children's rights? This article discusses the children's rights which are protected by doing so.     

CITIZEN GUN OWNERSHIP AND CRIMINAL DETERRENCE: THEORY,RESEARCH, AND POLICY*

Research on the general and specific deterrents emanating from citizenowned firearms is examined under assumptions about deterrence. Only slight and indirect empirical evidence for deterrence exists in the area of citizen gun ownership. The crime-reducing effects associated with public policies that support civilian gun ownership are balanced in light of other, negative public health factors associated with citizen-owned guns.     

TESTING A BAYESIAN LEARNING THEORY OF DETERRENCE AMONG SERIOUS JUVENILE OFFENDERS*

The effect of criminal experience on risk perceptions is of central importance to deterrence theory but has been vastly understudied. This article develops a realistic Bayesian learning model of how individuals will update their risk perceptions over time in response to the signals they receive during their offending experiences. This model implies a simple function that we estimate to determine the deterrent effect of an arrest. We find that an individual who commits one crime and is arrested will increase his or her perceived probability of being caught by 6.3 percent compared with if he or she had not been arrested. We also find evidence that the more informative the signal received by an individual is, the more he or she will respond to it, which is consistent with more experienced offenders responding less to an arrest than less experienced offenders do. Parsing our results out by type of crime indicates that an individual who is arrested for an aggressive crime will increase both his or her aggressive crime risk perception as well as his or her income‐generating crime risk perception, although the magnitude of the former may be slightly larger. This implies that risk perception updating, and thus potentially deterrence, may be partially, although not completely, crime specific.     

CRIMES,CRIME RATES,ARRESTS, AND ARREST RATIOS: IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE THEORY*

The relationship between crimes and arrests is one of the central issues in deterrence theory. There are several conceptual difficulties in attempting to assess whether arrests deter crimes or the number of crimes determine the number of arrests. These problems are compounded when rates are used to measure both variables. The issue is whether criminals respond to arrests or the police respond to changes in crime. The present analysis compares regression results when the variables are measured both as rates and raw numbers for three offenses: homicide, robbery, and burglary. The results indicate that arrests follow crimes. This suggests the need to reexamine some studies that argue that criminals’perceptions of arrest rates are an indication of deterrence.     

PERSONAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL CONTROL: THE DETERRENCE IMPLICATIONS OF A THEORY OF INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN CRIMINAL OFFENDING*

A large and growing literature links stable individual differences established early in life to deviant behavior through the life course. This literature challenges basic premises of modern sociological and economic theories of deviance that emphasize explanatory factors that are more proximate in time and external to the individual. In this paper we present and test a theory designed to link rational choice and social control theories with two leading examples of theories that emphasize stable individual differences (Wilson and Herrnstein, 1985; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). Based on appeals to the economic theory of investment, we argue that individuals who are more present oriented and self-centered invest less in social bonds and therefore are less deterred from committing crime by the possibility of damage to such bonds. Thus, our theory, which builds from key constructs of the Gottfredson-Hir-schi and Wilson-Herrnstein theories, departs from those theories with the contention that social control does matter.     

MISSING THE MARK: REFLECTIONS ON GREENBERG'S COMMENT*

Greenberg's (2003) Comment fails to address the substance or spirit of “The Privatization of Violence.”     

INTEGRATING CELERITY,IMPULSIVITY, AND EXTRALEGAL SANCTION THREATS INTO A MODEL OF GENERAL DETERRENCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE*

We propose a model that integrates the extralegal consequences from conviction and impulsivity into the traditional deterrence framework. The model was tested with 252 college students, who completed a survey concerning drinking and driving. Key findings include the following: (1) Although variation in sanction certainty and severity predicted offending, variation in celerity did not; (2) the extralegal consequences from conviction appear to be at least as great a deterrent as the legal consequences; (3) the influence of sanction severity diminished with an individual's “present‐orientation”; and (4) the certainty of punishment was far more robust a deterrent to offending than was the severity of punishment.     

ON AMBIGUITY IN PERCEPTIONS OF RISK:IMPLICATIONS FOR CRIMINAL DECISION MAKING AND DETERRENCE*

Deterrence theorists and researchers have argued that the critical dimension of sanction certainty is its level—increasing the certainty of punishment from a lower to a higher level will inhibit criminal conduct. However, the true certainty of punishment is rarely known with much precision. Both Sherman (1990) and Nagin (1998) have suggested that ambiguity about the level of punishment certainty is itself consequential in the decision to commit or refrain from crime. Here, we investigate this proposition. We find some evidence that individuals are “ambiguity averse” for decisions involving losses such as criminal punishments. This finding means that a more ambiguous perceived certainty of punishment is a greater deterrent of some crimes than a nominally equivalent but less ambiguous one. However, this effect depends on how large an individual's risk certainty perception is initially. That is, we find evidence for “boundary effects” (Casey and Scholz, 1991a, 1991b) in which this effect holds for lower probabilities but reverses for higher ones. For higher detection probabilities, individuals become “ambiguity seeking” such that a less ambiguous detection probability has more deterrent value than a nominally equivalent but more ambiguous detection probability. Results are presented from two distinct, but complementary, analysis samples and empirical approaches. These samples include a survey to college students with several hypothetical choice problems and data from the Pathways to Desistance study, a longitudinal investigation of serious adolescent offenders transitioning from adolescence to young adulthood.     

UNITED STATES COURTS AND THE OPTIMAL DETERRENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CARTELS: A WELFARIST PERSPECTIVE ON EMPAGRAN

E. Hoffmann–La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. concerned aprivate antitrust suit for damages against a global vitaminscartel. The central issue in the litigation was whether foreignplaintiffs injured by the cartel's conduct abroad could bringsuit in U.S. court, an issue that was ultimately resolved inthe negative. We take a welfarist perspective on this issueand inquire whether optimal deterrence requires U.S. courtsto take subject matter jurisdiction under U.S. law for claimssuch as those in Empagran. Our analysis considers, in particular,the arguments of various economist amici in favor of jurisdictionand arguments of the U.S. and foreign government amici againstjurisdiction. We explain why the issue is difficult to resolve,and identify several economic concerns that the amici donot address, which may counsel against jurisdiction. We alsoanalyze the legal standard enunciated by the Supreme Court andapplied on remand by the D.C. Circuit, and we argue that itsfocus on "independent" harms and "proximate" causation is problematicand does not provide an adequate economic foundation for resolvingthe underlying legal issues.     

DETERRENCE AND MORAL PERSUASION EFFECTS ON CORPORATE TAX COMPLIANCE: FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL*

Previous studies on tax compliance have focused primarily on the tax‐reporting behavior of individuals. This study reports results from a randomized field test of the effects of deterrence and moral persuasion on the tax‐reporting behavior of 4,395 corporations in Israel. Two experimental groups received tax letters, one conveying a deterrent message and the other a moral persuasion message. Three types of measures are used to evaluate compliance based on the magnitude of the difference‐in‐differences of means in 1) gross sales values reported to the authority, 2) tax dollars paid to the authority, and 3) tax deductions. Overall, both deterrence and moral persuasion approaches do not produce statistically significant greater compliance compared with control conditions. These results do not support the ability of a policy of sending tax letters to increase substantively the reporting of true tax liability or tax payments by corporations. However, these results also show that moral persuasion can be counterproductive: Corporations in this experimental group show an increase rather than a decrease in tax deductions, which translates into loss of state revenues. The implications for theory, research, and tax policy are discussed.