Rural migration and agrarian reform in Russia: a research note

This study focuses primarily on trends in rural-urban migration in Russia and the former Soviet Union. "New data suggest that a historic shift in migration patterns is underway in Russia, a change that may have profound long-term effects on agrarian reform and the nature of the Russian countryside. We begin with a short review of past rural migration trends and the rural demographic situation, in part using archival data for an oblast in central Russia. We will then present new data on rural migration. Finally, we assess the implications of rural migratory trends for agrarian reform in Russia."     

Between Neoliberalism and Difference: Multiple Practices of Property in Post-Soviet Russia

Two decades of aggressive neoliberalisation in Russia has failed to produce a uniform system of private property and profit-maximising enterprises. Instead, the complex interactions of multiple ‘practices of property’ that are pre-Soviet, Soviet and post-Soviet in origin, and not private property alone, have created a diverse economic landscape. Moreover, multiple practices of property have produced both capitalist economies (such as Moscow's early capitalist enterprises) and non-capitalist, ethically guided economies (such as the indigenous enterprises of Arctic reindeer herders). The persistence of alternative economic logics in Russia illustrates the limits of the role of private property in shaping the post-Soviet economy.     

Eastward bound: A case study of post-soviet labour migration from a rural Ukrainian town

This case study uses ethnographic interviews and survey data to explore temporary work migration from Komsomolsk, a rural town in central Ukraine. At the time of the Soviet collapse, experts expected temporary work migrants to orient toward labour markets in Western Europe but our data show that in 2002 the majority of temporary migrants made trips to Russia and parts of the former Soviet Union from Komsomolsk. Women were less likely than men to engage in temporary work migration, yet those women who did migrate for work were more likely to migrate west. Men, particularly older, ethnically Russian men, sought work in the east. Ethnographic data indicate language skills and knowledge of the Russian labour market influenced migrants' choice of destination. Social contacts, such as recruiters from Russian construction firms, helped to bring Ukrainian workers east. Survey data show that younger ethnic Russians and ethnic Ukrainians from all age groups were more likely to seek work within the country or in Western job markets than in Russia.     

Russia–Kazakhstan Relations in the Early Post-Soviet Era: Explaining the Roots of Cooperation

Abstract

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan was faced with domestic conditions that made cooperation with Russia rational. Kazakhstan inherited a large ethnic Russian population and a severe economic depression. These conditions affected other countries emerging from the Soviet Union, but only Belarus matched Kazakhstan’s level of strategic cooperation with Russia. President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s dominance of Kazakhstan’s national security agenda offers a partial explanation for the cooperation, but we still need to ask what makes him different from the leaders of other post-Soviet countries that faced the same conditions. Kazakhstan’s pattern of historical development provides the key to understanding the cooperation. The timing of the country’s contact and experiences with the Russian-led empires led to a ‘dominant ally’ image of Russia that continues to decide the two countries’ relationship to the present day.     

Dugin,Eurasianism, and Central Asia

Eurasianism as a concept emerged among Russian émigrés in the 1920s, with the premise that Russia is a unique ethnic blend, primarily of Slavic and Turkic peoples. Its geopolitical implications for Russia include gravitation toward mostly Turkic Central Asia. Alexander Dugin, one of its best-known proponents, believes that the demise of the Soviet Union was simply a tragic incident. The people of the former USSR should again be united in a grand Eurasian empire, with Russia a benign and generous patron, providing its “younger brothers” clients economic largesse and defense, mostly against the predatory USA. The “orange revolutions” and the rise of Russian nationalism, for whose proponents a restored imperial presence is rather marginal, indicate that Eurasianism—along with the dream of the resurrection of the USSR—is becoming less viable.     

Democratization and Political Change as Threats to Collective Sentiments: Testing Durkheim in Russia

Durkheim argued that acute political crises result in increased homicide rates because they pose a threat to sentiments about the collective. Though crucial to Durkheim's work on homicide, this idea remains untested. The authors took advantage of the natural experiment of the collapse of the Soviet Union to examine this hypothesis. Using data from Russian regions (N = 78) and controlling for measures of anomie and other covariates, the authors estimated the association between political change and change in homicide rates between 1991 and 2000. Results indicated that regions exhibiting less support for the Communist Party in 2000 (and thus greater change in political ideals because the Party had previously exercised complete control) were regions with greater increases in homicide rates. Thus, while democratization may be a positive development relative to the Communist juggernaut of the past, it appears that the swift political change in Russia is partially responsible for the higher rates of violence there following the collapse of the Soviet Union.     

Privatization in eight former socialist countries of eastern Europe

The demise of the communism in the former Soviet Union and the satellites of Eastern Europe has created a massive shift in the economies of these countries. The new governments are dedicated to establishing democratic political institutions and free market economies, but are hampered because of lack experience, little investment capital, and inertia of their constituents in the work force Each state is undertaking the changes differently and after approximately three years into the process, it is possible to see more progress in some countries than in others. Here, we present a brief political and economic statement followed by analysis of the privatization process in Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Russia, and Ukraine as of the end of 1992 and early 1993.     

Russia and the Caucasus

Russia began moving toward the Caucasus at the end of the 16th Century. In the early 19th Century, the Tsars consolidated control over Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, but had to fight a 35‐year war against the North Caucasian mountaineers to secure control of the entire area The three Transcaucasian republics declared their independence before the collapse of the Soviet Union, but have been hard pressed to consolidate it because of Russian interference. In the North Caucasus, the Chechens declared their independence as well. Erratic Russian policies and freebooting by elements of the Russian military have resulted in disruptive intervention in all three of the Transcaucasian countries. In December 1994, Russia launched a military offensive to subdue the Chechens. The Chechens have fought back furiously, and Russia's war against them has become a domestic Afghanistan. Russia has yet to define its national interests in the Caucasus and adopt coherent policies toward the region. Until it does the area will continue to be unstable.     

从美苏之间到美欧俄之间——1989年后中东欧国家的外交战略与大国关系的互动

在中东欧国家由苏联"卫星国"向北约和欧盟成员的转变中,苏联、美国、北约、欧盟及俄罗斯对中东欧国家的政策及它们之间的关系起到了至关重要、有时甚至是决定性的作用。正是在美苏对峙格局崩溃,美国成为世界唯一的超级大国,美、欧、俄的博弈渐次展开但远未构成三足鼎立的情况下,中东欧国家以加入北约与欧盟为主要内容的"回归欧洲"战略得以确立和实施。中东欧国家加入北约和欧盟对美、欧、俄关系产生了一定的影响,但不会从根本上改变与美、欧、俄之间现有的关系格局。     

Globalization and catching-up: from recession to growth in transition economies

The transitional recession in countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has lasted much longer than expected. The legacy of the past and recent policy mistakes have both contributed to the slow progress. As structural reforms and gradual institution building have taken hold, the post-socialist economies have started to recover, with some leading countries building momentum toward faster growth. There is a possibility that in the wider context of globalization several of these emerging market economies will be able to catch up with the more advanced industrial economies in a matter of one or two generations.     

The gender base of institutional support in Lithuania,Ukraine and Russia

This literature review pertains to women's status in Soviet society. This study examined the degree to which attitudes toward established institutions, support for the reform process, and generalized political orientations significantly reflect gender differences. Regression models were tested among Russians, Ukrainians, and Orthodox believers in Russia. Gender differences were apparent in the evaluations of the Communist Party. Ukrainian women were more supportive of the Communist Party. Age was the only significant factor in Russia; increased age was associated with more positive attitudes toward the Communists. More Ukrainian and Russian women than Orthodox women believed that political reform is moving too rapidly. Less educated and higher income women were more likely to believe that reform is proceeding too rapidly. Russian men were more likely to have participated in a political rally than Russian women in the model which includes socioeconomic controls. Russians with higher education were more frequent participants in political demonstrations than Russians with less education. Ukrainian women were more likely than men to be pacifists. Over 20% of the variance in pacifism scores was explained by sex and sociodemographic factors. The author concluded that gender differences are apparent in the strength of pacifism, the frequency of participation in demonstrations, attitudes toward reform, and evaluations of the Communist Party. Russian women compared to US women did not necessarily support liberal, democratic reforms. Lithuanian women and urban women were less supportive of the status quo and established economic and political institutions compared to Russian, Ukrainian, or rural women. Women and men responded similarly at the same educational levels. Women had a more humanitarian view of the environment and peace. A four-stage stratified sample of 2336 individuals (796 in Russia, 826 in the Ukraine, and 714 in Lithuania) was used. The survey instrument was designed by a team from the University of Iowa working with Soviet scholars.     

Conflicting Patterns of Thought in the Russian Debate on Modernisation and Innovation 2008–2013

This article draws conclusions based on an analysis of the relationship between economic ideas and institutional change in Soviet and post-Soviet Russia, so far covering roughly the years from 1971 to 2007. It analyses the recent debate on economic modernisation in Russian economics. We argue that the relative failure of transition has to be seen in the context of a ‘failed transition of the mind’ and that the recent modernisation debate resembles the debate of the Brezhnev period.     

Economic effects estimation for the Eurasian Economic Union: Application of regional linear regression

This paper aims to provide a coherent analysis of the economic impact accession to the Eurasian Economic Union has had on the economies of current member states and what affect membership would have on the economy of Azerbaijan. By applying a Linear Regression Model we find that membership to this regional bloc has yielded minimal financial benefits for the existing members. However, for most states, accession has increased the trade deficit with Russia and that a membership would likely produce a similar negative outcome for Azerbaijan in addition to undermining national economic and energy policy making.     

“If You Want to Be Russian Go to the United States”

Abstract

The latest and largest group of Russian immigrants arrived in the United States after 1983, when the Soviet Union collapsed. This was the first time in over seventy years that Russia's Jews were allowed to leave Russia. Unlike many other immigrants, this group had lived in a country where little or no contact had been allowed with the outside world. Not unlike Plato's characters living in a cave, the Russian Jews saw the outside world only as it had been portrayed in Russian propaganda. Mistrust of the Soviet regime led to fantasies and confusion about it.

Understanding this group of immigrants requires knowing something of Jewish life in Russia during the last hundred years. In an enclosed, totalitarian, oppressive society, individuals developed character traits that were necessary for survival. Some of these will be discussed in this article. Lack of knowledge on the part of the immigrants as well as on the part of American human services professionals has often led to culture shock for both groups. Misunderstandings, unrealistic expectations, and difficulties with language have caused frustration, anger, and hurt.

Increased cultural knowledge has been necessary to open up communication between immigrant clients and American service providers. Many signs have begun to point the way to different attitudes and greater     

Asymmetric bilateral bargaining in the new Russian Federation: A path-dependence explanation

In this essay we identify economic and political factors that led both the federal centre and the regions in Russia first to open the process of federal bargaining and then to pursue it in the form of signing bilateral treaties, unique for each region. Many Russian politicians and most scholars of Russian politics view asymmetric bilateral bargaining as a dangerous institutional choice contributing to federal instability and potentially threatening the disintegration of Russia. We offer an alternative view. While the treaty-signing practices are actively maintained by Russian political elites, we argue that the genesis of asymmetric bilateral bargaining in Russia had a strong `path dependence' component. In particular, it was precipitated by the developments of the last period in evolution of the Soviet federalism.     

Hybrid Historical Memories in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine

Abstract

This article attempts to measure the multilayered, diverse historical memories of contemporary Ukrainians, drawing on a cluster analysis of nationwide survey data collected after the Euromaidan. A significant minority of Ukrainian citizens still gravitate toward Soviet–Russian narratives. These are not merely copies of those embraced in Russia, however; they include ambivalent ‘hybrid’ feelings of nostalgia for the Soviet Union while supporting Ukraine's independence. This article argues that historical memories of Ukrainians in the southern and eastern regions are amorphous and heterogeneous, and that the architects of the Novorossiya project failed to distinguish Soviet nostalgia from Ukrainophobia and separatist grievances.     

Conflicting Patterns of Thought in the Russian Debate on Transition: 2003–2007

This article is a continuation of two essays by the same author on Soviet and Russian economic debates between 1987 and 2002 published in Europe-Asia Studies in 2006 and 2007. In the most recent phase of these debates, between 2003 and 2007, as in previous phases, the questions raised went far beyond the usual realm of economics. The questions raised included whether Russia should attempt to become a ‘Western’ country marked by democracy and a market economy serving the individual interests of its citizens or whether it was more important to become a great power again; whether Western patterns of political and economic life are suitable for Russia or whether the attempt to import foreign institutional structures is doomed to failure, making it necessary for Russia to find her own way. The discussion here is based on a qualitative content analysis of the most important economic journals and selected monographs.     

The challenge of design of intergovernmental relations in economies in transition

The governments of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union are at a crucial juncture in their movement from highly centralized command economies to more decentralized market economies. While there is a belief in these countries that decentralization brings greater economic efficiency, the reality is that such a transition is a difficult process. This paper examines what types of administrative reforms are needed for the decentralization process, how far along the countries are with respect to these reforms, and what reforms are missing. As we discuss, many of the necessary administration reforms are missing and we argue that more attention must be paid to these elements for successful decentralization of these governments.

This paper examines the recent experience and reform needs of the key administrative aspects of the design of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition in Eastern Europe and in the former Soviet Union. There is a widespread realization in all of these countries that decentralizing government will help increase efficiency in the public sector just as privatization will improve efficiency in their economies. Decentralization of government operations is also attractive as a way to cement a democratic form of government. Despite the appearances of the existence of an already decentralized system, such as in the case of the Soviet Union, this experiment started in practically all cases with a lack of institutions and experience on how decentralized government operations should be organized.

As different as these countries are, there are many similarities in the reform process they are following in order to decentralize government structure. While the basic components of a decentralized system of government are emerging in many of these countries the structure of government has not fully evolved in a manner that can support such a decentralized system. Often, governments remain structured along a vertical hierarchy: information, budgetary authority, and revenue pass from the central government down to subnational levels of government while little communication or interaction exists at a horizontal level. In general, the assignment of revenue and expenditure has not been clearly defined among the two or three levels of government, central government transfers continue to occur in a relatively ad hoc manner, and the entire budgeting system still rests in many cases on more or less formal system of negotiations and bargaining among the different levels of government. There has been some change in this structure in certain countries. Over the last three years, both Poland and Hungary have legally increased the automony of subnational governments. In 1994 in Russia a new and more transparent system of intergovernmental grants has been established between the federal government and the regions. In 1994 also, Latvia introduced a more transparent formula-driven, transfer formula for the regional and municipal governments.

The focus of this paper is to develop a “blue print” for necessary changes in organization and administration of intergovernmental relations in countries in transition. While many experts have recently been discussing the public finance policy components of this new, evolving relationship among levels of government, less attention has been paid to the structural and administrative challenges and the information design issues that must be met in order to develop and support a system of intergovernmental relations.

The paper is organized as follows: First we review the major responsibilities and their allocation among levels of government, the assignment of revenue sources, and the system of transfers. We then turn to a discussion of the current experience of Eastern European and NIS countries in the context of the structural components of an intergovernmental fiscal system. Next, we analyze the organizational reforms that are necessary for the efficient functioning of a decentralized system of government in the economies in transition. Finally we “rate” the transition economies in relation to their current design of the system of intergovernmental relations and support mechanisms.     

Russia as a New Immigration Country: Policy Response and Public Debate

Both the Russian public and its elites were taken by surprise by the fact that Russia has become an immigration country. It has resulted in widespread anti-immigrant sentiments and inconsistency in government actions. Russian immigration politics, as well as immigration politics in liberal democracies of the West, are characterised by a wavering between protectionist and liberal laissez faire approaches. This leads to a mismatch between public rhetoric and legal decisions. However, two features seem to make the Russian situation specific: open borders with most of the countries of the former Soviet Union and omnipresent corruption. Corruption results in a discrepancy between formal (legal) decisions and informal (illegal) practices.     

Continuity and change in Russia's policy toward Central and Eastern Europe

The accession of the CEE states to NATO and the European Union has put an end to the geopolitical ambiguity and implicit insecurity in the region between Russia and the so-called ‘Old Europe’. Instead of being an area of great powers' rivalry, elements of ‘buffer belts’ lacking meaningful strategic options, objects of raw Nazi-Soviet deals, or zones under Russian occupation and domination, the three Baltic States and the Visegrad group countries became full-fledged members of the European Union and were given NATO's security guarantees. By the middle of the 2000s, one would conclude that traditional geopolitics had ended in this region.However, the changes in the strategic situation in CEE have not changed the deep rooted moving forces and long-term strategic goals of the Russian policy toward the region. Moscow seeks to have the position, as its official rhetoric says, of an ‘influential centre of a multipolar world’ that would be nearly equal to the USA, China, or the EU. With this in view Moscow seeks for the establishment of its domination over the new independent states of the former USSR and for the formation of a sphere of influence for itself in Central Eastern Europe. If it achieves these goals, then Europe may return once again to traditional geopolitics fraught with great power rivalries and permanent instabilities radiating far beyond CEE borders.Yet a few questions remain. Has Russia come to the conclusion that attempting to restore its privileged position of influence in Central-Eastern Europe is wrong? Has Russia enough power to threaten the CEE countries? How credible are NATO's security guarantees? How may Russian behavior in CEE affect a wider European geopolitical context? These questions are appropriate in the light of Russia's ‘resurgence’ as a revanchist power and because Russia is, and most probably will remain in the next five to ten years, a weighty economic and strategic factor in areas along the Western borders of the former USSR.