Paśyantī, Pratibhā, Sphoţa and Jāti: Ontology and Epistemology in the Vākyapadīya

Eli Franco has recently suggested to distinguish the two main periods in the history of Indian philosophy, i.e. the older ontological and the new epistemological. In the Vākyapadīya, however, ontology and epistemology are evidently intertwined and interrelated. In this paper ontological and epistemological features of the concepts of pa?yantī, pratibhā, spho?a and jāti are analyzed in order to demonstrate that all these concepts, while being ontologically different, are engaged in similar epistemological processes, i.e. the cognition of a verbal utterance. Thus the identification of spho?a and jāti as well as of pa?yantī and pratibhā met with in some passages of VP and the commentaries implies not the absolute identity of these concepts, but only their overlapping in the sphere of epistemology. Considering concepts of different origin in one epistemological perspective enables to escape controversies in interpretation and provides a kind of consistency in a bit but amorphous work of Bhart?hari.     

The Impact of Navya-Nyāya on Mādhva Vedānta: Vyāsatīrtha and the Problem of Empty Terms

Journal of Indian Philosophy - In this article, I explore the encounter of the Mādhva philosopher Vyāsatīrtha with the works of the Navya-Naiyāyika Ga?ge?a...     

(Close) the Door,the King (is Going): The Development of Elliptical Resolution in Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā

This paper examines three commentaries on the ?abdapariccheda in Kumārila Bha??a’s ?lokavārttika, along with the the seventeenth century Bhā??a Mīmā?sā work, the Mānameyodaya. The focus is the Mīmā?sā principle that only sentences communicate qualified meanings and Kumārila’s discussion of a potential counter-example to this claim–single words which appear to communicate such content. I argue that there is some conflict among commentators over precisely what Kumārila describes with the phrase sāmarthyād anumeyetvād, although he is most likely describing ellipsis completion through arthāpatti. The paper attempts both a cogent exegesis and philosophical evaluation of the Bhā??a Mīmā?sā view of ellipsis completion, arguing that there remain internal tensions in the account of ellipsis preferred by the Bhā??a, tensions which are not entirely resolved even by the late date of the Mānameyodaya.     

Epistemology,Logic and Metaphysics in Pre-Modern India: New Avenues for the Study of Navya-Nyāya

Journal of Indian Philosophy -     

Facing the Boundaries of Epistemology: Kumārila on Error and Negative Cognition

Kumārila’s commitment to the explanation of cognitive experiences not confined to valid cognition alone, allows a detailed discussion of border-line cases (such as doubt and error) and the admittance of absent entities as separate instances of cognitive objects. Are such absent entities only the negative side of positive entities? Are they, hence, fully relative (since a cow could be said to be the absent side of a horse and vice versa)? Through the analysis of a debated passage of the ?lokavārttika, the present article proposes a reconstruction of Kumārila’s view of the relation between erroneous cognitions and cognitions of absence (abhāva), and considers the philosophical problem of the ontological status of absence.     

The nature of the Mādhyamika trick

This paper evaluates several recent efforts to interpret the work of Nāgārjuna through the lens of modern symbolic logic. An attempt is made to uncover the premises that justify the use of symbolic logic for this purpose. This is accomplished through a discussion of (1) the historical origins of those premises in the Indian and Tibetan traditions, and (2) how such assumptions prejudice our understanding of Nāgā rjuna’s insistence that he has no “proposition” (pratijñā). Finally, the paper sets forth an alternative interpretation that takes into account the literary dimensions of Nāgārjuna’s writing.     

Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag tsang’s Charge Against Tsongkhapa’s Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s Philosophy

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramā?a—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsa?gika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramā?a (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsa?gika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramā?a in the Prāsa?gika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsa?gika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsa?gika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.     

The Soteriological Role of the ṛṣi Kapila, According to the Yuktidīpikā

A basic teaching of classical Sā?khya is that repeated embodiment is the result of an individual’s ignorance of the distinction between prak?ti and puru?a. The only exception to this is the ??i Kapila, legendary founder of Sā?khya, who was born with innate knowledge of this distinction. It is this knowledge that leads to liberation from sa?sāra when it is acquired. This brings up the question, why was Kapila incarnated in the first place? If he already possessed this knowledge, what need did he have for further experience of prak?ti’s activity? The classical commentators on the Sā?khyakārikā give various accounts of the nature and origin of Kapila, but they do not directly address this question. However, the evidence of one commentary, the Yuktidīpikā, does provide clues to the reason behind Kapila’s incarnation. In this article, I argue that the author of the Yuktidīpikā views Kapila as a direct embodiment of prak?ti’s soteriological potential for all puru?as.     

Changing Frames in Buddhist Thought: The Concept of Ākāra in Abhidharma and in Buddhist Epistemological Analysis

It has been argued that the use of the concept of ākāra—a mental “form,” “appearance” or “aspect”—in Buddhist epistemological analysis or pramā?a exhibits continuities with earlier Buddhist thinking about mental processes, in particular in Abhidharma. A detailed inquiry into uses of the term ākāra in pertinent contexts in Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmako?abhā?ya brings to light different semantic nuances and functions of this term. The characteristic use of ākāra in Buddhist epistemological discourse turns out to be continuous with only some of the nuances it has in Abhidharma. Moreover, ākāra becomes associated with novel explanatory functions in Buddhist pramā?a. These discoveries underscore the need to pay closer attention to the reuse of terms and concepts, ideas and arguments in Buddhist philosophy, and to the often subtle adaptations and transformations that formed an integral part of its history.