The paradoxes of organized crime

The paper argues that the concept of organised crime inconsistently incorporates the following notions: a) the provision of illegal goods and services and b) a criminal organization, understood as a large-scale collectivity, primarily engaged in illegal activities with a well-defined collective identity and subdivision of work among its members. Against this superimposition, the author's contention is twofold: (1) The supply of illegal commodities mainly takes place in a `disorganized' way and, due to the constraints of product illegality, no immanent tendency towards the development of large-scale criminal enterprises within illegal markets exist. (2) Some lasting large-scale criminal organizations do exist, but they are neither exclusively involved in illegal market activities, nor is their development and internal configuration the result of illegal market dynamics.For Susan Strange: mentor and friend     

Assessing network patterns in illegal firearm markets

This study presents the results from a qualitative survey of 20 incarcerated and nonincarcerated illicit firearm market consumers in Quebec. Its general aim is to identify key acquisition patterns for illegal firearms. The interview sessions confirmed several general patterns emerging from past research. Illegal firearm acquisitions generally took place through informal channels. Opportunistic transactions were prevalent across all respondents’ experiences. The presence of key point sources were discussed across the interviews, but to a much lesser extent than the high volume of friends, family members, and close contacts who were more likely to supply firearms. Point sources, and particularly those operating off Native reserves near Montreal, were also more difficult to access for inexperienced acquirers. That such reputed suppliers were not as prevalent across respondents’ experiences was not simply due to the difficulties to access them, but largely because respondents were already well exposed to a variety of channels for acquiring firearms. An analysis of respondents’ personal networks revealed that only a few respondents had closed networks that were limited in suppliers and that most were able to acquire illegal firearms through open or brokered networks that put them into contact with a multitude of suppliers (in open networks) or a reliable set of intermediaries (in brokered networks). This was the case for both free and incarcerated respondents in the sample. That open and brokered networks were more prominent suggests that even if key point sources are removed from the market by law-enforcement efforts, consumers will be able to adjust rather quickly by turning to any of the channels that are accessible to them.     

Property Rights, Technology, and Internet Distribution

Lost in the discussion of the rapid growth of e-commerce is the role of the Internet as a means for the direct distribution of electronic goods and services. Any product that can be reduced to a string of digital code—text, images, and data—is capable of being transmitted over the Internet. These information intensive goods fall into three broad and overlapping categories: information goods, professional services, and entertainment goods. This paper discusses the implications of Internet distribution for competition, product quality, and pricing in consumer markets and how encryption technology addresses the property rights questions raised by online distribution.     

Do police crackdowns disrupt drug cryptomarkets? A longitudinal analysis of the effects of Operation Onymous

In recent years, there has been a proliferation of online illicit markets where participants can purchase and sell a wide range of goods and services such as drugs, hacking services, and stolen financial information. Second-generation markets, known as cryptomarkets, provide a pseudo-anonymous platform from which to operate and have attracted the attention of researchers, regulators, and law enforcement. This paper focuses on the impact of police crackdowns on cryptomarkets, and more particularly on the impact of Operation Onymous, a large-scale police operation in November 2014 that targeted many cryptomarkets. Our results demonstrate that cryptomarket participants adapt to police operations and that the impact of Operation Onymous was limited in time and scope. Of particular interest is the finding that prices did not increase following Operation Onymous, even though many dealers retired shortly after it occurred.     

Anticompetitive Employment

Scholars, antitrust agencies, and policy makers have historically paid little attention to anticompetitive practices in labor markets. This was largely due a misconception that antitrust law is meant to govern conventional markets in which goods and services trade, rather than govern labor markets. Antitrust law may also offer a poor remedy to redress employers who enter no-poaching agreements or otherwise impair competition. The primary tension involves antitrust's purpose, which is to promote “consumer welfare.” To identify whether conduct eroded consumer welfare, courts tend to scrutinize whether prices increased. But here, lessening wages can enable firms to sell goods at cheaper prices, benefiting consumers. Another issue is that the typical restraint affects only a smattering of workers instead of lessening wages throughout the greater market. This article uses empirical analyses to show that antitrust should promote labor's welfare as it does consumer welfare, and it argues that enforcement must condemn labor cartels as per se illegal. The research demonstrates that labor cartels are more pernicious than restraints in product markets, as employers can lessen wages with less effort than in product markets. Antitrust should even proscribe no-poaching agreements formed for a legitimate purpose (e.g., to protect trade secrets) because employers could have achieved the same goals using less coercive means; the noncompete agreement, at least, provides labor with a semblance of notice and bargaining power without drawing antitrust scrutiny. The prohibition of labor cartels would thus promote competition and consumer welfare, especially in minimum wage labor markets.     

Regulating the Trade in Recreational Drugs

This paper examines the market for illegal recreational drugs. Under the present regime of illegality, the law acts as a barrier to entry of other firms. It also restricts the information available to consumers. Both of these effects increase the market power of traders. Other negative consequences of illegality include the use of violence to enforce contracts, poor quality control and the use of illegal activities to finance the purchase of drugs.However, legalizing the trade is likely to lead to greater drug use in the long run. This follows from the addictive nature of recreational drugs. Initial use of the drugs will drastically reduce consumers' price elasticity at any given level of consumption. Firms can increase the extent of the market by using introduction strategies, reducing consumers' price elasticities. Since newly introduced consumers have no brand loyalty, introduction strategies are public goods for firms. Free rider problems will produce oligopoly and collusion. Legalization will lead oligopolistic firms to expand the market.To avoid these problems it is suggested that the recreational drugs industry should be nationalised, not legalised.     

Reframing illegalities: crime,cultural values and ideas of success (in Argentina)

The expansion and entrenchment of insecurity, organized crime and violence in Latin America has involved the participation of public officials. Without this participation, it would be impossible to create the necessary niches of impunity to enable the growth of organized crime and violence. Using a hermeneutic-interpretative approach, this essay shows how the norm of legality has lost its moral persuasive power as a categorical imperative while certain illegalities have acquired social and political legitimacy. The purpose of this article is to reflect on the under-examined impact of cultural values on criminality. It also describes how the dominant narratives surrounding illegality and policies designed to reduce criminality are limited by a lack of consideration of the way that broader cultural values are permissive of corrupt and illegal behaviour. This article considers current social norms, interests, values, ideas of success, and the lack of legitimate pathways to achieve prosperity and social recognition to provide a fresh perspective on the discourse surrounding illegality. For the purpose of illustration this essay uses examples, evidence, interviews and discourses drawn from the context of Argentina. Far from being an anomaly, illegality is a fundamental part of both social inter-relations and has become institutionalised as a part of the behaviour of state entities. Illegality has become not only the norm but is seen as an effective and legitimate means to gain social success and prestige.     

Understanding parrot trafficking between illicit markets in Bolivia: an application of the CRAVED model

The CRAVED model has been used to understand theft variation in a whole host of hot products, including wildlife. Past research, however, has only applied the model at either the theft or illicit market stage to understand why particular products are stolen in high numbers. The CRAVED model has yet to be applied to the trafficking stage of hot products smuggled between illicit markets and, therefore, its applicability at this particular stage remains unknown. Using secondary data from the Los Pozos wildlife market in Santa Cruz, Bolivia, this study applies the CRAVED model to explain why parrot species are trafficked between illicit markets in Bolivia. This research finds that species that are more “available” and less “valuable” are more likely to be trafficked between illicit markets, suggesting that variation at the trafficking stage of the parrot trade can be explained by nearly the same CRAVED concepts as they do at the poaching stage. This study also finds that one-quarter of parrots in the Los Pozos market are trafficked to other cities, of which 99% are to the city of Cochabamba. These findings suggest that shutting down illicit markets and patrolling major roadways between cities can substantially reduce the illegal parrot trade.     

‘On the Perimeter of the Lawful’: Enduring Illegality in the Irish Family Planning Movement, 1972–1985

Between 1935 and 1985, Irish law criminalized the sale and importation of condoms. Activists established illegal markets to challenge the law and alleviate its social consequences. They distributed condoms through postal services, shops, stalls, clinics, and machines. Though they largely operated in the open, their activities attracted little direct punishment from the state, and they were able to build a stable network of medical and commercial family planning services. We use 30 interviews conducted with former activists to explore this history. In doing so, we also examine the limits of ‘illegality’ in describing acts of everyday resistance to law, arguing that the boundaries between legal and illegal, in the discourses and practices of those who sought to challenge the state, were shifting and uncertain. In turn, we revisit ‘illegality’, characterizing it as an assemblage of varying selectively‐performed political practices, shaped by complex choreographies of negotiation between state and non‐state actors.     

Deterring Sex Sales to International Tourists: A Case Study of Thailand,South Korea,and the Philippines

In developing areas, large-scale international tourism often offers a market for illegal goods and services. Unable to directly control sex sales, governments may decide to discourage prostitution by making the industry less profitable. Sex is sold to international tourists in Thailand, South Korea, and the Philippines through the oligopolistic hotel/travel agency and competitive streetwalker markets. Applying legal sanctions prices change and sales decrease in both markets. The per unit cost of law enforcement is borne more heavily by customers on the street and by firms in the hotel/agency market owing to the markets' respective inelastic and elastic demand segments. If enforcement against sellers in both markets represents a fixed cost, initially sales will not decline, but firms will experience diminishing profits. The optimum short- and long-run effects result from applying enforcement against firms in the hotel/agency market.     

Arms Prices and Conflict Onset: Insights from Lebanon and Syria

What drives the prices of arms and ammunition sold at illicit markets? Do the prices of illegal arms soar during episodes of marked insecurity, such as conflict onset? This article seeks to advance knowledge on the dynamics and determinants of weapons prices through the quantitative analysis of illicit arms market price data in Lebanon for the period February 2011 to September 2012. The article also examines the relationship between arms and ammunition prices in Lebanon, and reported conflict fatalities in Syria, as the period under study overlapped with the onset of conflict in the latter country. Key results include strong, statistically-significant correlations between the prices of arms and the prices of ammunition in Lebanon, as well as between the prices of arms and ammunition in Lebanon and reported conflict fatalities in neighbouring Syria. These findings highlight the value of monitoring illicit arms market prices, including prices for a diverse range of weapons and ammunition, to improve our understanding of both illicit markets and conflict dynamics. The strong correlations observed in the article also suggest that crowdsourcing methodologies used by organisations monitoring killings during the Syrian conflict can effectively capture variations in conflict intensity over time.     

‘Are the ‘others’ coming?’: Evidence on ‘alien conspiracy’ from three illegal markets in Greece

In the early 1990s Greece accepted a large number of immigrants from a variety of contexts. Since then ‘organised criminality’ has become an important aspect of the immigration nexus in the country, and ethnicity has been viewed as an extremely important-if not the primary–explanatory variable. Simultaneously, there has been very little empirical research on ‘organised crime’ in Greece in general and ‘organised crime’ and ethnicity in particular. The purpose of this article, which is based on previous research that the author has conducted on three illegal markets in Greece (a. migrant smuggling business, b. the cigarette black market, and c. the market of stolen cars and car parts), is to show the extent to which these illegal markets are controlled by foreign nationals, and establish whether there is such thing as an ‘alien conspiracy’ in the particular country.     

‘C’ is for commercial collaboration: enterprise and structure in the ‘middle market’ of counterfeit alcohol distribution

This article utilising the work of Pearson and Hobbs [1] defines the middle market in counterfeit alcohol. Drugs markets have a resemblance to counterfeit alcohol markets in as much that they share the illicit nature of the product and the need to distribute the product at the ‘street’ level. Drawing on two case studies taken from a European regulator the article details the dynamics of the market, the enterprise actions of the actors and how law enforcement responses can, in certain circumstances, make the task of the distributors easier. The traditional notions of organised crime are challenged and organisation of counterfeit alcohol markets is viewed as being reliant upon those who have legitimate access to the market and are able to develop networks of commercial collaborators who by their position in the legitimate market are able to conceal their illicit actions.     

Counterfeiting as corporate externality: intellectual property crime and global insecurity

Corporate negative externalities occur when corporations place some of the costs of their profit-seeking activity onto society. This paper suggests that the current global problem of intellectual property crime is such an externality, and that it has not been recognised as such because corporations present product counterfeiting and piracy as crimes which reduce their revenue, rather than as predictable side effects of corporate production and merchandising, including branding activity, which have considerable socially deleterious consequences. It is argued that corporate actors are responsible for the socially harmful effects of the global counterfeiting problem in the following respects. Branding, advertising, and other corporate activities drive the market for goods which have a fashion value over and above their use value. While corporations ‘create’ this desire, they cannot prevent it being applied to the desire for fake or replica goods. Outsourcing of corporate production activities to developing countries to take advantage of cheap manufacturing and labour costs presents considerable opportunities to producers in those countries to copy and distribute the goods in an unauthorised way. Serious measures are not taken against product counterfeiters by rights-holding corporations, since market expediency dictates that the costs of counterfeiting are not so adverse to corporations to incentivise them to change their business methods. Counterfeit and pirated goods cause a range of social harms above and beyond the spuriously-costed financial damage corporate rights-holders suggest they suffer - these include the health and safety issues created by some fake goods, and the creation and maintenance of highly profitable organised crime activity in international markets for fake goods.     

Small arms,big guns: a dynamic model of illicit market opportunity

Transnational illicit markets are deeply embedded within legal trade systems and thus should be affected by shifting market conditions. Applying a stochastic actor-oriented model (SAOM), this study tests whether variation in illicit market opportunity could account for changing relations within the small arms trade (2003–2008). Measures of market accessibility – changes in export activity, reporting transparency and the percent of the labour force that is armed – outperformed measures of weapon availability with the exception of involvement in armed conflict. Significant structural change in outdegree density and transitivity suggest the development of trade factions, and decreasing balance hints that leaders are emerging. With the pending de-escalation of US-led conflict in the Middle East, a flood of second-hand weaponry is about to enter the market. Continued research is required to further uncover how the legitimate trade infrastructure facilitates the illicit flow of goods.     

The underworld of gold

This paper dissects the global business of gold, from the ground, through the refining and marketing process and on into the hands of the final consumer, while examining the main forms of criminal activity associated with each stage. In one fundamental respect the black market for gold is quite different from that for other contraband goods. With opiates, for example, although there are occasional interrelations, it is reasonable to differentiate between legal and illegal sectors. The legal one uses raw material from designated producing areas, transforming it into a pharmaceutical product to supply a controlled medical demand. The illegal one uses illicitly obtained raw materials to make recreational drugs in order to service a demand that in most countries is defined as criminal by its very nature. By contrast, with gold, legally and illegally produced raw materials flow through the same channels to the same set of legitimate firms for refining and casting; and the product of these respectable refineries then is redivided into separate streams serving the overt and the covert portions of the market. Even then the cross-links do not stop. Legally sold gold can be diverted into illicit uses, while illegally obtained gold can end up in the hands of otherwise legitimate manufacturers or consumers. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** AW502007 00002     

Using friends for money: the positional importance of money-launderers in organized crime

Despite the significant amount of attention and resources invested into the global anti-money laundering (AML) regime, there is a dearth of empirical studies on the role of money-launderers in illicit markets. This research tests two primary justifications of AML policy: 1) most money-launderers would not be detected through criminal investigations of predicate crimes and organized crime groups; and, 2) professional money-launderers play an important role in illicit markets and criminal networks. We extracted information about money-launderers in the drug market from police intelligence reports over a three-year period. Social network analysis was used to assess the positional importance of the launderers. The results show that most individuals are self-laundering, and relative to other market roles, launderers are not particularly central players. Policy implications for AML enforcement are discussed.     

The underworld of art

Although crime in the market for fine arts has a long historical pedigree, the explosive growth of the market, and the conversion of art (along with collectible goods of all sorts) into speculative assets, that began or at least accelerated in the mid 1970s, focused increasing attention on the phenomenon. At the same time the issue of protecting cultural patrimony became a subject of greater contention between source and market countries, while common law and civil code jurisdictions struggled over how to reconcile approaches to regulation and enforcement. This paper highlights these issues with specific reference to the market for high-end paintings although its lessons are germane to all subdivisions of the collectibles market. It attempts to elucidate the main criminogenic factors—speculative shifts in demand, fraudulent supply, and illegal activity by various intermediary institutions ranging from dealers to appraisers to auction houses, while highlighting the role of collectors, museums, and financial institutions both as victims and active participants. Despite enduring myths about “organized crime,” illegal operations in the art market are the work overwhelmingly of insiders who alone have the technical knowledge and circle of intimates necessary to link an illicit supply with a demand that can range from the strictly legitimate, the legal but dubious, and the explicitly criminal. The critical lesson is that stolen, forged or smuggled material makes its way through much the same circles of intermediaries and ends up for the most part in the same locations and the same hands as artwork of legal origin.     

The underworld of gemstones

In recent decades prices of high-end “colored gemstones” (trade jargon for precious stones other than diamonds), like almost all “collectibles,” have risen dramatically. Demand has been spreading to economic classes formerly excluded at the same time the supply of high-quality material from natural sources falls, leading to constant searches (that may take on the character of gold-rushes) for as yet undiscovered sites. While no doubt criminogenic factors have always existed within the gemstone business, periods of rapid price rise mean stronger temptation for illegal activities. The potential list of economic offenses, civil, regulatory and criminal, associated with the gemstones business includes: illegal mining, environmental offenses, bribery, gun-running, smuggling, “terrorist”(i.e. insurgent) financing, commercial fraud, mining-share swindles, money laundering and, not least, simple theft along with recycling stolen goods. This paper represents an attempt to understand the criminogenic factors in light of the history and current structures of the business. It fits the gemstone trade into a commercial, geo-strategic and sociological matrix, the three often interacting in mutually reinforcing ways. It asks whether, given the incentives and opportunities for illicit activity, relying primarily on industry self-regulation makes sense. But it also questions whether the international regulatory regime now in place for diamonds can be applied to the far more diffuse supply-side conditions of the colored gemstone market. Methodologically, the paper is a research essay in the political economy of clandestine international economic activity, with particular focus on its historical, geo-strategic and sociological context rather than a more narrow, traditional criminological study. The second may work well enough when the activity under investigation is a crime per se, as with studies of illegal drugs. However when the activity is inherently legal, but conducted illegally, it is essential to understand thoroughly the nature and operation of the legal business to make sense of the illegal. The illegal is buried in and works concurrently with the legal, not in the narrow sense of having the legal as cover, but in a more profound sense of the legal and the illegal sharing attitudes and supporting institutions. The paper is divided into three parts. The first, “Under the Rainbow,”examines the shady side of gemstone mining in a geo-political context. The second, “In the Eye of the Beholder,” looks at fraud in cutting and polishing of rough gemstones into finished gems. The third, “Hot Rocks, Cold Cash,” focuses on illicit activity in the retail jewelry trade.     

侵权责任中违法性的判断

违法性是侵权责任中的一个重要构成要件。在违法性的判断方面,传统上形成了结果违法理论与行为违法理论。本文在对这些理论进行深入分析的基础上提出我国在违法性的判断上,不应偏重于这两种传统理论,而应当对其背后的行为义务进行分析把握,根据侵权行为的三种不同形态来判断行为是否具有违法性。