Laissez-faire in campaign finance

In this paper we analyze the impact of campaign contribution limits on government expenditures. The theory is based on the proclivity of geographic-based legislators to support wealth transfers from the polity at large to finance benefits for local constituents. It predicts that laissez-faire in contributions will lead to less government spending on budgetary redistribution and to a greater output of laws by the legislature. The theory is tested using data on U.S. State governments.     

Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform

Campaign advertising can provide benefits to constituencies when used to fund the distribution of useful information, but voters can be harmed if candidates finance such advertising by trading policy favors to special interests in exchange for contributions. We report data from novel laboratory campaign finance experiments that shed light on this tradeoff, and that provide rigorous empirical evidence on formal campaign finance theory. Our key finding is that voters respond to advertising differently between special interest and publicly-financed campaigns, and that the nature of this difference is qualitatively consistent with formal models’ predictions.     

Political radio and television advertisements in a young democracy: the 2009 South African national election campaign

It is argued that political parties in a developing democracy should contribute to sustaining democracy through their informational and motivational functions during election campaigns. Rather than debating the merit of issue messages, it is argued that cognitive and emotional campaign messages should be integrated, in order to not only attract voters' attention but also to inform the voter, to foster democratic values, to stimulate debate and to motivate voters to vote. It was found that in the 2009 South African general election, South African political parties did not effectively integrate emotional and cognitive messages, but references to democratic values were integrated with the emotional messages. Few of the parties encouraged voters to participate in the election for the sake of sustaining the democracy. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Justice,democracy, and future generations

Proposals for how to redesign democracy so as to better secure the demands of intergenerational justice can be divided into three broad families: (1) representative proxies; (2) differential voting schemes; and (3) counter-majoritarian devices. However, these proposals suffer from a fundamental weakness: namely, they all assume that despite the fact that democracy is by its very nature ill-equipped to secure intergenerational justice, it is nevertheless possible to rely on democracy to solve this problem in the first place. But that, to put it colloquially, is like thinking that one can pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps. This paper sketches the shape and contours of a solution to this problem that is better able than the alternatives to escape this objection. This solution draws upon the strategy of a so-called ‘non-reformist reform.’     

The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers

This paper introduces a structural model of campaign finance which permits estimation of the marginal costs of raising money as well as the marginal benefits of spending and saving money. The model is estimated for the 1986 through 1990 election cycles; the results demonstrate that the probability of retirement hinders an incumbent's ability to raise money and that incumbents willingly trade off electoral security for financial gain.     

Economics,democracy, and Spanish elections

The argument is advanced that economic conditions have played an important role in Spanish elections but, until recently, one secondary to the establishment of democracy itself. First, the Spanish economy's development at the time of these elections and the Spanish public's response to it are considered. Next, Spain's three national elections and significant economic policy activities and conditions are analyzed. Unemployment is then considered as the central economic influence on recent Spanish elections. Finally, Spain's politics of consensus is presented as an explanation for the initial lack of influence of economic conditions on elections.     

State,democracy, socialism: introduction

This paper argues that comtemporary developments in democratic politics mark the emergence of a new type of representative government. Current trends such as the weakening of party identification, the decline of political platforms or the increasing role of an élite of media experts may be regarded as undermining the principle of popular government. The paper demonstrates, however, that representative government was not invented as an indirect form of government by the people, but as a wholly original political system resting on principles different from those which organize democracy. Moreover, a number of institutional arrangements were established at the origins of representative government which have been virtually unquestioned since. Political representation has changed much less than is generally assumed. It is true, on the other hand, that the constant principles of representative government have had different consequences depending on the circumstance in which they were implemented. Such differences have generated various forms of political representation. The paper constructs three ideal-types of representative government. It shows that the current situation is best conceived as the rise of a new type of representation.     

Tullock challenges: happiness, revolutions, and democracy

Gordon Tullock is one of the most important of the founders and contributors to Public Choice. Two innovations are typical ??Tullock Challenges.?? The first relates to method: the measurement of subjective well-being, or happiness. The second relates to digital social networks, such as Facebook, Twitter, and to some extent Google. Both innovations lead to strong incentives by governments to manipulate the policy outcomes. In general, ??What is important will be manipulated by the government.?? To restrain government manipulation, one has to turn to Constitutional Economics and increase the possibilities for direct popular participation and federalism or introduce random mechanisms.