Priming Predispositions and Changing Policy Positions: An Account of When Mass Opinion Is Primed or Changed

Prior research provides limited insights into when political communications prime or change citizens’ underlying opinions. This article helps fill that void by putting forth an account of priming and opinion change. I argue that crystallized attitudes should often be primed by new information. An influx of attention to less crystallized preferences, however, should lead individuals to alter their underlying opinions in accordance with prior beliefs. Since predispositions acquired early in the life cycle—such as partisanship, religiosity, basic values, and group‐based affect/antagonisms—are more crystallized than mass opinion about public policy, media and campaign content will tend to prime citizens’ predispositions and change their policy positions. Both my review of previous priming research and original analyses presented in this study from five new cases strongly support the crystallization‐based account of when mass opinion is primed or changed. I conclude with a discussion of the article's potential political, methodological, and normative implications.     

Identities, Interests, and Imports

There is increasing attention to the mass public in the politics of trade debate, yet we still know little about how Americans formulate opinion on trade. Scholars are puzzled by the ineffectiveness of traditional dispositional beliefs to account for trade policy judgment, while an emerging economic self-interest perspective contends that opinion on trade is based on material concerns. This article demonstrates how symbolic predispositions provide critical information shortcuts for Americans on trade in which the relationship between trade policy and economic self-interest may be unclear. Symbolic politics theory explains how citizens can rely on accessible symbolic predispositions, including conceptions of national identity, in an unfamiliar and evolving trade policy environment often subject to multiple and conflicting cues, limited political information, and changing economic circumstances.     

A Unified Theory of Value-Based Reasoning and U.S. Public Opinion

Public opinion research shows that American citizens utilize domain-specific political values to guide opinion formation in the key issue areas that comprise the American political agenda. One set of political values operates on economic welfare opinions, a different set of values applies to cultural issue positions, a third set shapes foreign policy preferences, and so on in other policy domains. Drawing on Shalom Schwartz’s theory of basic human values, this paper argues that two socially focused values—self-transcendence and conservation—guide opinion formation across all major policy domains. By contrast, the personally focused values of self-enhancement and openness-to-change should play a more limited role in preference formation. These hypotheses are tested using data from a novel 2011 national survey and the 2012 General Social Survey. The statistical results affirm expectations. We show that self-transcendence and conservation values predict scores on symbolic ideology, economic conservatism, racial conservatism, cultural conservatism, civil liberties, and foreign policy opinions. Self-enhancement and openness-to-change values play a modest role in shaping preferences.     

From opinions to policies: Examining the links between citizens,representatives, and policy change

Recent studies show that policy changes appear to correspond primarily to the preferences of citizens with high socio-economic status. However, the mechanisms explaining this trend remain largely unexplored. In this paper, I look closer at the role of political representatives as the critical factor connecting citizens’ opinions and policy changes. While the link between public opinion and elite opinion as well as the link between public opinion and policy output is relatively well studied, few studies have looked at the entire relationship between public opinion, elite opinion, and policy output concerning social groups. This paper combines data from Swedish election studies, surveys with members of parliament, and a database of policy change. It shows that representatives’ opinions reflect advantaged groups better than disadvantaged groups. Similar biases are found in policy responsiveness; policy changes correspond more closely to the opinions of the advantaged groups.     

Party,policy – or both? Partisan-biased processing of policy arguments in direct democracy

How do party cues and policy information affect citizens’ political opinions? In direct democratic settings, this question is particularly relevant. Direct democratic campaigns are information-rich events which offer citizens the opportunity to learn detailed information about a policy. At the same time parties try to influence citizens’ decision procedure by publishing their own positions on the issue. The current debate on whether “party” or “policy” has more impact on political opinions has not yet yielded conclusive results. We examine the effect of policy arguments and party cues on vote intention in two Swiss referendum votes using panel survey data. To the simple dichotomous question of “party cues or policy information” we add an additional twist in asking how party cues affect the processing of policy information through processes of motivated reasoning. We find first that both, policy arguments and party cues, have an independent effect on vote intention. However, in a second part of the analysis, we find strong evidence for partisan-biased processing of policy arguments – that is, voters tend to align their arguments with their preferred party’s position. Our conclusions with regard to the democratic quality of these vote decisions are therefore ambivalent.     

Do Voters Follow? The Effect of Party Cues on Public Opinion During a Process of Policy Change

A large body of literature has demonstrated how citizens use party endorsements when shaping their policy opinions. However, recent studies question the centrality of party cues in shaping public opinion. This study advances the literature with a four‐wave panel survey design that measures citizens’ policy opinions before, during and after a controversial policy proposal to ban street begging was made by the Norwegian government in 2014. Two main findings inform previous work. First, voters are modestly affected by party cues as the proposition turns salient. Second, when a party shifts their policy position on a highly salient issue, voters do not automatically shift their opinions accordingly. Thus, the magnitude and direction of opinion change in the electorate indicate that party cue effects are modest and that instead of polarizing patterns across time parallel publics moving in the same direction independent of party cues are detected. These findings demonstrate that under some conditions, voters’ opinion formation is less dependent on partisan elites than much of the previous work indicates.     

The Neglected Power of Elite Opinion Leadership to Produce Antipathy Toward the News Media: Evidence from a Survey Experiment

Today, most Americans dislike the news media as an institution. This has led to considerable debate about why people dislike the media and how their public standing could be improved. This paper contributes to this literature by using a survey experiment to test the effect of several different considerations on evaluations of the media. It finds, consistent with the broader literature on political persuasion, that elite partisan opinion leadership can powerfully shape these attitudes. Additionally, it finds that tabloid coverage creates antipathy toward the press regardless of predispositions and that horserace coverage has a negative effect on opinions among politically aware citizens on both sides of the political spectrum. Contrary to some claims in the literature, this study finds no detectable effect of news negativity.     

Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual Differences

This article explores individual differences in citizens’ reliance on cues and values in political thinking. It uses experimental evidence to identify which citizens are likely to engage in heuristic processing and which citizens are likely to engage in systematic processing in developing opinions about a novel issue. The evidence suggests that political awareness crisply distinguishes between heuristic and systematic processors. The less politically aware rely on party cues and not on an issue-relevant value. As political awareness increases, reliance on party cues drops and reliance on an issue-relevant value rises. Need for cognition fails to yield clear results. The results suggest two routes to opinion formation: heuristic processing and systematic processing. Political awareness, not need for cognition, predicts which route citizens will take.     

The Conditional Nature of Presidential Responsiveness to Public Opinion

How does public opinion affect presidential policymaking? We address this issue by testing a diverse set of hypotheses with data concerning a set of individual policies across time. In particular, the data revolve around presidential budgetary proposals on a set of major policy issues for which there are recurring surveys on citizens' preferences over spending. The analysis suggests that presidents are more responsive to mass opinion on issues that are familiar to citizens in their everyday lives. Also, for reelection‐seeking presidents, responsiveness is shown to depend upon two key political factors. First, presidents are more responsive to public opinion when the next election is imminent. Second, the effect of presidential popularity is nonmonotonic; presidents with average approval ratings are most likely to adopt policy positions congruent with public opinion, whereas presidents with approval ratings that are significantly above or below average have the greatest propensity to take unpopular positions.     

The political consequences of uninformed voters

Americans fail to meet the democratic ideal of an informed electorate, and the consequences of this political ignorance are a topic of significant scholarly debate. In two independent settings, we experimentally test the effect of political information on citizens' attitudes toward the major parties in the U.S. When uninformed citizens receive political information, they systematically shift their political preferences away from the Republican Party and toward the Democrats. A lack of knowledge on the policy positions of the parties significantly hinders the ability of low-socioeconomic-status citizens to translate their preferences into partisan opinions and vote choices. As a result, American public opinion—and potentially election results and public policy as a result—is significantly different from the counterfactual world in which all voters are informed.     

Crossing the River by Feeling the Stones: Grassroots Democracy with Chinese Characteristics

China’s policy of reform and opening has led to extraordinary economic and societal changes during the past 30 years. One aspect of this progressive, incremental change has been the remarkable development of democracy—both at the grassroots level and within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The CCP, recognizing that political reforms must accompany economic reforms, began to pursue a distinctively Chinese path to political reform and modernization—a socialist democracy with Chinese characteristics. Inspired by leadership from Deng Xiaoping to Hu Jintao, Chinese citizens living in the countryside and townships have held competitive elections for local leadership for over a decade. This paper posits that the rise and institutionalization of competitive, popular local elections is indicative of how the CCP, in fostering a Harmonious Socialist Society, has created a viable, Confucian, and uniquely Chinese alternative to Western liberal democracy in local governance.     

Public opinion polarisation and protest behaviour

Does an increasing divide in normative notions within a population influence citizens’ political protest behaviour? This article explores whether public opinion polarisation stimulates individuals to attend lawful demonstrations. In line with relative deprivation theory, it is argued that in an environment of polarisation, individuals’ normative notions are threatened, increasing the probability that they will actively participate in the political decision‐making process. Using the European Social Survey from the period 2002–2014 and focusing on subnational regions, multilevel analyses are conducted. Thereby a new index to measure public opinion polarisation is introduced. Depending on the issue, empirical results confirm the effect of polarisation. While average citizens are not motivated to demonstrate over the issue of whether people from other countries are a cultural threat, they are motivated by the issues of reducing inequality and of homosexuality. The article goes on to examine in a second step whether ideological extremism makes individuals more susceptible to environmental opinion polarisation. Findings show that members of the far left are more likely to protest when their social environment is divided over the issue of income inequality. In contrast, members of the far right are motivated by rising polarisation regarding homosexuality. In sum, citizens become mobilised as their beliefs and values are threatened by public opinion polarisation.     

Informing the Electorate? How Party Cues and Policy Information Affect Public Opinion about Initiatives

Citizens in representative democracies receive party endorsements and policy information when choosing candidates or making policy decisions via the initiative process. What effects do these sources of information have on public opinion? We address this important question by conducting survey experiments where citizens express opinions about initiatives in a real‐world electoral context. We manipulate whether they receive party cues, policy information, both, or neither type of information. We find that citizens do not simply ignore policy information when they are also exposed to party cues. Rather, citizens respond by shifting their opinions away from their party's positions when policy information provides a compelling reason for doing so. These results challenge the prominent claim in public opinion research that citizens blindly follow their party when also exposed to policy information. They also suggest that efforts to inform the electorate can influence opinions, provided that citizens actually receive the information being disseminated.     

Deservingness versus values in public opinion on welfare: The automaticity of the deservingness heuristic

Public attitudes towards welfare policy are often explained by political values and perceptions of deservingness of welfare recipients. This article addresses how the impact of values and perceptions varies depending on the contextual information that citizens have available when forming welfare opinions. It is argued that whenever citizens face deservingness‐relevant cues in public debate or the media, a psychological ‘deservingness heuristic’ is triggered prompting individuals spontaneously to think about welfare policy in terms of who deserves help. This is an automatic process, equally influential among the least and the most politically sophisticated. Moreover, when clear deservingness cues are present, the impact of values on opinions vanishes. These arguments are supported by data from two novel experimental studies embedded in separate nationwide opinion surveys. The findings revise conventional wisdom of how values and heuristics influence public opinion and have major implications for understanding dynamics in aggregate welfare opinion and attempts from political elites to manipulate public opinion.     

Ein Bericht von der Heimatfront

For a considerable period, the ISAF mission of the German army to Afghanistan has been opposed by a majority of German citizens. This discrepancy between elite decisions and public opinion suggests that the process of political representation does not work smoothly. This paper shows that political elites hardly engaged in political leadership concerning this issue. Moreover, voters did not give strong incentives for elite responsiveness by casting policy votes on the Afghanistan issue. Even in the 2009 election, the Afghanistan issue did not play a major role in voting choice. At the same time, public opinion appears to have affected elite decisions. Accordingly, the process of political representation appears to work more smoothly than suggested at a first glance.     

Responsive Government? Public Opinion and Government Policy Preferences in Britain and Denmark

The ability of a political system to respond to the preferences of its citizens is central to democratic theory and practice; yet most empirical research on government responsiveness has concentrated on the United States. As a result, we know very little about the nature of government policy responsiveness in Europe and we have a poor understanding of the conditions that affect cross-national variations. This comparative study examines the relationship between public opinion and policy preferences in the United Kingdom and Denmark during the past three decades. We address two key questions: First, are the government's policy intentions driven by public opinion or vice versa? Second, do political institutions influence the level of government responsiveness? We suggest that public opinion tends to drive the government's policy intentions due to the threat of electoral sanction, and that this is more pronounced in proportional systems than in majoritarian democracies.     

The conditional party mandate: A model for the study of mass and elite opinion patterns

Abstract.  This article explores the pattern of opinions within political parties. What is the level of issue congruence between voters and elected leaders? The article introduces two ideas for the analysis of mass and elite opinion patterns. First, the authors challenge the unidimensional conception of mass-elite linkages, and argue that the opinion structure of political parties may best be understood in the context of a multidimensional policy space. Second, they contest the proximity logic of the traditional party mandate model. In so doing, they propose the 'conditional party mandate model', arguing that 'direction' rather than 'proximity' attracts voters' interest and attention. The authors contend that in issues of principle significance for a particular party (so-called 'core issues'), the party's voters and representatives will proceed in the same direction, but the representatives will stress their position more strongly than the voters. In issues that are less significant to the parties, the relationship between the two levels will be fortuitous and less clear. The analyses, which are based on elite and mass survey data from the Norwegian political system, support the authors' hypotheses concerning positional issues. When the direction of an issue is given, representatives are more extreme than voters.     

Do Voters Respond to Party Manifestos or to a Wider Information Environment? An Analysis of Mass‐Elite Linkages on European Integration

Recent studies analyze how citizens update their perceptions of parties’ left‐right positions in response to new political information. We extend this research to consider the issue of European integration, and we report theoretical and empirical analyses that citizens do not update their perceptions of parties’ positions in response to election manifestos, but that citizens’ perceptions of parties’ positions do track political experts’ perceptions of these positions, and, moreover, that it is party supporters who disproportionately perceive their preferred party's policy shifts. Given that experts plausibly consider a wide range of information, these findings imply that citizens weigh the wider informational environment when assessing parties’ positions. We also present evidence that citizens’ perceptions of party position shifts matter, in that they drive partisan sorting in the mass public.     

Give Us Your Tired, Your Poor, ... But Make Sure They Have a Green Card: The Effects of Documented and Undocumented Migrant Context on Anglo Opinion Toward Immigration

Although few controversies in our political environment are as contentious as the current debate over immigration policy, the research on public opinion toward immigration is quite limited. In particular, we know relatively little about the contextual determinants of opinions on immigration issues. We address this issue by investigating the impact of migrant context on Anglo opinions toward immigration. We find that Anglo support for increased immigration is directly related to the size of the documented migrant population. Conversely, as the relative size of the undocumented migrant population increases, Anglo support for increased immigration decreases. We conclude with a discussion of the relevance of our findings for the study of immigration opinion, in particular, and the study of intergroup relations more generally.     

Issue Framing and Engagement: Rhetorical Strategy in Public Policy Debates

Conventional wisdom and scholarly research indicate that to win a policy debate political actors should frame the issue strategically—that is, selectively highlight considerations that mobilize public opinion behind their policy position. Engaging the opponent in a dialogue (i.e., focusing on the same considerations) is portrayed as a suboptimal strategy because political actors forfeit the ability to structure the debate. Using over 40 public opinion polls and a detailed content analysis of news stories, I examine the use of framing and engagement strategies during the 1993–94 debate over health care reform. The analysis shows that engagement was more effective at increasing support for reform than framing. This study is the first to document the role of engagement in a policy debate, and it extends work showing that this strategy is more common in election campaigns than scholars once suspected.