转型以来俄罗斯与外高加索国家关系的演变

苏联解体后，俄罗斯与外高加索三国关系的演变同俄对独联体政策的转变密切相关。随着对独联体政策的调整，俄罗斯加强了对外高加索事务的介入，以解决“热点”问题为契机，双边关系得到一定发展。但在美国和北约等外部强大势力对该地区的渗透之下，格鲁吉亚、阿塞拜疆在对俄罗斯失望之余，双边关系很快冷淡下来，格俄之间甚至兵戎相见。     

冷战后波兰对俄罗斯的外交政策浅析

冷战后波兰对俄罗斯的外交政策表现为相互对立又相互联系的两个方面：既要疏俄、防俄、抑俄，防范霸权式的俄罗斯东山再起，又要改善对俄关系，并与俄罗斯建立起比较正常和稳定的双边关系。可以预见，随着欧盟政治一体化的深化和共同外交与安全政策以及独立安全防务政策的加强，波兰对俄罗斯的外交政策将更多受欧盟对俄政策的影响。     

俄罗斯发展与伊朗关系的动机及影响

目前发展同伊朗的关系已成为俄罗斯对外政策的一个重要环节，俄加强同伊朗关系的战略考虑：保障俄罗斯南部地缘战略空间的安全；争夺对里海石油资源及其输送管道的控制权；利用伊朗在伊斯兰世界和中亚地区的影响解决地区和国内问题；占领伊朗的广阔市场。俄伊发展双边关系使中亚战略格局的重组形势更加复杂，从短期看，俄伊关系将会进一步发展。     

北约东扩背景下的俄罗斯与波罗的海三国

本文首先分析了北约东扩因素对俄罗斯与波罗的海三国关系的影响;立陶宛、拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚积极准备加入北约,俄则强烈反对.在对三国、俄罗斯和西方的政策、立场进行对比分析的基础上,本文认为三国在2002年被北约接纳的可能性有两种,一种可能是立陶宛率先加入北约,拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚稍晚加入,第二种可能是三国都不会接到北约的邀请,但它们终究会加入北约.其次,本文分析了俄罗斯与波罗的海三国关系中的其他主要问题,即讲俄语居民的地位问题、边界问题和经济合作问题等.再次,本文归纳出俄罗斯对波罗的海三国的战略目标,即在鼓励地区经济一体化和双边经济合作、安全不可分、尊重少数民族权利的基础上,同三国实现睦邻友好,建立起建设性的国家关系模式.最后,本文勾勒了俄与三国关系的未来发展方向:俄罗斯与波罗的海三国的关系将长期处于相互磨合碰撞之中,实现与三国,尤其是与拉脱维亚和爱沙尼亚睦邻友好、相互合作的道路仍然艰难而漫长.     

俄罗斯与北约关系：问题与前景

冷战结束以来，俄罗斯与北约的关系受到北约东扩问题、双方根深蒂固的相互疑惧心理以及美国因素的影响，总体上呈现“分歧大于共识、）中突多于合作”的发展态势。近年，受俄美关系重启的带动以及出于在阿富汗等问题上亟需俄罗斯帮助等考虑，北约在一系列事关俄核心利益问题上的立场正在发生重大变化，俄与北约之间出现了新的互动态势，双方关系有望迎来一个“合作增多、冲突趋少”的新的发展阶段。但鉴于俄与北约之间既有问题的“积重难返”，双方关系的实质性改善仍然“任重而道远”，未来俄罗斯加入北约的可能性不大。     

试析转型以来的俄罗斯与非洲关系

俄罗斯和非洲关系经历了一个较为曲折的发展历程。意识形态因素作为影响俄非关系发展的一个制约因素 ,对双边关系产生了深远影响。冷战结束后 ,基于国际形势的变化 ,基于国家利益和地区战略考虑 ,俄罗斯调整了同非洲的政治、经贸和安全关系。俄非关系渐趋稳定 ,并呈现出多元化的发展态势     

波兰总统选举后俄波关系走向分析

2010年7月4日,科莫罗夫斯基当选波兰新一届总统,他将调整前任莱赫.卡钦斯基实行的内外政策。波兰和俄罗斯在历史上就积怨很深,冷战后,波兰加入北约和欧盟,实行疏远、抑制和防范俄罗斯的政策。卡钦斯基对俄的强硬态度以及美波之间在导弹防御系统上进行的合作,引起俄罗斯的强烈不满,两国关系进入冰冻期。科莫罗夫斯基上任后,两国关系有望回暖,但波兰依靠美国提高防御能力、压制俄罗斯的战略不会改变。表面友好、暗中对抗将是俄波两国关系的主旋律。     

俄罗斯同西方国家关系发展新阶段

“9·11”恐怖袭击事件加快了俄罗斯同西方国家改善关系的步伐:俄罗斯与北约关系明显改善,俄美关系实现了从对手到伙伴的突破。这是冷战后俄与西方国家再次聚拢,俄同西方大国关系从摩擦与竞争转向妥协与合作的重大转折。与此同时,根本利益的分歧又阻碍着双方合作的进程和相     

俄美关系与欧洲大西洋安全共同体的前景

正一俄美关系"重启"、欧洲危机、美国优先发展方向向亚洲转移是相互联系的吗?俄美关系"重启"问题的真正解决是以俄罗斯与欧洲大西洋安全共同体的关系,特别是与北约的关系为前提的。俄罗斯前总统梅德韦杰夫和美国总统奥巴马宣布俄美关系"重启"后,无论是俄罗斯,还是西方的专家都在积极研究俄罗斯与欧洲大西洋共同体一体化的可能性,以至俄罗斯加入北约的可能性。但客观环境却是:虽然双方出现了一些新的合作领域,但仍然残存着一种视对方     

重振大国地位的俄罗斯外交

俄罗斯外交从对西方“一边倒”到“全方位”，目标是捍卫民族利益，重振大国地位，争取成为多极化世界的一极。做法是：着力营造独联体；注意处理好同西方，首先是同美国的关系；争取进入亚太；重回传统影响地区。在北约东扩问题上，俄有可能在最大限度地争取维护民族利益的前提下，同西方达成妥协。发展同中国的合作是俄外交的重要方面，前景良好。俄社会稳定、经济复苏之日，才是俄大国地位牢固确立之时。     

The US–Russian security ‘reset’: implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany

Abstract

The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the US-performed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia and explores the ways in which they have been adapting to the new set-up. The article is divided into three parts: after the discussion of the substantive continuity and limited change in US foreign and security policy (USFSP), the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of USFSP procedure are examined through John Ruggie's theoretical observations. The second part of the article deals with implications of the USFSP for Central-Eastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion of Russian attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European security architecture. The next section sheds light on the unexpected process of strategic realignment of the region (USA/NATO/EU/CSDP) and simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into ‘normal life’. The third part of the article tackles the implications of heightened US–Russian bilateralism for Germany. Authors' findings, many of them based on conducted elite interviews, suggest the contrary process, namely Germany's strengthened multilateral commitment to the EU and specifically to European Security and Defence Policy, limiting the bilateral option to energy trade with Russia. What follows are concluding remarks.     

NATO: The View from the East

Abstract

Relations between Russia, Ukraine and Belarus and NATO have placed more emphasis on cooperation than confrontation since the Cold War, and Ukraine has begun to move towards membership. At the popular level, on the evidence of national surveys in 2004 and 2005, NATO continues to be perceived as a significant threat, but in Russia and Ukraine it comes behind the United States (in Belarus the numbers are similar). There are few socioeconomic predictors of support for NATO membership that are significant across all three countries, but there are wide differences by region, and by attitudinal variables such as support for a market economy and for EU membership. The relationship between popular attitudes and foreign policy is normally a distant one; but in Ukraine NATO membership will require public support in a referendum, and in all three cases public attitudes on foreign policy issues can influence foreign policy in other ways, including the composition of parliamentary committees. In newly independent states whose international allegiances are still evolving, the associations between public opinion and foreign and security policy may often be closer than in the established democracies.     

俄罗斯亚太战略的利益、合作方向与前景

进入新世纪,在俄罗斯的外交战略中亚太地区的地位在不断上升。俄罗斯大部分国土位于亚洲,所以在利用外交手段维护国家领土安全,并为本国东部地区的经济发展创造有利外部条件的同时,提升俄罗斯在亚太地区的影响力,是俄罗斯实施亚太战略的主要目标与利益所在。目前,俄罗斯与亚太地区的合作主要体现在能源、交通运输、粮食和安全保障等领域。但由于受俄罗斯东部地区的经济发展水平,以及俄罗斯参与亚太合作的矛盾心理,特别是与区域内各大国之间的关系等多方面因素的影响,俄罗斯与亚太关系的发展缺乏稳固的基础,进一步发展面临制约。     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变及其政策效应

俄罗斯对美国战略认知的演变过程分为友好合作、竞争凸显和激烈对抗三个阶段。俄罗斯的强势外交和安全政策,表现为俄罗斯对美国和北约的强硬战略姿态以及追求超出自身相对实力的外交和安全目标。俄罗斯战略认知的演变与俄美两国的利益冲突之间有着相互塑造的关系,但是俄罗斯战略认知的变化并不仅仅取决于利益考量。俄罗斯之所以把北约东扩、乌克兰走向、叙利亚局势等看得如此重要,不惜投入大量资源,这是与塑造俄罗斯战略认知的历史和心理因素是分不开的。美国采取的许多对俄政策和行为,正是因为忽略了这些因素,才被俄罗斯看作是“侮辱性”和“威胁性”的,从而导致了双方敌意的螺旋式上升。由于俄罗斯独特的历史记忆和大国情结,俄罗斯对俄美两国的利益冲突作出了激烈的回应,这些回应虽然不利于俄罗斯的国家实力和整体利益,但却是可以理解的。随着俄罗斯对美战略认知的逐步定型,俄美关系在短期内很难实现所谓的“重启”。从俄罗斯对美战略认知的案例分析可以看出,战略认知自身有其相对的独立性,在受到利益冲突影响的同时,也受到社会文化因素的深刻影响,从而使得国家的外交与安全政策未必完全遵循理性主义的路径。     

The EU and Ukraine: Rhetorical Entrapment?

Recently there has been a trend towards the development of two rival sets of alliances in Eurasia: in effect, one Western‐oriented alignment led by the United States and Turkey, including Israel, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, a group of states resisting American and Turkish influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia is developing, led by Russia and Iran, including Syria and Armenia. One of the most important questions for the development of these alignments is their expansion into Central Asia; in this context Uzbekistan's role is crucial. Uzbekistan is the only Central Asian state to pursue a proactive and independent foreign policy, as exemplified in its relations with both its neighbors and great powers. Tashkent has developed close military and security relations with NATO and for a time seemed to hedge its bets on US support, but has lately shown signs of turning back toward increasing security cooperation with Russia and China. Given the strategic value of Uzbekistan and its role as a regional player in its own right, the future course of the country's policies is of great importance to the security of Eurasia.     

Military professionalism in post‐communist Hungary and Poland: An analysis and assessment

Abstract

This article discusses Russian perceptions of and attitudes toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia has historically disliked and mistrusted NATO, seeing it as the primary threat to its international aspirations; in practice Russia pursues a dual policy. Its harsh condemnation of NATO has not stopped it from cooperating in selected areas of mutual interest. The most important among them is support for NATO's military operations in Afghanistan. The recent rejuvenation of relations between the west and Moscow is known as the strategic ‘reset’, meaning a return to diplomatic contacts and limited cooperation regardless of disagreements over the invasion of Georgia and Moscow's other recent international transgressions. The reset in NATO–Russia relations has only tactical significance, however. Cooperation will take place on a limited basis, but a genuine reset in mutual relations must wait for a reset in Russia's political and strategic priorities.     

Pushing the Boundaries of the Possible at the Margins of Peacekeeping: The Promises of ESDP–Russia Co-operation for Humanitarian Intervention1

While relatively little attention has been paid to the significance of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as a newly emerged mechanism in the domain of international peacekeeping, even less research has been undertaken on the potential benefits of its external relations and co-operation with third countries. This article sheds light on such a potential by investigating the relations of the ESDP with the Russian Federation. The current debate on humanitarian intervention tends to reduce the analysis to a single plane of reality, namely the normative one, thus ignoring the material aspects of military intervention. The enlargement of the ontological horizon of research from normative to material factors uncovers the greatest advantage of ESDP–Russia co-operation for humanitarian intervention, namely their mutually complementary peacekeeping capacities. Whilst the European Union boasts a long-standing human rights culture, Russia could offer vast material resources both in terms of manpower and logistics. Ignoring this possible synergy between the ESDP and Russian capacities would be a considerable loss for the cause of humanitarian intervention. Joint operations conducted by the European Union, Russia, and NATO against genocidal governments, the “common enemies”, would not only enhance the cause of humanitarian intervention but also enable common actions and thus mitigate current tensions between the East and West. In many respects ESDP–Russia co-operation actually lags behind NATO–Russia relations.     

Russian policies on central and eastern Europe: An overview

After the collapse of both the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance in 1990—91 Russia has lost highly effective instruments of (repressive) control of the East European countries and has been left without any significant influence on the economic, political and military developments in the region ever since. This can partly be explained by the deep distrust and emotional reserve vis‐à‐vis Russia on behalf of the new ruling elites in the region. A very important additional factor, however, has been the lack of a clear and coherent Russian strategy on the region in the early years of independent Russian statehood. After the initial loss of importance the region has regained prominence only indirectly as a crucial variable in Russian relations with Western countries and institutions such as NATO, the WEU, and the EU. Though deeper economic and trade relations between Russia and the region seem mutually advantageous, a major rapprochement seems to be blocked by political reservations and considerations.